Glider
Captain
For those who doubt the ability of the RN to sink the invasion barges just think what a short burst from a quad 2pd would do
Follow along with the video below to see how to install our site as a web app on your home screen.
Note: This feature may not be available in some browsers.
Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
Even having a harbour wouldn't solve much, I have been on a ferry swept onto Dover harbour entrance.
That It isNo worries, I am multi lingual and can speak fluent "sea coaler", I used to work there (Hartlepool steelworks) and frequently had a beer in the "Golden Flats" after work. Its a great beach to walk a dog.
For those who doubt the ability of the RN to sink the invasion barges just think what a short burst from a quad 2pd would do
Probably nothing at the time. Barges are mostly empty space, and small shell make precious little damage.
Quite a lot I would have thought, 400 rpm with an explosive warhead at close range to a barge full of people, fuel and or ammunition would do a huge amount of damage.Probably nothing at the time. Barges are mostly empty space, and small shell make precious little damage.
I believe that Germany could have put a force onto a British beach. I also believe that a force of some tens of thousands of Infantry without heavy equipment or much hope of re supply would then fight bravely but after a few days will run out of ammunition and supplies.
You are more optimistic than many of the Germans who were supposed to carry out the operation!
Every time the scenario has been gamed an allowance has been made to allow the Germans to get ashore. Otherwise there is no game, just a body count.
Cheers
Steve
Surely the definitive consequences expected of any invasion should be left to the men who might have been ordered to carry it out.
Two of the most senior (there are plenty more who expressed a similar view). First Raeder:
'I considered it extremely fortunate that the invasion project was not carried out, as the resulting setback would have been disastrous.'
Gustav Kleikamp, head of the transport fleet based in Calais, writing in October 1940 (not with years of hindsight).
'In my opinion the belated beginning and insufficient preparations, as well as a complete lack of training in craft and prahme at steaming together, would have given the greatest trouble or might have rendered it impossible at the end of September or early October to take a transport fleet with the desired success and order to the enemy shore, especially at night.'
The Germans responsible for carrying out the operation were more convinced of its impossibility than some of the British commanders, waiting on the other side of the Channel. Some British commanders, particularly in the RN, never believed that the Germans were capable of such a huge amphibious operation and would agreed with the opinions expressed by their fellow naval officers, across the Channel.
Even the army was not convinced that the operation could be carried out. Frederick-Karl Plehwe, head of the army's liaison staff at naval headquarters wrote, also in 1940.
'I would like to lay great emphasis on the fact that the decisive deterrent to the operation was the expected large-scale intervention by the British fleet.'
Some idea of the lack of preparation may be gleaned from Blumentritt's comments, made later, in 1949.
'I should state, for the record, that no member of my staff had an accurate picture of the English south coast. Our maps were inaccurate. Relief maps were sent to us from Munich! … It must not be forgotten that we Germans are a continental people. We knew far too little of England. We knew literally nothing of amphibious operations and had no experience. At the same time we were preparing the Sea Lion plans, accounts of the campaigns of Caesar, Britannicus and William the Conqueror were being read, and in Paris books about Napoleon's 'Camp of Boulogne' (1804) were being sought in the bookshops.'
Compare that to Allied planning for Overlord.
In terms of the original question, had the RAF been defeated, had the KM not found some other excuses NOT to launch Sealion and had the operation been attempted, it might well have resulted in a complete defeat and total debacle for the Germans. This was certainly something that Raeder feared.
Cheers
Steve
And the barges had precious little damage control, that is trained men, equipment and pumps. A few guys with hammers and corks to plug rifle bullet holes and bailing water out with helmets isn't going to work against the holes a 2 pdr would make in the side.
I would also note that with thousands of barges a good portion of the tow ships will NOT be armed meaning the defence of the tow boat barge combination will be the rifles and machine guns of the troops.