Ideal Luftwaffe starting 1/1/1936

I'll return at the moment to the supposed German anti-Soviet 'oil' campaign. The catch is that Germans did not intended to destroy Soviet-held oil fields refineries, but rather to capture them.
IIRC, Maikop fields were producing only 10% of what Baku oil fiels were making. Grozny oil fields were at 20% of Baku? So any bombing of said oil fields will need to wait until a) Germans are definitely certain that those cannot be captured, and b) Germans have adequate force of heavy bombers and their escorts close enough. So the decision to bomb Baku will be issued when, November of 1942? That would mean it is too late for any meaningful large scale operations until snow rain are gone, like April/May 1943? Way too late for anything? The Soviets can have some Spitfire IXs by that time, supported by radars.

tomo pauk said:

I'll return at the moment to the supposed German anti-Soviet 'oil' campaign. The catch is that Germans did not intended to destroy Soviet-held oil fields refineries, but rather to capture them.
IIRC, Maikop fields were producing only 10% of what Baku oil fiels were making. Grozny oil fields were at 20% of Baku? So any bombing of said oil fields will need to wait until a) Germans are definitely certain that those cannot be captured, and b) Germans have adequate force of heavy bombers and their escorts close enough. So the decision to bomb Baku will be issued when, November of 1942? That would mean it is too late for any meaningful large scale operations until snow rain are gone, like April/May 1943? Way too late for anything? The Soviets can have some Spitfire IXs by that time, supported by radars.

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Joel Hayward: Luftwaffe vs. Soviet Oil - Prof. Joel Hayward's Books and Articles
October was the earliest bombing of Grozny, so the Germans could start hitting Baku then, but that's assuming no other changes that would result in an earlier attack on the oil fields or perhaps mining of Atyrau oil terminal if you want to stop Soviet oil shipments from Baku reaching the rest of the USSR. Baku oil was shipping north to either Astrakhan, shut down by bombing historically, or north to the Atyrau area for dispersal to the rest of the USSR.
The He177B could operate from either Crimea or Mariupol on the Sea of Azov due to the major Soviet airbase that was there that could house the strategic bombers and have a milder climate for winter. An October operation against Baku from Mariupol would not be an issue in winter due to the milder Black Sea climate and of course the more mild climate over the Caspian around Baku. Plus they can attack at night, as Baku is very easy to approach that way thanks to water reflection, as British planners noticed in Operation Pike:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Pike

Subsequent analysis of the photography by the PDU revealed that the oil infrastructure in Baku and Batum were particularly vulnerable to air attack as both could be approached from the sea, so the more difficult target of Grozny would be bombed first to exploit the element of surprise. Oil fields were to be attacked with incendiary bombs, while tests conducted at the Royal Arsenal at Woolwich revealed light oil storage tanks at the oil processing plants could be detonated with high explosives.

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Navigating against British coastal targets during the Blitz was the easiest navigation, as the British noticed too for their night mining of German ports on the North Sea (Hamburg) during 'Gardening' operations.

tomo pauk said:

One 4-engined bomber should be more expensive than two 2-engined ones, but should also haul more bombs over same range, while using less crew per bombs carried? Provided, of course, that both 2- and 4-engined designs are armed with guns, like most of ww2 aircraft.]

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When looking at that chart it would be well to remember that the A-28, A-29, A-30 ( Lockheed Hudsons) used roughly the same engines as the B-17 and B-24 only without Turbos. Or that while the B-17 used four 9 cylinder engines the B-26 "twin" used two 18 cylinder engines.

Germans are pretty much going to be using the Jumo 211 or DB 600 series engines either in pairs or fours so the difference in engine costs is pretty much going to double instead of bouncing around like the American engine costs.

tomo pauk said:

I'll return at the moment to the supposed German anti-Soviet 'oil' campaign. The catch is that Germans did not intended to destroy Soviet-held oil fields refineries, but rather to capture them.
IIRC, Maikop fields were producing only 10% of what Baku oil fiels were making. Grozny oil fields were at 20% of Baku? So any bombing of said oil fields will need to wait until a) Germans are definitely certain that those cannot be captured, and b) Germans have adequate force of heavy bombers and their escorts close enough. So the decision to bomb Baku will be issued when, November of 1942? That would mean it is too late for any meaningful large scale operations until snow rain are gone, like April/May 1943? Way too late for anything? The Soviets can have some Spitfire IXs by that time, supported by radars.

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The other problem with a major four engined effort against strategic targets is that it leave the bread and butter issues for the LW really short. Historically the LW entered Russia with about 2900 a/c. by the end of July, after a months extremely hard fighting and massive successes, the numbers of operational aircraft available at the front had dropped massively, to just over 1000. It recovered after the pause at Smolensk, and then plummetted again after Typhoon.

Operational numbers were always poor in Russia. Best month after 1941, prior to 1945, was June 1942, with Richthofen at the helm of LF-4, serviceability rates were just under 70%. During the winter months they plummetted to around 40% or less.

