Ideal night bomber for RAF: how would've you done it? (1 Viewer)

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What recommends the B-25 for the role?

Sorry for that - for some reason I read 'light' bomber instead of 'night'. But my point would be to still use USA for bombers and concentrate on fighters in my country. Practical use of resources. If I can get the USA to build bombers and fly them to UK then there isn't a major need to have many convoys bringing that much more material.
 
Since a big part of the night bomber campaign would be the use of incendiary devices i might expand on a medium to large sized bomber like the Lanc, focusing on
the bombbay compartment to hold a max load and increase in spread. Probably something similar to how they converted post war B-25s and 26s to firefighter aircraft.

A new plane similar to a C-130 could be possible.
200px-YC-130s_formation_usaf.jpg

A large cargo bay that could hold a larger load of incendiary sticks.
The more you can carry the less bombers you'd need.
With less flak to worry about at night i don't see a light armored cargo ship being more than effective in this roll.
Rather than relying on 10 Lancs, you might only require 3 or 4 of these to do the incendiary part.

The low level raids would still be better suited for Mosquitoes.

The incendiary part of the load was complemented by the large,usually 4000lb, 'cookie',effectively a blast bomb to blow in roofs and windows,allowing the incendiaries to fall into and ignite the buildings. H.E. and delayed action bombs were also needed to disrupt infrastructure,communications and water supplies in order to hamper fire fighting efforts.
The Lancaster bomb bay was ideal for various mixed loads as it was not partitioned having originally been designed to be capable of holding a torpedo. You would struggle to improve on it in the 1940s.
Cheers
Steve
 
The principal flaw with almost all WW2 bombers is that they were predicated on pre-radar tactical concepts. They assumed that an intercept was so hard to achieve that it would be late in the bombers mission and by small numbers of fighters. Radar ensured that the intercept would be by massed numbers of fighters early in the mission. Hence most bombers compromised speed somewhat; this wasn't helped by the slowness of 'dogfighter' style fighters specs and weak engines which favored twin engine speeds.

The most successful bomber of the war was the DeHaviland Mosquito: in terms of load, range, efficiency in fuel usage and crew usage it was unparalleled. Lack of wood limited its production. In sufficient numbers and with suitable P-51 escorts it probably could have carried out the day offensive against the Reich.

So a 4 engined mosquito made of a mixture of wood and alloy, configured so as to be as fast as single engined fighters with the same power, would be my spec. The larger size of such an aircraft would allow for some kind of basic defensive armament, perhaps a single remotely fired tail gun, though I doubt it would be necessary in most instances; post war the RAF completely abandoned defensive armament for the v-bombers.
 
SNIP At 22000 feet, the principal German AA weapon is inneffective. at a cruising (with bombload) speed of 323mph, vs German fighters will have a much harder time intercepting the bomber force. Me110s and Ju88s will have no hope in a stern chase situation, which was the method used in night interceptions
.

The 8.8cm FLAK 37 is certainly loosing effectiveness however the 12.8cm FLAK 40 and 10.5cm FLAK 38 are effective and even the super powerful new 8.8cm cm flak 41 is available in small numbers from 1942 (it had problems converting from brass to steel cartridges). The FLAK 41 was seen as answer to Oboe equipped Mosquitoes.

So the Luftwaffe FLAK regiments can be re-equipped though it would be costly; the FLAK 37's can be sent to the front, perhaps on new AT optimized carriages. You probably tend to create a AT gun shortage at the front.

The DB605D (with big supercharger) was running in 1942, so the Germans would have to bring forward this engine or the DB628. All up it creates a production problem for the Germans who have to think in terms of uncompromising quality rather than quantity. For instance they would have to re-engineer the Me 109 to ensure the tail wheel continued to retract in the G4/G6 and that the drag robbing bulges were smoother over.

For night fighters the Germans would need to put their best DB603, Jumo 213 and BMW801 engines on cleaned up Ju 88's immediately.
 
"So a 4 engined mosquito made of a mixture of wood and alloy, configured so as to be as fast as single engined fighters with the same power, would be my spec".

'Avro Lancaster' by Francis Mason lists the various bomb loads carried by Lancaster bombers,including the rather special 'Tallboy' and 'Grand Slam' bombs though not the famous 'Upkeep' bouncing mine. The typical weight for a load is around 12,000lbs.
The Mosquito could carry a maximum load of 4000lbs. You are attempting to triple the bomb load,enlarge the airframe,add two engines and still maintain the performance (at least speed) of the original aircraft. The Lancaster's bomb bay is 33' long. I don't believe that is possible.
You'd probably end up with something remarkably like the Lancaster!

