Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
Sorry for the confusion. Sometimes ships wound up with similar (outwardly) characteristics for different reasons.Your classification into different types of carrier makes it sound like each nation had some pre-ordained plan to achieve that end.
They certainly were not a "class". But they were both smaller, cheaper carriers built to budget/tonnage restrictions. And they sacrificed similar things. Like protection and speed although not in same amounts. The Wasp, being about 5 years newer could take advantages of some advantages in marine propulsion/machinery and other things.Edit:- Ranger and Wasp can't, IMHO be classified as a "type". Their origins and the drivers for their designs were totally different.
Right, but the working space has to be wider to accommodate the blocks.
You got the timestamp correct:Hiya D don4331 , further to our conversation about Krupp's sliding breech-blocks, Drachinifel's Drydock episode released today has a segment addressing these knock-on effects further. I hope I got the timestamp right to take you directly to the question and his answer:
View: https://youtu.be/sG0DZ--K3eo?t=3586
I think the Germans used a two part system. Two powder charges. The base charge (rear charge) was in the cartridge case and depending on type of powder was 111.5kg in a 900mm long cartridge case that weighed 70kg ( lot of brass). The Fore charge was 99.5kg and was contained in a silk bag. Both the fore charge and rear charge (cartridge case) were rammed together.And I understand that the sliding breech mechanism, requires the cartridge (for gas check).
But does it require the full cartridge as historically used? Or could it have been a 'wafer' which wouldn't have needed the elaborate ejection ports
In fact it might have been possible to acquire Brewster fighters just before Norwegian Campaign. Fortunately for the Finns the UK governement didn't make a try.Hi
The British Air Commission that arrived in the USA at the end of May 1938 was looking for various aircraft to fulfil requirements which included a FAA fighter. The only aircraft that the USA was able/willing to sell were the; Vought SB2U Vindicator, Curtiss SBC Helldiver and a Grumman two-seat fighter (and probably the F3F). None of these was what was needed, indeed because of this the order for Fulmars was increased from 127 to 250 machines (source; page 11, 'Air Arsenal North America' by Butler and Hagedorn).
The first Buffalo production machine was rolled out in June 1939, while the first production Wildcat was ready to fly in February 1940, both too late for use off Norway in early 1940.
The first Buffalos that arrived in the UK was in August 1940, this was a Belgian order of 32 aircraft that arrived too late for that country. In August 1940 six Martlets (Wildcat), non-folding, turned up, by October 1940 the total was 44. The Fulmar entered first line service with the FAA June 1940.
Wildcats and Buffalos did not exist to "save the day" in this scenario.
Mike
In 1938 USN placed an order for 54 F2A-1 with Brewster. These began to be delivered from mid-1939 with 11 entering service before the end of the year, 9 or 10 with VF-3 on Saratoga.In fact it might have been possible to acquire Brewster fighters just before Norwegian Campaign. Fortunately for the Finns the UK governement didn't make a try.
The FiAF B-239 timetable
The first shipment of 11 a/c left NY for Bergen Norway on 13 Jan 40, the crossing took 2 weeks, the rest were shipped in 3 lots of which the last one arrived to Bergen on 13 March 40 [they departed from NYC on 20 Jan, 7 Feb and 19 Feb 40 [source: Kari Stenman and Andrew Thomas Brewster F2A Buffalo Aces of WW 2 Osprey Aces 91 (2010)]. In the contract Brewster had promised faster delivery and it was later forced to pay compensation to Finland for the delay. The planes were assembled in Sweden and the first 4 were flown to Finland on 1 March 40, before end of the Winter War (13 Mar 40) 2 more were flown to Finland. 3 of the first 4 were flown to Pyhäniemi in Hollola on 5 March 40. Pyhäniemi was an ad hoc depot base utilising a frozen lake as the landing area but FiAF began to flow also combat sorties from there, first 2 B-239 combat sorties were flown from there on 7 Mar 40, no contact.. One more combat sortie was flown on 11 March, again without contact to Soviet planes. Not surprisingly, after all the plane was a product of Brewster, there were some critical defects, the anchorages of aileron linkage rods were too weak, there were leakages from integral fuel tanks etc. The defects had been fixed well before the start of the Continuation War in late June 1941.
The British always stored their charges in metal canisters. The problem was that the battle cruiser gun crews were not following procedures and were removing the charges from the canisters prematurely in order to maximize rate of fire. After Dogger Bank the BC force learned the wrong lesson and decided that firing as quickly as possible was paramount.I think the Germans used a two part system. Two powder charges. The base charge (rear charge) was in the cartridge case and depending on type of powder was 111.5kg in a 900mm long cartridge case that weighed 70kg ( lot of brass). The Fore charge was 99.5kg and was contained in a silk bag. Both the fore charge and rear charge (cartridge case) were rammed together.
The Germans also thought the cartridge case offered some sort of protection from propellent fires. I don't know if it did or if was just wishful thinking. It is supposed to have slowed the flame travel, a bit more time for the flooding to take effect?
The British after Jutland had gone to storing their charges in metal cannisters and only taking them out of the cannisters at some point in the travel from magazine to gun (might depend on exact gun and mount?) KGV class used 4 powder bags and stored two bags per case/cannister.
Supply ship armed with 14" guns. I cannot think of a greater waste of resources. The hybrid carriers were the answer to a question that should never have been asked.Ise and Hyuga were useful supply ships. They contributed so little in combat value that it's fair to say their conversions were throwing good money after bad.
As for autogyros, didn't the Japanese have one hell of a time trying to train conventional pilots? How much more complex might it be to train rotary pilots? Even in 1943 their flight schools were struggling to keep up with fixed-wing demand.
The "good radar" thing might be a problem too in that timeframe.
