If the US is neutral, how does the air war in Europe play out?

[wiking85]

Its a silly question really. The US is absolutely essential to the war outcome. And that had to be something more than just Lend Lease. Neither Britain or Russia had the strength, even with Lend Lease, to survive, let alone defeat the Axis Powers. Germany would have had time to assimialte the rest of occuapied Europe as part of their empire....the very reason Britain refused to accept Hitlers demands that they surrencer Dave (you got that more than a bit wronmg incidentally).

That's a pretty bold statement that the Soviets and British couldn't survive without US intervention. They could survive, but not win in the context of defeating Germany totally. I think the Soviets with LL can push the Germans pretty close to the pre-war border without US intervention before petering out. The British cannot be invaded so long as the Soviets are in the war. Not having US bombing or Hitler's meddling would certainly be extremely helpful to the Axis war effort, but I doubt Germany is going to end the war in victory as Hitler wanted or even in a Brest-Litovsk situation.

 

[zoomar]

Its a silly question really. The US is absolutely essential to the war outcome. And that had to be something more than just Lend Lease. Neither Britain or Russia had the strength, even with Lend Lease, to survive, let alone defeat the Axis Powers. Germany would have had time to assimialte the rest of occuapied Europe as part of their empire....the very reason Britain refused to accept Hitlers demands that they surrencer Dave (you got that more than a bit wronmg incidentally).

I respectfully disagree. It was ultimately US production capacity, not the direct participation of US forces in combat that made German victory impossible. Decisive Allied victory might also be problematic with the US on the sidelines, but Germany simply could not sucessfully invade and occupy Britain, especially with the US providing materiel, weapons, supplies, and food to the British through Lend-Lease. I think the situation regarding the USSR would be similar. The only way Nazi Germany could have decisively defeated the USSR would have been if they approached Ukranians, Byelorussians, etc as "liberators", not racist overlords. It would take more than a few different Nazis in charge of Germany for the basic Nazi attitudes to change.

 

[wiking85]

The only way Nazi Germany could have decisively defeated the USSR would have been if they approached Ukranians, Byelorussians, etc as "liberators", not racist overlords. It would take more than a few different Nazis in charge of Germany for the basic Nazi attitudes to change.

Goering was far less ideological than Hitler or Himmler; had he removed guys like Koch from Ukraine and let the German army run it there would be much more of a chance to recruit. Belarus was never going to be pro-German due to their identifying with Russia (even today), which is why it was the hub of partisan activity in the war. Had the Germans cultivated the UPA in 1941 they would have avoided the serious issues of 1942 (murdering their leadership in concentration camps) and could have set them up as a governing body in Kiev, which would yield better results than the Nazi administration did historically. The Ukrainians East of the Dnieper did not view themselves as Ukrainian however, so would be very much against any regime that worked with a foreign power, which is why the support of the UPA historically came from Galicia and West Ukraine (even today the feelings of Ukrainian-ness come from areas west of the Dnieper). Without Hitler Goering is going to have to make concessions to the army to stay in power, because Hitler was the popular one in the party with the public (Goering and everyone else was disliked or outright hated by the public), so its likely that he would have to dismantled the Nazi administration in Ukraine, especially because they opposed his 4-year program influence in the economy there; political conflicts in the party with Goering would actually more than likely have him side with the army against the party and in fact dismantled a fair bit of the party apparatuses to court the army, which would be his power base going forward, as he and Himmler were not really that close by 1941, while the rest of the party and Goering were not in touch. Letting the army run things in the East would probably go better than the historical Nazi leadership there.

 

[Balljoint]

Without Hitler in the picture, it's rerolling the dice. Does the Wehrmacht or SS take over? Hitler was a one-off crazy –actually a throwback to the days of Louie XIV- still playing the old war-as-an-adventure game. Without Hitler, Mussolini would have been on his own in his African and Hellenic misadventures. Had Germany limited its objective to the USSR and not frittered away the LW and other resources, they could have made it to the Urals at least –assuming that logistics and strategic planning were not deemed defeatist. But, without Hitler inciting insanity, Germany likely would have followed its better lights even during 1941. And, without Hitler, the allies would have been receptive.

The thread is essaying the war without the US. Not to the jack the thread, but perhaps the question is cleaner posing: What if Hitler hadn't honored his treaty with Japan and not declared war on the US. That would keep both Hitler's charisma and insanity in the picture along with FDR's ability to get in the European action with just Japan in the US picture. Lend lease when the US is in a shooting war with its pants down militarily?

