Ideal night bomber for RAF: how would've you done it?

[Shortround6]

I simply dont get this argument that it was somehow not possible to design a high speed bomber using the technology of the "mid 30s"....I guess it depends on what is the "mid 30s", but if it includes 1938, then history shows that it definately was possible to design a high speed bomber with the technology available at that time. So its not a case of "historically posible", its a case of "historical fact". Both the germans with their Ju88, and the brits (more successfully IMO but a little later in development) with their Mosquito concepts were doing just that very thing....designing and dveloping a fast bomber using the technology developed in the immeditely preceding mid thirties technology.

This is an extract from the ubiquitous wiki that pretty succinctly describes what was happening in the dehavvilland world in the early 30's and onward.........

Part of the problem is the exact timing. Perhaps the British could have developed a high speed medium/heavy bomber counterpart to the Mosquito. However, from Wiki......

"The first operational sortie by a Mosquito was made by a PR Mk I on 17 September 1941 (the Bomber Mk IV entered service in May 1942 with No. 105 Squadron)"

Avro Manchester " Avro however persisted with the Vulture and the Manchester went into production, entering service with No. 207 Squadron of RAF Bomber Command in November 1940, flying its first operational mission on 24–25 February 1941 in a raid on the French port of Brest

The Short Stirling was in production in the summer of 1940 but a German air raid on the factory not only destroyed 6 airframes but set production back months.

The Halifax " The maiden flight of the Halifax took place on 24 September 1939 from RAF Bicester, just 21 days after the UK declared war on Germany."
"The Halifax entered service with No. 35 Squadron RAF at RAF Linton-on-Ouse in November 1940 and its first operational raid was against Le Havre on the night of 11–12 March 1941"

Now it is rather obvious that had the RAF gotten the stick out and tried to get the Mosquito going as a bomber it's first bomber operation could have been a lot closer to Sept of 1941 than May of 1942 but it is still 6 months to a year behind the British heavies. As one example of the "benefit" this gave the Mosquito, the Mosquito prototype flew with Merlin 21 engines instead of the Merlin X engines used in the Halifax. While the two engines have about the same 'nominal' hp for take off the Merlin 21, with it's "Hooker" supercharger had much better performance at altitude. The Mosquito was planed to have a 1000lb bomb load, it's demonstrated performance by the prototype lead to the every quick increase to 2000lbs and beyond.

Going from a 300mph bomber to a 360mph bomber requires about an 88% increase in engine power. Obviously streamlining helps but trying for a 4 engined fast bomber to show up at the same time as the regular British 4 engine planes may be pushing things a bit too far.

 

[wuzak]

As I suggested before, if fast unarmed bombers were deemed the way forward for the RAF it would have been in response to Volkert's paper, and would therefore have been formulated in 1938/39, possibly tendered in 1939, with a prototype flying, perhaps, in 1941. Production would be gearing up about 1943. I would suggest a twin engined aircraft, which would require more power than Merlins were expected to give at the time, so maybe the new Griffons would be a choice, but more likely Sabre, Vulture (if tender before cancellation) or Centaurus.

 

[stona]

Well my fellow countrymen were not exactly the darlings of BC , I know of aircrew that used to bomb from low altitudes to get out of the flak and other hazards. There was a lot of acrimony between the higher ups in the RAF and RCAF but that is a very different topic

I'd say they showed considerable initiative and don't blame them one bit! Mind you I'm not in charge of bomber command

Cheers
Steve

 

[stona]

As I suggested before, if fast unarmed bombers were deemed the way forward for the RAF it would have been in response to Volkert's paper, .

Quite right,and as I keep saying that opportunity was well and truly missed for doctrinal reasons at that time. I believe he wrote that paper in response to a request to Handley Page from the Air Ministry. The Air Ministry obviously didn't like what they saw. It seems no further action was taken.
Cheers
Steve

 

[Readie]

Nearly had you there SR6..

Cheers
John

 

[Readie]

Quite right,and as I keep saying that opportunity was well and truly missed for doctrinal reasons at that time. I believe he wrote that paper in response to a request to Handley Page from the Air Ministry. The Air Ministry obviously didn't like what they saw. It seems no further action was taken.
Cheers
Steve

The Air Ministry had to make some crunchy decisions bearing in mind that Britain was still in the grip of a depression. Maybe it all boiled down to cost. Nevertheless we ended up with almost the perfect fast bomber in the Mosquito and heavy bomber in the Lancaster. Luck or design / forward thinking? Pure luck I reckon....

