If the US is neutral, how does the air war in Europe play out?

[RCAFson]

How does Britain react to having hundreds if not over 1000 launched per day by 1945?

Tube Alloys...

 

[Juha]

That's interesting regarding the cost effectiveness of the V1.

Found this also:

Blitz V-1
1. Cost to Germany
Sorties 90,000 8,025
Weight of bombs tons 61,149 14,600
Fuel consumed tons 71,700 4,681
Aircraft lost 3,075 0
Personnel lost 7,690 0
2. Results
Structures damaged/destroyed 1,150,000 1,127,000
Casualties 92,566 22,892
Rate casualties/bombs tons 1.6 1.6
3. Allied air effort
Sorties 86,800 44,770
Aircraft lost 1,260 351
Personnel lost 2,233 805

Looks like the V-1 for the same amount of fuel would deliver far more bombs and casualties, without the loss of aircraft or aircrews. And if one can build 50 V-1's for a medium bomber, you are pretty cost effective. I don't think they were accurate enough though to target things like factories?

There is something odd in the table, LW lost some 70+ He 111s while air-launching V-1s and I'm pretty sure that Flak Regiment 155(W) suffered losses during the V-1 launches (premature explosions) even if we left out losses it suffered during Allied attacks on the V-1 launch sites, which is odd when the Allied losses during those attacks seems to be included.

 

[Garyt]

LW lost some 70+ He 111s while air-launching V-1s and I'm pretty sure that Flak Regiment 155(W) suffered losses during the V-1 launches (premature explosions)

It does mention the 70 or Heinkels lost in the notes below, which I did not get all of. Still an extremely small amount compared to losses during the blitz - at the most negligible losses. I look at it as more of a failed experiment, but it was required due to the Allies over running the launch sites in France.

 

[wiking85]

Tube Alloys...

With no means to really deploy it without the B-29 and the Avro-Lincoln couldn't move quickly enough to get outside the blast effect. Plus there is no proof that the US would just give one or more to Britain in August 1945 (which BTW could Britain take bombing for that long?), and Tube Alloy wasn't ready until 1948. Historically the US didn't help the British with their program or give the nukes in 1945.

 

[wiking85]

It does mention the 70 or Heinkels lost in the notes below, which I did not get all of. Still an extremely small amount compared to losses during the blitz - at the most negligible losses. I look at it as more of a failed experiment, but it was required due to the Allies over running the launch sites in France.

They wouldn't have happened without the launch sites being overrun by Overlord and the follow up. We can write them off here then. Not only that but the inaccuracy was a function of lack of aerial recon to check the fall of the missiles, which without the USAAF making the Me262 needed for fighter defense would mean they would be used for recon work to gauge V-1 use.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Messerschmitt_Me_262#Variants

Me 262 A-1a/U3
Reconnaissance version modified in small numbers, with Reihenbildner RB 20/30 cameras mounted in the nose (sometimes one RB 20/20 and one RB 75/30). Some retained one 30 mm (1.18 in) cannon, but most were unarmed.

Plus the AR234 would be ready to go in September; arguably sooner if the recon version was adopted:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arado_Ar_234#Background

The Ar 234 V7 prototype made history on 2 August 1944 as the first jet aircraft ever to fly a reconnaissance mission, flown by Erich Sommer.[4]

 

[parsifal]

That's a pretty bold statement that the Soviets and British couldn't survive without US intervention. They could survive, but not win in the context of defeating Germany totally. I think the Soviets with LL can push the Germans pretty close to the pre-war border without US intervention before petering out. The British cannot be invaded so long as the Soviets are in the war. Not having US bombing or Hitler's meddling would certainly be extremely helpful to the Axis war effort, but I doubt Germany is going to end the war in victory as Hitler wanted or even in a Brest-Litovsk situation.

