If the RAF had been defeated in the Battle of Britain
- Thread starter DogFather
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Good post Yulzari, the eventual fate of the Spanish armada illustrates exactly what you are talking about. Many of the ships and crews were built and used in the Mediterranean sea. They made it to Gravellines OK in good weather but when attacked and sailed into the North sea they ran in to serious trouble, less than a third made it back to Spain and almost none of them were sea worthy despite few being sunk by enemy action.
The barges themselves proved remarkably sea worthy. I posted on this in some other thread. Even the Germans were surprised how well they coped in sea states rougher than expected.
The problems were the nature of the tows, rudimentary (being polite) communications and some very complicated manoeuvering both at assembly and particularly at the approaches to the landing grounds. Some German officers didn't believe that it was possible in a calm sea, in daylight and unopposed.
The plans for unloading the transports and landing the men and materiel from them were just as 'optimistic'.
The more you look into the detail of the plans, the more improbable they become. The senior naval officers expressing relief at the cancellation of Sealion knew exactly what would have happened to their makeshift invasion fleet.
Cheers
Steve
The problems were the nature of the tows, rudimentary (being polite) communications and some very complicated manoeuvering both at assembly and particularly at the approaches to the landing grounds. Some German officers didn't believe that it was possible in a calm sea, in daylight and unopposed.
The plans for unloading the transports and landing the men and materiel from them were just as 'optimistic'.
The more you look into the detail of the plans, the more improbable they become. The senior naval officers expressing relief at the cancellation of Sealion knew exactly what would have happened to their makeshift invasion fleet.
Cheers
Steve
The invasion fleet would be like a convoy, if you have a designated landing area and some of the towed barges cannot get there because of the current what do you do, choose another beach or let some make their way to somewhere else?
parsifal
Colonel
According to Paul Watson (http://dionysus.biz/NavalGunnery.html) "The Evolution of Naval Gunnery (1900 to 1945)" .
"From 1890 through 1945 a continuous stream of technological improvements increased battleship big gun effectiveness in terms of:
Battle ranges increased as percentage hits grew throughout the period. In 1898, 2% hits was achieved by the Americans in the Spanish American War at ranges of approximately 2000 yards. By 1905, the Japanese achieved 20% hits at battle ranges of 6500 yards in the Russo-Japanese War. By World War I, 3% to 4% was achievable under the worst sea conditions at 14000 yards range. During the interwar years, 15% hits at 15000 yards was a realistic battle expectation using optical fire control".
These estimates apply to Battleships, firing at 'typical ranges" 9which began in the 1890s at just a few thousand yards and progressed through to the 1930's to about 14-16000 yds, at targets travelling at normal speeds and manouvering in a normal way. Here we have a convoy, restricted in its ability to manouver by the need to maintain formation and the fact that the barges are under tow (by definition requiring the vessels to hoist appropriate signal flags to indicate a restricted ability to manouver and excercising their sea movement accordingly). These vessels are lagely undefended , but will be escorted by vessels with a typical armament of 20mm and 37mm cannon. A few of the escorts would be armed with 75mm guns.
The invasion convoy was expected to occupy a sea area of about 20km by 15km overall (if the German army plan was adopted you could basically double that). Assuming the convoy is roughly elliptical in shape, there will be 53 miles of convoy perimeter to patrol with roughly 100 warships, of which 19 could be considered "major warships' (the DKM Zerstorers and torpedobootes). The vorpostenboote (armed trawlers) are not fully known as to armament, but a reasonable estimate might be that 20 of these vessels were armed with 75mm weapons. That gives us 3 DDs, 6 TBs, 10 vorpostenbootes) and about 29 other vessels with which to escort this great mass of vulnerable ships.
Assuming a 50% presence at any time (a DD on escort had an endurance of about 5-6 days, for an operation lasting 11 days, they will need to refuel at least twice, smaller warships have an endurance even shorter. Then there is the unknown variable of after action replenishment. A 50% availability is being massively optimistic for the germans).
The spacing of our estimated escort force is one "proper warship" every 6 miles, a somewhat less effective VP craft also at every 6 miles, and the rest spaced at about 1 warship every 2miles. Altogether, there might be a warship of some description spaced at 1 every 1 to 1.5 miles, with no reserves, no command and control vessels and no interior patrollers for the convoy.
As the attacker, with more than 60 DDs immediately available and maybe 40 MGB and MTBs, I wouldn't be able to attack in one go and I would want to maximise surpise if possible. If not surprise, then attack with the defenders having the least possible opportunity of forewarning. Necessarily that means attacking at night. To ensure a continuous attack, I would attack in waves, separated by say 30 mins. The maximum distance to target is about 80 miles, the minimum is 10 miles. Looking at a compromise of 60mile, there is a 2 hour approach time (for ships already at sea), say a one hour engagement and then withdrawal. To ensure the convoy is under continuous pressure, I would need to break my attacks into at least 4 waves, each separated by about 30 mins. With four waves, I can expect attacks with about 16-18 DDs in each wave. There would be at least two of these waves attacking at any given time, prefereably from different sides of the convoy. I would use my MGBs as a pinning force, bolstered by one flotilla 96 ships) of DDs. Two full flotillas of Dds should be clear to pass through the gap so formed by these blockers, firing torpedoes, firing guns, firing light weapons, dropping depth charges as they go, to pass though the middle of the convoy and come out the other side. I would use my heavier ships to lay suppressive fire onto the convoy, forcing the DKM to take evasive action and quite unable to react by concentrating. I would try to increase the confusion by night air attack by any remaining bombers. Ahead of the convoy, I would use some of my slower escort ships and the minlayers, to lay a mine barrage in the path of the convoy.
