Hunter crashes at shoreham airshow

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The fact that an aircraft has swept wings is irrelevant and I think that people think that the swept wings carry some ejection seat mandate.

Well, they do under CAA regulations which refer specifically to swept wing ex-military aircraft. A permit to fly will not normally be issued for an aircraft with swept wings, fitted with and ejection system which is inoperative.

seats_zpsxeo4x67f.gif


Once again, if the operators or other experts think that they can argue a case for a change in this requirement they need to do so with the CAA. If not then these types of aircraft may well find themselves grounded.
None of this is new and none of it is a result of the accident involving the Hunter at Shoreham. Until now, and the announcement that Martin Baker are no longer going to support these older seats, there has never been a problem with these regulations.

It's worth noting that had the South African Lightning's ejection system worked when required (the pilot did attempt to eject) he may very well have survived.

Cheers

Steve
 
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Well, they do under CAA regulations which refer specifically to swept wing ex-military aircraft. A permit to fly will not normally be issued for an aircraft with swept wings, fitted with and ejection system which is inoperative.

And again to my original point - the folks in the CAA who wrote that really don't know what they are talking about, but the same ignorance could be found in many civil aviation authorities.

seats_zpsxeo4x67f.gif



Once again, if the operators or other experts think that they can argue a case for a change in this requirement they need to do so with the CAA. If not then these types of aircraft may well find themselves grounded.
None of this is new and none of it is a result of the accident involving the Hunter at Shoreham. Until now, and the announcement that Martin Baker are no longer going to support these older seats, there has never been a problem with these regulations.
Here in the US we have an organization called the Classic Jet Aircraft Association (CJAA) that does just that. Many operators don't mind compliance, but what's frustrating is dealing with an errored regulation or a civil servant that does not understand the system they are supposed to be regulating
It's worth noting that had the South African Lightning's ejection system worked when required (the pilot did attempt to eject) he may very well have survived.

Cheers

Steve

Ejection seats don't always mean you're going to live, especially when operated by civilians. The last time I looked at civilian jet warbird ejection seat survival, the numbers weren't that favorable for a number of reasons. I could tell you in aircraft like a Fouga, T-33 or an L29, unless you shed a wing, you're probably better off staying with the aircraft and completing a forced landing. At the same time many of these types of trainers are easy to egress from with out making one's self a human rocket.
 
And it would be for military operators with fit, trained pilots in highly maintained aircraft and egress systems.

The belly of the Lightning was basically a 2,000lb fuel tank. The handbook doesn't mention a wheels up landing as an option.

A forced or crash landing is only an option when control of the aircraft is maintained, otherwise it is going to be abandoned in the air or the pilot dies (as in the case of ZU-BEX). He might die or be injured in an ejection but he will almost certainly die in an uncontrolled collision with terrain. It's a matter of odds.

Why the CAA considers ejection the safest way of abandoning a swept wing ex-military aircraft I don't know. I don't make the rules.

Cheers

Steve
 
All cases are different, but the CAA seems to consider that the ejection system, as fitted in the original design of a swept wing aircraft, is the only safe way of abandoning such an aircraft in flight. If it can be shown that the aircraft can safely be abandoned by other means then the CAA would be obliged to examine such evidence.

The fact that other authorities are prepared to allow such aircraft types to fly with non operational safety systems would be (and should be) irrelevant to the UK CAA.

And this is the problem I've had with dealing with the CAAUK. They have a set of rules, and won't vary from it. With the ejection seat issue, the only risk is to the pilot, someone who can make an informed decision as to whether they are willing to fly the aircraft or not. The ejection seat, or lack thereof does not alter the risk to the general public.
 
If you did you'd probably have a better insight than some of those making the rules! ;)
The problem is, they have university graduates working for them who have no aviation experience - mostly they are life-long public 'servants'.

Wo once had a warbird aircraft denied a UK Permit to Fly because they deemed it to be a new aircraft because they estimated more than 51% of it had been replaced.
 
The problem is, they have university graduates working for them who have no aviation experience - mostly they are life-long public 'servants'.

On the board alone.