 

[Juha]

Goering was far less ideological than Hitler or Himmler; had he removed guys like Koch from Ukraine and let the German army run it there would be much more of a chance to recruit. Belarus was never going to be pro-German due to their identifying with Russia (even today), which is why it was the hub of partisan activity in the war. Had the Germans cultivated the UPA in 1941 they would have avoided the serious issues of 1942 (murdering their leadership in concentration camps) and could have set them up as a governing body in Kiev, which would yield better results than the Nazi administration did historically. The Ukrainians East of the Dnieper did not view themselves as Ukrainian however, so would be very much against any regime that worked with a foreign power, which is why the support of the UPA historically came from Galicia and West Ukraine (even today the feelings of Ukrainian-ness come from areas west of the Dnieper). Without Hitler Goering is going to have to make concessions to the army to stay in power, because Hitler was the popular one in the party with the public (Goering and everyone else was disliked or outright hated by the public), so its likely that he would have to dismantled the Nazi administration in Ukraine, especially because they opposed his 4-year program influence in the economy there; political conflicts in the party with Goering would actually more than likely have him side with the army against the party and in fact dismantled a fair bit of the party apparatuses to court the army, which would be his power base going forward, as he and Himmler were not really that close by 1941, while the rest of the party and Goering were not in touch. Letting the army run things in the East would probably go better than the historical Nazi leadership there.

It was more complicated than that, Göring made callous comments on the treatment of Soviet PoWs and of all people Alfred Rosenberg asked/pleaded the WM high command for better treatment of the Soviet PoWs, at least to give them some means to built shelters for themselves and allow locals to give them food. In the end he went to Keitel on this but that was futile.

Juha

 

[Garyt]

I respectfully disagree. It was ultimately US production capacity, not the direct participation of US forces in combat that made German victory impossible. Decisive Allied victory might also be problematic with the US on the sidelines, but Germany simply could not sucessfully invade and occupy Britain, especially with the US providing materiel, weapons, supplies, and food to the British through Lend-Lease. I think the situation regarding the USSR would be similar.

One thing to think about - air superiority, for the axis or allies was a huge issue. No blitzkrieg without superiority, no D-day without it. The Luftwaffe was lost over the skys of Germany. Without US involvement, the Luftwaffe does not see the pilot attrition due to both having more fuel for training and just not losing the sheer numbers from the US bomber onslaught. The Russian front has German air superiority almost similar to 1941, and the British night bombing is more of a nuisance.

That is of course, unless the US also provides pilots via lend lease

 

[Juha]

One thing to think about - air superiority, for the axis or allies was a huge issue. No blitzkrieg without superiority, no D-day without it. The Luftwaffe was lost over the skys of Germany. Without US involvement, the Luftwaffe does not see the pilot attrition due to both having more fuel for training and just not losing the sheer numbers from the US bomber onslaught. The Russian front has German air superiority almost similar to 1941, and the British night bombing is more of a nuisance.

That is of course, unless the US also provides pilots via lend lease

Daytime would have been a big problem to Allies but in fact Speer was more worried on RAF than USAAF attacks on oil targets because of powerful British blast bombs were much more destructive in oil installations than smaller US HE bombs and RAF was capable to hit at least most of the installations.

Without Hitler Germans might well have been able to avoid the Stalingrad catastrophe, Halder's plan for summer 42 was more conservative and safer. But it was Hitler who sacked von Bock because the latter wanted to conquer also the eastern part of Voronez beyond the river and allowed his troops to became too involved in the fierce street fighting there. So there were high ranking army commanders who were too eager to conquer big cities, too.

But without USA participation, no D-Day, at least in 1944. So British ground forces could only operate in fringes and all depended on the SU, probably dead lock there somewhere between Volga and Dnepr/Mius rivers.

Juha

 

[wiking85]

Oil Campaign of World War II - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Luftwaffe Field Marshal Erhard Milch, referring to the consequences of the Oil Campaign, claimed that "The British left us with deep and bleeding wounds, but the Americans stabbed us in the heart."[35]

Without the USAAF pushing the oil campaign would the British have even gone for it? Also by 1944 the Nachtjagdwaffe would be much stronger without having to build up daylight defenses against the USAAF, so its very unlikely the RAF would have been able to go after the Ruhr oil industry in the same way and wouldn't have been able to go after Romania at all without conquering North Africa and Southern Italy.

 

[Juha]

...Without the USAAF pushing the oil campaign would the British have even gone for it?...

Why not, of course someone would have to push Harris to do it, but British knew that the oil was one of the Achilles heels of Germany's economy. Oil target were top priority targets for the BC early in the war but when they found out that they seldom hit them at that time, those went down the list. But when British got adeguate navigational aids and marketing tactics, why not?