I would repeat this operation for as many nights as the convoy was at sea. If the convoy is at sea for say 7 days, with each of my attackers sinking just one ship each per sortie, and each ship able to undertake two sorties per night 9a not unreasonable estimate of activity), we can expect at the end of that seven days of continuous action do see at least 504 ships of the invasion fleet to be sunk, of which many would be the tow ships. Impossible to know what proportions of tow ships but probably at least 150, which effectely doubles the losses for those ships. At the end of the "initial" battles, I would expect to see at least 650 barges unable to land, probably sunk. I have no idea of the losses to mines and night air attack but one would expect some degree of loss.
And we have yet to commit the bulk of the coastal forces to finish off this ill considered venture by the germans
RN losses would be unknown, but from the 3rd or 4th day we can expect to see the arrival of emergency reserves from the north and west. They would amount to at least another 40 DDs according to Admiralty sources.
As I said, for the life of me, I cannot understand the logic of anyone claiming a billet in this invasion fleet was safe, nothing to worry about and likely to make it across the ditch without a scratch
"From 1890 through 1945 a continuous stream of technological improvements increased battleship big gun effectiveness in terms of:
- Battle ranges
- Hit percentages
- Firing rates
Battle ranges increased as percentage hits grew throughout the period. In 1898, 2% hits was achieved by the Americans in the Spanish American War at ranges of approximately 2000 yards. By 1905, the Japanese achieved 20% hits at battle ranges of 6500 yards in the Russo-Japanese War. By World War I, 3% to 4% was achievable under the worst sea conditions at 14000 yards range. During the interwar years, 15% hits at 15000 yards was a realistic battle expectation using optical fire control".
These estimates apply to Battleships, firing at 'typical ranges" 9which began in the 1890s at just a few thousand yards and progressed through to the 1930's to about 14-16000 yds, at targets travelling at normal speeds and manouvering in a normal way. Here we have a convoy, restricted in its ability to manouver by the need to maintain formation and the fact that the barges are under tow (by definition requiring the vessels to hoist appropriate signal flags to indicate a restricted ability to manouver and excercising their sea movement accordingly). These vessels are lagely undefended , but will be escorted by vessels with a typical armament of 20mm and 37mm cannon. A few of the escorts would be armed with 75mm guns.
The invasion convoy was expected to occupy a sea area of about 20km by 15km overall (if the German army plan was adopted you could basically double that). Assuming the convoy is roughly elliptical in shape, there will be 53 miles of convoy perimeter to patrol with roughly 100 warships, of which 19 could be considered "major warships' (the DKM Zerstorers and torpedobootes). The vorpostenboote (armed trawlers) are not fully known as to armament, but a reasonable estimate might be that 20 of these vessels were armed with 75mm weapons. That gives us 3 DDs, 6 TBs, 10 vorpostenbootes) and about 29 other vessels with which to escort this great mass of vulnerable ships.
Assuming a 50% presence at any time (a DD on escort had an endurance of about 5-6 days, for an operation lasting 11 days, they will need to refuel at least twice, smaller warships have an endurance even shorter. Then there is the unknown variable of after action replenishment. A 50% availability is being massively optimistic for the germans).
The spacing of our estimated escort force is one "proper warship" every 6 miles, a somewhat less effective VP craft also at every 6 miles, and the rest spaced at about 1 warship every 2miles. Altogether, there might be a warship of some description spaced at 1 every 1 to 1.5 miles, with no reserves, no command and control vessels and no interior patrollers for the convoy.
As the attacker, with more than 60 DDs immediately available and maybe 40 MGB and MTBs, I wouldn't be able to attack in one go and I would want to maximise surpise if possible. If not surprise, then attack with the defenders having the least possible opportunity of forewarning. Necessarily that means attacking at night. To ensure a continuous attack, I would attack in waves, separated by say 30 mins. The maximum distance to target is about 80 miles, the minimum is 10 miles. Looking at a compromise of 60mile, there is a 2 hour approach time (for ships already at sea), say a one hour engagement and then withdrawal. To ensure the convoy is under continuous pressure, I would need to break my attacks into at least 4 waves, each separated by about 30 mins. With four waves, I can expect attacks with about 16-18 DDs in each wave. There would be at least two of these waves attacking at any given time, prefereably from different sides of the convoy. I would use my MGBs as a pinning force, bolstered by one flotilla 96 ships) of DDs. Two full flotillas of Dds should be clear to pass through the gap so formed by these blockers, firing torpedoes, firing guns, firing light weapons, dropping depth charges as they go, to pass though the middle of the convoy and come out the other side. I would use my heavier ships to lay suppressive fire onto the convoy, forcing the DKM to take evasive action and quite unable to react by concentrating. I would try to increase the confusion by night air attack by any remaining bombers. Ahead of the convoy, I would use some of my slower escort ships and the minlayers, to lay a mine barrage in the path of the convoy.