Point is that the LW even historically lacked the depth to maintain sustainability, and on the eastern front they absolutely needed every aircraft they had to keep up the pressure on the ground Level bombers were forced to go quail hunting to support the exceptionally hard pressed ground formations, and from 1941 on, the LW was called upon to more or less constantly act as fire brigades, which gave them no rest or ability to recover.

Soviets were not particularly vulnerable to an oil campaign. They had plenty of reserves, and alternative (if less significant) fields beyond the Caspian sea and in the Central Asian Republics. hitting Soviet oil installations and infrastructure early would have hurt, but it would have hurt the Germans more by reason of the resources they would need to suck out of their other programs to achieve this. Even the hated Me210 did quite well on the EF. It was never a problem with quality for the Germans, they always held marked qualitative advantages over the Russians, it was always a problem with numbers, or more correctly the lack of numbers. Frittering LW strength away on distractions like the Soviet Trans Caucasus Oil fields would only serve to bring about an even earlier defeat for the Germans.

parsifal said:

The other problem with a major four engined effort against strategic targets is that it leave the bread and butter issues for the LW really short. Historically the LW entered Russia with about 2900 a/c. by the end of July, after a months extremely hard fighting and massive successes, the numbers of operational aircraft available at the front had dropped massively, to just over 1000. It recovered after the pause at Smolensk, and then plummetted again after Typhoon.

Operational numbers were always poor in Russia. Best month after 1941, prior to 1945, was June 1942, with Richthofen at the helm of LF-4, serviceability rates were just under 70%. During the winter months they plummetted to around 40% or less.

Point is that the LW even historically lacked the depth to maintain sustainability, and on the eastern front they absolutely needed every aircraft they had to keep up the pressure on the ground Level bombers were forced to go quail hunting to support the exceptionally hard pressed ground formations, and from 1941 on, the LW was called upon to more or less constantly act as fire brigades, which gave them no rest or ability to recover.

Soviets were not particularly vulnerable to an oil campaign. They had plenty of reserves, and alternative (if less significant) fields beyond the Caspian sea and in the Central Asian Republics. hitting Soviet oil installations and infrastructure early would have hurt, but it would have hurt the Germans more by reason of the resources they would need to suck out of their other programs to achieve this. Even the hated Me210 did quite well on the EF. It was never a problem with quality for the Germans, they always held marked qualitative advantages over the Russians, it was always a problem with numbers, or more correctly the lack of numbers. Frittering LW strength away on distractions like the Soviet Trans Caucasus Oil fields would only serve to bring about an even earlier defeat for the Germans.

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I understand your point, however you are ignoring several major issues: 1 being that the LW under Udet badly mismanaged production and replacements, which created this negative feedback loop historically; there is also the issue of being ordered to do wasteful missions on other fronts when the efforts would have been far more helpful in the East: Steinbock and the Baedekker Blitz for one. Then there is the issue of the V-2 and V-3 projects and the massive waste there. Jeschonnek deserves major blame for constantly raiding schools for instructors to put at the front, men with irreplaceable skills. Stupid decisions too like the Stalingrad and Demyansk airlifts among others wore down the LW, as did going for unobtainable objectives, which creates massive logistic issues that wore down the LW in the East (going for Moscow after the muddy season in November 1941, the Caucasian campaign). Then there were stupid moves like the Tunisian campaign and trying to defend forward in the Mediterranean especially at Sicily that really wore down the LW.

Beyond that there was the poor decision making by Goering that put the LW in the position of being the 'army's whore' to quote Richthofen. Instead of conducting appropriate missions like logistics interdiction the LW was shoehorned into army support, which has serious consequences; take for instance the battle of Kursk: prior to the offensive the one operational rail line into the bulge was bombed only once by a weak force, because the LW was ordered to conduct raids on the front lines, even when they had some breathing space to actually do something with airpower that might have a wide operational or strategic impact on the war.

How badly misused the LW was in Russia, especially after 1941:
The German Air War in Russia: Richard Muller: 9781877853135: Amazon.com: Books

The final point I want to make is about Soviet oil; 90% came from the Caucasus, most of the rest from Central Asia. While the Soviets certainly did have fields outside of that, they were very minor at this point and accounted for at best 3% of Soviet oil output. The one major source outside of the Caucasus was Iranian oil, which went to the Soviets during the war for the most part. That could be interdicted by the mining of Atyrau, which was the primary oil station for it during the war, not to mention Caucasian oil from Baku (which alone accounted for something like 70% of Soviet output.
As to Soviet oil reserves, can you quote a figure on that? AFAIK it was about 15 million tons of oil (crude). Compared to Germany that was huge, but considering how oil dependent the Soviets were that's not as much as you'd think given that their agriculture was totally dependent on tractors and were thirsty for oil; they could survive on rationing, but that means demechanizing agriculture, which results in millions more deaths due to starvation and serious morale problems, even if they had to take horses away from the army and demobilize millions of men and women (from the military and industry) to work in agriculture. Taking out Soviet oil, while not a panacea, would create massive problems for the Soviets that their reserve and Iranian oil cannot solve.