They might survive, but they could not have won. Britain lacked the manpower to open a second front, and the Russians needed the distraction of a plausible second front landing in order to make headway against the heer in the East. In the air, the USAF efforts of 1943 were needed to break the back of the luftwaffe and also to ensure that the Germans followed the strategic blind alley of building more and more fighters, and investing ever greatre proportions of their spending on air defence. In 1942, the germans were spending about half what they would in 1944,. and in 1944 their air defence spending was over 50% of their entire defence budget. without the American B-17s and more importantly the P-51s ravaging germany and the occupied territories wherever and whenever they wanted, Germany's position fundamentally changes. Less threat in the air, means more effort for ground forces, greater tank production, more divisions, beter TOE levels, and the Luftwaffe does not suffer the rupturing losses in experience levels that they did. And a beefed up RAF, much as it pais me to say it, is not going to put the same pressure on the germ,ans as a full blown American effort. Lend Lease accounted for about 30% of US output, but that means that 70% of its effort are not being used.....

I am the first to admit that the British laid the groundwork that made the US victory possible. Since the end of the BOB, the luftwaffe had eaked out a semi bankrupt existence as losses whittled away their experience base. The RAF bombing efforts accounted for about 17% of germany military outputs.these are not insubstantial effects, but neither are they decisive. it took the Americans, and their massive campaigns of 1943-4 to put the luftwaffe on the canvas. even the so called defeats at Schweinfurt had long term fatal effects on the survival of the jagdwaffe.

As far as the Soviets being able to push back to the border, maybe, maybe not. Evidence suggests not. In 1943, with vast amounts of the german industrial potential already being poured into air defence, and more that 50% of german manpower forced to remain in the west, Germany still came close to breaking through at Kursk as it was. At that stage of the war, some 105 divisions were stationed in the west, in Italy (well, by September at least), or in the occupied territories. With hitler gone, the repressive policies he authorised would at least be reduced, making occupation easier and reducing demands on manpower in that sector. We know that the invasion of Italy caused the abandonement of Citadelle, just as it was poised to achieveing some real success, and italy would not have occurred without the Americans

In the west, prior to the US entry, German deployment in France was just 12 divisions, by the end of 1943, it had increased to 42 divisions. There were a further 12 divisions in the low countries, whereas prior to 1942 it has been held by just 2-3 divs. in germany itself there were over a million men serving in the flakartillerie, and 11 of the 13 flak corps were forced to remaion in Germany or the west to defend the reich. Whilst only BC was attacking, there were just 6 or seven flak units. 1942-4, in the east, there were a constant 2 flak corps deployed, whereas, without the Americans, its arguable that would increase to 6 or 7 such units. The flak units, as Richthofen points out in his despatches were critical to the AT defences in the east and with 6 or 7 of them available, Soviet tank losses would have skyrocketed. Further, of the 100 or so divisions retained on garrison in the west, we can probably assume 50 of them could could go east. The million or so flak men in the Reich could probably spare about half a million men for the east, which could pretty much restore the understrength units already fighting their.

In economics, the difference between boom or bust is about 7% of economic activity. In military economics the balance is similar, and I can categorically say the US contributed far more than 7% of the Allied military effort. Its a lay down mezzaire...without the active participation of the US, the Allies cannot win

 

[RCAFson]

With no means to really deploy it without the B-29 and the Avro-Lincoln couldn't move quickly enough to get outside the blast effect. Plus there is no proof that the US would just give one or more to Britain in August 1945 (which BTW could Britain take bombing for that long?), and Tube Alloy wasn't ready until 1948. Historically the US didn't help the British with their program or give the nukes in 1945.

Historically the UK gave all their A-bomb technology to the USA and the Commonwealth then cut back on their A-bomb program because the USA gave it high priority. With the USA neutral then Tube Alloys goes ahead full steam to build a Commonwealth bomb if the USA won't cooperate.

A number of different aircraft could have carried a "Little Boy" A-bomb to Berlin, and time to exit the blast radius could be given by deploying a drogue or chute from the bomb as needed, although the Lancaster VI should have no problem achieving the required 8 mile distance from ground zero (Enola Gay achieved 11 miles), with a drop from 31000ft as per the historical mission, given that Little Boy was only 9600lb and the Lanc VI could carry that with ease.