What is that question?The hybrid carriers were the answer to a question that should never have been asked.
What is that question?
Seems legit."Should we take up two drydocks and spend millions of yen doing partial conversions which cannot perform either role well?"
But if you wanted to get a convoy through the largest naval cordon in history, apparently these were the best ships ever.Supply ship armed with 14" guns. I cannot think of a greater waste of resources. The hybrid carriers were the answer to a question that should never have been asked.
What happens when a battleship and a carrier fall in love?What is that question?
"Should we take up two drydocks and spend millions of yen doing partial conversions which cannot perform either role well?"
IIRC, those big 14" guns were half removed after its conversion to a hybrid carrier-battleship.
The other big guns on it were dual-purpose cannon and its AA armament exceeded any other carrier that I'm aware of.
The question, IMO, should be whether carriers should have had more anti-aircraft firepower and better radar added.
Thanks for the reply. You are right that the later Essex class definitely had more effective AA by any measure, although in sheer weight it would have had fewer tonnage in guns than the Ise and Hyuga because the Type 89 guns were DP. Also, the 14" guns were also technically DP. But you're right, not quite half removed. 1/3rd removed.They were built with 12x14" guns. The conversions saw the after four guns removed, leaving 8 main-battery weapons.
I'm trying to communicate that the hybrids survived because they had a lot of AA. IIRC, Shokaku and Zuikaku (purpose built carriers) did have a lot of AA like you predicted. Yet their AA wasn't able to drive off dive bombers targeting Zuikaku. As impractical as hybrids design was, credit where credit is due. Somehow Ise and Hyuga's ineffective guns did drive off a f-ton of aerial bombs and torpedoes. Doesn't that count for something? It's frankly weird that no one is willing to recognize this.I don't think that's the case. The Ise class had 6" secondaries that were not capable of AA. As for tertiary AA, the 25-mm cannons were poorly-suited, having slow rate-of-fire and generally manually-trained.
HMS Ark Royal, on the other hand, had 16x4.5" truly DP cannons mounted in eight twin turrets, and I can't tell you the number of 40-mm pom-poms but they were far better than the 25-mm Japanese cannons.
The Essex class had 12x5" true DP weapons, eight mounted in twin turrets and four open-mount singletons and were festooned with 20- and 40-mm cannon for close-in work, both superior to the slow and unguided 25-mm Japanese weapons.
In the context of the conversation, I wasn't saying hybrids were good. But rather they had good AA (for a Japanese ship). And the lesson that should have been learned is why they survived overwhelming air attacks, unlike all the other carriers in the Japanese fleet which mostly had glass jaws, except for Shokaku and Zuikaku.Most other purpose-built carriers did have those improvements.
At Leyte Gulf, Ise & Hyuga were part of Ozawa's Northern Force coming down from Japan itself. It comprised:-However, it was useless as a battleship and its commander and captains knew it. During the Battle of Leyte Gulf, these ships were deployed in a ship-to-ship engagement, supposedly to hunt down damaged capital ships. The Ise and Hyuga's commander wisely chose to not engage the Americans, knowingly full well that they lacked the firepower, speed, or really anything, to be anything more than a support unit.
Somehow Ise and Hyuga's ineffective guns did drive off a f-ton of aerial bombs and torpedoes. Doesn't that count for something? It's frankly weird that no one is willing to recognize this.
This event took place a day before Leyte officially began on October 24. But Japanese Wikipedia refers to it as the Battle of the Philippines (see the translation below).Neither Ise nor Hyuga came anywhere near 14in gunfire range of US warships.
However, from the commander's Wikipedia page (the translation is not 100% accurate):As the vanguard unit of Ozawa's main force, the Matsuda Branch was formed, and on October 24, it went south to attempt a gun battle with the American fleet, but was not blessed with an opportunity to meet the enemy, and rejoined the main force at 7 a.m. on the 25th[26].
"In the Battle of the Philippines, I was aboard the "Hyuga" and led the "Ise" in a sortie, but on the 24th, Kurita's fleet was sent to the Sibuyan Sea. I struggled with it and retreated to the west of Ichiji, which has a lot to do with the Ozawa Task Force. Before Mr. Kurita could evacuate, the Philippine base air force had destroyed the enemy ships, and since there were three wounded enemy battleships left ahead of us, the order was given that the "Ise" and "Hyuga" should pursue the remaining enemy and destroy them with their cannons. So I went south with four destroyers, as a vanguard unit, away from the main force of the carrier force, including the Zuikaku. I thought it was a good opportunity, even though it was risking my life. Kurita's fleet also appears. If "Ise" and "Hyuga" were to leave from the north, the U.S. task force would be pinned down from the north and south, and the probability of success would become even stronger. So as I went further and further south, I saw a lot of light flashing on the horizon. I thought this was a night attack by friendly forces. However, if we continued to rush forward, it was the middle of the night, and there was a possibility that we would fight each other with friendly aircraft, so I decided to wait for dawn, so I changed course from south to east. However, Mr. Kurita sent a telegram of reversal while we were preparing for an assault. So Secretary Ozawa said that there was no point in advancing only with Matsuda's unit when Kurita's unit had reversed, so he ordered my unit to turn around and join the main unit. So I gave up and headed north. Soon, however, Kurita's fleet would have re-turned and resumed its advance in the Sibuyan Sea. The Ozawa unit did not receive this telegram of reversal. If I had received it, it would have been a different story. After the battle was over, Secretary Ozawa said that he did not know that Kurita's forces had turned around again and were charging towards Leyte Gulf.
I will quickly try to list some of the attacks on Ise from English and Japanese Wikipedia before it was perma-moored:Can you quantify this? It's my understanding that the vast vast majority of American attacks were aimed at the true flattops.