If we look at the economic situation now and the modern battles being fought the same cost consciousness is there with the powers that be.I say no more other than 'body armour'.

Cheers
John

 

[tomo pauk]

While I do agree that UK was in the 'grip of the depression' in 1936, ditto for 'boiling out down to cost', those things did not prevented RAF to request 4 engined designs in that year. An unarmed bomber, of lower weight, with less crew fuel needed seems like a more affordable thing, than a bomber with MGs, more crew, more weight fuel.

 

[Siegfried]

SNIP LW tried to acquire both, yet failed. A day fighter Bf-110G-2 was barely able to make 350 mph, under 20,000ft that is. SNIP

A Me 110G2 managed 368 mph, presumably with the DB605 at 1.42 ata noteleistung.

With all NF gear, it's 320mph for 110G-4. Ju-88 was only a tad better, but with Jumo 213s from second half of 1944. Ta-154 ended before it started. He-217 managed to score vs. ordinary bomb trucks, those that cruised 250-300 mph.

Or maybe we need an "ideal German NF" thread, to give Germans a chance?

A Me 110G2 managed 595kmh/369 mph, presumably with the DB605 at 1.42 ata noteleistung. Not to bad but not good enough in consideration that it didn't have a bomb bay. The Me 410 was better in this regard: it did have a bomb bay.

There are things the Germans can do to speed up their standard aircraft: The Me 109G4/G6 are slightly re-engineered so that when the tail wheel was enlarged from about the G3/G4 onwards it can still be retracted as it was in the Me 109F and Me 109G1/G2. The gun bulges can also be streamlined. These two actions gain the aircraft about 10mph.

Ta 154 was Kurt Tanks FW 187 converted to wood. Had they stayed with the FW 187 the Luftwaffe would have had a high speed interceptor that could be configured to carry a second crew member (radar operator). The Ta 154 could have done the job depending on engine but once the TE-GO film glue factory was bombed it was no longer possible to make the plywood. Really the Ta 154 was started to late.

The DB605A1a engine might be upgraded with C3 fuel to run at 1.42 ata throughout 1942-43 as this rating was blocked much of the time, it might even be pushed to 1.55 ata.

The DB605D (with DB603 over sized supercharger) was running in 1942, the oversize supercharger could be released earlier. I suspect the impact to the Luftwaffe is reduced production rather than an immature engine.

A whole range of high altitude engines was suspended such as the DB628 that might have been useful.

The Jumo 222A3/B3 and Jumo 222E/F probably could be brought in to service in late 1943 or early 44 if it had of not been suspended or put on low priority.

The DB603A and Jumo 213 can do the job but the airframe to exploit them (eg Ta 154) is not there. Ideally the Jumo 213E/F or DB605L with two stage superchargers are hurried along.
He 219 was designed for the Jumo 222. The Me 410 with a DB605L probably makes a very fast night fighter due to the two stage supercharger. I estimated about 420mph.

The Germans have several problems

A 'super mosquito' is going to be flying at the limit of possible speed achievable by piston engined aircraft irrespective of engine count. Even if the Luftwaffe fields an aircraft 5% faster its not likely to be enough to get reliable intercepts. Since the aircraft are limited by compressibillity effects on propellors it becomes impossible to gain the speed advantage needed i.e. about 20%.

German airborne radar needs to dramatically improve aerial streamlining. This means either microwave radar (which they needed time to catch up on) or streamlined aerial rods (used in FuG 218 Neptunes in 1945)

 

[stona]

those things did not prevented RAF to request 4 engined designs in that year. An unarmed bomber, of lower weight, with less crew fuel needed seems like a more affordable thing, than a bomber with MGs, more crew, more weight fuel.

But it's exactly what Volkert suggested in his report to the Air Ministry and he was ignored.
Remember that as late as 1939 the Fairey Battle was considered by the men at the Ministry to be an adequate bomber. Infact it was worse than useless.
Cheers
Steve

 

[tomo pauk]

Then we could agree that Volkert was right, while Air Ministry was wrong?

 

[stona]

Then we could agree that Volkert was right, while Air Ministry was wrong?