 

[RCAFson]

They might survive, but they could not have won. Britain lacked the manpower to open a second front, without the active participation of the US, the Allies cannot win

One of the unspoken assumptions here is that the USA would not defeat Japan until August 1945...yet historically the USA and Commonwealth beat Japan in August 1945 using a rather small fraction of their total industrial and economic potential. The long and short of this is that Japan is beaten much more quickly than historically if the USA uses it's full might against Japan only, which means that Commonwealth resources and Forces deployed against Japan are then freed for use against Germany.

If the USA continues Lend Lease (and they will have a lot of spare industrial capacity if only fighting Japan) then the Commonwealth might be able to pull off D-Day and/or invade Italy and/or deploy ground forces to fight alongside the Red Army since they could field about 60-100 divisions after Japan surrenders.

 

[parsifal]

Equipment levels are not the issue. its manpower that serves as the main constraint. Historically the British raised 32 divisions, however by the time of Normandy, manpower levels were so critical, they could only deploy a maximum of ten divisions into active combat areas of the main front where there was a likleihood of significant casualties. As it was, during Normandy, despite very modest casualty rates, the british were forced to scrap a number of units to provide replacements for other units. Britain simply lacked the manpower to undertake significant land operations and meet her wide other committments.

Canada was the major dominion partner and fielded a total of 8 divs, but only committed a maximum of 5 to combat. the rest remained at home.

India was the major land power in the Empire, fielding some 36 divs. By 1943-4 there were still 6 divs deployed in the middle east, but these formations were needed for garrsion duty outside the ETO. Of the remainder, perhaps 10 divs were combat ready in an ETO sense, but the British were loathe to commit them to the ETO, and these formations were critical to operations in Burma anyway. Large numbers of Indian troop numbers were needed just to keep the peace. In 1942 there was a crippling famine in Bengal that killed over 2 million Bengalis alone. The region was on the verge of revolt, and this could not be ignored.

In australias case, there were 4 AIF divisions that could serve outside Australia or its territories, but the remaining 7 divisions were restricted to Australia or its territories.

In any event, saying the US can do all the fighting in the PTO is misleading and untrue. they cant. In 1942 through to the beginning of 1944, the overwhelming majority of ground formations in the TO are firstly Chinese, then Russian (on watch) followed by the Indians, the australians, the british and lastly, the US ground formations. The US lacks the shipping capacity to commit more of its vast land army to these defensive tasks, just as the dominions lack the shipping capacity to commit much more to the ETO. For practical purposes, the brits are limited to their 10 divs they historically could spare, plus the odds and ends from Canada and the italian TO. Not nearly enough to undertake any operations of any significance in the main front of the ETO, and this enables the germans to relase formations enmasse from west to east. . Further, a large proportion of the amphibious fleet was of American origin, reflagged, but in this scenario more shipping would be needed in the PTO, not less so lift capacity would be fatally affected in this scenario.

There is no option of fighting the war on the western front on an offensive footing without the US direct intervention. any other conclusion is kite flying. We needed them to win, if not to survive.

 

[wiking85]

Historically the UK gave all their A-bomb technology to the USA and the Commonwealth then cut back on their A-bomb program because the USA gave it high priority. With the USA neutral then Tube Alloys goes ahead full steam to build a Commonwealth bomb if the USA won't cooperate.

A number of different aircraft could have carried a "Little Boy" A-bomb to Berlin, and time to exit the blast radius could be given by deploying a drogue or chute from the bomb as needed, although the Lancaster VI should have no problem achieving the required 8 mile distance from ground zero (Enola Gay achieved 11 miles), with a drop from 31000ft as per the historical mission, given that Little Boy was only 9600lb and the Lanc VI could carry that with ease.

To the height of 31000 feet though? My understanding was that it could only carry that load to under 22,000 feet.