I would repeat this operation for as many nights as the convoy was at sea. If the convoy is at sea for say 7 days, with each of my attackers sinking just one ship each per sortie, and each ship able to undertake two sorties per night 9a not unreasonable estimate of activity), we can expect at the end of that seven days of continuous action do see at least 504 ships of the invasion fleet to be sunk, of which many would be the tow ships. Impossible to know what proportions of tow ships but probably at least 150, which effectely doubles the losses for those ships. At the end of the "initial" battles, I would expect to see at least 650 barges unable to land, probably sunk. I have no idea of the losses to mines and night air attack but one would expect some degree of loss.
And we have yet to commit the bulk of the coastal forces to finish off this ill considered venture by the germans
RN losses would be unknown, but from the 3rd or 4th day we can expect to see the arrival of emergency reserves from the north and west. They would amount to at least another 40 DDs according to Admiralty sources.
As I said, for the life of me, I cannot understand the logic of anyone claiming a billet in this invasion fleet was safe, nothing to worry about and likely to make it across the ditch without a scratch
buffnut453
Captain
Agree with all that invasion was a non-starter...but Hitler didn't need to invade to achieve his strategic objective which was removing Britain from the war. All he needed was a more pliant government in London than that led by Churchill. Loss of the BofB might well have brought about those circumstances.
I think you mean Eire (ie the Republic of Ireland aka Southern Ireland). Northern Ireland is part of the UK.
I think you mean Eire (ie the Republic of Ireland aka Southern Ireland). Northern Ireland is part of the UK.
Eire was neutral, but apparently had contact with Nazi Germany.
There were also talks with the IRA from what I understand.
buffnut453
Captain
Correct..but in the post of yours that I quoted you stated N Ireland. Eire is not N Ireland.
A complex situation almost exactly repeated today, a neutral country is not forbidden to have relations with combative nations but they are prohibited from becoming involved.
parsifal
Colonel
Eire had some contact with the Nazis, and it is worth noting she was one of the few nations in 1945 to put their national flags at half mast after Hitlers death in 1945.
Eire's relations were strained by the operations of the U-Boats in the North Atlantic and after the loss of several clearly marked neutral ships operating for the republic. Relations with the Germans were already strained by these actions.
Despite this the Irish assisted several U-Boats on several occasions that got themselves into difficulties, and readily accepted survivors that had been towed or transported to republic shores in that first year of the war.
Relations with Britain complicated, but far closer than the republics leadership cared to admit. Britain had maintained a naval presence in the republic until 1938, and from the beginning of the war there had been careful, and quiet negotiations on the level of
assistance the "BEF" (as it was euphemistically called) would provide to the Germans. Ireland made plans to cover either an invasion by Britain or Germany
An invasion of the emerald isle for Germany would have been several orders of magnitude more difficult to achieve for Germany, in oceans generally rougher and more exposed, across open stretches of ocean. Re-supply would have been nearly impossible for Germany, infrastructure almost non existent.
I don't see how this variant is at all helpful to the notion of a successful german cross channel attack
Eire's relations were strained by the operations of the U-Boats in the North Atlantic and after the loss of several clearly marked neutral ships operating for the republic. Relations with the Germans were already strained by these actions.
Despite this the Irish assisted several U-Boats on several occasions that got themselves into difficulties, and readily accepted survivors that had been towed or transported to republic shores in that first year of the war.
Relations with Britain complicated, but far closer than the republics leadership cared to admit. Britain had maintained a naval presence in the republic until 1938, and from the beginning of the war there had been careful, and quiet negotiations on the level of
assistance the "BEF" (as it was euphemistically called) would provide to the Germans. Ireland made plans to cover either an invasion by Britain or Germany
An invasion of the emerald isle for Germany would have been several orders of magnitude more difficult to achieve for Germany, in oceans generally rougher and more exposed, across open stretches of ocean. Re-supply would have been nearly impossible for Germany, infrastructure almost non existent.
I don't see how this variant is at all helpful to the notion of a successful german cross channel attack
All situations are different but this is not automatically a violation of neutrality. Switzerland accepted allied bombers landing or crashing there and it was actually bombed by accident in the course of the conflict.
swampyankee
Chief Master Sergeant
- 3,977
- Jun 25, 2013
You may be confusing Northern Ireland, part of the UK, with the Republic of Ireland, which wasn't. While there probably wasn't much love lost between Dublin and London, especially between Éamon de Valera, Taoiseach of Ireland and either Chamberlain or Churchill, it's also quite evident that the Taoiseach was not a fan of Hitler: Irish neutrality was somewhat biased in favor of the Allies, not the Axis. About 28,000 Irish citizens joined the British armed forces, possibly some deserting the Irish Army to do so.
Ireland permitted overflights of RAF military aircraft, which was not a neutral act.
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Shortround6
Major General
If you can't get troops across the channel then how do you get them
A. to Ireland, regardless of where in Ireland.
B. get them from Ireland to any point in the rest of the UK that is not Northern Ireland? (Britain, Wales or Scotland.)?
what would be the object of such a move?
March a couple hundred men landed from submarines to the Shorts factory in Belfast?
Same few hundred men seize the Dublin-Liverpool ferry and sail to Liverpool? Storm the Liverpool ferry terminal and signal a force of men hiding in a Neutral freighter?
A. to Ireland, regardless of where in Ireland.
B. get them from Ireland to any point in the rest of the UK that is not Northern Ireland? (Britain, Wales or Scotland.)?
what would be the object of such a move?
March a couple hundred men landed from submarines to the Shorts factory in Belfast?