Regarding Flak,a post war study estimated that a German Flak gun fired,on average,16,000 shells for every aircraft destroyed.
Not a particularly good return.

By far the greatest threat to the night bomber was the specialised night fighter. When they got into the bomber stream in numbers they caused carnage. It beggars belief that the Luftwaffe squandered this valuable and expensive (in terms of technology and training) resource in pointless daytime operations against the USAAF.

Cheers
Steve
 
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The Lancaster was the best night bomber of WWII. It was very expensive (about £50,000 in 1943/4)

The price fell later in the war. The average price the government paid for a Lancaster was just under £32,000.
 
Since a big part of the night bomber campaign would be the use of incendiary devices i might expand on a medium to large sized bomber like the Lanc, focusing on
the bombbay compartment to hold a max load and increase in spread. Probably something similar to how they converted post war B-25s and 26s to firefighter aircraft.

A new plane similar to a C-130 could be possible.

A large cargo bay that could hold a larger load of incendiary sticks.
The more you can carry the less bombers you'd need.
With less flak to worry about at night i don't see a light armored cargo ship being more than effective in this roll.
Rather than relying on 10 Lancs, you might only require 3 or 4 of these to do the incendiary part.

The low level raids would still be better suited for Mosquitoes.

You do realize that the C-130 started with engines of least 3500hp? about three times the power of the first Lancaster engines and double the power of the later engines? The C-130 went over 4000hp per engine very quickly.

Avro had a transport in the works using the Lancaster wing.

Avro York - Warbird Photo Album

But it didn't carry any more weight than a Lancaster.
 
yeah, 4000hp is a lot for that time.
I hadn't seen the output of the T56 til after my post.


I think designing a similar aircraft would be doable at the expense of a slightly smaller design.
The main point is getting enough cargo bay space similar to that of the 130.
It might not get the same load capacity (72k pounds) either, but none the less a good goal.
If you think of the C-17 and proceeding C-5 as the evolved versions of the C-130, then i'd be looking to design the prequel to the C-130.
There are other cargo designs of the late 40s and early 50s that might also fit a similar design curve.
There wasn't really anything with that kind of versatility around in ww2, which might have more to do with the lack of available horsepower as you mentioned.
 
The price fell later in the war. The average price the government paid for a Lancaster was just under £32,000.

The 1943 price I've noted,probably from Mason,is £42,000,equivalent to nearly £1,500,000 today. Given that production didn't peak until March 1945 with 260 aircraft that month,compared with an average 1943 monthly production total of around 100-110 aircraft, I imagine that the average figure would be skewed by the economies of scale in late war production.
The strategic bombing programme was still a massive investment. 7379 Lancasters were built along with several other types. I see all sorts of figures bandied about,some claiming it absorbed as much as half of Britain's total war budget. This leads to the questions about whether the campaign waged by Harris gave a good return on this huge investment. Maybe that's a subject for a different thread.
Cheers
Steve
 
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"So a 4 engined mosquito made of a mixture of wood and alloy, configured so as to be as fast as single engined fighters with the same power, would be my spec".

'Avro Lancaster' by Francis Mason lists the various bomb loads carried by Lancaster bombers,including the rather special 'Tallboy' and 'Grand Slam' bombs though not the famous 'Upkeep' bouncing mine. The typical weight for a load is around 12,000lbs.
The Mosquito could carry a maximum load of 4000lbs. You are attempting to triple the bomb load,enlarge the airframe,add two engines and still maintain the performance (at least speed) of the original aircraft. The Lancaster's bomb bay is 33' long. I don't believe that is possible.
You'd probably end up with something remarkably like the Lancaster!

Regarding Flak,a post war study estimated that a German Flak gun fired,on average,16,000 shells for every aircraft destroyed.
Not a particularly good return.

By far the greatest threat to the night bomber was the specialised night fighter. When they got into the bomber stream in numbers they caused carnage. It beggars belief that the Luftwaffe squandered this valuable and expensive (in terms of technology and training) resource in pointless daytime operations against the USAAF.

Cheers
Steve


Hi Steve


The problem with the large, multi engined, defended bomber is that it was not a very survivable weapon system. Losses were heavy in all the heavy bombers, not just Lancs. The main problem was that with the engines available, it was not possible to get much in the way of speed, whilst carrying a heavy bombload, retaining a heavy defensive armament and achieving the range required. The Brits had to sacrifice something in that design mix, and they opted for a drop in performance. I believe that was a wrong decision. The problem was not helped in the defended bomber concept by the generally poor aerodynamics in all of these designs.