Also by 1944 the Nachtjagdwaffe would be much stronger without having to build up daylight defenses against the USAAF, so its very unlikely the RAF would have been able to go after the Ruhr oil industry in the same way and wouldn't have been able to go after Romania at all without conquering North Africa and Southern Italy.

Why, they could bomb Köningsberg/Kaliningrad from England why would they be incapable to bomb Ploesti from Cyrenaica coastal plain?

Juha

 

[wiking85]

Why not, of course someone would have to push Harris to do it, but British knew that the oil was one of the Achilles heels of Germany's economy. Oil target were top priority targets for the BC early in the war but when they found out that they seldom hit them at that time, those went down the list. But when British got adeguate navigational aids and marketing tactics, why not?

Better German defenses and far less Western airpower making it more dangerous and less profitable against a small target?

Also:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oil_Campaign_of_World_War_II

1944:
USAAF: 347 strikes
RAF Bomber Command: 158 "strikes"
1945: 175 strikes (31 RAF)

The RAF contributed much less than the USAAF to the oil campaign
It was also based on the post-Normandy situation at the front, where they could now base on the continent and put in even closer navigation beacons, while moving around the established German radar network, while overrunning part of it, making the attacks more likely to succeed due to overloaded German defenses.

Bomber Command didn't start hitting German oil until after Normandy too, by which time the V-1 missile will be in service and the RAF focused on taking out the launch sites. Also it wasn't until November 1944 that the RAF dropped over 4500 tons of bombs on the oil targets.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oil_Campaign_of_World_War_II#Statistics

The efficiency of the bombing was lacking. Working from German records for certain sites, the USSBS determined that on average 87% of Allied bombs fell outside the factory perimeter and that only a few percent struck plant or equipment inside the boundary. The USAAF could put 26% of their bombing within the factories in good bombing conditions, 12% when using a mix of visual and instruments but only 5% when it had to use instrument-only bombing techniques; and 80% of their tonnage was delivered under partly or fully instrument conditions. The RAF averaged 16% inside the factory. Bomber Command's efforts against oil were more efficient in some regards - although delivering a smaller total tonnage it did so from 2/3 base area. The USSBS believed that Bomber Command's heavy bombs - 4,000 lb "cookies" - were more effective than an equivalent weight of smaller bombs. Both RAF and USAAF dropped a large number of bombs on oil targets that failed to explode: 19% and 12% respectively.[37]

Why, they could bomb Köningsberg/Kaliningrad from England why would they be incapable to bomb Ploesti from Cyrenaica coastal plain?

Juha

Attacking a coastal target is much easier at night due to the reflection of the moonlight off the water, plus lots of identifiable land features; that's why RAF 'gardening' missions were considered so easy and were focused on earlier in the war. Navigation by guidance system is impossible at that range (900 miles from Britain to Königsberg). Ploesti was 1100 miles from Tripoli; its just not able to be found in the dark due to being in land at a great distance with little to no identifying terrain. The RAF didn't go after it for a reason, while the USAAF only went during daylight. Later when Italy was captured they were able to mine the Danube, but that required bases in Italy and beacons set up there to navigate at night.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_of_Königsberg_in_World_War_II

The first RAF attack was carried out by No. 5 Group on the night of 26/27 August 1944 using 174 Avro Lancasters. The raid, which was at the extreme range for the planes, was a round trip of 1,900 miles (3,100 km) from bases in England.

Ploesti is too far from Cyrenaica to reach with any sort of viable bomb load. Also the first raids were not that successful until the raiders had gained experience operating in the area.

Also the range of British navigation systems from late war:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gee-H_(navigation)

Gee-H was limited to distances just out of line of sight, in this case limiting it to about 300 miles.

 

[Garyt]

Why not, of course someone would have to push Harris to do it, but British knew that the oil was one of the Achilles heels of Germany's economy. Oil target were top priority targets for the BC early in the war but when they found out that they seldom hit them at that time, those went down the list. But when British got adeguate navigational aids and marketing tactics, why not

The other issue is that Germany will devote a lot more resources towards night fighting if that becomes an issue. Personally I would think we would see a similar effort by the British but thwarted better by the Germans.

And maybe over the next few years we may see a true 4 engine heavy from the Germans, perhaps even some fighters better equipped for long range escort duties. Perhaps even just modifications of the ME109 or FW190, I lean more towards the second being modified.

I think without the disruption of the German economy and without having to commit resources to the daylight bombing, and no Mediterreanean campaign and no invasion of Italy, Germany handles the Russian front with a lot more success.

