syscom3
Pacific Historian
What about Russian airpower reinforcements? Is China making rumblings out east, making it impossible for Russia to move assets from there?
Hypothetical - NATO vs WP 1970s
- Thread starter parsifal
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- #22
parsifal
Colonel
The particular scenario allows for considerable WP movement on their side of the border, and for a lesser degree of freedom of manouvre for the NATO formations. Austrian, Italian, Belgian and French formations cannot at all, and there are only very limited options for the Dutch and Danish forces. British recon artillery and three armoured brigades can move and did so to present a consolidated front in northern Germany (British forces are dark green with black letterring). The Germans can also move their HQ assets and the combat elements of three divs. They moved 2PG div in the Fulda area, as well as two divs around the Hamburg area. The US is permitted to move its HQ elements, recon formations and one of its two armoured divs. 11 Cav retreated from Fulda to lihnk up with 3rd armoured to positions in front of Frankfurt, and the main US bases at Darmstadt and Ramstein.
The WP has concentrated into six main assault groups.
Group 1 is tasked with the capture of Hamburg and Denmark, and includes seaborne marines not shown in the photos. The airborne components to this attack have been grounded due to the loss of air superiority in this region.
Group 2 is tasked with a drive to the Ruhr via Hanover, or possibly further to the south depending on NATO resistance. It would be preferable for this group of forces to be able to link up with Group 1 formations if possible.
Group 3 is a smaller force, tasked with a crossing of the Elbe near to Fulda, and then to take up defensive positions to maintain a potential threat to Frankfurt, and to prevent US led counterattacks designed to threaten the flanks of the groups operating further to the north. . It will be reinforced after the fall of Berlin (group 7).
Group 4 is a larger formation tasked with the capture of Nurenberg and Munich, and the destruction of US 1st Armoured Div. 1st Armoured will be supported initially by 2.5 WG mech formations, but can be reinforced by up to 5 italian Divs and about 4 French Divs, if and when these national armies get moving
Group 5 are the currently immmobilized formations in Czech territotry. They are busy putting down a coup at the moment but will cross into lower germany from GT-2.
Group 6 is a large contingent tasked woth the destruction of Austria and then a push into southern Germany, to link up with the survivors of group 4 and 5, and try and outlflank the defences around Frankfurt
Group 7 are the formations tasked with the defeat of the Berlin garrison. Once this has been achieved this formation will form a ready reserve to reinforce where needed.
The WP has concentrated into six main assault groups.
Group 1 is tasked with the capture of Hamburg and Denmark, and includes seaborne marines not shown in the photos. The airborne components to this attack have been grounded due to the loss of air superiority in this region.
Group 2 is tasked with a drive to the Ruhr via Hanover, or possibly further to the south depending on NATO resistance. It would be preferable for this group of forces to be able to link up with Group 1 formations if possible.
Group 3 is a smaller force, tasked with a crossing of the Elbe near to Fulda, and then to take up defensive positions to maintain a potential threat to Frankfurt, and to prevent US led counterattacks designed to threaten the flanks of the groups operating further to the north. . It will be reinforced after the fall of Berlin (group 7).
Group 4 is a larger formation tasked with the capture of Nurenberg and Munich, and the destruction of US 1st Armoured Div. 1st Armoured will be supported initially by 2.5 WG mech formations, but can be reinforced by up to 5 italian Divs and about 4 French Divs, if and when these national armies get moving
Group 5 are the currently immmobilized formations in Czech territotry. They are busy putting down a coup at the moment but will cross into lower germany from GT-2.
Group 6 is a large contingent tasked woth the destruction of Austria and then a push into southern Germany, to link up with the survivors of group 4 and 5, and try and outlflank the defences around Frankfurt
Group 7 are the formations tasked with the defeat of the Berlin garrison. Once this has been achieved this formation will form a ready reserve to reinforce where needed.
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- #23
parsifal
Colonel
"Parsifal, thanks for the update. I was amazed to see the WP got Air Sup over Nothern Germany. The Italian end of the world is less of a suprise but also less of a worry. More on that later.
The numbers you quoted for losses seem to indicate that the WP lost about 400 aircraft to the Nato 160. Of the Nato bunch, 80 will be returned to active service within the next period or two. Given that, and seeing as how the F15/F4 USAF replacements are on the way from the US, I'm questioning the wisedom of going after those SAM sites with so much of your airmoble components. Maybe a wiser move would be to supress the SAMs with a lessor force of combined Air/Air mobile while going after the crossing and bridging sites in the NG Plain in preparation for your coming ground assalts. You don't really need to destroy the SAM sites a much as suppress them for now. Deal with them using ground forces in a week or so."
