Glider
Captain
For those who doubt the ability of the RN to sink the invasion barges just think what a short burst from a quad 2pd would do
If the RAF had been defeated in the Battle of Britain
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I had the misfortune to be on a ferry which stood off Dover Harbour for several hours in a storm. There was a failed attempt to get us in with tugs. Given the sea state I'll let your imaginations run free with the state of the toilets and just about everywhere else. Worse, they closed the bars!
Cheers
Steve
That It is
Shortround6
Major General
Shoot the tugs. Most are going to have 1-2 scotch boilers, a vertical steam engine (either double or triple expansion) and only one steering station.
parsifal
Colonel
The pictures of those barges do look to be running light, and consequently do appear to be racing through the water, probably at 6-8 knots.
Be that as it may, DKM were estimating an 11 day operation from commencement of loading to disembarkation. The DKM orders were very specific, a maximum fleet speed of 2.5 knots. That's a fleet waiting to be sunk.
The barges were vulnerable to all manner of counter fire, including MG fire. DKM simply did not have the men to put proper DC teams on each barge, and their merchant marine was pretty well fully committed as well. These barges, by and large were being manned by heer personnel. The heer had some experienced small boat crews for river crossings and the like, but again not nearly enough to make any appreciable difference . if these barges are hit by anything, even rifle calibre MG fire (if enough hits are registered), is more than likely to sink, or at the very minimum to take on so much water as to be incapable of landing. If you add flame producing ammunition to the mix the vision of what is likely to happen gets even worse.
Just to put the German plan and the capabilities of its invasion fleet into perspective we can compare it to the last major invasion attempt on the british Isles. In 1588 the Spanish amassed a massive armada of ships and proceeded up the channel with the intention of landing troops. They intended to take on additional troops on Holland I believe, but were set upon by the coastal forces of the day that opposed them . The Spanish fleet was anchored at the time of its loss, but its fleet speed has been calculated to be in excess of 6knots at the time. , We are talking similar engagement ranges, similar ship numbers, a faster fleet, yet apparently, despite 500 years of development in military technique and technology, wouldn't be able to hit a near stationary, concentrated target unable to defend itself. Can some please explain the logic of how that works?????
The other major obstruction to amphibious operations is organization. things need to be planned very carefully, even to the tactical loading choices of the troops. We all tend to read about the successful amphibs, like Normandy, but what about the ones that don't work.....Gallipoli , Milne Bay, Kerch, Oslo, They (and many others) fell apart because of a lack of organisation. It doesn't take much disruption of naval forces to render the operation unworkable. Even if you want to countenance the idea that some of the barges might make it to the British coast, if substantial losses had been suffered does anyone seriously believe there be enough organization to get ashore. I think the heer units would be arriving in a total jumble, bits missing, the troops sick scared and ready to surrender as soon as set foot on dry land. hitler suspected this and it weighed on his decisions pretty heavily........
Be that as it may, DKM were estimating an 11 day operation from commencement of loading to disembarkation. The DKM orders were very specific, a maximum fleet speed of 2.5 knots. That's a fleet waiting to be sunk.
The barges were vulnerable to all manner of counter fire, including MG fire. DKM simply did not have the men to put proper DC teams on each barge, and their merchant marine was pretty well fully committed as well. These barges, by and large were being manned by heer personnel. The heer had some experienced small boat crews for river crossings and the like, but again not nearly enough to make any appreciable difference . if these barges are hit by anything, even rifle calibre MG fire (if enough hits are registered), is more than likely to sink, or at the very minimum to take on so much water as to be incapable of landing. If you add flame producing ammunition to the mix the vision of what is likely to happen gets even worse.
Just to put the German plan and the capabilities of its invasion fleet into perspective we can compare it to the last major invasion attempt on the british Isles. In 1588 the Spanish amassed a massive armada of ships and proceeded up the channel with the intention of landing troops. They intended to take on additional troops on Holland I believe, but were set upon by the coastal forces of the day that opposed them . The Spanish fleet was anchored at the time of its loss, but its fleet speed has been calculated to be in excess of 6knots at the time. , We are talking similar engagement ranges, similar ship numbers, a faster fleet, yet apparently, despite 500 years of development in military technique and technology, wouldn't be able to hit a near stationary, concentrated target unable to defend itself. Can some please explain the logic of how that works?????
The other major obstruction to amphibious operations is organization. things need to be planned very carefully, even to the tactical loading choices of the troops. We all tend to read about the successful amphibs, like Normandy, but what about the ones that don't work.....Gallipoli , Milne Bay, Kerch, Oslo, They (and many others) fell apart because of a lack of organisation. It doesn't take much disruption of naval forces to render the operation unworkable. Even if you want to countenance the idea that some of the barges might make it to the British coast, if substantial losses had been suffered does anyone seriously believe there be enough organization to get ashore. I think the heer units would be arriving in a total jumble, bits missing, the troops sick scared and ready to surrender as soon as set foot on dry land. hitler suspected this and it weighed on his decisions pretty heavily........