Also Britain did conduct its research alone historically; Britain did not have the resources to do it on their own.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manhattan_Project#Collaboration_with_the_United_Kingdom

The British and Americans exchanged nuclear information but did not initially combine their efforts. Britain rebuffed attempts by Bush and Conant in 1941 to strengthen cooperation with its own project, codenamed Tube Alloys,[50] because it was reluctant to share its technological lead and help the United States develop its own atomic bomb. An American scientist who brought a personal letter from Roosevelt to Churchill offering to pay for all research and development in an Anglo-American project was poorly treated, and Churchill did not reply to the letter. The United States as a result decided as early as April 1942 that its offer was rejected, and that it should proceed alone.[51] The United Kingdom did not have the manpower or resources of the United States and despite its early and promising start, Tube Alloys soon fell behind its American counterpart.[52] On 30 July 1942, Sir John Anderson, the minister responsible for Tube Alloys, advised Churchill that: "We must face the fact that ... [our] pioneering work ... is a dwindling asset and that, unless we capitalise it quickly, we shall be outstripped. We now have a real contribution to make to a 'merger.' Soon we shall have little or none."[53] That month Churchill and Roosevelt made an informal, unwritten agreement for atomic collaboration.[54]

The opportunity for an equal partnership no longer existed, however, as shown in August 1942 when the British unsuccessfully demanded substantial control over the project while paying none of the costs. By 1943 the roles of the two countries had reversed from late 1941;[51] in January Conant notified the British that they would no longer receive atomic information except in certain areas. While the British were shocked by the abrogation of the Churchill-Roosevelt agreement, head of the Canadian National Research Council C. J. Mackenzie was less surprised, writing "I can't help feeling that the United Kingdom group [over]emphasizes the importance of their contribution as compared with the Americans."[54] As Conant and Bush told the British, the order came "from the top". The British bargaining position had worsened; the American scientists had decided that the United States no longer needed outside help, and they and others on the bomb policy committee wanted to prevent Britain from being able to build a postwar atomic weapon. The committee supported, and Roosevelt agreed to, restricting the flow of information to what Britain could use during the war—especially not bomb design—even if doing so slowed down the American project. By early 1943 the British stopped sending research and scientists to America, and as a result the Americans stopped all information sharing. The British considered ending the supply of Canadian uranium and heavy water to force the Americans to again share, but Canada needed American supplies to produce them.[55] They investigated the possibility of an independent nuclear program, but determined that it could not be ready in time to affect the outcome of the war in Europe.[56]

By March 1943 Conant decided that British help would benefit some areas of the project. James Chadwick and one or two other British scientists were important enough that the bomb design team at Los Alamos needed them, despite the risk of revealing weapon design secrets.[57] In August 1943 Churchill and Roosevelt negotiated the Quebec Agreement, which resulted in a resumption of cooperation[58] between scientists working on the same problem. Britain, however, agreed to restrictions on data on the building of large-scale production plants necessary for the bomb.[59] The subsequent Hyde Park Agreement in September 1944 extended this cooperation to the postwar period.[60] The Quebec Agreement established the Combined Policy Committee to coordinate the efforts of the United States, United Kingdom and Canada. Stimson, Bush and Conant served as the American members of the Combined Policy Committee, Field Marshal Sir John Dill and Colonel J. J. Llewellin were the British members, and C. D. Howe was the Canadian member.[61] Llewellin returned to the United Kingdom at the end of 1943 and was replaced on the committee by Sir Ronald Ian Campbell, who in turn was replaced by the British Ambassador to the United States, Lord Halifax, in early 1945. Sir John Dill died in Washington, D.C., in November 1944 and was replaced both as Chief of the British Joint Staff Mission and as a member of the Combined Policy Committee by Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson.[62]