Certainly,if you want a fast strategic bomber which was what this thread was about.
I think the Air Ministry was wrong in the same way that every pre war air force organisation was. Everyone believed that the armed bomber would get through in daylight.They believed it would fight its way through,hence the necessity for defensive armament. Even senior figures in RAF fighter Command envisaged lines of turret fighters engaging bomber formations in a fashion somewhat like a naval battle. With the benefit of hindsight we know this is nonsense.
In the end the RAF did a good job with what it had. It took a while but the area attacks,when a good concentration was achieved,were devastating. In the run up to the invasion Bomber Command showed that it was capable of accurately bombing relatively small tactical targets,something that Harris himself did not believe his crews to be capable of.
The Air Ministry may have got it wrong but it ended up with one of the best bombers,and certainly the best night bomber,of the of the war in the Lancaster.
Cheers
Steve

 

[Readie]

Certainly,if you want a fast strategic bomber which was what this thread was about.
I think the Air Ministry was wrong in the same way that every pre war air force organisation was. Everyone believed that the armed bomber would get through in daylight.They believed it would fight its way through,hence the necessity for defensive armament. Even senior figures in RAF fighter Command envisaged lines of turret fighters engaging bomber formations in a fashion somewhat like a naval battle. With the benefit of hindsight we know this is nonsense.
In the end the RAF did a good job with what it had. It took a while but the area attacks,when a good concentration was achieved,were devastating. In the run up to the invasion Bomber Command showed that it was capable of accurately bombing relatively small tactical targets,something that Harris himself did not believe his crews to be capable of.
The Air Ministry may have got it wrong but it ended up with one of the best bombers,and certainly the best night bomber,of the of the war in the Lancaster.
Cheers
Steve

We are judging the Air Ministry with the benefit of hindsight.A marvellous thing that enables us to see the mistakes made. However, at the time of the original decision who could have possibly foreseen the need for 24/7 bombing over Germany? A 'super mosquito' would have been a marvellous thing as would other equipment in WW2 ( like better infantry tanks)
The most important pieces were in place. Radar, the Spitfire Hurricane for the BoB and, DH had designed the Mosquito the Avro team developing what was to become the Lancaster in order to take the fight to Germany.
Cheers
John

 

[parsifal]

Part of the problem is the exact timing. Perhaps the British could have developed a high speed medium/heavy bomber counterpart to the Mosquito. However, from Wiki......

n fact, almost certainly they could have, and more relevantly, such a platform could have been in service considerably earlier than either the halifax or the Stirling and with far fewer production bottlenecks. DeHavilland, in response to Spec 13/36 proposed an upengined DH91, which according to to the Company could have delivered a 6000 lb bomload all the way to germany at a cruising speed of 270mph and a max speed (loaded) of 300mph. These craft would have had three defensive turrets, and would have entered production sooner than either the Halibag or the Stirling because they were made of wood, and in prewar Britain qualified workers able to work Duralumin were in very short supply. Thats a big reason why the large scale entry to service of the heavy types that you mentioned. in addition to the damaging Luftwaffe raids that you mention, there were also production bottlenecks due to shortfalls in a whole range of asdsociated industries, all of them with a direct effect on either engine, and/or airframe development and production. With an "off the shelf" proposal like the DH95, wooden construction methods were proposed, which in 1938-40 would have facilitated accelarated production early in the war, and allowed an earlier kickoff of the serious bombing campaign, rather than delay it. The situation would have been the exact opposite to what you are expecting....instead of delaying the commencement of the bomber offensive, it would have expedited it.

A bomber version of the Albatross was no mosquito, but at 300mph, carrying 6000lbs of bombs it was a more agile, and IMO more survivable option than a Halifax, with a cruise speed under load of about 180 knots and a max speed of about 240mph.

Now it is rather obvious that had the RAF gotten the stick out and tried to get the Mosquito going as a bomber it's first bomber operation could have been a lot closer to Sept of 1941 than May of 1942 but it is still 6 months to a year behind the British heavies. As one example of the "benefit" this gave the Mosquito, the Mosquito prototype flew with Merlin 21 engines instead of the Merlin X engines used in the Halifax. While the two engines have about the same 'nominal' hp for take off the Merlin 21, with it's "Hooker" supercharger had much better performance at altitude. The Mosquito was planed to have a 1000lb bomb load, it's demonstrated performance by the prototype lead to the every quick increase to 2000lbs and beyond.