The allies needed to cover all the sectors whereas the WP could tend to concentrate their forces in more critical sectors. The WP also has regional limits for some of their members, which expalins the efforts made in the far south.
SAMs represent an ongoing source of attrition that needs to be dealt with in order to string out the effectiveness of of the WP airforces. If ther is a lull of bad weather, the WP will have a breathing space in which to repair its damaged aircraft, so its important to keep the pressure up. Finally dont forget that the WP have the very real capability of overrunning NATO airfields, which may reduce the return rate and force available rates. It aint over just yet, despite the drubbing the WP air forces are receiving. And the WP has access to vast reserves as the interior air forces are released and made ready for operations
" Also, with the given exchange rate with Nato and the fact that they are losing second line aircraft more than primary while you are losing primary, at what point does your air offensive collapse due to losses? Assuming your losses will increase with the USAF reinforcements. My thought would be, if you're going to use your airmobile assets, you'll have to do it fast. In a week, they may not survive without air cover (that will be driven down to the level of losses that their appearence is sporatic)."
Agreed, they are a wasting asset as airmobile formations, but they still are useful as regular infantry particulalry in the urban areas around the Ruhr and such.
" Lastly, just my thought on this, I'd forget about Italy. Airmoble and air action over there is probably easier, but it is a distraction from real fight going on up in Germany. If you sieze territory on the far side of the Alps, you set yourself up for getting cut off due to a Airmoble assault on the passes supported by air and an armored counterattack. Toss in an arial blockade of the mountain passes/valleys of Austria and anything you throw over the Alps is as good as lost. If Nato High Command throws anything serious in your way down there, they are making a mistake. Northern Italy is a side show"
The battle does not hinge on italy....yet, but the key to southern Germany is in getting suffiicient resources so as to releve the Americans, so that they can rest, and then counterattack. The Americans represent the best offensive elements in the NATO arsenal, with powerful artillery and combat element, as wellas, of course their airstrike capabilities
The numbers you quoted for losses seem to indicate that the WP lost about 400 aircraft to the Nato 160. Of the Nato bunch, 80 will be returned to active service within the next period or two. Given that, and seeing as how the F15/F4 USAF replacements are on the way from the US, I'm questioning the wisedom of going after those SAM sites with so much of your airmoble components. Maybe a wiser move would be to supress the SAMs with a lessor force of combined Air/Air mobile while going after the crossing and bridging sites in the NG Plain in preparation for your coming ground assalts. You don't really need to destroy the SAM sites a much as suppress them for now. Deal with them using ground forces in a week or so."
The allies needed to cover all the sectors whereas the WP could tend to concentrate their forces in more critical sectors. The WP also has regional limits for some of their members, which expalins the efforts made in the far south.
SAMs represent an ongoing source of attrition that needs to be dealt with in order to string out the effectiveness of of the WP airforces. If ther is a lull of bad weather, the WP will have a breathing space in which to repair its damaged aircraft, so its important to keep the pressure up. Finally dont forget that the WP have the very real capability of overrunning NATO airfields, which may reduce the return rate and force available rates. It aint over just yet, despite the drubbing the WP air forces are receiving. And the WP has access to vast reserves as the interior air forces are released and made ready for operations
" Also, with the given exchange rate with Nato and the fact that they are losing second line aircraft more than primary while you are losing primary, at what point does your air offensive collapse due to losses? Assuming your losses will increase with the USAF reinforcements. My thought would be, if you're going to use your airmobile assets, you'll have to do it fast. In a week, they may not survive without air cover (that will be driven down to the level of losses that their appearence is sporatic)."
Agreed, they are a wasting asset as airmobile formations, but they still are useful as regular infantry particulalry in the urban areas around the Ruhr and such.
" Lastly, just my thought on this, I'd forget about Italy. Airmoble and air action over there is probably easier, but it is a distraction from real fight going on up in Germany. If you sieze territory on the far side of the Alps, you set yourself up for getting cut off due to a Airmoble assault on the passes supported by air and an armored counterattack. Toss in an arial blockade of the mountain passes/valleys of Austria and anything you throw over the Alps is as good as lost. If Nato High Command throws anything serious in your way down there, they are making a mistake. Northern Italy is a side show"
The battle does not hinge on italy....yet, but the key to southern Germany is in getting suffiicient resources so as to releve the Americans, so that they can rest, and then counterattack. The Americans represent the best offensive elements in the NATO arsenal, with powerful artillery and combat element, as wellas, of course their airstrike capabilities
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- #24
parsifal
Colonel
Abstracted out of the equation by force non availability....the Russians have about 90 dive and roughly 3000 a/c not included in the battle for the very reason they have alot of other fronts to consider
Thanks for the update Parsifal. Looks good so far.