 

[zoomar]

If the US is not an active combatant in Europe, their would be a much less comprehensive strategic bombing campaign. The RAF would mount its urban nightime campaign, but with the exception of specific situations such as a build up to an invasion of Europe, I don't see a large daylight campaign of so-called "precision bombing". The RAF would probably attempt much the same thing with more and varied Mosquito raids. Of course with the US out, one has to wonder if anything like the Normandy invasion would be attempted by Britain alone - especialy since Churchill wasn't too keen on the idea initially anyway. Invasions of Greece, Italy, South France, and perhaps even Norway might be more likely I think this would alter the theatre mix of Luftwaffe aircraft to the detriment of the Soviets. In the absence of a sustained USAAF daylight campaign, more day fighters (Bf 109 and Fw 190) and their experienced crews would be available to the East, while more effort would be placed on nightfighters in the west. High performance/high altitude fighters like the Fw 190D/Ta-152 would be deemphasized, since the RAF bombing campaign and Soviet AF operates at lower altitudes. I suspect the development and introduction of jet fighters such as the Me 262 might be less aggressively pursued since their real forte was as high-speed daylight bomber interceptors. Perhaps the only jet aircraft that would be introduced in quantity would be the Ar 234, as a highspeed recon and intruder for hit and run attacks on coastal Britain. Since lend-lease would still be in play, the Mustang would become a major RAF fighter, and probably the P-47 might be more widely used as well. I agree with those who suggest that German transportation and industrial infrastructure might survive better without the USAAF, but I don't think this would translate into a more varied Luftwaffe. V-weapons, yes, long-range heavy bombers, no.

 

[Garyt]

but I don't think this would translate into a more varied Luftwaffe. V-weapons, yes, long-range heavy bombers, no.

The one difference is I don't see a push for jet fighters, because as mentioned their best use was as daylight interceptors.

That is unless something could be done to extend their range significantly, in which case a jet long range fighter is better than a prop one.

A heavy bomber on the other hand I see a push for. The Germans had these in the works, it's just the needs of the war made heavy bombers rather useless (as is most bombing if you have no chance of air superiority). But look at planes like the HE274 that would have stood a much better chance of making it to full production if there was a need for them.

A heavy 4 engine bomber would have been very useful for taking the war to the British and Russians. With the poor performance of Russian fighters at high altitudes, you would think a bomber like the HE274 would have been effective.

 

[wiking85]

V-weapons, yes, long-range heavy bombers, no.

I don't see the V-2 or V-3 without Hitler; the V-1 I could see a lot more of. It would be a brutal blow to Britain, as they won't be able to counter them by overrunning the launch sites and the more advanced versions that were even cheaper would be available in late 1944 and early 1945. With jet recon they won't be fooled into overshooting London either. Not only that but the cost of building defenses was huge, much of which would be rendered useless once the original operating height could be reached by the V-1 (historical version operated at 2-3,000 feet, while the early versions operated at 9k feet over the Bofors 40mm guns) once the pressure gauge system could be worked out. Would the US have the 90mm radar guided AAA to send to Britain like they did historically if there is no war in Europe to justify their construction? I don't see them having a use in the Pacific, though the proximity fuse certainly would. I think the V-1 would be a much bigger problem then it was historically. Also it was in range of Leningrad from Estonia, so if and when the blockade of the city was broken, then Germany could launch V-1s at Leningrad without having to deal with the AAA as advanced as the British would have. Later versions with increased range and wooden parts were even cheaper and easier to make, but never were used against Britain because the launch sites in range were overrun.

How does Britain react to having hundreds if not over 1000 launched per day by 1945?

Edit:
Plus no USAAF for Operation Crossbow
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Crossbow

Sorties/bomb tonnage:
Total: 68,913/122,133[3]
RAF: 19,584/72,141
USAAF: 17,211/30,350[4]

 

[wiking85]

double post

 

[Garyt]

and the more advanced versions that were even cheaper would be available in late 1944 and early 1945.

What was the cost of a V-1 vs say the cost of a medium bomber, and the cost of a dumb bomb of same warhead weight?

 

[wiking85]

What was the cost of a V-1 vs say the cost of a medium bomber, and the cost of a dumb bomb of same warhead weight?