When cooperation resumed after the Quebec agreement, the Americans' progress and expenditures amazed the British. The United States had already spent more than $1 billion ($13,600,000,000 today[1]), while in 1943, the United Kingdom had spent about £0.5 million. Chadwick thus pressed for British involvement in the Manhattan Project to the fullest extent and abandon any hopes of a British project during the war.[56] With Churchill's backing, he attempted to ensure that every request from Groves for assistance was honored.[63] The British Mission that arrived in the United States in December 1943 included Niels Bohr, Otto Frisch, Klaus Fuchs, Rudolf Peierls, and Ernest Titterton.[64] More scientists arrived in early 1944. While those assigned to gaseous diffusion left by the fall of 1944, the 35 working with Lawrence at Berkeley were assigned to existing laboratory groups and stayed until the end of the war. The 19 sent to Los Alamos also joined existing groups, primarily related to implosion and bomb assembly, but not the plutonium-related ones.[56] Part of the Quebec Agreement specified that nuclear weapons would not be used against another country without mutual consent. In June 1945, Wilson agreed that the use of nuclear weapons against Japan would be recorded as a decision of the Combined Policy Committee.[65]

The Combined Policy Committee created the Combined Development Trust in June 1944, with Groves as its chairman, to procure uranium and thorium ores on international markets. The Belgian Congo and Canada held much of the world's uranium outside Eastern Europe, and the Belgian government in exile was in London. Britain agreed to give the United States most of the Belgian ore, as it could not use most of the supply without restricted American research.[66] In 1944, the Trust purchased 3,440,000 pounds (1,560,000 kg) of uranium oxide ore from companies operating mines in the Belgian Congo. In order to avoid briefing US Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau Jr. on the project, a special account not subject to the usual auditing and controls was used to hold Trust monies. Between 1944 and the time he resigned from the Trust in 1947, Groves deposited a total of $37.5 million into the Trust's account.[67]

Groves appreciated the early British atomic research and the British scientists' contributions to the Manhattan Project, but stated that the United States would have succeeded without them. Whether or not he was correct, the British wartime participation was crucial to the success of the United Kingdom's independent nuclear weapons program after the war when the McMahon Act of 1946 temporarily ended American nuclear cooperation.[56]

 

[wiking85]

One of the unspoken assumptions here is that the USA would not defeat Japan until August 1945...yet historically the USA and Commonwealth beat Japan in August 1945 using a rather small fraction of their total industrial and economic potential. The long and short of this is that Japan is beaten much more quickly than historically if the USA uses it's full might against Japan only, which means that Commonwealth resources and Forces deployed against Japan are then freed for use against Germany.

If the USA continues Lend Lease (and they will have a lot of spare industrial capacity if only fighting Japan) then the Commonwealth might be able to pull off D-Day and/or invade Italy and/or deploy ground forces to fight alongside the Red Army since they could field about 60-100 divisions after Japan surrenders.

Maybe Japan could be invaded by mid-late 1944 even with full resources considering how long it took the US to mobilize and the limited utility of B-17s in the Pacific. Also an earlier success in the Pacific means an invasion of the Japanese Home Isles, which would be a nightmare, and would require a major US occupation in mainland Asia, as Russia won't have the resources to devote to invading Manchuria and Korea, so the US then has to go from invading and occupying Japan to rounding up over 1.5 million IJA soldiers in China, assuming they peacefully surrender, which is not a given; the US will have its hands full in 1944-46. The excess US capacity could also be used to keep up their consumer economy during the war, rather than all go toward the war effort. Also how many resources were really spent in the Pacific by the British?

 

[RCAFson]

Maybe Japan could be invaded by mid-late 1944 even with full resources considering how long it took the US to mobilize and the limited utility of B-17s in the Pacific. Also an earlier success in the Pacific means an invasion of the Japanese Home Isles, which would be a nightmare, and would require a major US occupation in mainland Asia, as Russia won't have the resources to devote to invading Manchuria and Korea, so the US then has to go from invading and occupying Japan to rounding up over 1.5 million IJA soldiers in China, assuming they peacefully surrender, which is not a given; the US will have its hands full in 1944-46. The excess US capacity could also be used to keep up their consumer economy during the war, rather than all go toward the war effort. Also how many resources were really spent in the Pacific by the British?