Won't give Berlin much time to survive. Looks like vacation time in Odessa from all the Soviet controlled forces that ring it. Still, the longer they hold, the better it is for Nato. A distraction, but one that has to be dealt with by the WP.
Does the game allow for attacks by SAC on targets in the SU via conventional bomber runs? Something to force the Soviets to keep forces back to cover air assaults from different directions. How about Carrier strikes up north or in the Far East? Just a thought to keep the Soviets on their toes.
Seems like Group 1 and 2 are the two the Soviets are putting their money on. Given the Air losses, Group 1 is going to have a rough time keeping the Nato birds off it's back when pushing for their objectives. Further, if the bridges are down and local forces make a fight of it, it could take a while to get to Hannover. Seems like Group 2 is the real key. They can swing north and cover the flank of Group 1 (in doing so expose themselves to the Americans farther south, pulling Group 3 in as a flank support) or they can swing south and hit the US forces (essentially ignoring the Nato forces in the North and reducing Group 1 to the same position of Group 3 in a flanking attack to the north by Group 2). It seems the fight is really coming down to which way Group 2 is going to move, how well the US forces around Fulda are re-equiped and rested, and who is going to get control of the air. At least that seems to be the narrative as it stands now.
You made a note about French divisions coming into it. Are they committed on Nato's side or is this just a possibility?
Thanks for the update on the southern front. I see the option of letting the WP run riot is not an option. I guess a fighting retreat is the best option for the Nato forces in the south. I don't think there is much that can be done about Austria. It may be possible to hold part of it but the whole thing would really be a question of if the Italians want to fight north of the Alps or south of them. On the far side of the Alps, there are just too much in the way of WP stuff for the Austrians to hold for long. And they are coming from two directions, both of which looks stronger than the total Austrian forces. My thought would be the smartest move for Nato is a fighting retreat by Nato forces to the Passes over the Alps. Or even in front of the Alps. The ground around there is another spot like Fulda, but even worse. Oddly enough, I've driven through it and it's all uphill on winding roads. Take the Main Highway out and it's nothing but problems for an attacker.
But such a move may not be politically feasable. The Austrians may demand a response from Nato.
Another thought, both Turkey and Greece are part of Nato as is Spain. Are any of their contingents active?
Won't give Berlin much time to survive. Looks like vacation time in Odessa from all the Soviet controlled forces that ring it. Still, the longer they hold, the better it is for Nato. A distraction, but one that has to be dealt with by the WP.
Does the game allow for attacks by SAC on targets in the SU via conventional bomber runs? Something to force the Soviets to keep forces back to cover air assaults from different directions. How about Carrier strikes up north or in the Far East? Just a thought to keep the Soviets on their toes.
Seems like Group 1 and 2 are the two the Soviets are putting their money on. Given the Air losses, Group 1 is going to have a rough time keeping the Nato birds off it's back when pushing for their objectives. Further, if the bridges are down and local forces make a fight of it, it could take a while to get to Hannover. Seems like Group 2 is the real key. They can swing north and cover the flank of Group 1 (in doing so expose themselves to the Americans farther south, pulling Group 3 in as a flank support) or they can swing south and hit the US forces (essentially ignoring the Nato forces in the North and reducing Group 1 to the same position of Group 3 in a flanking attack to the north by Group 2). It seems the fight is really coming down to which way Group 2 is going to move, how well the US forces around Fulda are re-equiped and rested, and who is going to get control of the air. At least that seems to be the narrative as it stands now.
You made a note about French divisions coming into it. Are they committed on Nato's side or is this just a possibility?
Thanks for the update on the southern front. I see the option of letting the WP run riot is not an option. I guess a fighting retreat is the best option for the Nato forces in the south. I don't think there is much that can be done about Austria. It may be possible to hold part of it but the whole thing would really be a question of if the Italians want to fight north of the Alps or south of them. On the far side of the Alps, there are just too much in the way of WP stuff for the Austrians to hold for long. And they are coming from two directions, both of which looks stronger than the total Austrian forces. My thought would be the smartest move for Nato is a fighting retreat by Nato forces to the Passes over the Alps. Or even in front of the Alps. The ground around there is another spot like Fulda, but even worse. Oddly enough, I've driven through it and it's all uphill on winding roads. Take the Main Highway out and it's nothing but problems for an attacker.
