If the RAF had been defeated in the Battle of Britain

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This change the fact that the Force C didn't pursued the second landing force?
It never landed any troops on Crete. Destroying the convoy would have only exposed the RN to more losses, although with hindsight it might have been safer amongst the convoy, the Saggitario not withstanding...

700 meters were in the first engagement (Force D - Lupo), as I stated and you obviously didn't understand.

and Lupo was hit 18 times.


And so? Have I ever said that it wasn't in the firts engagement? Have I ever said that it wasn't accidental? Have I ever said that were more than a few hits, or that they were a serious threat?
I said that "the RN ships even shoot themself".
You stated that it was "a fantasy".
So? It was my fantasy or your ignorance?

You implied that RN ships deliberately engaged each other.


Actually only three of the shells exploded, and the damages were light. Two sailors were killed (as those abroad the Orion for the friendly fire).

Source please. 3 - 6in shells exploding is typically enough to do severe damage to a destroyer, not to mention 12 other 6in hits.


And they are normally a match for a force of three cruisers and four destroyers (by night, having the force of cruisers and destroyers the radar, and the torpedo boat not)?

Lupo's convoy was destroyed. The RN opted not to destroy the other because of the Luftwaffe, not the naval escort.


So, when Cunningam reported to his superiors that it was no more possible to operate in daylight, he was lying. Interesting...
Apparently the Italians and Germans came to the same conclusion because they made no more attempts at seaborne landings for another 5 days or so. In any event Cunningham didn't have to operate in daylight to destroy Axis landing attempts, but it seems likely that the fleet would have done so if necessary.
 
No-one in this thread has so far demonstrated how the Germans are going to overcome the following:

The crossing and transport problems: How will they achieve surprise? How will they protect the transports - some of which will take more than 30 hours to reach their disembarkation points - from the Royal Navy? How will they land the troops? How will they provide protection for the flotilla and fire support?

The follow-on transport problem: How will Germany supply its land forces, both the seaborne and airborne infantry? How will it protect the supply convoys?

The land combat problem: How will Germany make its planned broad-front advance against an opposition that has superiority in availability of men and materiel and is fighting from prepared positions, in depth? How will it advance with less than 200 armoured vehicles in the first wave, as well as reduced organic artillery levels? How will will it maintain its beachheads for the nine days required before the second wave of divisions arrive?

The air combat problem: How will it defend the beacheads and ports from night bombing?

maybe the secret plan was to build the Chunnel...
 
No one has mentioned yet the landing in the Romney Marsh area.

Some quotes from this link, Problems with German Plans for Operation Sealion

The standard argument that if the Germans had gained air superiority they would have been able to sink the British vessels does not really stand up to much scrutiny. During the Dunkirk evacuation, despite having control of the air for long periods, and despite the ships spending a lot of time stationary in the harbour (loading), the Luftwaffe was able to sink only 4 of the 39 Royal Navy destroyers which took place in the operation.
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Totally an unfair comparison. First of all the Germans were operating from bases quite a bit further away from Dunkirk than they would have been operating against Southern England during Sealion. Not only that, but this was after a huge expenditure of effort against the French and British ground forces at an extreme tempo of operations for over 2 weeks previous, meaning that operational rates had dropped tremendously, not to mention the losses incurred in defeating the Allied air forces on the continent. Also the LW was busy at the same time operating against the French and other allied ground forces in the pocket and outside of it too. The weather was pretty bad during the evacuation, meaning the LW could only operate 2 of the days of the evacuation, both of which were not at the peak of the 'packed' ship period.

This is not comparable to the situation during Sealion, as the LW would have had time to rest, would have good weather (as they would be launching it during a period where shipping could operate), have much, much closer bases to the Channel, so would have a much higher turn around time between sortees and less fatigue traveling to the fighting area, and they would have air superiority over the Channel (as the prerequisite for Sea Lion is defeating the RAF in Southern England), which they did not have over Dunkirk, as the RAF was sending over fighters from England to cover the evacuation that was closer to Dunkirk than LW bases. Plus here the entirety of the LW would be available, rather than a fraction at Dunkirk.

The situation would be very different, meaning the Dunkirk experience is not useful for comparison at all. Even the fighting around Malta isn't instructive, as Malta was much further from Axis airbases than the English Channel was from German bases in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. The LW is going to have much, much more in terms of aircraft to throw at the British as they advanced into the constricted area of the Channel mere tens of miles from LW bases in the Low Countries. As the Kanalkampf demonstrated the Ju87s were more than capable of shutting down British shipping during daylight hours even when covered by the RAF, which the British fleet would not be here, as again the premise is that the RAF has been defeated in Southern England as a prerequisite for the invasion to even be happening in the first place.
 
So how does your comment square with Hitler's offer that Britain would retain it's Empire? Vichy France held onto its empire so why not Britain. As for painting this purely as a Tory issue...again, I disagree. There were plenty in the Labour party who didn't want war. They weren't necessarily on the side of Nazism but they were in favour of reaching an accommodation with Berlin because war ended up with "the people" killing each other...that would be a bad thing.