Even if the RAF had been defeated, (Which I think had the Germans not done things so stupidly was a possibility. A distant possibility, but a possibility.) there is no way that the Germans could have launched an invasion fleet, and sustained and supplied an occupation of the British Isles.
Probably nothing at the time. Barges are mostly empty space, and small shell make precious little damage.
11 Oct 1940 five GTB attacked four armed trawlers , all four were sunk but not before 1100 x 4" shells were expended plus several torpedoes.
1941 July- August 4 DD launched 11 sortie & sank 4 trawlers with 1300 shells.. 17th Dec 1941 four DD fired ~ 300 shells netting only 4 gun hits on one minesweeper, putting it in for repairs for 2 months.
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Kryten
Senior Airman
The empty space on those barges was going to be filled with men and equipment!
Oct 1940, All four were sunk, well that should tell you something really, hitting a single target manoeuvring is more difficult than hitting a minesweeper towing several barges at 2.5knts!
Has anyone stopped to consider the ability to even keep the force on course at those speeds in currents as strong as the channel, the ability to actually land, have a look at the coastline in southern England, most beaches (what there are of them between the cliffs) are shale, look what happened at Dieppe, what about the state of the troops being transported in those barges, sea sick ,combat casualties, loss of communications equipment and command and control, this was a hodge podge invasion planned by a staff that had no clue what they were doing, the allies had years of planning, the lessons of Dieppe and massive force complete with overwhelming air superiority and still had problems!
The whole thing is a nonsense, the Luftwaffe could not defeat the RAF, the RAF was completely outstripping the LW in terms of pilots trained and aircraft produced by the end of August, had the battle continued the balance would have tipped entirely in the RAF's favour, Winter ends any notion of an invasion and by 1941 there was no chance of success at all!
Oct 1940, All four were sunk, well that should tell you something really, hitting a single target manoeuvring is more difficult than hitting a minesweeper towing several barges at 2.5knts!
Has anyone stopped to consider the ability to even keep the force on course at those speeds in currents as strong as the channel, the ability to actually land, have a look at the coastline in southern England, most beaches (what there are of them between the cliffs) are shale, look what happened at Dieppe, what about the state of the troops being transported in those barges, sea sick ,combat casualties, loss of communications equipment and command and control, this was a hodge podge invasion planned by a staff that had no clue what they were doing, the allies had years of planning, the lessons of Dieppe and massive force complete with overwhelming air superiority and still had problems!
The whole thing is a nonsense, the Luftwaffe could not defeat the RAF, the RAF was completely outstripping the LW in terms of pilots trained and aircraft produced by the end of August, had the battle continued the balance would have tipped entirely in the RAF's favour, Winter ends any notion of an invasion and by 1941 there was no chance of success at all!
Shortround6
Major General
And the barges had precious little damage control, that is trained men, equipment and pumps. A few guys with hammers and corks to plug rifle bullet holes and bailing water out with helmets isn't going to work against the holes a 2 pdr would make in the side.
I would also note that with thousands of barges a good portion of the tow ships will NOT be armed meaning the defence of the tow boat barge combination will be the rifles and machine guns of the troops.
Surely the definitive consequences expected of any invasion should be left to the men who might have been ordered to carry it out.
Two of the most senior (there are plenty more who expressed a similar view). First Raeder:
'I considered it extremely fortunate that the invasion project was not carried out, as the resulting setback would have been disastrous.'
Gustav Kleikamp, head of the transport fleet based in Calais, writing in October 1940 (not with years of hindsight).
'In my opinion the belated beginning and insufficient preparations, as well as a complete lack of training in craft and prahme at steaming together, would have given the greatest trouble or might have rendered it impossible at the end of September or early October to take a transport fleet with the desired success and order to the enemy shore, especially at night.'
The Germans responsible for carrying out the operation were more convinced of its impossibility than some of the British commanders, waiting on the other side of the Channel. Some British commanders, particularly in the RN, never believed that the Germans were capable of such a huge amphibious operation and would agreed with the opinions expressed by their fellow naval officers, across the Channel.
Even the army was not convinced that the operation could be carried out. Frederick-Karl Plehwe, head of the army's liaison staff at naval headquarters wrote, also in 1940.
'I would like to lay great emphasis on the fact that the decisive deterrent to the operation was the expected large-scale intervention by the British fleet.'
Some idea of the lack of preparation may be gleaned from Blumentritt's comments, made later, in 1949.