Same few hundred men seize the Dublin-Liverpool ferry and sail to Liverpool? Storm the Liverpool ferry terminal and signal a force of men hiding in a Neutral freighter?
buffnut453
Captain
There are a number of scenarios where Germany having troops in Ireland would be beneficial...but I just don't see it happening, nor do I see it being sustainable. Certainly it's not a good starting point for an invasion of the GB mainland.
On the plus side, one could imagine Hitler offering reunification as a carrot to encourage active aggression by Eire against Britain. That reunification could remove airfields in Northern Ireland that were used for long-range maritime reconnaissance, which would be a boon for the U-Boat fleet. It would also send a powerful message to counter the "Britain standing alone" propaganda...because a significant part of the UK would have fallen to the enemy.
Despite these potential positives, I don't think any such operation would be sustainable, nor do I think the Irish Government would be duped by any such offer from Hitler. Eire had far too much to lose to countenance such an operation.
On the plus side, one could imagine Hitler offering reunification as a carrot to encourage active aggression by Eire against Britain. That reunification could remove airfields in Northern Ireland that were used for long-range maritime reconnaissance, which would be a boon for the U-Boat fleet. It would also send a powerful message to counter the "Britain standing alone" propaganda...because a significant part of the UK would have fallen to the enemy.
Despite these potential positives, I don't think any such operation would be sustainable, nor do I think the Irish Government would be duped by any such offer from Hitler. Eire had far too much to lose to countenance such an operation.
parsifal
Colonel
For every Irishman willing to side with hitler in the name of re-unifying with the north, rthere are going to be just as many opposed to it. . moreover, the leadership in Irelans was firmly opposed to entry into the war, on either side, under any circumstance.
There were reasons why they never sided with the germans, just as there were reasons for not joining the allies. Unlike turkey for example, who in the dying days did make a DoW on Germany
There was about as much chance of the irish being a willing partner against britain, as there was Sweden, Portugal ofr Switzerland. Almost none, to none.
There were reasons why they never sided with the germans, just as there were reasons for not joining the allies. Unlike turkey for example, who in the dying days did make a DoW on Germany
There was about as much chance of the irish being a willing partner against britain, as there was Sweden, Portugal ofr Switzerland. Almost none, to none.
https://www.tapatalk.com/groups/warships1discussionboards/kriegsmarine-vs-center-force-t23530-s200.html
Dec 1939 2 RN DD clashed with 2 German Zerstörer 1934. Germans undetected at night launched 1/2 dozen torps at 5000 yards with one hitting HMS Juno putting in dry dock for 10 months repair. Germans escaped undetected.
April 1940 Narvik 1st battle : 5 RN DD ambushed 10 German Zerstörer refueling in port. In running gun battle 2 DD are sunk on each side while one RN and 5 German Zerstörer are damaged. Germans were unlucky since at least one torpedo passed under each RN DD but failed due to depth mechanism. None the less a brilliant British attack.
April 1940 Narvik 2nd battle : 9 RN DD + BB attack 8 remaining German Zerstörer in fiord, with only 4 of the German Zerstörer battle ready . Trapped in the fiord all the German Zerstörer are sunk ; while 3 RN DD are damaged/crippled in a running gun/torpedo battle.
Oct 1940 Isle of White: 5 RN DD chase 5 German "Raubvogel" Torpedo Boat who escape un harmed despite being slower and not as well armed.
Oct 1940 off Lands End; 5 German Zerstörer are chased by 5 RN DD plus 2 Cruisers in moderate seas. The British were able to close with the Germans since they were "chasing splash". In the long range exchange the British fired 1200 shells getting 2 minor hits on the German Zerstörer. German commander Bey had each German Zerstörer unload several Torps astern @ 15,000 yards and the RN evasive action allowed the Germans to open distance and escape.
Nov 1940 off Plymouth; 3 German Zerstörer again lead by Bey engage 5 RN DD launching a dozen torpedo ; crippling a RN DD at dawn. Germans suffered some splinter damage.
March 1942 off Dieppe. After beating off several RN MTB attacks, an escort of 5 Raubtier class Torpedo boats beat back a RN flotilla of 2 older DD plus 3 Hunt DEs. The Germans were escorting the HSK "Michel" which was showered with some splinters, while most of the RN warships were damaged with the worst two warships spending 1-2 months in repair each.
Oct 1942 off Cherbourg; 9 RN Hunts get revenge sinking the HSK Komet and damaging all 4 of the escorting German Torpedoboot 1935, without suffering any damage in return.
March 1942; Defense of PQ13; British flotilla of Cruiser plus 5 DD defend against 3 German Zerstörer in short range clash, in heavy seas and snow squalls. British Cruiser lead the fight crippling the lead German warship with multiple 6" shell hits. Finally a British Torps malfunctioned and slammed into their own Cruiser forcing it out of the fight and allowing the German Zerstörer an escape attempt. This attempt failed when intercepted and sunk by Mack's DD HMS Eclipse ; which in turn was then hammered by 3 German 5.9" shells at long range from the other two German Zerstörer .
May 1942 near Bear Island; 3 German Zerstörer attack British convoy covered by 4 older DD plus 4 sub chasers. Germans attack in heavy seas and sleet/snow. In three attempts they sink Soviet freighter with long range torpedo hit and damage 3 RN DD in gun exchange, while the British return fire nets no results , all attempts to get through to the convoy fail. The next day these same German Zerstörer attack and sink a crippled RN Cruiser and batter 2 escorting DD, while loosing one Zerstörer sunk and another damaged in the exchange.