Mark Swan.
Appointed to the Board as Group Director Airspace Policy in March 2008, Mark previously held numerous appointments in the Royal Air Force since joining as a pilot in 1979, and he was formerly Director of Operational Capability for the Ministry of Defence from 2006 to 2008. In July 2013 he was charged with merging the Airspace and Safety groups and re-structuring the combined group to focus on performance-based regulation. He is currently Director Safety and Airspace Regulation.

David King.
Appointed to the Board as a Non-Executive Member of the Board on 1 September 2013. David serves as a member of the Audit Committee and Nomination Committee. David also serves as Chairman of the Board Safety Review Committee for Cathay Pacific Airways and is a visiting Professor at Cranfield University. He was formerly the Chief Inspector of the UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) where he was responsible for hundreds of investigations, many involving large public transport aircraft.

Richard Knighton.
AVM Knighton was appointed as a Non-Executive Member of the Board in January 2015. As Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, AVM Knighton is a member of the Air Force Board and is the policy and strategy lead for the Royal Air Force within the MOD. His breadth of responsibility includes the development of policy for the UK Military Low Flying System, the development of MOD policy for the continued use of Joint and Integrated UK Airspace and also the Release to Service Authority for dealing with specific aspects of airworthiness for UK Military aircraft.

Peter Drissell.
Peter was appointed by the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) as its first Director of Aviation Security in 2013 and led the transition of operational aviation security functions from the Department for Transport (DfT) to the CAA on 1st April 2014. In February 2015, he took on the additional role of Director CAA Transformation Programme. Prior to his appointment, Peter was Director of Security & Business Continuity for the Home Office. He was also the Home Office HR Diversity Champion. Prior to this, Peter had served for 32 years in the Royal Air Force from which he retired as an Air Commodore in April 2007. In his military career, Peter served in a number of operational and staff appointments within the UK and overseas. After a year serving as Provost Marshal for the RAF, his last appointment combined the roles of Commandant General of the Royal Air Force Regiment and Air Officer RAF Police. Until 2014, Peter was a Director of Plan UK, an international children's charity, a position he had held for some 10 years, and until 2014 had been a trustee of the City and Guilds; he remains on the governing council of that organisation.

All information in the public domain.

Cheers

Steve
 
That's the Board - when I dealt with a fresh uni graduate whose only recourse was to quote the rules, and whose manager could only quote the same, there was an obvious lack of fresh insight and willingness to solve problems.
Contrast that with CAANZ's reaction, which was to immediately put the aircraft back on the NZ register, and they had a CAA rep in the UK at the time on another job who had a look at the aircraft to ensure that nothing had changed, and it was flying within a week on the NZ register. So how did the CAAUK's position change safety for anyone?

Three out of four of those on the board are ex-RAF, and don't look to have any commercial experience at all - doesn't bode well for 'out-of-the-box' thinking, which is what it takes to surmount issues like this.
 
Three out of four of those on the board are ex-RAF, and don't look to have any commercial experience at all - doesn't bode well for 'out-of-the-box' thinking, which is what it takes to surmount issues like this.

Ex RAF is better than ex-RAAF (Real Amateur Air Force)

About 30 years ago I had an ex-RAAF CASA (Australia has to be different and have CASA not CAA) operations idjit tell me that only RAAF aircrew should be allowed to fly the Wirraway and Hudson.

My answer, "that lot are trained to abandon the aircraft the instant it has a problem, but the airline pilots that fly those aircraft are trained to get both the aircraft and its passengers on to the ground safely" was not appreciated.

Later when going through the very painful process to get the first MiG on the Aus register the ex-RAAF noddy in charge of ops said he would never allow any MiG on the register because of its high approach speed. I pointed out that the American flight manual for the type gave an approach speed lower than a Piper Comanche 400 so he would have to deregister them and an number of other aircraft. He said that was bull but Australia's top warbird pilot of the day (Jack Mac) said the manual was right. He then did the usual "only RAAF pilots" crap and Jack shot him down.

He then tried the how are you going to keep the ejection seat serviceable line. Jacks answer was that the bang seat MUST be made inert otherwise it encourages cowboys to push aircraft to the limit at airshows and then, when it bites, the cowboy will punch out leaving the aircraft to crash into the crowd. End of that discussion.

(After the meeting a retired Polish Air Force ground crew member who was translating and advising said at least 50% of all MiG 15/17 ejections resulted in the pilots loosing both arms as they ejected because they forgot the correct ejection sequence. He had previously pointed to repairs on one of the aircraft in the hangar that showed it had been successfully belly landed.)