Not at all, though it is a matter of opinion. The Mosquito as a concept was first mooted and its basic configuration worked out as early as 1938. It would take 2 year of unceasing and tireless persuasion to get the official spec written for it. If, by some miracle the Air Staff could have been brought round to the Mosquito concept, there is no reason not to expect the mosquito to be enterin service from late 1940 instead of 1942. Moreover, if the Albatross proposal had been pushed forward, the RAF would have had a fast medium bomber, not as good as the mosquito, but better than a halifax, from 1939. Its produceability, like the Mosquito would have been better, so ramping up of supply would not have been as problematic as the RAF heavies proved.

Going from a 300mph bomber to a 360mph bomber requires about an 88% increase in engine power. Obviously streamlining helps but trying for a 4 engined fast bomber to show up at the same time as the regular British 4 engine planes may be pushing things a bit too far.

I agree, but not for technological reason. For doctrinal reasons rather than technological reasons. A four engined version of the Mosquito was not that difficult or unusual in reality. The French with their BRE482 concept had shown that a 350mph heavy (ie 4 engines) bomber was a possibility in 1940, carrying a bombload of 8000lb. If the French could do it, with one of the most innefficient and late start aeronautical efforts for WWII, why couldnt the brits take a proven (well, proven subsequently at any rate....thats the weakness of the high speed bomber argument...in 1939 it was not proven....it was possible, and DeHavilland had the vision to see that potential, but the air staff were cautious and could not see it) design in 1939 and develop a world beater in 1941.

It all gets back to the policy and doctrinal decisions that were being made 1936-40. As Stona has pointed out, everybody believed in the concept of "the bomber will always get through" and the idea was that the heavily defended bomber would simply smash its way through the defences. add to that the fact that a revolution in fighter performance occurred, and at the time of the issuing of 13/36 the bombers would have been outperforming their fighter opposition, one begins to see why this mistake was made. moreover, a high performance bomber that isnt a high performance bomber is quite vulnerable....eg Do17 and He111 (and of course the poor old Blenheim), both thought uninterceptable in 1937, but by 1940 quite vulnerable

 

[Shortround6]

n fact, almost certainly they could have, and more relevantly, such a platform could have been in service considerably earlier than either the halifax or the Stirling and with far fewer production bottlenecks. DeHavilland, in response to Spec 13/36 proposed an upengined DH91, which according to to the Company could have delivered a 6000 lb bomload all the way to germany at a cruising speed of 270mph and a max speed (loaded) of 300mph. These craft would have had three defensive turrets, and would have entered production sooner than either the Halibag or the Stirling because they were made of wood, and in prewar Britain qualified workers able to work Duralumin were in very short supply. Thats a big reason why the large scale entry to service of the heavy types that you mentioned. in addition to the damaging Luftwaffe raids that you mention, there were also production bottlenecks due to shortfalls in a whole range of asdsociated industries, all of them with a direct effect on either engine, and/or airframe development and production. With an "off the shelf" proposal like the DH95, wooden construction methods were proposed, which in 1938-40 would have facilitated accelarated production early in the war, and allowed an earlier kickoff of the serious bombing campaign, rather than delay it. The situation would have been the exact opposite to what you are expecting....instead of delaying the commencement of the bomber offensive, it would have expedited it.

I could be wrong but that proposal probably carried no armor or self sealing tanks. The provision of which would affect bomb load or range or both. what kind of defensive turrets? The DeHavilland method of construction was not the normal aircraft wooded construction and British manufacture of wooden aircraft in the 1930s was not so great that a vast surplus of experienced wooden aircraft workmen were available. Much is made of the ability to use workmen from the furniture industry. I wonder how much of that was propaganda. I know some companies contributed and did well but not every table maker could make airplanes. A big hang up when trying to build a bomber force of hundreds if not thousands of aircraft are all the bits and pieces. Landing gear capable of dealing with 40,000lb and up aircraft, brakes, Hydraulic systems that will be needed regardless of airframe material. Spitfires got 3 pitch props because the constant speed units were going to the bombers. I think trying for a big wooden bomber would have been about the same as a metal one, no earlier into service but no later.

A bomber version of the Albatross was no mosquito, but at 300mph, carrying 6000lbs of bombs it was a more agile, and IMO more survivable option than a Halifax, with a cruise speed under load of about 180 knots and a max speed of about 240mph.