Not counting fuel, lubricants, and anything else besides the basic airframe of each and the explosives (i.e. the warhead of the V-1) the Osprey book on the V-1 says 2% of a medium bomber without factoring in fuel, aircrew cost, training, anything the aircrews need (defensive armament, radios, gear, ammunition, service costs, ground crew, basing, pay, etc.). That's not including the dumb bomb cost (not sure what that was). The launch site probably cost about as much as a small airfield to build if not even less, especially with the temporary sites built in 1944. The construction was cheap and dirty, because it was making 1 one way trip; later they were able to introduce wooden parts, including the nose cap, the lower cost and weight, increasing range too.

So about 50 V-1s per He-111 (not the heavier Ju-188 or Do-217 that were standard by 1944).
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/V-1_flying_bomb#Assessment

Unlike the V-2, the V-1 was a cost-effective weapon for the Germans as it forced the Allies to spend heavily on defensive measures and divert bombers from other targets. More than 25% of Combined Bomber Offensive's bombs in July and August 1944 were used against V-weapon sites, often ineffectively.[14] In early December 1944, American General Clayton Bissell wrote a paper which argued strongly in favour of the V-1 compared to conventional bombers.[40]

Blitz (12 months) vs V-1 flying bombs (2¾ months)
Blitz V-1
1. Cost to Germany
Sorties 90,000 8,025
Weight of bombs tons 61,149 14,600
Fuel consumed tons 71,700 4,681
Aircraft lost 3,075 0
Personnel lost 7,690 0
2. Results
Structures damaged/destroyed 1,150,000 1,127,000
Casualties 92,566 22,892
Rate casualties/bombs tons 1.6 1.6
3. Allied air effort
Sorties 86,800 44,770
Aircraft lost 1,260 351
Personnel lost 2,233 805

The costlier operations later from the air launched V-1s wouldn't happen here without the launch sites being overrun by the Normandy invasion by August.

 

[Juha]

Better German defenses and far less Western airpower making it more dangerous and less profitable against a small target?

Also:
Oil Campaign of World War II - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The RAF contributed much less than the USAAF to the oil campaign
It was also based on the post-Normandy situation at the front, where they could now base on the continent and put in even closer navigation beacons, while moving around the established German radar network, while overrunning part of it, making the attacks more likely to succeed due to overloaded German defenses.

Bomber Command didn't start hitting German oil until after Normandy too, by which time the V-1 missile will be in service and the RAF focused on taking out the launch sites. Also it wasn't until November 1944 that the RAF dropped over 4500 tons of bombs on the oil targets.
Oil Campaign of World War II - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia







Attacking a coastal target is much easier at night due to the reflection of the moonlight off the water, plus lots of identifiable land features; that's why RAF 'gardening' missions were considered so easy and were focused on earlier in the war. Navigation by guidance system is impossible at that range (900 miles from Britain to K�nigsberg). Ploesti was 1100 miles from Tripoli; its just not able to be found in the dark due to being in land at a great distance with little to no identifying terrain. The RAF didn't go after it for a reason, while the USAAF only went during daylight. Later when Italy was captured they were able to mine the Danube, but that required bases in Italy and beacons set up there to navigate at night.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_of_Königsberg_in_World_War_II

Ploesti is too far from Cyrenaica to reach with any sort of viable bomb load. Also the first raids were not that successful until the raiders had gained experience operating in the area.

Also the range of British navigation systems from late war:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gee-H_(navigation)

Ploesti is 1400km/870mls from Cyrenaica, at least according to Google Earth so it was in range. Also H2S could see rivers and lakes, even bigger cities. H2S and low level markings, if the latter was needed, at least certain types of oil refineries are easily seen at nights, would made it possible to hit oil refineries, probably not every time, the BC missed distant targets sometimes even in 1945.

Juha

PS the attack that sunk KM Tirpitz was 2252mls round trip, bomb load was 5 000kg/12 000lb Tallboy.

 

[Garyt]

That's interesting regarding the cost effectiveness of the V1.

Found this also:

Blitz V-1
1. Cost to Germany
Sorties 90,000 8,025
Weight of bombs tons 61,149 14,600
Fuel consumed tons 71,700 4,681
Aircraft lost 3,075 0
Personnel lost 7,690 0
2. Results
Structures damaged/destroyed 1,150,000 1,127,000
Casualties 92,566 22,892
Rate casualties/bombs tons 1.6 1.6
3. Allied air effort
Sorties 86,800 44,770
Aircraft lost 1,260 351
Personnel lost 2,233 805

Looks like the V-1 for the same amount of fuel would deliver far more bombs and casualties, without the loss of aircraft or aircrews. And if one can build 50 V-1's for a medium bomber, you are pretty cost effective. I don't think they were accurate enough though to target things like factories?

 

[Juha]

... I don't think they were accurate enough though to target things like factories?

Even Greater London was missed often