But such a move may not be politically feasable. The Austrians may demand a response from Nato.
Another thought, both Turkey and Greece are part of Nato as is Spain. Are any of their contingents active?
Parsifal, one thing that's been bothering me is Austria. It seems that the Austrians are in the bag. They are essentially flanked on two sides by WP forces. If they decide to defend Wein, they end up in the middle of a pincer movement. While it might be politically needed to hold Wien, in military terms, it would probably be better to move the Govt to Innsbruck or something and fall back to the Passes over the alps with the Italians in support. That way, they are not cut off from their lines of communication to the Nato forces. But if the WP in place attack directly towards Wein, essentially dong a diversion attack along an expected axis, with a secondary attack as a deep thrust to cut the Austrians off from the Italians in a pincer coming together west of Wein, they Austria falls and they are out of the war. Itally has to fall back as far as the passes and holds there, probably with support from USMC or other Nato Forces (strikes from the 6th Fleet in the Agean would be a definite). Wien is something of a trap for the Austrians.
If the Hungarians and Checz WP forces attack, they are on the horns of a dilema as well. Go for the retreating Austrian forces, and you expose yourself to a drive from Munich. Go for Munich, and the Austiran/Italians hit you in the flank. And with the Austrians back at the passes, they can counter attack with Nato assists and drive the WP back.
Down there, thinks can get interesting and hairy all at the same time.
If the Hungarians and Checz WP forces attack, they are on the horns of a dilema as well. Go for the retreating Austrian forces, and you expose yourself to a drive from Munich. Go for Munich, and the Austiran/Italians hit you in the flank. And with the Austrians back at the passes, they can counter attack with Nato assists and drive the WP back.
Down there, thinks can get interesting and hairy all at the same time.
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- #27
parsifal
Colonel
These are all excellent points, and I am not so blinded as to say the game will answer all of them. Games are only as good as the assumptions that underpin them, but usually they can tell us something about a given military situation.
We hope to get an hour or two of playing time in soon. My apologies for the delay, but family issues do take precedence I am sad to report. We intend to complete the operations of one Group at the time, and then its the NAT players who get to move. They wont be attacking to start with.
I think Berlin will fall quickly, but then it must......it acts as a major choke point for the WP as most of their rail links pass close by the city. The forces tied down containing the Berlin garrison are needed elsewhere, and fast.
Austria does not surrender as such. The game postulates that they will continue to fight after the fall of Vienna (though there is a chance for surrender. But yes, the majority of the Austrian army is caught in a pincer attack, about to be unleashed, made even worse by the Hungarians moving around their flank close to the Yugoslav border.
There are no Spanish forces, as I dont think they were part of the alliance at that time (or were they?) We wont know what the French will do until halfway through GT-1. If they do live up to their treaty obligations well and good. in fact there are several NATO unreliability issues to address, and none of these will be known until just after the first ground combats occur. Will let you know of the outcomes of these random events as they occur.
Having playewd NATO several times before, the usual run of events is to try and stabilise the north German sector, and after an initial period of setbacks in the south, to use the Americans to counterattack there, whilst their flanks are guarded by the French, remnants of the Germans and the italians. Will have to see how things pan out however.
We hope to get an hour or two of playing time in soon. My apologies for the delay, but family issues do take precedence I am sad to report. We intend to complete the operations of one Group at the time, and then its the NAT players who get to move. They wont be attacking to start with.
I think Berlin will fall quickly, but then it must......it acts as a major choke point for the WP as most of their rail links pass close by the city. The forces tied down containing the Berlin garrison are needed elsewhere, and fast.
Austria does not surrender as such. The game postulates that they will continue to fight after the fall of Vienna (though there is a chance for surrender. But yes, the majority of the Austrian army is caught in a pincer attack, about to be unleashed, made even worse by the Hungarians moving around their flank close to the Yugoslav border.
There are no Spanish forces, as I dont think they were part of the alliance at that time (or were they?) We wont know what the French will do until halfway through GT-1. If they do live up to their treaty obligations well and good. in fact there are several NATO unreliability issues to address, and none of these will be known until just after the first ground combats occur. Will let you know of the outcomes of these random events as they occur.