July 1943 off Breton coast: 2 German Elbing TB 1939 escort flotilla of minesweepers, while 3 RN Hunts mount a night attack. In the exchange a minesweeper is sunk while another damaged but the rest get through untouched. The DE on each side exchange rapid fire and the Germans hit each of the 3 RN DE putting them out of action for 1-2 weeks each. One of the German Elbing Torpedoboot suffers splinter damage from a near miss.
Oct 1943 1st Tunnel battle; RN launched a series of night attacks to cut of German coastal convoys along the French coast. Experienced German commander Franz Kohlauf ambushes a mixed RN flotilla of 5 Hunts and Emergency DD, with his 4th flotilla of 4 Elbing Torpedoboot. In the exchange 33 torpedoes were fired with no hits on either side. In the gunfight the two RN DD were each hit twice by German gun fire forcing them to retreat one flooding , the other on fire. The German Torpedoboot do not seem to have been hit in the exchange and the Hunts were left out since they were too slow to keep up.
Oct 1943 2ndTunnel battle; RN launched second night attack based on false reports of success earlier that month and include a light cruiser to increase the damage inflicted. This time Kohlauf aware of the British Tunnel tactics , establishes long range detection with his GHG passive sonar at 20-30km range. This allows him to move in for an ambush that sinks the British Cruiser and one DD with a flotilla spread of 24 torpedoes getting 3 hits. As usual no German ships were hit in the ambush.
April 1944 3rdTunnel battle; RN spent the winter reviewing the failures of 1943 and regrouped Tunnel based on homogenous escorts, no Hunt DE& DD mix.... all Tribal DD this time. While Kohlauf lead 3 Elbing Torpedoboot they were out gunned 4:1 by the 4 Canadian Tribals and RN light cruiser Black Prince . This time the Commonwealth force was well lead and the gunnery advantage proved decisive, sinking Kohlauf's Torpedoboot and damaging the other two boats. At the conclusion of this close range ,moonless night action -two of the Canadian DD collided putting both out of operation for weeks.
April 1944 another battle; Two days later the 2 undamaged Tribal DD attacked the two remaining Elbing Torpedoboot of the 4th Flotilla in another night exchange. While the excellent Tribal firepower advantage sank one Torpedoboot and damaged another, the German massed torpedo salvo sank one of the Tribals in the exchange.
June 1944 ]Brittany: 8 Allied Tribal DD attack a group of 4 German DD, out gunning them more than 2:1 in a short sharp night clash. In the span of 5 minutes the veteran RN DD got 13 hits crippling one ship and damaging 2 of the other 3 Zerstörer. Over the next 4 hours a series of confused clashes occurred with the allies getting the upper hand through superior training and leadership and use of radar and radio intercept. Allied force inflicted 30-40 hits on the German Zerstörer sinking one forcing another to run-aground or sink, while another Zerstörer was crippled. The poor German counter fire did net some 5.9" hits that did damage to one Tribal and lightly damaged 2 more.
]5th ]GermanTorpedoboot Flotilla : In the first week after D-day, [June 1944] the 5th German Torpedoboot flotilla -with prewar boats -launched 5 raids shooting 55 torpedoes and some gunfire getting 1 hit against a French DD. In all attacks they made long range attacks against allied DD and escaped unharmed. RAF bombers were then ordered in to put an end of the threat with 1200 tons of bombs that wiped out the flotilla, along with 15 S-Boot and 39 other vessels.[/font]
Over the next couple of months the allied DD forces mounted 9 night sweeps against German coastal forces/convoys off France, but these were mostly German Minesweepers with the odd Torpedoboot. In only 4 sweeps did they catch the Germans but when they did they sunk 5 and battered 4 minesweepers; while lightly damaging another 6.
Interestingly enough in each encounter the Germans fought back well inflicting damage on at least one enemy warship. In each case the allies also enjoyed an overwhelming firepower advantage of over 5:1 in gun numbers; to say nothing of the fact that all the German guns were 4.1" single mounts, while all the allied guns were 4.7" twin guns or better.
In the most surprising clash, a Minesweeper plus a couple of V-Boot [ 88mm gun each] engaged a Tribal DD , which destroyed the minesweeper- but was crippled when a 88mm gun destroyed the DD boiler and cut a steam line. The Tribal had to be towed back to port.
There were four other clashes off Norway and the Baltic through early 1945, where German coastal convoys escorted with minesweepers and V-Boot were attack by overwhelming forces of allied cruisers and destroyer. The Allied Firepower advantage was more than 4:1 and the results were predictable with 5 out of 19 warships sunk and 5 more crippled, but 9 retired. The German return fire damaged 4 allied warships and crippled two more.
]5th ]GermanTorpedoboot Flotilla : In the first week after D-day, [June 1944] the 5th German Torpedoboot flotilla -with prewar boats -launched 5 raids shooting 55 torpedoes and some gunfire getting 1 hit against a French DD. In all attacks they made long range attacks against allied DD and escaped unharmed. RAF bombers were then ordered in to put an end of the threat with 1200 tons of bombs that wiped out the flotilla, along with 15 S-Boot and 39 other vessels.[/font]
Over the next couple of months the allied DD forces mounted 9 night sweeps against German coastal forces/convoys off France, but these were mostly German Minesweepers with the odd Torpedoboot. In only 4 sweeps did they catch the Germans but when they did they sunk 5 and battered 4 minesweepers; while lightly damaging another 6.