Operation Eisenhammer would be another good choice about a focused effort, maximum return attack for strategic bombing. Historically nearly 1200 He177s were built and they did very little despite having trained crews for them and fuel used on training and various flights for when they were used; having a functional aircraft instead given the historical resources spent on the project, would have them actually put to use; the LW had the trained units ready to go, but the machines were not functional historically, so with actual functional units they could actually conduct operations without affecting historical operations, due to the fact they spent the resources and had them sit idle historically. Even a single Geschwader could conduct minimal numbers of attacks on the Moscow-Upper Volga power stations in 1942 and get major benefits from those without impacting historical LW operations.

Then there are historical strategic attacks that sucked up medium bombers that could have been used at the front:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinkel_He_111_operational_history#Eastern_Front

The He 111 operated in the same capacity as in previous campaigns on the Eastern Front. The bomber was asked to perform strategic bombing functions. The tank factory at Gorkovskiy Avtomobilniy Zavod (GAZ) was subjected to a series of heavy attacks throughout June 1943. On the night of 4/5 June, He 111s of Kampfgeschwader 1, KG 3, KG 4, KG 55 and KG 100 dropped 161 tonnes (179 tons) of bombs, causing massive destruction to buildings and production lines. All of GAZ No. 1 plant's 50 buildings, 9,000 m (29,500 ft) of conveyers, 5,900 pieces of equipment and 8,000 tank engines were destroyed.[56] However, the Germans made an error in target selection. The GAZ plant No. 1 produced only the T-70 light tank. Factory No. 112, the second-biggest producer of the more formidable T-34, continued production undisturbed. Soviet production facilities were repaired or rebuilt within six weeks. In 1943, Factory No. 112 produced 2,851 T-34s, 3,619 in 1944, and 3,255 in 1945.[56] The Luftwaffe had also failed to hit the Gorkiy Artillery Factory (No. 92) or the aircraft plant where the Lavochkin La-5 and La 5FN were made.[56] The Luftwaffe failed to disrupt the Soviet preparation for the coming battle, but the He 111 had proved capable of operating in a strategic role.

The He 111 also formed the core of the strategic bombing offensive later in the year. During the Soviet Lower Dnieper Offensive He 111 Geschwader performed strike missions. Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring issued an order to General Rudolf Meister's IV. Fliegerkorps on 14 October 1943:

I intend to initiate systematic attacks against the Russian arms industry by deploying the bulk of the heavy bomber units [mostly equipped with medium bombers] - reinforced by special units - which will be brought together under the command of IV. Fliegerkorps. The task will be to deal destructive strikes against the Russian arms industry in order to wipe out masses of Russian tanks, artillery pieces and aircraft before they reach the front, thus providing the hard-pressed Ostheer [East Army] with relief which will be much greater than if these bombers were deployed on the battlefield.

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[57]

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This could have been done by the He177s which historically sat idle due to technical failings.

During operations on the Eastern Front in early 1944, often carried out in daylight at about 6,000 m (19,690 ft) or higher, losses were relatively light. The Soviet Air Force, equipped mainly for low-level interception and ground-attack roles, was able to do little to hinder the high-flying bombers.

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Here is another issue too; the Soviets, scared of the German strategic bombing capabilities, will divert production to higher altitude fighters that would be useless for frontline service at standard East Front altitudes (Mig-3), which would eat up Soviet resources that where used for front line service historically. Consider the diversion of resources and the loss of efficiency in dispersion of factories caused by the German reaction to Western strategic bombing. If the Germans were to conduct it themselves, on a more limited scale obviously, the Soviets would be forced to react by diverting resources from offensive front line uses to defensive ones to protect industry against this threat; it becomes a 'fleet in being' in a sense, where the Soviets have to react to the threat even if it sits idle after its initial usage, simply due to the threat it could attack again, which helps the German ground forces and tactical/operation LW forces, who now don't have to deal with the full usage of Soviet resources against them.

I suppose we could also ask the question: how about there are no He177s constructed and the Bomber A is abandoned before mass production starts?
2,400 more medium bombers from 1942-44 (though probably more due to greater experience with those airframes and efficiencies due to larger scale production of existing models)?

wiking85 said:

Then there are historical strategic attacks that sucked up medium bombers that could have been used at the front:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinkel_He_111_operational_history#Eastern_Front

This could have been done by the He177s which historically sat idle due to technical failings.

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Goring can "intend" whatever he wants, even with 1000 bombers the chances of him disrupting the Russian arms industry to a significant extent when the allies needed many times 1000 bombers to disrupt the German arms industry doesn't look like a good bet. Everybody over estimated the effectiveness of bombing the factories. It did have effects but the Germans by Oct 1943 should known better than anyone (being on the receiving end) just how difficult it was to knock out production by a large percentage for more than short (weeks) period of time.