People killing each other is a bad thing; sitting around and letting other people kill you is worse.

The histories I've read is that there would not be any kind of negotiated peace had the invasion been resisted and succeeded; the occupation policy would have been to depopulate the British Isles. As for the Commonwealth? I suspect the reaction for many of its members would be less than conciliatory. I would be willing to be a large sum of money that Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and South Africa would simply declare themselves independent, and the peace treaty is not binding on them. Somehow I think that an occupied UK sending over a fleet to invade Canada to keep it in the nazi-controlled "Commonwealth" would not go over well with the slightly more populous, highly industrialized country south of its border.
 
So how does your comment square with Hitler's offer that Britain would retain it's Empire? Vichy France held onto its empire so why not Britain. As for painting this purely as a Tory issue...again, I disagree. There were plenty in the Labour party who didn't want war. They weren't necessarily on the side of Nazism but they were in favour of reaching an accommodation with Berlin because war ended up with "the people" killing each other...that would be a bad thing.
We don't know what terms Hitler was prepared to offer, there was no formal offer made nor was there one drafted as far as I know so it is just speculation. I expect the very least Hitler would have wanted was to be sure that his western flank was secure in order for him to safely attack Russia and for this he would need to be certain that Britain was out of the war for good and not just using the time to gather strength. With this in mind he would have wanted to occupy at least part of the country with the option of occupying the whole of it as he did in Vichy France, he also would have robbed the place blind and bled it try through taxes. Vichy France was a rump state controlled by the Germans who were able to and did invade it on a whim. As far as the French Empire was concerned, the Germans were just using French troops as a convenience to stop it falling into British hands, the Germans said OK to the Japanese taking Indo-China from the French. Similarly Hitler would probably have used British troops to protect India from Russia in the short term but have handed it over to Japan in the long term.
I don't think Hitler put any serious thought or energy into invading Britain or even to what Britain might decide to do in the event it was left to fight alone. It sounds to me as though Hitler thought "well we will bomb them and threaten them with invasion and we will see if they are daft enough to trust us to honour a peace treaty", nothing ventured nothing gained. Churchill and the Admiralty must surely have understood about the practicalities of an invasion and understood that we could keep the Germans out. The Germans were trying what Nelson got away with at Copenhagen, invasion was a bluff but a bad one because unlike Nelson's Danes the British knew what they were up against.
 
I am convinced, 12 Germans armed with pocket pistols in leaky rowboats with a spavined mule could have crossed the channel, stormed Dover castle and marched on to London and take over the seat of government all within 72 hours. Stopping for a number of pub meals on the way.

The Royal Navy was bunch of incompetents who did nothing but drink rum and waste the taxpayers money.


And yet the Germans lost????????

IT WAS ALL HITLER"S FAULT!
 
As far as the French Empire was concerned, the Germans were just using French troops as a convenience to stop it falling into British hands, the Germans said OK to the Japanese taking Indo-China from the French.

Agree no terms were offered but the rhetoric of peace was included in several of Hitler's speeches. We all know how trustworthy he wasn't so Churchill and his Cabinet refused even to consider discussing terms. Would that be the same if London was exposed to unrestrained air attack? Not entire sure that it would...but we're arguing about what might have happened which nobody can know for sure.

One final point...I'm not entirely sure it was up to Berlin whether or not Japan took Indo-China from the French. The Japanese were highly offended by not having prior warning of Germany's attack against the USSR and saw themselves as operating within their sphere of influence without need to refer to Berlin. The Axis really didn't coordinate activities to the extent you are indicating.
 
There were plenty in the Labour party who didn't want war.

I'm sorry Buffnut, but I think you are overestimating the extent of the anti-war sentiment and how big a part these people would or could play in Britain's future at that time. Churchill's decision making was made behind closed doors during private meetings with senior personnel, none of whom held anti-war sentiment. Britain was very autocratic at this time; it had to be. If there was an invasion you can guarantee that many of these individuals would quickly change their minds about any peace deals with the Nazis if their liberties were being threatened. You are right in stating that there was sympathy for the Nazis and an idea of peace being with among indivduals, but once the bombs started dropping and the dead began to be rolled out into the streets much of this dried up. No, people didn't want war, but they didn't want invasion and occupation either.
 
Many Americans were against the war before December 7, 1941. Attacks on ones own soil tend to piss off most of the population, even the most anti war people tend to get annoyed when their own homeland is being attacked.
 
I think initiative and surprise would be a major asset for the Germans.

A sixteen hour boat ride across the English Channel in flat bottomed barges is what constitutes initiative and surprise?! The men and horses would most likely have been seasick, with the animals shitting last night's dinner around the interior of the boats, causing even more ill feeling among the soldiers! Try invading with your army having to endure that! :lol:

Personally, I think England could be invaded, but supplying the invasion force might be the real issue.

Any country can be invaded with the right circumstances and equipment in place. By the Germans in 1940? Not a chance.
 