The bombers were effective, I am not one of those who believes the efforts of bomber command were a waste. They wreaked greater destruction on Germany than the US bombers ever did, and at least equalled the destruction on German production and transport systems. They could have wreaked at least as much damage on oil facilities, if Harris had accepted this as a primary target earlier. They would have suffered far fewer casualties if Harris had not chosen his primary target as Berlin after hamburg. I can accept all of that, but in my opinion these genre of aircraft suffered greatly nevertheless, and might have done far better with an enlarged (4 engine) derivative of the Mosquito). It might have been an design based on the Lanc....there was nothing wrong with the lancaster frame....but cleaned up and stripped of armament, with reduced bombload, survivability is going to increase for every bit of speed added to the bomber. With greater speed comes far greater survivability, with greater survivability comes a far more rapid exansion of the force, with a rapid expansion of the force, numbers make up for the reduced bombloads....there is a roll on effect right the way down the equation.

Certainly the high speed bomber was the formula followed after the war, rather than the slow defended bomber concept that had dominated thinking before the war.

The amount of ammunition expended by flak for each kill varied greatly as the war progressed. In 1942, the average flak expenditure per kill was about 3000 rpk according to Westermann (Flak -1939-45). The often quoted figure of 16000 rpk is based on the Lufwaffe quarter masters returns for the latter half of 1944, drawn up at a time when untrained replacements were being used to man a greatly expanded, but grossly less efficient flak arm, equipped with, by that stage, outmoded and largely worn out artillery and whose radar equipped batteries (which were doing the lions share of actual kills) had had their performancce greatly reduced by allied countermeasures.
 
I see all sorts of figures bandied about,some claiming it absorbed as much as half of Britain's total war budget.

I've never seen an original source for that figure. The closest I can find is that bomber production (some of which went to Med, Coastal Command etc) took up 45% of the Ministry of Aircraft Production effort.

Of course, MAP was just a small part of the war effort overall.

In total Bomber Command absorbed about 3.5 million man years. That compares to a total of 45 million man years expended on all the armed forces.

Bomber Command used up 7% of the British war effort.
 
The problem of survivability affected bombers both by night and by day and was,as you rightly say,a problem rooted in pre war thinking. It was too late to start from scratch when the realisation that bombers couldn't defend themselves sank in. I realise that we are talking hypothetically and would agree that a fast heavy bomber would have been a better solution. It wouldn't need defensive armament and would require a smaller crew. Unfortunately,even discounting pre war doctrine, I don't believe that anyone could have built a bomber capable of cruising at around 300 mph and carrying 12,000lbs of bombs which could have been in service in 1941.
The RAF tried to protect its bombers with technological and operational methods. 'Window' famously worked for a while and later elaborate planning and spoofs as well as attempts to jam the German controllers' commentaries or even imitate them sometimes worked.'Monica' would warn a bomber that enemy radar was illuminating it but it didn't take long for the Germans to develop a system (Flensburg) to home in on this. Intruders had limited success too. Harris actually wanted 'provision of nightfighter support on a substantial scale' which makes me wonder just how much of a grasp he had of the operational problems faced by his crews. It was Bennett,who did such a tremendous job with his Pathfinders,who observed that one of the great failings in Bomber Commands leadership was that no other senior officer besides himself (he had flown an operational tour) had any grasp of the operational conditions under which their crews fought,because they had not flown combat missions in this war.
They never attempted to develop a high speed,heavy,strategic bomber because they had taken the wrong fork in the road years earlier.
Cheers
Steve
 
1 USD = .21 British pound.
So...
A 1943 Lancaster bomber cost about $ 238,095. About the same as an American made B-17 or B-24. Not cheap but not gold plated either.
 
The incendiary part of the load was complemented by the large,usually 4000lb, 'cookie',effectively a blast bomb to blow in roofs and windows,allowing the incendiaries to fall into and ignite the buildings. H.E. and delayed action bombs were also needed to disrupt infrastructure,communications and water supplies in order to hamper fire fighting efforts.
The Lancaster bomb bay was ideal for various mixed loads as it was not partitioned having originally been designed to be capable of holding a torpedo. You would struggle to improve on it in the 1940s.
Cheers
Steve


Steve, I completely agree with you. The key to the Lancaster's success was its flexibility.
Without going over old ground with the merits of other bombers, this is the unarguable advantage the Lancaster held till cessation of the WW2 in Europe.
We could theorise about an improvement in speed etc till the cows come home, but the one thing that Bomber command needed to improve most of all was its leadership skills and 'hands on' experience.
Cheers
John
 
I've never seen an original source for that figure. The closest I can find is that bomber production (some of which went to Med, Coastal Command etc) took up 45% of the Ministry of Aircraft Production effort.

Of course, MAP was just a small part of the war effort overall.

In total Bomber Command absorbed about 3.5 million man years. That compares to a total of 45 million man years expended on all the armed forces.