Both the speed and bomb load for the Albatross are questionable given the lack of protective equipment I noted above. It also looks a little suspicious when you figure that the Albatross needed 270hp per engine to do 200mph at 15,000ft (data from 1938 Jane's, may be in error) at that altitude with no other changes the Albatross should have needed just over 900hp per engine to do 300mph if the cube law is right (and my math). maybe a bit less power in the thinner air at higher altitudes but with only the Merlin X engine on offer in 1938/early 39 going much higher than 20,000ft for top speed or best cruising speed is out of the question. Numbers for the Halifax could be a bit under rated, what bomb load are they for? While the Halifax seldom carried it's 13,000lb max load they could be for a load greater than 6,000lbs. The Halifax was also carrying the structure to deal with a 13,000lb load even when it wasn't fully loaded. A Halifax built to carry just 6000lbs could have had a smaller wing, smaller landing gear, lighter spars, fuselage, etc.

Not at all, though it is a matter of opinion. The Mosquito as a concept was first mooted and its basic configuration worked out as early as 1938. It would take 2 year of unceasing and tireless persuasion to get the official spec written for it. If, by some miracle the Air Staff could have been brought round to the Mosquito concept, there is no reason not to expect the mosquito to be enterin service from late 1940 instead of 1942. Moreover, if the Albatross proposal had been pushed forward, the RAF would have had a fast medium bomber, not as good as the mosquito, but better than a halifax, from 1939. Its produceability, like the Mosquito would have been better, so ramping up of supply would not have been as problematic as the RAF heavies proved.

It also took a while for the proposal to actual settle down, while wiki claims " twin Merlin engined Albatross, armed with three gun turrets and a six-man crew.[10] It would carry 6,000 pounds (2,700 kg) of bombs to Berlin and return at 11,000 feet (3,400 m). It had a total weight of 19,000 pounds (8,600 kg), a top speed of 300 miles per hour (480 km/h) and cruise speed of 268 miles per hour (431 km/h) at 22,500 feet (6,900 m)." One can see that somebody was being a bit optimistic. After all a Handley Page Hampden weighed just under 19,000lbs Normal loaded, had two gun positions (not turrets) 4 men, a top speed of 254mph and a range of 1850 miles with a 2,000lb load. Or compare it to a an Early B-25 without power turrets. A latter proposal according to one source called for " A two Merlin compromise design was arrived at on 11 August, with a bomb load of 4,000 lb., a top speed of 260 mph and a range of 1,500 miles" this in 1938. Ramping up supply hits the same roadblocks as every other program. All the bits and pieces that go into any airplane regardless of the air-frame material. And you still need jigs and fixtures wither you are building in wood or metal.

I agree, but not for technological reason. For doctrinal reasons rather than technological reasons. A four engined version of the Mosquito was not that difficult or unusual in reality. The French with their BRE482 concept had shown that a 350mph heavy (ie 4 engines) bomber was a possibility in 1940, carrying a bombload of 8000lb. If the French could do it, with one of the most innefficient and late start aeronautical efforts for WWII, why couldnt the brits take a proven (well, proven subsequently at any rate....thats the weakness of the high speed bomber argument...in 1939 it was not proven....it was possible, and DeHavilland had the vision to see that potential, but the air staff were cautious and could not see it) design in 1939 and develop a world beater in 1941.

Maybe you have different sources than I do. According to the books I have the French didn't do it. Not only didn't they fly in 1940 (one flew in 1947) but the proposed bomb load was 5500lbs not 8000lbs. Max speed with 1940 engines was estimated at 326mph. Cruise speed was 248mph, range not given but with the 5500lb load full fuel was supposed to be 693imp gallons. Not a lot for four 1100hp engines. More fuel meant less bombs.
The 350mph (or above) speed was achieved post war but the engines offered 1500hp for take off and hundreds more hp at altitude than the 1940 engines.

This goes back to the technological reason. The Merlin X engine doesn't really offer the performance needed for the concept to work. The Merlin XX does, an extra 20% or more of power at 20,000ft for less than 50lbs per engine. In 1938 (Hooker goes to work at R-R in Jan) the XX isn't even a speck on the horizon and nobody's engines offer the power to weight at 20,000ft that the Merlin XX will in under two years.