The USA only has to occupy Okinawa and Iwo Jima to effectively isolate Japan, which will bring about her capitulation or at least an armistice - no need for an invasion and with full US resources directed at Japan this will happen much sooner than historically.

I really don't think the USA is going to deliberately lengthen the war by not fully mobilizing but we can always invent scenarios where they decide to fiddle their thumbs for some reason or another, but after Pearl Harbour this is unlikely.

 

[RCAFson]

To the height of 31000 feet though? My understanding was that it could only carry that load to under 22,000 feet.

Also Britain did conduct its research alone historically; Britain did not have the resources to do it on their own.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manhattan_Project#Collaboration_with_the_United_Kingdom

The Lancaster VI had a service ceiling of 28500ft @ 65000lb which equals full fuel and a 10,000lb bomb load and full armament (3 turrets and the dorsal turret). With half fuel, (@57000lb) the service ceiling is well over 30,000 ft.

Historically, the UK did not devote much effort to Tube Alloys because they didn't have to since the USA was in the war but if the USA remains neutral then Tube Alloys becomes the Commonwealth's only sure way of defeating Nazi Germany and the program would have been massively expanded. Simply reducing output of heavy bombers by ~10%, for example, would have provided the needed resources.

 

[Juha]

They wouldn't have happened without the launch sites being overrun by Overlord and the follow up. ..

No. they were also adopted to outflank British AA belts, it was very easy to deploy AA defences against ground launched V-1s once one knew where the launchpatches were. And British AA was much more effective against V-1s than Germans were predicted.

Juha

 

[wiking85]

The Lancaster VI had a service ceiling of 28500ft @ 65000lb which equals full fuel and a 10,000lb bomb load and full armament (3 turrets and the dorsal turret). With half fuel, (@57000lb) the service ceiling is well over 30,000 ft.

Fair enough. The problem is whether the British can make a little boy on their own.

Historically, the UK did not devote much effort to Tube Alloys because they didn't have to since the USA was in the war but if the USA remains neutral then Tube Alloys becomes the Commonwealth's only sure way of defeating Nazi Germany and the program would have been massively expanded. Simply reducing output of heavy bombers by ~10%, for example, would have provided the needed resources.

Historically they couldn't devote those resources even with LL due the expense. Cutting heavy bombers 10% when the US isn't in the war severely curtails Bomber Command; plus did Britain have the engineering talent to spare? What cuts cut in terms of development to make gaseous diffusion uranium enrichment work on a mass scale? What's the ETA for a British bomb project if the US one took until August 1945 with Britain and the US working together? 1946 at the very earliest?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manhattan_Project#Collaboration_with_the_United_Kingdom

They investigated the possibility of an independent nuclear program, but determined that it could not be ready in time to affect the outcome of the war in Europe.[56]

Britain was running and independent project until 1943 until it realized its project would not be ready during the war, then begged to help the American one.

When cooperation resumed after the Quebec agreement, the Americans' progress and expenditures amazed the British. The United States had already spent more than $1 billion ($13,600,000,000 today[1]), while in 1943, the United Kingdom had spent about £0.5 million. Chadwick thus pressed for British involvement in the Manhattan Project to the fullest extent and abandon any hopes of a British project during the war.[56]

What about the massive investments in production sites with the labor involved?
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/5b/Manhattan_Project_US_Canada_Map_2.svg
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manhattan_Project#Project_sites

By May 1945, 82,000 people were employed at the Clinton Engineer Works.

Although progress on the reactor design at Metallurgical Laboratory and DuPont was not sufficiently advanced to accurately predict the scope of the project, a start was made in April 1943 on facilities for an estimated 25,000 workers, half of whom were expected to live on-site. By July 1944, some 1,200 buildings had been erected and nearly 51,000 people were living in the construction camp. As area engineer, Matthias exercised overall control of the site.[103] At its peak, the construction camp was the third most populous town in Washington state.[104] Hanford operated a fleet of over 900 buses, more than the city of Chicago.[105] Like Los Alamos and Oak Ridge, Richland was a gated community with restricted access, but it looked more like a typical wartime American boomtown: the military profile was lower, and physical security elements like high fences, towers and guard dogs were less evident.[106]

There are two of about a dozen facilities. Where do they all get built by Britain, with what labor, and what staff?