Here is another issue too; the Soviets, scared of the German strategic bombing capabilities, will divert production to higher altitude fighters that would be useless for frontline service at standard East Front altitudes (Mig-3), which would eat up Soviet resources that where used for front line service historically. Consider the diversion of resources and the loss of efficiency in dispersion of factories caused by the German reaction to Western strategic bombing. If the Germans were to conduct it themselves, on a more limited scale obviously, the Soviets would be forced to react by diverting resources from offensive front line uses to defensive ones to protect industry against this threat; it becomes a 'fleet in being' in a sense, where the Soviets have to react to the threat even if it sits idle after its initial usage, simply due to the threat it could attack again, which helps the German ground forces and tactical/operation LW forces, who now don't have to deal with the full usage of Soviet resources against them.

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Trouble is without a rather different He 177 ( speaking of engine capability not reliability) the Soviets don't really need to change fighter types. Bomber service ceiling changed considerably depending on load. perhaps I am reading the charts provided by Tomo wrong (My German is about non-existent) but the Ceiling for the loaded He-177 may be only 6.55km or under 22,000ft. Operational altitude would be even lower. On the way back out or with lighter bombloads and less fuel The HE 177 may very well hit 8000 meter "service" ceiling often listed for it. While the Yaks and LA series fighters were at their best below 4000 meters that doesn't mean they could not reach 8-10000 meters. For He 177s running at 6-7000 meters without escorts the Russians don't need a different fighter type.

Now if you could come up with turbo chargers ( or two stage superchargers) for the German engines used in the He 177, no matter how they were arranged on the wing, you may be able to fly high enough to get away from Yak-7/9s and LA-5s. But then were are into a whole new "what if".

Soviet industry was far more concentrated than German industry was. German dispersal was a function of their pre-war economy being based on subcontracting and small dynamic firms; the Soviets were based on massive concentrated factories in the US model with all work being done under one roof, which was a major problem if they start getting bombed, which the quote about He111 raids on Soviet industry in 1943 indicate. The soviets were far more vulnerable than the Germans were historically to bombing of factories. Now, we should also not forget to mention that US strategic bombing is downplayed far more than it should be, as it pretty much collapsed the German economy by 1944. It was pretty much only going after Germany deeply from 1943-44, so within about 16 months they had smashed Germany up very badly and would have done so sooner if they focused on the right targets earlier. Really most of the damage was done in 1944 after Big Week wrecked the German fighter arm (which was already badly worn down in the Mediterranean in 1943), so the collapse was actually due to a short period in 1944, rather than 1943-44.

Also to your point about Soviet fighters anything over 15,000 feet was very uncomfortable for pilots without pressurized cockpits, which Soviet fighters mostly lacked. Even if they were able to reach 22,000 feet, they lack optimal performance at that height, so having something designed for higher altitude like that will require some specialized bomber killers, especially as the standard Soviet fighter was not designed to kill an armored, well defended bomber like the He177B. Sure they can use the P47 and Spitfire, but their standard fighters are not going to be especially good at shooting them down any more than the Me109 was at shooting down the B17.

Don't forget here the Germans would have the Fw187, so they could be escorted. But this leaves out that the Soviets lacked an integrated radar defense system due to the wide open spaces of Russia and lack of sufficient radar to guard everything. So the He177 can slip through, just as the He111 was able to do and attack targets without the Soviets being able to get fighters formed up and to altitude in time. Individual fighters going after bomber boxes did not do well. The Germans discovered the problems with that tactic early on so would form up into coordinated groups to attack from multiple directions, but that took time to organize, which the Germans were able to do due to their integrated radar system, something the Soviets lacked historically and would not have been able to form due to the factors I listed above. So at best Soviet defense is going to be based on how much AAA they can put around any possible target and fighter attacks on outgoing He177s after they made their attack; this also assumes there is no escort, so if the Germans are escorted by Fw187s, then forming up fighters are going to get attacked and distracted, which lets the He177s get away, which was a major issue the Germans had historically with Allied escorts preventing 'big wing' fighter groups from coordinated attacks on Allied bombers.

No need for Turbos or two-stage superchargers, use DB 605AS as basic engines and you have a far better high-alt performance (althout you lose a little for take-off).
I found a doc "Flugstreckentabelle He 177 A-3/R2" which states fuel calculation is done with 10% higher usage for some safety margin.

The DB-605AS is a bit too late?

The He-177s best cruising altitude when carrying a bomb load was, once we forget about the unrealistic 1.5 km, at 5 km. At least so it is stated at the alejandro's table. That altitude is well within scope of VVS fighters. With 415 km/h on max continuous power, with bombs they are not going to run away either. By mid/late 1942, the Soviets have a powerful 37mm cannon that fires through the prop; the cannon bagged a reasonable amount of aircraft, historically.
So the other things must be considered: how good is Soviet air devfence network? It was pretty good above Moscow in 1941/42, IIRC. By late 1942, it should be better? In case Germans can field a reasonable number of capable ranged escorts, the VVS has a problem. But, if LW is geared more towards long range capabilities, who conducts the army support? Are the Stormoviks free to bomb along the front line, and the LW is ill able to return the favor?