Bomber Command used up 7% of the British war effort.

Indeed,as I said all sorts of figures get thrown into the melting pot! 7% of the total war effort would be as low as I have seen but I'm not able to argue the statistics as I simply don't have enough information. It was a vast expenditure in men and material whatever the figures are.
Cheers
Steve
 
Indeed,as I said all sorts of figures get thrown into the melting pot! 7% of the total war effort would be as low as I have seen but I'm not able to argue the statistics as I simply don't have enough information. It was a vast expenditure in men and material whatever the figures are.
Cheers
Steve

There were no simple answers on the reasons why the death rate among aircrews was higher during different periods but, the state of aircrew training and experience, quality of equipment, weather, and the German defences all played a part.

If one looks that the percentage monthly loss rate of aircraft in Bomber Command over the winter of 1943/44 for example, it can be seen that the rate reached a peak of 5.6% in January 1944 and then began to decrease in February and March 1944 - perversely these being months when the Command suffered many of the highest numerical losses on individual raids - the % loss rate for the last three months of 1943 and the first five months of 1944 being 3.9%, 4.0%, 5.3%, 5.6%, 5.2%, 3.6%, 2.4%, 3.2%, 2.4%. Yet this was supposedly a period (i.e. Jan-Mar 1944) before the invasion when the German defences were at their peak, yet they saw the start in the decline of the percentage loss rate. Source: 'The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany 1939-1945 Volume IV.

Horrendous losses.
John
 
the one thing that Bomber command needed to improve most of all was its leadership skills and 'hands on' experience.
Cheers
John

Yes indeed John,Harris very nearly destroyed his own force during the five months of the Battle of Berlin. His comand lost 1,128 aircraft,mostly four engined bombers. Even the Pathfinders lost about 150% of their establishment! In one seven day period,which included the Nuremberg debacle, Bomber Command lost 190 bombers (73 in Berlin,9 in Essen and 108 in Nuremberg). This was not a sustainable rate of loss. After all this,though Harris never conceded defeat,the OFFICIAL history wrote that "...the German fighter force had interposed itself between Bomber Command and its strategic objective...". A nice way of saying that the Luftwaffe had won this battle.
The German night fighters suffered losses too though their worse enemy was,statistically at least,themselves. Running out of fuel and belly landing or crashing on unfamiliar aitfields were popular methods of damaging or writing off their expensive aircraft.
One unfortunate crew from NJG 6 got lost and force landed in Switzerland!
Cheers
Steve
 
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Yes indeed John,Harris very nearly destroyed his own force during the five months of the Battle of Berlin. His comand lost 1,128 aircraft,mostly four engined bombers. Even the Pathfinders lost about 150% of their establishment! In one seven day period,which included the Nuremberg debacle, Bomber Command lost 190 bombers (73 in Berlin,9 in Essen and 108 in Nuremberg). This was not a sustainable rate of loss. After all this,though Harris never conceded defeat,the OFFICIAL history wrote that "...the German fighter force had interposed itself between Bomber Command and its strategic objective...". A nice way of saying that the Luftwaffe had won this battle.
The German night fighters suffered losses too though their worse enemy was,statistically at least,themselves. Running out of fuel and belly landing or crashing on unfamiliar aitfields were popular methods of damaging or writing off their expensive aircraft.
One unfortunate crew from NJG 6 got lost and force landed in Switzerland!
Cheers
Steve

Steve,Yes, another British Commander in the vein of Haig. Jeez. Its incredible that we any resources after the BoB !
Cheers
John
 
Seems high speed bomber is in favor here.

My proposal would be Merlinized Mixmaster (XB-42). Or, later, Griffonized :)
 
John the reason those losses pan out like that is because in January 1944 the Battle of Berlin was lost. Most of the attacks in February were against less dangerous targets in southern and western Germany. Another major raid on Berlin did not occurr until March 24th and bomber command lost 73 bombers or 9.1% of aircraft dispatched. By early March the commitment to the invasion had started to divert Bomber Command to targets in France. The Luftwaffe night fighters had made the skies over the Reich too dangerous for Bomber Command to risk frequent deep penetration raids but the Luftwaffe was unable to tranpose that success to the skies over the occupied western countries,principally France. There are many reasons for this but overall the night fighter defence system was designed for defence of the Reich,German cities,not French marshalling yards.

We all look at these figures,73 bombers lost,9.1% of aircraft dispatched and sometimes lose sight of the men that this represents. Whatever I may feel,with the benefit of 70 years of hindsight,about the strategic bombing campaign my admiration for these men knows no bounds.They were a special breed and we owe them an immense debt.

Cheers
Steve
 
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