Interestingly enough in each encounter the Germans fought back well inflicting damage on at least one enemy warship. In each case the allies also enjoyed an overwhelming firepower advantage of over 5:1 in gun numbers; to say nothing of the fact that all the German guns were 4.1" single mounts, while all the allied guns were 4.7" twin guns or better.
In the most surprising clash, a Minesweeper plus a couple of V-Boot [ 88mm gun each] engaged a Tribal DD , which destroyed the minesweeper- but was crippled when a 88mm gun destroyed the DD boiler and cut a steam line. The Tribal had to be towed back to port.
There were four other clashes off Norway and the Baltic through early 1945, where German coastal convoys escorted with minesweepers and V-Boot were attack by overwhelming forces of allied cruisers and destroyer. The Allied Firepower advantage was more than 4:1 and the results were predictable with 5 out of 19 warships sunk and 5 more crippled, but 9 retired. The German return fire damaged 4 allied warships and crippled two more.
https://www.tapatalk.com/groups/warships1discussionboards/viewtopic.php?f=63&t=22080&p=360368#p360368
1939 Battle of River Plate
Weather: 3/8[/size][/size] Visibility: Excellent[/size] Sea State: calm[/size][/size]
AGS fired 405 11" shells at distances between 19,000 and 13000 yard for 9 hits =2.22%
EXETER fired 200 8" shells at distances betwwen 18,000 and 13000 yard for 3 hits =1.50%
AJAX & ACHILLES fired 2065 6" shells at distances between 17,000 and 7000 yard for 17 hits =0.82%
1940 Battle with JERVIS BAY
Weather: 6/8 Visibility: decreasing from 24000 yard Sea State calm to medium
AS fired 335 shells (including an unspecified number of 5.91") and attained no less than 8 documented hits at ranges from 16,000 yard to 9,000 yard >2.39%
1941 Battle of the Denmark Strait (ranges 26,000 yard down to 16,000 and up again to ~20,000 yard before general disengagement at good visibility and medium seastate):
NORFOLK fired 12 rounds and attained no hits =0% (note, the rounds fired is statistically not large enough a sample)
PRINZ EUGEN 157 rounds fired and attained six hits =3.8% (note, some say five hits, depending on how You rate PoW damage assesments)
1942 Battle of Barent Sea
Weather: mixed with intermittent snow storms[/size] Visibility: max 14000 yard, min 1500 yard[/size][/size] Sea State: large swells [/size]
Hipper fired 120 8" shells at distances between 20,000 and 11,000 yard for 3 hits =2.50%
1942 Battle of Java Sea, February 27th, 1942
Weather: Fair to poor[/size] Visibility: good to small[/size] Sea State: moderate swells [/size]
The japanese cruisers fired 1619 8" rounds at distances between 26,000 yard and 15,000 yard in the long range part of the action for 5 hits =0.31% hit rate
Allied cruisers fired an unspecified number of shells at distances between 20,000 yard and 13,000 yard for one hit = <0.1% hit rate
1943 Battle of the Komandorski Islands, March 26th, 1943
Weather: Clear, light breeze from SW, high overcast.[/size] Visibility: Excellent[/size] Sea State: Glassy[/size]
USS SALT LAKE CITY fired 832 8" shells (all AP + 26 HE) at distances between 22,000 yard down to 13,500 yard for 3 hits attained = 0.36%
USS RICHMONT fired 271 of 6in at distances between 17,000 yard down to 9,000 yard for 4 hits =1.47%
IJN NACHI fired 707 8" at distances between 22,000 yard down to 9,500 yard for 3 hits = 0.42%
IJN MAJA fired 904 8" at distances between 22,000 yard down to 9,500 yard for 6 hits = 0.66%
1944 Battle of the Suribao Strait, Octobre 24 - 25th, 1944
Weather: partly clouded[/size], wind 7kts 40 deg[/size][/size].[/size] Visibility: 4000 yard[/size] Sea State: smooth[/size][/size]
American Cruisers expended 553 x 6-8" shells at distances between 16,000 and 8000 yard, attaining 11 hits =1.989%
1939 Battle of River Plate
Weather: 3/8[/size][/size] Visibility: Excellent[/size] Sea State: calm[/size][/size]
AGS fired 405 11" shells at distances between 19,000 and 13000 yard for 9 hits =2.22%
EXETER fired 200 8" shells at distances betwwen 18,000 and 13000 yard for 3 hits =1.50%
AJAX & ACHILLES fired 2065 6" shells at distances between 17,000 and 7000 yard for 17 hits =0.82%
1940 Battle with JERVIS BAY
Weather: 6/8 Visibility: decreasing from 24000 yard Sea State calm to medium
AS fired 335 shells (including an unspecified number of 5.91") and attained no less than 8 documented hits at ranges from 16,000 yard to 9,000 yard >2.39%
1941 Battle of the Denmark Strait (ranges 26,000 yard down to 16,000 and up again to ~20,000 yard before general disengagement at good visibility and medium seastate):
NORFOLK fired 12 rounds and attained no hits =0% (note, the rounds fired is statistically not large enough a sample)
PRINZ EUGEN 157 rounds fired and attained six hits =3.8% (note, some say five hits, depending on how You rate PoW damage assesments)
1942 Battle of Barent Sea
Weather: mixed with intermittent snow storms[/size] Visibility: max 14000 yard, min 1500 yard[/size][/size] Sea State: large swells [/size]
Hipper fired 120 8" shells at distances between 20,000 and 11,000 yard for 3 hits =2.50%
1942 Battle of Java Sea, February 27th, 1942
Weather: Fair to poor[/size] Visibility: good to small[/size] Sea State: moderate swells [/size]
The japanese cruisers fired 1619 8" rounds at distances between 26,000 yard and 15,000 yard in the long range part of the action for 5 hits =0.31% hit rate
Allied cruisers fired an unspecified number of shells at distances between 20,000 yard and 13,000 yard for one hit = <0.1% hit rate