Having playewd NATO several times before, the usual run of events is to try and stabilise the north German sector, and after an initial period of setbacks in the south, to use the Americans to counterattack there, whilst their flanks are guarded by the French, remnants of the Germans and the italians. Will have to see how things pan out however.
Zniperguy114
Airman
Sorry what I have to say has almost no relation to the simulation, But I have always wondered why people think that the Soviets would attack from Eastern Europe. The most strategic place for the Russians to invade first would have to be the Middle East. This would be great for the year 1973 for the Soviets. Even though at this time Americans still used some American Crude Oil, Tensions in the Mid East had a huge impact on the US. If war did break out and the Reds took the Middle East, NATO would have very limited Fuel Sources. One of the biggest sources left would be in Alaska, which is only a short flight for Russian Paratroops. If that did happen, The USSR could cut through the world like a knife through hot butter. For that matter, even if NATO forces took the Mid East, the Soviets had Siberia, oil rich although relatively hard to get to.
Thanks for the reply Parsifal, I appreciate it. No worries, take your time. These post are appreciated but not a needed response. Family always comes first and you have a little fella to worry about. To paraphrase Woody Allen, "Start the Revolution (or in this case, the third world war) without me".
Do appreciate your letting us know what's up and how it's trending.
I see your perspective on being Nato in the past. It does seem that things will head that way again. Given political viability, military effectiveness and cohesion, the North Plain is the weak point for Nato. One thing I was thinking about was the possibility of Group 2 doing a feight towards Group 1, then swinging down and heading south to hit the Americans in the flank. Hey, if they Americans can do it to them, why not the other way around. Then, Group 3 would become a critical part of your campaign. They could attack into the American flank if the US Forces turn to meet Group 2. And with the Airmobile forces, Group 3 becomes a decent threat. Just a thought.
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Zniper guy, there was probably a scenario where such a thing happened. It does have the positive affect, from the Soviet point of view, of going after a strategic asset of the west. I do not have the figures but do not know how much of that oil was actually used by the US. I know it was a lot less than at present. Back in the 70s, the US used most of the oil it produced. The majority of the oil that came out of the middle east went to Europe and Japan. At least that is how I recall it.
But moving on. The Soviets would not need to control the oil fields to have that affect, only to deny access to them. The two are not really the same. To do that, they would have to effectively cut the sea lanes. To do that, they would have to invade at least one of the countries bordering the persian gulf. Most likely Iran. I don't think the US would stand still for it and I also don't think they would roll over the Iranians. They have a history of being very difficult to beat.
A Soviet land attack into the Middle East has all the potential of going very badly, very quickly. A couple of problems. Firstly, the oil reserves in the ME are huge and spread all over the place. It's going to take a lot of doing to interdict and control them. The people in that end of the world are not going to just sit there while it's happening, especially with the US as their sponsor. It would take just about every solider/asset in the SU as well as sizeable chunk of the WP. Secondly, the SU controlled a lot of Eastern Europe by fear and troops. Most of those troops would have to leave that area to fight in the ME. As such, local revolts (such as the Checz Spring of 1968 or Hungarian of 1956) would start popping up. Or at least a serious burst of local unrest. Think of what happened in 1989.
And that is not even considering the political dimension in the UN or other bodies. It would probably be the only time in history where you would see the Israelis and Arabs on the same side of a question. The SU actions would be interperted as an open agression. As such, the moral impetus would change. Think of Afghanistan on a larger scale.
In short, and this is just my opinion, the gains from going into the ME would, in no way, counter the problems that pop up from stripping forces from Europe and the problems of trying to control the ME. In sum, it's a loser proposition.
From a tactical point of view, with the Nato/Allies holding the sea lanes, they would be able to launch attacks anywhere they want, pretty much whenever they want. Not good for the SU. Lot of coastline to cover.
Lastly, this thing would not stay in the ME. It would spread. Such an attack would be the opening gambit in a World War. No way you can go after a strategic asset like that and not get everyone in a tizzy. For the SU, it means the majority of their assets are in the ME while the majority of Natos are in Western Europe.
As to the point about Alaska, if the balloon went up from an invasion of the ME by the SU, the final battles would be fought long before the Alaskan oil fields even got established. This is the kind of war that would be over in 30 days, one mushroom cloud way or another.