My feeling is that if Fighter Command was comprehensively written down (say to around 200 fighter aircraft) and Bomber Command suitably diminished (cut by around 50%) and the Germans did decide to launch Sealion, the most likely result is the Germans losing anywhere from 10-25% of their initial force of 160,000 men in the crossing and landing, another 15-25% in the actual combat phase while on land and then another 10-20% as they beat an ignominious retreat.

SEA: There is simply no way to prevent the RN from sallying forth, at night or by day, to oppose the crossing. Submarines, mines, the surface fleet and the Luftwaffe were simply not enough to stop the RN braving its MTB/MTGs, sloops, destroyers and light capital elements (6" cruisers) in the channel. All through the BoB period, RN destroyers were running sweeps along the French and Belgian coasts and attacking targets of opportunity, both in daylight and at night.

If a crossing does get underway, as of 14 September 1940 there were the five battleships and aircraft carrier, 16 cruisers and 48 destroyers or corvettes, plus another 700 light armed patrol vessels in home waters. 12 destroyers, three battleships and two cruisers were ready to sail from Rosyth to directly oppose the flotilla.

To fight them, the Kriegsmarine has two old battleships, two modern battleships, five cruisers (including a gunnery training ship) and no more than ten destroyers. The submarine force is mostly going to be deployed in the North Sea or the Atlantic, not in the Channel, mostly due to its shallowness.

AIR: Even a written down RAF is still going to bomb the invasion beaches, ports and the follow on assembly areas in both Southern England and France/Belgium. Fighter Command will take a heavy toll on fighter bomber attacks by Ju-87s and Bf-110s, although F/B 109-E4s and E7s will probably have an easier time of it.

LAND: Sealion envisions a nine day build-up by infantry forces to grant the armoured forces of the second wave enough manoeuvring room for a push on London. This is lunacy of the highest order.

The British defence plan consisted of using fortifications, the Home Guard and static regular army units as a coastal crust to provide initial resistance. Behind this came the semi-mobile formations, again supported by fortifications (over 14,000 by September). Their main objective was to trade space for time and to channel German advances into corridors, allowing the reformed British divisions to chose the ground they fight on.

The nine German infantry divisions that land are going to be outnumbered, outgunned in terms of artillery and armoured support and lacking some of their organic transport support. The bulk of the British Army's armour and artillery was to have been brought in to phase lines inland of the invasion sites, mustered and then used to attack in strength.


What I see is a force that is subject to attack from both the land and the sea by day, by land, air and sea by night. It is outnumbered and under supplied, without significant armour support (the ~250 Tauchpanzers amount to roughly one division of armour) attempting to achieve a wide-front advance against an opponent that is going to meet it with a delaying tactics and resistance concentrated around strongpoints. A few days in, it is going to start to run shorts of bombs, bullets and bandages, while the opposition continues to strengthen. The BA is going to be raining shells on it from the land, the RN is going to be raining shells on it from the sea and Bomber Command is going to be appearing every night and hitting pretty much whatever they can find.

General Franz Halder likened the whole exercise to sticking his hand into a meat grinder. I think he may have been understating the case.
 
Hello Jabberwocky
both modern BBs were still in repairs, Sch. till late Nov 40 and Gnei. till mid Oct 40. Both were hit by a torpedo during Norway ops.

Juha
 
The highly trained Nazi Sea Lions would have easily got across the Channel and invaded at night. Can you imagine the chaos caused by squads of Sea Lions roaming the countryside balancing balls on there noses and attacking all the Fish shops. Luckily the Royal Seal Heavy Infantry aided by The Queens Own Otters would be ferried in and there would be bloody flipper to flipper combat in the Council Swimming pool at Walmington On Sea.
 
There were plenty in the Labour party who didn't want war.

Certainly not the leadership. Attlee was one of the most vociferous opponents of appeasement. This went for most Labour politicians if not some of the party's grass roots. The reason they joined the coalition was because it was perceived as being in the national interest.

As soon as Barbarossa was launched this all became irrelevant. The Labour Party and the entire Trade Union Movement (and I agree some had been wavering, despite the Nazi treatment of its own Trade Unionists..."a bayonet is a tool with a worker at both ends" and all that) got solidly behind the war. Didn't prevent a spate of strikes which kept Beaverbrook on his toes!

Cheers

Steve
 
I would just like to say how much I have enjoyed reading some of the comments on this thread, I enjoy a good bit of sarcastic wit and have had a really good laugh at some of things people have written.
 
Certainly not the leadership. Attlee was one of the most vociferous opponents of appeasement. This went for most Labour politicians if not some of the party's grass roots. The reason they joined the coalition was because it was perceived as being in the national interest...

But Attlee and Labour Party opposed the rearmament till 1937. IMHO it was not very bright policy to pursuit active anti-nazi policy while in the same time made best efforts to make sure that one's own armed forces would be as weak as possible. Singing the International / Red Flag wasn't the most effective way to stop bombers or panzers.

Juha
 

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