'I should state, for the record, that no member of my staff had an accurate picture of the English south coast. Our maps were inaccurate. Relief maps were sent to us from Munich! … It must not be forgotten that we Germans are a continental people. We knew far too little of England. We knew literally nothing of amphibious operations and had no experience. At the same time we were preparing the Sea Lion plans, accounts of the campaigns of Caesar, Britannicus and William the Conqueror were being read, and in Paris books about Napoleon's 'Camp of Boulogne' (1804) were being sought in the bookshops.'
Compare that to Allied planning for Overlord.
In terms of the original question, had the RAF been defeated, had the KM not found some other excuses NOT to launch Sealion and had the operation been attempted, it might well have resulted in a complete defeat and total debacle for the Germans. This was certainly something that Raeder feared.
Cheers
Steve
Two of the most senior (there are plenty more who expressed a similar view). First Raeder:
'I considered it extremely fortunate that the invasion project was not carried out, as the resulting setback would have been disastrous.'
Gustav Kleikamp, head of the transport fleet based in Calais, writing in October 1940 (not with years of hindsight).
'In my opinion the belated beginning and insufficient preparations, as well as a complete lack of training in craft and prahme at steaming together, would have given the greatest trouble or might have rendered it impossible at the end of September or early October to take a transport fleet with the desired success and order to the enemy shore, especially at night.'
The Germans responsible for carrying out the operation were more convinced of its impossibility than some of the British commanders, waiting on the other side of the Channel. Some British commanders, particularly in the RN, never believed that the Germans were capable of such a huge amphibious operation and would agreed with the opinions expressed by their fellow naval officers, across the Channel.
Even the army was not convinced that the operation could be carried out. Frederick-Karl Plehwe, head of the army's liaison staff at naval headquarters wrote, also in 1940.
'I would like to lay great emphasis on the fact that the decisive deterrent to the operation was the expected large-scale intervention by the British fleet.'
Some idea of the lack of preparation may be gleaned from Blumentritt's comments, made later, in 1949.
'I should state, for the record, that no member of my staff had an accurate picture of the English south coast. Our maps were inaccurate. Relief maps were sent to us from Munich! … It must not be forgotten that we Germans are a continental people. We knew far too little of England. We knew literally nothing of amphibious operations and had no experience. At the same time we were preparing the Sea Lion plans, accounts of the campaigns of Caesar, Britannicus and William the Conqueror were being read, and in Paris books about Napoleon's 'Camp of Boulogne' (1804) were being sought in the bookshops.'
Compare that to Allied planning for Overlord.
In terms of the original question, had the RAF been defeated, had the KM not found some other excuses NOT to launch Sealion and had the operation been attempted, it might well have resulted in a complete defeat and total debacle for the Germans. This was certainly something that Raeder feared.
Cheers
Steve
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Glider
Captain
Quite a lot I would have thought, 400 rpm with an explosive warhead at close range to a barge full of people, fuel and or ammunition would do a huge amount of damage.
fastmongrel
1st Sergeant
I believe that Germany could have put a force onto a British beach. I also believe that a force of some tens of thousands of Infantry without heavy equipment or much hope of re supply would then fight bravely but after a few days will run out of ammunition and supplies. Its not landing the men its landing and distributing the supplies the Army needs every day.
Logistics would defeat the Germans not the RN, RAF or Army.
Logistics would defeat the Germans not the RN, RAF or Army.
You are more optimistic than many of the Germans who were supposed to carry out the operation!
Every time the scenario has been gamed an allowance has been made to allow the Germans to get ashore. Otherwise there is no game, just a body count.
Cheers
Steve
fastmongrel
1st Sergeant
I think the Germans could land, the numbers mean something will get across the Channel not all the landing vessels were the bloody awful Barges. Some of the vessels might even land in the correct county.
parsifal
Colonel
Hi Steve
Excellent points. You can add hitler to the list of doubters actually. the wording of his sealion directive is uncharacteristically vague and hesitant. his continual postponement of the operation all at least point to a man full of doubt as t o the chances for success
And you don't even need to sink the barges. without the tow ship, how is the barge going to get to shore?
What about the possibility of going in through N Ireland? I've heard that there were communications between Germany and N Ireland, mostly regarding intelligence, but could this have been an easier entry into the U.K.?
Hitler may have made his decision well before the accepted date. He was always equivocal about an invasion of Britain, and the British themselves.
Student, never the most reliable witness, claimed in a post war interview (beware hindsight) that at a meeting with Goering on 2nd September he [Student] expressed concerns about the planned use of airborne troops. According to Student, Goering told him not to worry, at least not for 1940, because
'The Führer does not want to invade Britain.'
Did this actually happen? Possibly. Is it plausible? Certainly. Only Goering, Student and Hitler could know.