- Thread starter
- #31
parsifal
Colonel
Sorry what I have to say has almost no relation to the simulation, But I have always wondered why people think that the Soviets would attack from Eastern Europe. The most strategic place for the Russians to invade first would have to be the Middle East. This would be great for the year 1973 for the Soviets. Even though at this time Americans still used some American Crude Oil, Tensions in the Mid East had a huge impact on the US. If war did break out and the Reds took the Middle East, NATO would have very limited Fuel Sources. One of the biggest sources left would be in Alaska, which is only a short flight for Russian Paratroops. If that did happen, The USSR could cut through the world like a knife through hot butter. For that matter, even if NATO forces took the Mid East, the Soviets had Siberia, oil rich although relatively hard to get to.
What you are saying may make sense, and in game terms ther is no reason why this might not be hapening simultaneous to the invasion of western europe....
However, the kind of war you are envisaging is not the kind of war the Soviets planned for, or shaped their force structure for. Whilst in our eyes the Soviets represent the evil empire on world domination, they never planned to achieved that by an overt invasion of the whole planet. Soviet infiltration and control of the third world was always by supporting and exporting insurrection. The only exceptions to this were in Europe (Czechoslovakia, Hungary) and later, Afghanistan (to an extent the cuban missile crisis might be argued as an act of overt Soviet aggression outside Europe, but in that case there were not significant numbers of conventional forces involvedjust a dangerous deployment of nuclear assets to the western hemispher). Putting Afghanistan to one side for a moment, why would the Soviets be prepred to use overt agression in Europe, and nowhere else???
I think the answer lies somewhere in the fact that the Soviets saw eastern europe as vital to their national interest, as a linchpin to securing the defences of the USSR itself. They did not view dominance of the middle east in the same vein as that, and hence until Afghanistan were not prepared to commit large ground or air forces under the Soviet flag to any of those non-euorpean theatres.
Whilst I have no doubt the Soviets would have acted militarily to any significant military threat into eastern europe, I am less sure about overt agression into western europe. There are a number of possibilities, however, including:
1) curbing covert infiltrations by the west into eastern europe
2) as a distraction tosome domestic problem (similar to the argentinians in 1982)
3) a perceived or real weakness in western resolve , that allowed the Soviets to believe a conquest of western europe was possible
What you are saying may make sense, and in game terms ther is no reason why this might not be hapening simultaneous to the invasion of western europe....
However, the kind of war you are envisaging is not the kind of war the Soviets planned for, or shaped their force structure for. Whilst in our eyes the Soviets represent the evil empire on world domination, they never planned to achieved that by an overt invasion of the whole planet. Soviet infiltration and control of the third world was always by supporting and exporting insurrection. The only exceptions to this were in Europe (Czechoslovakia, Hungary) and later, Afghanistan (to an extent the cuban missile crisis might be argued as an act of overt Soviet aggression outside Europe, but in that case there were not significant numbers of conventional forces involvedjust a dangerous deployment of nuclear assets to the western hemispher). Putting Afghanistan to one side for a moment, why would the Soviets be prepred to use overt agression in Europe, and nowhere else???
I think the answer lies somewhere in the fact that the Soviets saw eastern europe as vital to their national interest, as a linchpin to securing the defences of the USSR itself. They did not view dominance of the middle east in the same vein as that, and hence until Afghanistan were not prepared to commit large ground or air forces under the Soviet flag to any of those non-euorpean theatres.
Whilst I have no doubt the Soviets would have acted militarily to any significant military threat into eastern europe, I am less sure about overt agression into western europe. There are a number of possibilities, however, including:
1) curbing covert infiltrations by the west into eastern europe
2) as a distraction tosome domestic problem (similar to the argentinians in 1982)
3) a perceived or real weakness in western resolve , that allowed the Soviets to believe a conquest of western europe was possible
Excellent point. Russia/Soviet Union was attacked and savagely mauled 2X in 2 centuries. Both attacks came from the West. As a consequence, it was especially sensitive, even possible neurotic, about any threat from the West. Just the existance of Nato was enough for the SU to consider it a major threat. Keep in mind, Nato came into being after a war during which the SU lost 20+ Million people. The Warsaw Pact was a direct response to Nato.
From the Soviet Union's perspective, Nato was a threat in being just waiting for the word "Go".
Zniperguy114
Airman
I can see your right, tim. Getting bogged-down in the ME would suck when trying to fight off NATO in Europe. But the SU still had more resources than the US.
Colin1
Senior Master Sergeant
Warsaw Pact strength always looked good on paper
I don't think the Soviets logistical expertise ever matched their 'paper strength' and you need to take into account the fact that NATO and the Warsaw Pact measured their respective strengths in subtly different ways eg NATO counted their artillery strength by number of platforms, Warsaw Pact by number of 'tubes' (ie there could be several tubes to a platform).