Denniss said:

No need for Turbos or two-stage superchargers, use DB 605AS as basic engines and you have a far better high-alt performance (althout you lose a little for take-off).
I found a doc "Flugstreckentabelle He 177 A-3/R2" which states fuel calculation is done with 10% higher usage for some safety margin.

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Maybe by 1944, because the DB605 didn't get the restrictions taken off of it until late 1943 for start and emergency power. Using 1450 HP engines would probably be fine for the He177B, but the problem is it couldn't use its full power for years. Being limited to 1310HP is not a viable option then:
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daimler-Benz_DB_605
Ironically that's when the DB603 was declared reliable! So much for 605 developments influencing the 603, they problems were worked out in tandem, rather then 605 first then 603 using the developments.

Might as well use the DB603 from 1941/2 on for higher HP, even with a lower altitude. Also note the performance of the DB606/10 with the historical He177A5 isn't necessarily the performance of the DB603 equipped He177B:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinkel_He_274#Specifications_.28He_274_V1.29

Powerplant: 4× Daimler-Benz DB 603A 12-cylinder inverted-vee engine, 1,750 PS (1,726 hp; 1,287 kW) each
Performance

Service ceiling: 14,300 m (46,920 ft)

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Why would the Soviets not do what they did and move their industry far beyond the reach of German Aircraft?

tomo pauk said:

The DB-605AS is a bit too late?

The He-177s best cruising altitude when carrying a bomb load was, once we forget about the unrealistic 1.5 km, at 5 km. At least so it is stated at the alejandro's table. That altitude is well within scope of VVS fighters. With 415 km/h on max continuous power, with bombs they are not going to run away either. By mid/late 1942, the Soviets have a powerful 37mm cannon that fires through the prop; the cannon bagged a reasonable amount of aircraft, historically.
So the other things must be considered: how good is Soviet air devfence network? It was pretty good above Moscow in 1941/42, IIRC. By late 1942, it should be better? In case Germans can field a reasonable number of capable ranged escorts, the VVS has a problem. But, if LW is geared more towards long range capabilities, who conducts the army support? Are the Stormoviks free to bomb along the front line, and the LW is ill able to return the favor?

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Moscow's defense system was the best in the country and probably second best in the world after Berlin in 1941. The only thing they lacked was gunlaying radar, which came later from British LL. They had trouble engaging bombers at night.
But then again you cannot use Moscow's system as a model for the rest of the country, due to it being the largest concentration of defensive systems in the country. There were far too many targets to defend to have that sort of concentration elsewhere. For instance Moscow's and the Upper Volga;s power infrastructure was virtually undefended the whole war; in 1943-44 the Germans noticed it was pretty ripe for bombing, but had squandered their chance to get at it, due to being pushed back from effective range of the stations. Also note that Moscow wasn't the prime target for going after the Soviet weapons industry. Going after the undefended power stations and transmission stations outside of the city would have a far greater impact than actually hitting the factories themselves.

Again the LW had the He177 in service IOTL, but they were grounded due to technical issues; they won't require any more resources than were spent on the He177 IOTL; little changes for the LW in terms of resources by having a functional, four engine He177, as the coupled engine version was built to 1200 units and actually formed combat Geschwader that sat around waiting for their aircraft to become functional, basically sitting out the war. The only significant change is they actually being able to fly in this scenario. The major difference would be fuel usage vs. OTL, but considering the He177A series did fly a lot of training and combat missions (like the Steinbock raid and around Stalingrad) avoiding things like that would mean those resources are spent more profitably against Soviet industry and power infrastructure, rather than later against political targets like London.

vikingBerserker said:

Why would the Soviets not do what they did and move their industry far beyond the reach of German Aircraft?

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They would eventually, but that overloads the power infrastructure and disrupts production in the meantime. It also increases the distances that shipping raw materials must travel, plus how far parts need to travel from one area to the next, not to mention to get to the front; assuming they evacuate everything to the Urals and there is no power problems from that, or logistics issues from limited rail networks having to support extra factories and population, then 1942 is pretty much lost for the moving factories in terms of output like 1941 was. Then we have the increased cost of transporting everything further than they historically needed to, which slows down replenishment from factories and wears down the rail infrastructure from having to move rolling stock over much greater distances. There would be consequences.

Soviets can move much of their industry (and most of it is already beyond LW reach in 1942). On the other hand, the oil fields and much of that infrastructure will remain on their spot.

But they did, and it was quite successful. The Russians traded space for time.

Below is a posting I found on the Axis History and is supposedly a quote from an article by Colonell G.S. Kravchenko 1967. However I will point our I do not have access to the original article.