 

[wiking85]

No. they were also adopted to outflank British AA belts, it was very easy to deploy AA defences against ground launched V-1s once one knew where the launchpatches were. And British AA was much more effective against V-1s than Germans were predicted.

Juha

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/V-1_flying_bomb#Experimental_and_long-range_variants

One variant of the basic Fi 103 design did see operational use. The progressive loss of French launch sites as 1944 proceeded and the area of territory under German control shrinking meant that soon the V-1 would lack the range to hit targets in England. Air-launching was one alternative utilised, but the most obvious solution was to extend the missile's range.

 

[wiking85]

The USA only has to occupy Okinawa and Iwo Jima to effectively isolate Japan, which will bring about her capitulation or at least an armistice - no need for an invasion and with full US resources directed at Japan this will happen much sooner than historically.

Yet the US was about to invade when the Japanese surrendered. Why with the A-bomb, operation starvation, and B-29 raids? In 1944 the B-29 isn't ready, the B-17 cannot reach Japan even with Iwo Jima, the A-bomb isn't ready, operation starvation cannot be launched without the B-29, and the only apparent way to end the war was invasion?

Also are you sure that in 1944 Iwo and Okinawa were enough to blockade Japan from Korea and mainland Asia? Did they have enough basing facilities to handle sustaining a blockading fleet?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Downfall

The US Navy urged the use of blockade and airpower to bring about Japan's capitulation. They proposed operations to capture airbases in nearby Shanghai, China, and Korea, which would give the US Army Air Forces a series of forward airbases from which to bombard Japan into submission.[9] The US Army, on the other hand, argued that such a strategy could "prolong the war indefinitely" and expend lives needlessly, and therefore that an invasion was necessary. They supported mounting a large-scale thrust directly against the Japanese homeland, with none of the side operations that the Navy had suggested. Ultimately, the Army's viewpoint won.[10]

Also:

Olympic was to be mounted with resources already present in the Pacific, including the British Pacific Fleet, a Commonwealth formation that included at least eighteen aircraft carriers (and providing 25% of the Allied air power) and four battleships. The Australian First Tactical Air Force took part in the campaign to retake the Philippines. These would likely have augmented US close air support units over Japan. The only major re-deployment for Olympic was Tiger Force, a Commonwealth long range heavy bomber unit, made up of 10 squadrons scheduled to be transferred from RAF Bomber Command control in Europe to airbases on Okinawa. This would have included 617 Squadron, the specialist 'Dam Busters' who were armed with the massive ground penetrator 'Grand Slams'. In 1944, British plans had allowed for 500–1,000 heavy bombers, this had been reduced to 22 squadrons of RAF, RCAF and other nations and by 1945 to 10 from the RAF, RCAF, RNZAF and RAAF.

Without the British its feasible for the US to do it alone, but that mobilizes even more resources that cannot be used for LL.

 

[wiking85]

BTW is there any chance Midway could play out differently due to the circumstances of 1942 being different without Germany fighting the US?

 

[Juha]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/V-1_flying_bomb#Experimental_and_long-range_variants

Now that's just Wiki, e.g. nothing on KG 53 which did most of the launching. The first air launching of V-1s against England was on 7 Jul 44, that's before the launchpads were lost.

 

[Juha]

Yet the US was about to invade when the Japanese surrendered. Why with the A-bomb, operation starvation, and B-29 raids? In 1944 the B-29 isn't ready, the B-17 cannot reach Japan even with Iwo Jima, the A-bomb isn't ready, operation starvation cannot be launched without the B-29, and the only apparent way to end the war was invasion?...

Why use B-17s when longer range B-24 was the main heavy bomber used in PTO before B-29 arrived?