That is not to say they didn't outgun us and they did apply common sense in areas that we didn't eg (and back to the artillery) they didn't rely totally on tracked SPGs, alot of their pieces were towed; the obvious advantage here being that if the prime mover broke down, it can be towed by something else. A team of horses if need be.
No sadder indictment of the Soviets lack of logistic capability is needed than their exit strategy from Afghanistan - at the end of hostilities, troops had to make their own way home.
Another thought about the SU that I read some time in the late to middle 90s was an anaysis of the fighting strength of their divisions. It was something of a closely guarded secret that the US knew their divisions weren't all of the same caliber. The Guards units tended to be good but the rest of the Army tended to be very uneven. In some cases, just straight bad.
What had happened is the SU had sacrificed qualtiy for quantity in their buildup of the 70s. This info was kept very close to the vest by the analysts. They didn't want the SU or our own polititians to know.
Further, the SU had as it's main method of Logistical movement, the rail system whereas Nato used Air. It is fairly easy to drop a bridge and wreck a switching yard. Whereas airports can be destroyed, not all of them. And not at once. But once the trains start backing up...
When you think of the SU resources, think in terms of Lennin's "Quantity has a quality all it's own" statement. It is true, to a certain extent, but it isn't everything. Where I think it really was going to hurt was in the air. If the SU came over the German border, or into the ME, they would've been flying against Air Forces that had recent combat experience (in the USAF and the Israelis). That is a force multiplier. Think of the Battle of France but with the Air Forces switched. German 109s on the French side and RAF on the German side.
It would've been interesting to say the least.
What had happened is the SU had sacrificed qualtiy for quantity in their buildup of the 70s. This info was kept very close to the vest by the analysts. They didn't want the SU or our own polititians to know.
Further, the SU had as it's main method of Logistical movement, the rail system whereas Nato used Air. It is fairly easy to drop a bridge and wreck a switching yard. Whereas airports can be destroyed, not all of them. And not at once. But once the trains start backing up...
When you think of the SU resources, think in terms of Lennin's "Quantity has a quality all it's own" statement. It is true, to a certain extent, but it isn't everything. Where I think it really was going to hurt was in the air. If the SU came over the German border, or into the ME, they would've been flying against Air Forces that had recent combat experience (in the USAF and the Israelis). That is a force multiplier. Think of the Battle of France but with the Air Forces switched. German 109s on the French side and RAF on the German side.
It would've been interesting to say the least.
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parsifal
Colonel
I think as a general statement its true to assert the Soviets were patchy in quality, but is only a short step from there to assert that all Soviet forces were poor quality. And very similar conclusions could be drawn about the NATO force structurees. There were some abolutely yawing gaps in the capabilites of some of the national armies in the '70s. One only has to look at the structure and organizations of the French, Dutch, Danish, Austrian and Italian armies, and then look at the national resolve of their governments to start to wonder exactly which side was more patchy in its quality assessments. We tend to measure NATO capabilities against the best of the best....and then draw another erroneous conclusion that all the NATO forces were in that category. To draw another WWII analogy, its like looking at the LW experten and then drawing the conclusion that all of the LW was trained like that.
I have to make a correction about Red Army readiness rates. The Soviet army was organised on three readiness levels for their 115 Mech and 50 Tank Divs, that were more or less evenly distributed. Category 1 were the front line forces and were maintained at 100% strength and readiness. Most of these, but not all were Guards units. Category II were maintained at 50-75% strength, and 100% equipment rates, category 3 were kept at kept at 30% strengths and about 50% equipment.
Cat 2 Divs were expected to be brought up to full combat readiness in 15-30 days whilst Cat3 were mostly used as fillers for other divs, but could be made fully combat ready in about 90 days.
None of this was secret Tim, it was commonly known and taught at officer training schools allover the world, and compares quite favourably with the readiness rates for western european armies. To give yourself a rough idea of our cabailities, think back to the preparations for the wars in Iraq, '91 and 2002....how long did it take the Americans to redeploy their forces, and bring them up to combat readiness.....quite a while in my opinion. This sort of delay in the 70's led to my country and I think the US as well to developing rapid deployment forces at a high state of readiness. In the Australian experience incidentally, despite maintaining a field force of mor than 30000, it still took us more than 3 months to make ready a force of just 6500 for deployment into Timor. The British prepratiions for the Falklands is another good illustration that most military formations are not immediately combat ready...