 

[tomo pauk]

What kind of performance (max cruise speed) would we need for 'our' bomber, in order to avoid interception by historic LW NFs, per year? At 20 kft, perhaps 280 mph in 1941, 300 in 1942, then, in 1943, we go to 25kft with 300 mph, and 330 in 1944?

 

[Siegfried]

The speed advantage an fighter needs over a bomber should probably be at least 10% and at least 20%, however even with 5% speed advantages intercepts would still occur though rare and almost exclusively from the rear. The question then is how to defend the bomber. The Mosquito relied upon evasive maneuvers and diving into clouds (during daylight) however a scaled up 4 engined Mosquito would be limited in its audibility to do this. Given our ideal Bomber Command bomber is a night bomber it is likely to be very fast compared to a radar equipped German night fighter which will be burdened by external aerials. Since the RAF bomber is lightly armed or unarmed the Luftwaffe night-fighter can afford to dispense with guns and Armour as well. Historically the specialist Mosquito hunters were not very successful but what armament arrangement is possible.

I suspect a single manned tail gun position, streamlined along American practices would cost up to 5% in speed. A remote controlled tail turret periscopically aimed creates demands for sophisticated narrow/wide angle optics and either hydraulic remote controls using mechanical linkages or electrical remote control as in naval gun practices (synchros)

 

[stona]

My hunch is that the speed advantage for the night fighter does not need to be very great. Their most succesful tactic was to insert themselves into the bomber stream before selecting a target and maneuvering into a firing position. It was hardly 'boom and zoom'!
If the bomber saw the fighter and started evasive maneuvers the fighter would almost invariably break off the attack and seek a less alert victim.
Cheers
Steve

 

[Siegfried]

Stona, the problem the Luftwaffe night fighter forced faced was that jamming reduced the range of their early warning radars while 'spoof' raids which dropped a great deal of windows to simulate the appearance of a much larger bomber force, this would then breakoff and turn into a minning mission. The "Nachtjagd" would firstly head to intercept the diversionary raid and find itself over the wrong part of Germany when the real intention of the raid became apparent. With only a modest speed advantage the night fighters would burn out engines or run short of of fuel. Of course it depended on the state of the Luftwaffe's radar. At times anti-jamming measures would regain the upper hand over bomber command or a new radar (like SN-2) would gain the upper hand for a while.

The Germans introduced a coherant pulse doppler system to overcome windows called "Wurzlaus" and then more advanced versions "Tastlaus" and finally "k-laus" that was effectively in overcomming windows but they also a year latter faced nosie jamming (carpet) which greatly degraded their radars and when combined with windows. Because they had suspended their microwave work in 1942 in favour of developing existing radars due to manpower issue (they were about to halve the wavelength of their radars to 27cm) the 53cm wavelengths of a Wurzburg radar produced a half power beam width of about 15-20 degrees if they had of been using 27cm wavelengths the beam would have been 1/2 as wide and intercepted 1/4th as much jamming or windows, if 9cm it would have been 1/36th as much. They also fell behined in boosting the power output of their radars: the Wurzberg radar produced an 8kw impulse but a version with 160kW that could burn through jamming (Wurberg Reisen Gigant) was very rare.

Although the Nightfighters were effective once swimming in the bomber stream it was extremely hard to get there. In additon they also had to contend with the deadliest night fighter of the war: the Mosquito.

 

[stona]

Absolutely correct and yet they managed to inflict a crippling rate of attrition on Bomber Command throughout 1943 and 1944. Sometimes,as at Hamburg the technology and circumstances favoured the bombers. At other times fate favoured the night fighters. I think of the routing of the infamous Nuremberg raid of 30/3/44. A turn South of Brussels and then a 25 minute straight flight directly at beacons 'Ida' and 'Otto' and then a further 35 minutes in a straight line having passed them! Even falling for the spoof raid on Berlin somewhere between 12 and 17 nightfighter still managed to get into the bomber stream departing from Peenemunde and caused carnage. It didn't need a lot of fighters to cause havoc.
Cheers
Steve

Homing in on a 'Monica' equipped Mosquito rather than a four engined bomber must have given a few night fighter pilots a nasty,sometimes fatal,surprise.

Cheers
Steve

 

[fastmongrel]

I have read that there were proposals to fit RR Nene jets to the Lanc. Does anyone have any performance figures for this a quick google doesnt bring anything up. I imagine the main problem would be range with the thirsty jets.