"On June 23rd 41 mobilisation production plans went into force. On June 24th the Evacuation Council was set up and on the 30th the State Defense Committee was organised with Stalin as its head. In July 41 300,000 railway wagons were in operation in August 185,000 in September 140,000 in October 175,000 in November 123,000. In the July November period 1,503 industrial enterprises were evacuated to the east. It took two and a half years to erect a blast furnace before the war but furnaces No. 5 and 8 were erected in eight monthes at Magnitogorsk. In October tank building plant No.183 was working in November it was evacuated and in December it resumed production. Tank production went from 4,177 in the second half of 41 to 11,021 in the first half of 42.
Military production increased 180% in the urals in 1942 compared to 41 200% in the Volga area and 140% in Western Siberia.
In 1942 4.4 million industrial workers were trained or re-educated. The number of women operating for example forging and press machines rose from 11% 1941 to 50% end of 42.
The Germans siezed or put out of action 31,850 big and small industrial enterprises. German industrial capacity in 41 including conquered countries was :-
31.8 million tons of steel against the Soviets 18.3
rolled stock 22.5 m.tons against Soviets 13.1
coal 506mt against Soviets 165.9mt
stock of metal cutting machines 1694 thousand Soviet 58.4 thousand "

At the beginning of the war the whole of the Transcaucasus accounted for 72% of Soviet Oil production as a whole, with the main concentrations being around Baku, with an annual output of 25.4 million tons. By 1945, however, Bakus output had slumped to less than 12 million units. And the Soviets showed NO signs of economic collapse because of that slump. The reason for that is because during the war they had greatly increased outputs in their eastern MDs.

According to Sohbet Karbuz


"Meanwhile, the enemy was closing in on Baku. On September 9, 1942, martial law was declared in Transcaucasia. The danger of an attack on Azerbaijan was becoming more likely. The emergency measures which had been prepared beforehand were set into operation-Azerbaijanis began closing the functioning wells with plans, if necessary, to explode the wells themselves so that the Germans wouldn't get a single drop of oil.

Because of the crisis, the State Defense Committee decided to transfer the main forces of oil-workers and oil enterprises of Baku to the regions of Volga, Ural Mountains, Kazakhstan and Central Asia for the enforcement of the oil extraction there. In October, 1942, more than ten thousand oil workers left for these eastern parts.

All the nine drilling offices, oil-expedition and oil-construction trusts as well as various other enterprises with their staffs were transferred to an area near Kuybishev, (Russia Federation in Tartarstan near the Ural Mountains north of Kazakhstan). This city soon came to be known as "the Second Baku".

Despite the severe frost the drillers started searching for oil and thanks to day and night working, the Bakuis in the region of Povolzhye increased the fuel extraction in "Kinelneft" trust that first year by 66% and by 42% in entire region of Kuybishev. As a result, five new oil and gas fields were discovered and huge oil refinery construction projects were undertaken, including the first pipe line between Kuybishev and Buturslan was built that same year.

Beginning in late 1943 drilling work in Baku was reestablished. However, the sealing off of a number of wells turned out to be a tragedy. Many of them were impossible to restore. Eventually, the oil extracting had considerably been reduced by the end of the war: in 1945 only 11.5 million tons of oil was extracted".

So, the attacks on Baku and the Caucasus were not only contrary to German war strategy of capruring these fields intact, they also would have little or NO EFFECT on Soviet war making potential. Even with a 60% reduction in Bakus output ther was no effect on the Soviets. they were absolutely rolling in oil.

Soviet Committee on Defence had specified a 2 year reserve of oil in 1940. im not certain if that was reached, but there is no reason to show that they didnt. If they had a 2 year reserve, and the attacks began in 1943, the war would be over before any effect on the Soviet operations became apparent.

vikingBerserker said:

But they did, and it was quite successful. The Russians traded space for time.

Below is a posting I found on the Axis History and is supposedly a quote from an article by Colonell G.S. Kravchenko 1967. However I will point our I do not have access to the original article.


"On June 23rd 41 mobilisation production plans went into force. On June 24th the Evacuation Council was set up and on the 30th the State Defense Committee was organised with Stalin as its head. In July 41 300,000 railway wagons were in operation in August 185,000 in September 140,000 in October 175,000 in November 123,000. In the July November period 1,503 industrial enterprises were evacuated to the east. It took two and a half years to erect a blast furnace before the war but furnaces No. 5 and 8 were erected in eight monthes at Magnitogorsk. In October tank building plant No.183 was working in November it was evacuated and in December it resumed production. Tank production went from 4,177 in the second half of 41 to 11,021 in the first half of 42.
Military production increased 180% in the urals in 1942 compared to 41 200% in the Volga area and 140% in Western Siberia.
In 1942 4.4 million industrial workers were trained or re-educated. The number of women operating for example forging and press machines rose from 11% 1941 to 50% end of 42.
The Germans siezed or put out of action 31,850 big and small industrial enterprises. German industrial capacity in 41 including conquered countries was :-
31.8 million tons of steel against the Soviets 18.3
rolled stock 22.5 m.tons against Soviets 13.1
coal 506mt against Soviets 165.9mt
stock of metal cutting machines 1694 thousand Soviet 58.4 thousand "