1943 Battle of the Komandorski Islands, March 26th, 1943
Weather: Clear, light breeze from SW, high overcast.[/size] Visibility: Excellent[/size] Sea State: Glassy[/size]
USS SALT LAKE CITY fired 832 8" shells (all AP + 26 HE) at distances between 22,000 yard down to 13,500 yard for 3 hits attained = 0.36%
USS RICHMONT fired 271 of 6in at distances between 17,000 yard down to 9,000 yard for 4 hits =1.47%
IJN NACHI fired 707 8" at distances between 22,000 yard down to 9,500 yard for 3 hits = 0.42%
IJN MAJA fired 904 8" at distances between 22,000 yard down to 9,500 yard for 6 hits = 0.66%
1944 Battle of the Suribao Strait, Octobre 24 - 25th, 1944
Weather: partly clouded[/size], wind 7kts 40 deg[/size][/size].[/size] Visibility: 4000 yard[/size] Sea State: smooth[/size][/size]
American Cruisers expended 553 x 6-8" shells at distances between 16,000 and 8000 yard, attaining 11 hits =1.989%
British efforts to get the Republic into the war peaked in 1940.The British government put a unified Ireland on the table but de Valera declined.
British efforts at the time were predicated on the fear that the Germans would invade Ireland, indeed, on 20th June 1940, Chamberlain observed 'I fear he [de Valera] won't be moved until the Germans are in Dublin'.
For his part, de Valera saw Ireland's neutrality as a statement of sovereignty. The British envoy to Ireland, Health Minister Malcolm MacDonald, would report to London on his discussions with the Taoiseach
'He could not enter into serious discussions on any basis except the immediate establishment of a united, neutral Ireland. Moreover, the Taoiseach made it clear to Mr MacDonald that Ireland belonged to the Irish people and Great Britain had no right of any kind to attempt to barter the unity of the Irish nation for the blood of her people. Ireland's unity and complete independence would come some day. The Government would defend the country against invasion, but they would not purchase unity by an act which would bring civil war and disaster to the people."
The crucial word in the first sentence is 'neutral'. The final sentence and reference to 'civil war and disaster' should be a reality check to republicans who don't read their history.
Despite de Valera's optimism about defending the Republic, it was almost defenceless. This was a bad thing for the British. Had the British managed to convince de Valera to forego Irish neutrality it would have fallen to the UK to provide troops and all the other resources required to garrison and defend the entire Island at a time when they were least able to do so. With hindsight de Valera not only stood up for his nation and people, even when offered what the British would have considered the most juicy of all carrots, he did the British a favour!
The offer of a unified Ireland was made by the then Minister of Health, Malcolm MacDonald (son of Ramsay MacDonald) and it was on behalf of the British government. MacDonald was well qualified, having had dealings with Dublin in his former role as Dominions Secretary. The proposal was for the abolition of the Northern Irish State and the unity of Ireland under Dublin rule. It would have entailed the complete withdrawal of the British and their forces from the entire Island of Ireland AFTER the war.
The British also briefed the US representative in Dublin, David Gray, who summed up the offer thus.
'…it guaranteed the whole lock, stock and barrel, providing for the immediate setting up of a commission to draft an all-Ireland Constitution but insisting on a declaration of war by Eire.'
( I don't know why Americans refer to the Republic as 'Eire'!)
De Valera had many reasons for not accepting the offer, some of which I mentioned above. Though the document setting out the British proposal was drawn up by Chamberlain and taken by MacDonald to Dublin on 26th June, de Valera knew it would be Churchill with whom he would deal. To put it politely, de Valera didn't trust Churchill further than he could throw him and given Churchill's record over the Irish issue he was probably correct not to.
The reaction of Craigavon and the Ulster Unionists was predictable. Craigavon, having seen a copy of the proposal wrote
'I am profoundly shocked and disgusted by your letter making suggestions so far reaching behind my back and without any pre-consultation. To such treachery to loyal Ulster, I will never be party.'
With a war to win, just as he might have reneged on any deal with Dublin, I suspect that Churchill would have been prepared to throw 'loyal Ulster' under the bus. This may well have precipitated the civil war de Valera feared.
For their part, the Germans never considered an invasion of Ireland as an option.Günther Blumentritt, the operations officer of Army Group A, later explained that any thoughts about an early German landing in Ireland
"were quite unreal and they bear no relation to German resources at sea and in the air at the time. It would have been necessary to get there, a much harder task than an attack across the Narrows [I think a reference to Norway/Oslo (Drobaksundet) rather than the Channel]. The British fleet and air force would have crushed any attempt very quickly. Above all, it would have been impossible to transport supplies even if we had got there in the first place."
On a different point,De Valera explained his visit of condolence to the German representative in Ireland in a letter to his close friend, Robert Brennan, Irish envoy to Washington.