Cheers
Steve
Student, never the most reliable witness, claimed in a post war interview (beware hindsight) that at a meeting with Goering on 2nd September he [Student] expressed concerns about the planned use of airborne troops. According to Student, Goering told him not to worry, at least not for 1940, because
'The Führer does not want to invade Britain.'
Did this actually happen? Possibly. Is it plausible? Certainly. Only Goering, Student and Hitler could know.
Cheers
Steve
yulzari
Staff Sergeant
Everyone on both sides knew it could never work. It suited Britain to stir up the nation to continue the war. It suited the Germans as a blind for Barbarossa.
Even with no naval opposition the barges would have been scattered from the Isle of Wight to Essex just from amateur sailing of river barges across a complex and ever changing seaway even in good weather. Both Caesar and William the Bastard had to wait weeks until they got good enough weather long enough to put a trained fleet of just a few scores of vessels across in daylight. The Spanish Armada would have stood a better chance of shipping Spanish troops from the Netherlands to England and more likely to win once they arrived. At least they had seagoing vessels and trained sailors. The Dutch did best when they invaded in 1688.
Even with no naval opposition the barges would have been scattered from the Isle of Wight to Essex just from amateur sailing of river barges across a complex and ever changing seaway even in good weather. Both Caesar and William the Bastard had to wait weeks until they got good enough weather long enough to put a trained fleet of just a few scores of vessels across in daylight. The Spanish Armada would have stood a better chance of shipping Spanish troops from the Netherlands to England and more likely to win once they arrived. At least they had seagoing vessels and trained sailors. The Dutch did best when they invaded in 1688.
parsifal
Colonel
Just wanted revisit this claim that in 1940 every battle took thousands of rounds before a hit was registered. I can think of enough exceptions to this rule to make a mockery of it.
Battle of Battle of Lofoten islands, between BCs RENOWN, GNEISENAU and SCHARHORST. At 04:30, Gneisenau sighted Renown on its radar and the German ships cleared for action. Due to poor weather conditions, neither side was able to engage the other until 05:05, as heavy seas and poor visibility prevented the two squadrons from closing within range. Renown began the action by attacking Gneisenau with her 15-inch guns. The German warships returned fire at 05:08 with Gneisenau scoring two hits on Renown with her 11 inch shells with their first salvo. Both shells failed to explode, with the first hitting the British battlecruiser′s foremast and the second passing through the ship near the steering gear room. About the same time, Renown struck Gneisenau with two shells. it was the british ships third salvo
Battle Of Denmark strait, engagement range > 20000 yds, speeds in excess of 20 knots. Fire commenced 0552, First hits registered (by PoW) approximately 0553, 1 minute after firing had commenced. Bismarck scored her first hit 0556 and destroyed her target (Hood) in one shot.
This level of accuracy was not limited to heavy ships, though their superior fire control gear and training was clearly a factor
At the Battle of Carnavon November 1941, DKM Kormoran did not have access to modern FC gear and her guns were old . She was firing on a target travelling in excess of 15 kts, but only 1500 yds distant. She scored hits on her 2nd, 3rd 4th and 5th salvos. Sydney is believed to hav scored hits on her 3, 5, and 6 th salvoes.
The claim that it was not possible to hit ships with naval technologies available at this time is just bunkum.
Battle of Battle of Lofoten islands, between BCs RENOWN, GNEISENAU and SCHARHORST. At 04:30, Gneisenau sighted Renown on its radar and the German ships cleared for action. Due to poor weather conditions, neither side was able to engage the other until 05:05, as heavy seas and poor visibility prevented the two squadrons from closing within range. Renown began the action by attacking Gneisenau with her 15-inch guns. The German warships returned fire at 05:08 with Gneisenau scoring two hits on Renown with her 11 inch shells with their first salvo. Both shells failed to explode, with the first hitting the British battlecruiser′s foremast and the second passing through the ship near the steering gear room. About the same time, Renown struck Gneisenau with two shells. it was the british ships third salvo
Battle Of Denmark strait, engagement range > 20000 yds, speeds in excess of 20 knots. Fire commenced 0552, First hits registered (by PoW) approximately 0553, 1 minute after firing had commenced. Bismarck scored her first hit 0556 and destroyed her target (Hood) in one shot.
This level of accuracy was not limited to heavy ships, though their superior fire control gear and training was clearly a factor
At the Battle of Carnavon November 1941, DKM Kormoran did not have access to modern FC gear and her guns were old . She was firing on a target travelling in excess of 15 kts, but only 1500 yds distant. She scored hits on her 2nd, 3rd 4th and 5th salvos. Sydney is believed to hav scored hits on her 3, 5, and 6 th salvoes.
The claim that it was not possible to hit ships with naval technologies available at this time is just bunkum.