The RAAF/CASA idjit then claimed that the engine was dangerous and prone to blowing up in flight. My answer was that engine had a 2000 TBO in the USA with at least two operators (in Chino and Reno). His answer was the Yanks have much lower standards than Australia. I pointed to the row of Cessna 412 ambulance aircraft sitting outside and said the Americans require those engines to be overhauled at 1400 hours and Australia lets them run to 2800. He had no answer to that but continued to obstruct at every turn for months.

Eventually we beat him when the owner got a far more senior CASA ops person from another state as test pilot. On the test flight that pilot insisted on a discrete radio channel and open mike, just in case. His first words after calling rotation was "1.6 miles DME hands off". His grin on the ground after the flight made a Cheshire cat look positively gloomy
 
Ex RAF is better than ex-RAAF (Real Amateur Air Force)

About 30 years ago I had an ex-RAAF CASA (Australia has to be different and have CASA not CAA) operations idjit tell me that only RAAF aircrew should be allowed to fly the Wirraway and Hudson.

My answer, "that lot are trained to abandon the aircraft the instant it has a problem, but the airline pilots that fly those aircraft are trained to get both the aircraft and its passengers on to the ground safely" was not appreciated.

Later when going through the very painful process to get the first MiG on the Aus register the ex-RAAF noddy in charge of ops said he would never allow any MiG on the register because of its high approach speed. I pointed out that the American flight manual for the type gave an approach speed lower than a Piper Comanche 400 so he would have to deregister them and an number of other aircraft. He said that was bull but Australia's top warbird pilot of the day (Jack Mac) said the manual was right. He then did the usual "only RAAF pilots" crap and Jack shot him down.

He then tried the how are you going to keep the ejection seat serviceable line. Jacks answer was that the bang seat MUST be made inert otherwise it encourages cowboys to push aircraft to the limit at airshows and then, when it bites, the cowboy will punch out leaving the aircraft to crash into the crowd. End of that discussion.

(After the meeting a retired Polish Air Force ground crew member who was translating and advising said at least 50% of all MiG 15/17 ejections resulted in the pilots loosing both arms as they ejected because they forgot the correct ejection sequence. He had previously pointed to repairs on one of the aircraft in the hangar that showed it had been successfully belly landed.)

The RAAF/CASA idjit then claimed that the engine was dangerous and prone to blowing up in flight. My answer was that engine had a 2000 TBO in the USA with at least two operators (in Chino and Reno). His answer was the Yanks have much lower standards than Australia. I pointed to the row of Cessna 412 ambulance aircraft sitting outside and said the Americans require those engines to be overhauled at 1400 hours and Australia lets them run to 2800. He had no answer to that but continued to obstruct at every turn for months.

Eventually we beat him when the owner got a far more senior CASA ops person from another state as test pilot. On the test flight that pilot insisted on a discrete radio channel and open mike, just in case. His first words after calling rotation was "1.6 miles DME hands off". His grin on the ground after the flight made a Cheshire cat look positively gloomy


In my experience, CASA is a close second to CAAUK!

Tok Pidgin?
 
I have read the entire report and in some detail.
I am not qualified to comment on the multitude of data and conclusions drawn, affecting just about everyone involved in the Shoreham display. But the reason that the Hunter crashed onto the road is best described in point #23 of the conclusions.

"23. The pilot stated that he would abandon a 'bent loop' manoeuvre if the minimum entry speed, or the minimum gate height at the apex, were not achieved. He did not abandon the accident manoeuvre when these minimums were not achieved."

Illustration of the 'bent loop' accident manoeuvre on page 10.

Why bad decisions were made at those 'safety gates' and why the parameters for a safe manoeuvre were not met is the subject of hundreds of pages and much debate. For those who can't be arsed to plough through the entire report, pages 196 through 204 summarise the conclusions.

Cheers

Steve
 
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That's the end of any criminal proceedings. Manslaughter in English law quite rightly sets a very high bar for the prosecution and the jury obviously did not feel it was met. I still think Hill has been a bit fortunate, but what I think doesn't matter.

There are still some options open to the families of those killed, we'll see what happens.

Cheers

Steve
 

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