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I'd have to fact check what he's saying, because 1960s Soviet history wasn't exactly honest; they were still claiming lend lease made no difference and that they suffered less than 10 million dead in WW2. As to the specific claim about tank production, keep in mind that the number he is quoting for the second half of 1941 was a depressed number due to the invasion, evacuations, and capture of factories, so of course the first half of 1942 was going to be better because factories were back in operation after being moved. What he's not saying is how that figure compares to the first half of 1941 before the invasion.
So there is already number massaging to make Soviet achievements seems bigger than they were, which was a facet of 1960s era Soviet history about WW2.
I'd be very curious if modern Russian historians could validate his numbers with access to the archives.

parsifal said:

At the beginning of the war the whole of the Transcaucasus accounted for 72% of Soviet Oil production as a whole, with the main concentrations being around Baku, with an annual output of 25.4 million tons. By 1945, however, Bakus output had slumped to less than 12 million units. And the Soviets showed NO signs of economic collapse because of that slump. The reason for that is because during the war they had greatly increased outputs in their eastern MDs.

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Source? And they also were receiving all the Iranian oil, not to mention avgas from the US via Siberia. So they could survive the slump, though it did hurt, thanks to, as you say, increased effort on other fields, but mainly due to foreign imports. Those imports could mostly be blocked by mining of Atyrau as I mentioned earlier, as Iranian oil was coming in via that port.

parsifal said:

According to Sohbet Karbuz

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Who?

parsifal said:

"Meanwhile, the enemy was closing in on Baku. On September 9, 1942, martial law was declared in Transcaucasia. The danger of an attack on Azerbaijan was becoming more likely. The emergency measures which had been prepared beforehand were set into operation-Azerbaijanis began closing the functioning wells with plans, if necessary, to explode the wells themselves so that the Germans wouldn't get a single drop of oil.

Because of the crisis, the State Defense Committee decided to transfer the main forces of oil-workers and oil enterprises of Baku to the regions of Volga, Ural Mountains, Kazakhstan and Central Asia for the enforcement of the oil extraction there. In October, 1942, more than ten thousand oil workers left for these eastern parts.

All the nine drilling offices, oil-expedition and oil-construction trusts as well as various other enterprises with their staffs were transferred to an area near Kuybishev, (Russia Federation in Tartarstan near the Ural Mountains north of Kazakhstan). This city soon came to be known as "the Second Baku".

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By whom and was it just for propaganda or something that was actually said by the locals? The government could call it that in propaganda, but that means nothing.

parsifal said:

Despite the severe frost the drillers started searching for oil and thanks to day and night working, the Bakuis in the region of Povolzhye increased the fuel extraction in "Kinelneft" trust that first year by 66% and by 42% in entire region of Kuybishev. As a result, five new oil and gas fields were discovered and huge oil refinery construction projects were undertaken, including the first pipe line between Kuybishev and Buturslan was built that same year.

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What was the pre-expansion production and what was post expansion production? Raw numbers are more helpful than unqualified percentages. How big were those 5 fields that were discovered and what does 'huge' mean in terms of refining capacity built? How would it not be vulnerable to bombing?

parsifal said:

Beginning in late 1943 drilling work in Baku was reestablished. However, the sealing off of a number of wells turned out to be a tragedy. Many of them were impossible to restore. Eventually, the oil extracting had considerably been reduced by the end of the war: in 1945 only 11.5 million tons of oil was extracted

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parsifal said:

".

So, the attacks on Baku and the Caucasus were not only contrary to German war strategy of capruring these fields intact, they also would have little or NO EFFECT on Soviet war making potential. Even with a 60% reduction in Bakus output ther was no effect on the Soviets. they were absolutely rolling in oil.

Soviet Committee on Defence had specified a 2 year reserve of oil in 1940. im not certain if that was reached, but there is no reason to show that they didnt. If they had a 2 year reserve, and the attacks began in 1943, the war would be over before any effect on the Soviet operations became apparent.

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As I said above the Soviets were getting all of Iranian oil from 1941 on via the Caspian, so they could survive Baku oil being cut in half, but they did suffer consequences in 1942-43 over the drop in oil output. Plus the Iranian oil shipment could be stopped up by mining the oil station at Atyrau, which well within range of the He177 and Do217 from Rostov or even Mariupol.

Also what is a two year reserve in 1940 compared to the massive consumption rates of 1941-42? How much was lost in the attacks by the Germans and how much was destroyed? Beyond that its not like the Soviets couldn't have underanticipated consumption rates, all powers did in WW2.

Who?

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r. Sohbet Karbuz was born in Istanbul in 1965. He received his Bachelor of Science and Masters of Science degrees from the industrial engineering department of Istanbul Technical University, his PhD degree in natural sciences from the Technical University of Vienna and Postgraduate Diploma in economics from the Institute for Advanced Studies in Vienna.
He currently works at Observatoire Mediterraneen de l'Energie (an energy industry association) in Paris as director of its hydrocarbons division.
Before joining the OME in 2004, he was with the International Energy Agency in Paris, where he worked for as head of non-OECD energy statistics section and as administrator in the energy technology policy division. Previously, he worked as research associate and manager at several institutions in Austria, Turkey and Germany.
His main areas of interests are oil and natural gas markets, geopolitics, energy security, energy modeling and scenario building.
He is considered one of the foremost specialists on Soviet era energy policies and production

By whom and was it just for propaganda or something that was actually said by the locals? The government could call it that in propaganda, but that means nothing.