I never fought or encountered Soviet land forces, but I did get to see their Naval and long range air assets in top cold war action and face off against them in the Arabian sea during the 79-81 invasion of Afghanistan. We were there as a not so subtle reassurance to the Pakistanis, should the Soviets think about pushing to the sea from Afghanistan. They were there to challenge that, and show the Pakis that there was a serious threat at sea to western dominance. I was greatly impressed with how well they were trained, and precision that they delivered their simulated attacks on us. I dont think they outclassed us, but neither were they impotent or inneffective....they had their strengths, and we had ours, it was as simple as that
I have to make a correction about Red Army readiness rates. The Soviet army was organised on three readiness levels for their 115 Mech and 50 Tank Divs, that were more or less evenly distributed. Category 1 were the front line forces and were maintained at 100% strength and readiness. Most of these, but not all were Guards units. Category II were maintained at 50-75% strength, and 100% equipment rates, category 3 were kept at kept at 30% strengths and about 50% equipment.
Cat 2 Divs were expected to be brought up to full combat readiness in 15-30 days whilst Cat3 were mostly used as fillers for other divs, but could be made fully combat ready in about 90 days.
None of this was secret Tim, it was commonly known and taught at officer training schools allover the world, and compares quite favourably with the readiness rates for western european armies. To give yourself a rough idea of our cabailities, think back to the preparations for the wars in Iraq, '91 and 2002....how long did it take the Americans to redeploy their forces, and bring them up to combat readiness.....quite a while in my opinion. This sort of delay in the 70's led to my country and I think the US as well to developing rapid deployment forces at a high state of readiness. In the Australian experience incidentally, despite maintaining a field force of mor than 30000, it still took us more than 3 months to make ready a force of just 6500 for deployment into Timor. The British prepratiions for the Falklands is another good illustration that most military formations are not immediately combat ready...
I never fought or encountered Soviet land forces, but I did get to see their Naval and long range air assets in top cold war action and face off against them in the Arabian sea during the 79-81 invasion of Afghanistan. We were there as a not so subtle reassurance to the Pakistanis, should the Soviets think about pushing to the sea from Afghanistan. They were there to challenge that, and show the Pakis that there was a serious threat at sea to western dominance. I was greatly impressed with how well they were trained, and precision that they delivered their simulated attacks on us. I dont think they outclassed us, but neither were they impotent or inneffective....they had their strengths, and we had ours, it was as simple as that
renrich
Chief Master Sergeant
Don't know about the 70s but in 1961, when the Berlin Wall went up, I was in a Texas National Guard outfit, the 49th AD which was called to active duty. We trained for about six months and were designated a STRAC division and theoretically were ready to go to Europe and engage the WP. As I remember, the US had around ten divisions in Europe, but only about 13 divisions overall and the WP had about 50 divisions facing them. Another division, the 26th ID, I think, had been called up also. If it had come to a straight up fight, without nukes, I think Nato would have been in for a very difficult time and I would probably not be here to write this. We were sent home in August, 1962, just before the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Freebird
Master Sergeant
Depends who is in command though doesn't it? With NATO composed of the UK, Netherlands, Denmark, W. Germany Belgium - they sure don't want to use nukes in Europe.
Parsifal, have you played the other games in this era? We has "NATO" by victory games, (divisional level) and "Third World war" by GDW, also on a similar scale, all were about mid-70's or early 80's simulations of warsw Pact vs. NATO.
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- #39
parsifal
Colonel
ive played the GDW game once, for the southern front, it was more playable than "Next War" but not as detailed or accurate either (though I may chage that view if we get a rubbish result) Ive also played a game called "NATO" which is a great "beer and pretzels" gamei but nbot really a serious attempt at simulating the likley outcomes. It gets played as a tournament game still, and I usually play it because of that, but as a simulation it sucks big time.
But by far the worst game i have ever had the misfortune to play on this subject material was an abomination called "world War III" by SPI. It was kind of like Third Reich, only it sucked it a big way. I ahd a copy years agao, I think I used it to light my barbecue one day.....
There are lots of tactical simulations that do a pretty good job. I think the best might be "Mech War 77" or "Fulda", both of which are worth playing, and are good fun to boot
Parsifal, do you know any good computer games that do the same thing as the board games. There seem to be a bunch of games out there but I can't tell one from another in terms of being any good. Not limited to WP/Nato, across the board decent strategic/tactical games.