"I could have had a diplomatic illness but, as you know, I would scorn that sort of thing…So long as we retained our diplomatic relations with Germany, to have failed to call upon the German representative would have been an act of unpardonable discourtesy to the German nation and to Dr Hempel himself. During the whole of the war, Dr Hempel's conduct was irreproachable. He was always friendly and invariably correct—in marked contrast with Gray [US representative]. I certainly was not going to add to his humiliation in the hour of defeat."
You might like to investigate who flew what flags at half mast and on what buildings
Cheers
Steve
British efforts at the time were predicated on the fear that the Germans would invade Ireland, indeed, on 20th June 1940, Chamberlain observed 'I fear he [de Valera] won't be moved until the Germans are in Dublin'.
For his part, de Valera saw Ireland's neutrality as a statement of sovereignty. The British envoy to Ireland, Health Minister Malcolm MacDonald, would report to London on his discussions with the Taoiseach
'He could not enter into serious discussions on any basis except the immediate establishment of a united, neutral Ireland. Moreover, the Taoiseach made it clear to Mr MacDonald that Ireland belonged to the Irish people and Great Britain had no right of any kind to attempt to barter the unity of the Irish nation for the blood of her people. Ireland's unity and complete independence would come some day. The Government would defend the country against invasion, but they would not purchase unity by an act which would bring civil war and disaster to the people."
The crucial word in the first sentence is 'neutral'. The final sentence and reference to 'civil war and disaster' should be a reality check to republicans who don't read their history.
Despite de Valera's optimism about defending the Republic, it was almost defenceless. This was a bad thing for the British. Had the British managed to convince de Valera to forego Irish neutrality it would have fallen to the UK to provide troops and all the other resources required to garrison and defend the entire Island at a time when they were least able to do so. With hindsight de Valera not only stood up for his nation and people, even when offered what the British would have considered the most juicy of all carrots, he did the British a favour!
The offer of a unified Ireland was made by the then Minister of Health, Malcolm MacDonald (son of Ramsay MacDonald) and it was on behalf of the British government. MacDonald was well qualified, having had dealings with Dublin in his former role as Dominions Secretary. The proposal was for the abolition of the Northern Irish State and the unity of Ireland under Dublin rule. It would have entailed the complete withdrawal of the British and their forces from the entire Island of Ireland AFTER the war.
The British also briefed the US representative in Dublin, David Gray, who summed up the offer thus.
'…it guaranteed the whole lock, stock and barrel, providing for the immediate setting up of a commission to draft an all-Ireland Constitution but insisting on a declaration of war by Eire.'
( I don't know why Americans refer to the Republic as 'Eire'!)
De Valera had many reasons for not accepting the offer, some of which I mentioned above. Though the document setting out the British proposal was drawn up by Chamberlain and taken by MacDonald to Dublin on 26th June, de Valera knew it would be Churchill with whom he would deal. To put it politely, de Valera didn't trust Churchill further than he could throw him and given Churchill's record over the Irish issue he was probably correct not to.
The reaction of Craigavon and the Ulster Unionists was predictable. Craigavon, having seen a copy of the proposal wrote
'I am profoundly shocked and disgusted by your letter making suggestions so far reaching behind my back and without any pre-consultation. To such treachery to loyal Ulster, I will never be party.'
With a war to win, just as he might have reneged on any deal with Dublin, I suspect that Churchill would have been prepared to throw 'loyal Ulster' under the bus. This may well have precipitated the civil war de Valera feared.
For their part, the Germans never considered an invasion of Ireland as an option.Günther Blumentritt, the operations officer of Army Group A, later explained that any thoughts about an early German landing in Ireland
"were quite unreal and they bear no relation to German resources at sea and in the air at the time. It would have been necessary to get there, a much harder task than an attack across the Narrows [I think a reference to Norway/Oslo (Drobaksundet) rather than the Channel]. The British fleet and air force would have crushed any attempt very quickly. Above all, it would have been impossible to transport supplies even if we had got there in the first place."
On a different point,De Valera explained his visit of condolence to the German representative in Ireland in a letter to his close friend, Robert Brennan, Irish envoy to Washington.
"I could have had a diplomatic illness but, as you know, I would scorn that sort of thing…So long as we retained our diplomatic relations with Germany, to have failed to call upon the German representative would have been an act of unpardonable discourtesy to the German nation and to Dr Hempel himself. During the whole of the war, Dr Hempel's conduct was irreproachable. He was always friendly and invariably correct—in marked contrast with Gray [US representative]. I certainly was not going to add to his humiliation in the hour of defeat."
You might like to investigate who flew what flags at half mast and on what buildings
Cheers
Steve
Glider
Captain
PSI
There is a huge difference between warships firing at approx. 20,000 yds travelling at 25 - 30 knots and a totally defenceless tug towing two loaded barges at 2-3 knots at a range thats likely to be down to 100 - 200 yards where the AA guns would simply decimate the targets.
You should also recall that part of the attack on the barges RN warships including battleships sailed up and down the channel without any problem
There is a huge difference between warships firing at approx. 20,000 yds travelling at 25 - 30 knots and a totally defenceless tug towing two loaded barges at 2-3 knots at a range thats likely to be down to 100 - 200 yards where the AA guns would simply decimate the targets.
You should also recall that part of the attack on the barges RN warships including battleships sailed up and down the channel without any problem