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Youd have to ask the guy above about where it came from.

Baku began the war as a critical element of Soviet Oil production, but it didnt stay that way. In 1937 Soviet Oil Production amounted to 10.7 million tons. This was considered the minum requirement incidentally of the wartime Soviet economy by the Committee of Defence.

In 1940 there was a production spike, as the Soviets stepped up to meet German Oil requirements as well as their own. Output spiked at 34 million tons. 1941 was another big year, at 33 million tons. Unquestionably the ability of Baku to operate enabled this production spoke to occur. Thereafter however, Baku and the Transcaucasus was steadily decommissioned as the threat of German occupation began to loom large. By July 1942, 1125 of the roughly 1800 wells in the Baku and Azerbaijan regions had been demolished, and this is reflected in Soviet oil production figures from 1942-5

In millions of tons, Soviet outputs were as follows

22.0 18.0 18.2 19.4

This is still well above the baseline numbers of 1937. Moreover, as a percentage of this, the transcaucasus was no longer as critical as it had been. Production in 1945 was about 11 million tons, so the Soviets were almost self sufficient, with or without Transcaucasus oil.

Imports from overseas never exceeded 4% of total production, so whilst that still might amount to a not inconsiderable 1 million tons or so, in the overall scheme of things, it was small fry for the Soviet economy. The most important contribution of foreign imports were in the high quality POLs which the Soviet petrochemical industry had a great deal of trouble with

What was the pre-expansion production and what was post expansion production? Raw numbers are more helpful than unqualified percentages. How big were those 5 fields that were discovered and what does 'huge' mean in terms of refining capacity built? How would it not be vulnerable to bombing?

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I dont know exactly, but more than half the POL workforce had been moved to the Urals and Central Asian economic zones by 1942. All I can say is that the shift to cent5ral Asian oil was substantial. Baku alone as an oil supply produced 25.4 million tons of the 34 million tons in 1940, and the remainder of the transcaucasus amounted to between 5 and 8 million tons. Altogether that accounts for somewhere between 30 and 33 million tons of the production totals. That's between 80 and 90%. By 1945, the whole of the Transcaucasus accounted for 11 million of the 19.5 million tons produced. Thats roughly 50% of total output. The Transcaucasus was still a critical part of the Soviet Oil production capability, but it was no longer the ace in the hole that it was in 1940.

As I said above the Soviets were getting all of Iranian oil from 1941 on via the Caspian, so they could survive Baku oil being cut in half, but they did suffer consequences in 1942-43 over the drop in oil output. Plus the Iranian oil shipment could be stopped up by mining the oil station at Atyrau, which well within range of the He177 and Do217 from Rostov or even Mariupol.

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Iranian Oil is largely irrelevant. In 1938 it produced less than 1 million tons of oil. in 1941, the british empire overall produced 7.4 million tons from the entire empire, including Burma, Iraq, iran and the gulf. Im not sure if those figures include Curacao, if they do, you can forget iranian oil as anything other than a distraction.

if there is any drop in production of any commodity, there are consequences, and so that of course includes oil. but was oil supply a critical factor in constraining Soviet production or military activities. I would suggest not. Their biggest constraints in 1942 were getting the available manpower trained up, and recovering from the shortages of artillery and aircraft that they wer still recovering from. In all of the contemporary material Ive see, oil shortages were never cited as a major constraint holding back the Soviets, partilcualry in 1942-3, which are the critical years. if youve got material that says diferently, Id love to see it.l

Also what is a two year reserve in 1940 compared to the massive consumption rates of 1941-42? How much was lost in the attacks by the Germans and how much was destroyed? Beyond that its not like the Soviets couldn't have underanticipated consumption rates, all powers did in WW2.

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We dont know the figures for the two year reserve, but in 1937 the annual consumption rate was pretty close to the production rate. Production at that time was 10.7 million tons. Whether this 2 year reserve was for the entire economy or just for military operations, I dont know. For the Japanese, their 18 month reserves were just for military operation,as was the reserve by the Italian Navy (which was a 2 year reserve and around 1 million tons). At a guess I would say it was for military operations only, and that for the Soviets around 30% of total consumption was for military purposes. if that guess is even close to right, that means their 2 year reserve was about 6-8 million tons

German interdiction of Soviet Oil reached its peak in 1942, and not by aircraft, but by physical occupation and interdiction of the rail and road links to Baku. Im not aware of significant interdiction of the Vaspian Sea, which in any event was linked by underwater pipeline from the middle of 1942 to western Kazakhstan. The Germans talkjed a lot about aerial interdiction, but in the end never had the resources to spare to undertake such an operation. They had maybe 35 aircraft, for example, to try and interdict the Black sea during the siege of Sevastopol. Germany was losing steamand power by the latter half of 1942, and simply diod not have the resources to spare for this kind of frippery.

Cool stuff, Parsifal.