If the US is neutral, how does the air war in Europe play out?

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Without the US in the war, Britain does not have the same resources due to lack of manpower. A separate peace is not unthinkable if just Britain and the USSR are in the war if the pressure gets to be too much. However you seem to be arguing something based on the historical situation, which I agree with in terms of the historical situation; however in the context of the alternate scenario I laid out, I think the V-1 would have a much more lasting impact and potentially a political one if it goes on long enough without being fully countered. From a military standpoint it was having a major impact due to the resources put into defending London and spent on Operation Crossbow.

For the reaction it provoked I cannot think of anything that would be nearly as cheap and have the same impact on the war as the V-1 did and would in my scenario. If you can name some I'd be very curious to hear what that would be.
 
wiking85 said:
For the reaction it provoked I cannot think of anything that would be nearly as cheap and have the same impact on the war as the V-1 did and would in my scenario. If you can name some I'd be very curious to hear what that would be.
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The V-1 didn't have a significant impact on the war. It wouldn't in your scenario. Countering any threat demands resources.
If I was running the German war in any scenario I would have spent the money wasted on V weapons, and any other number of wasteful or useless programmes and built U-Boats. I wouldn't even have built the 'commerce raiders' which were either sunk or skulked in harbour throughout the war. The best chance the Germans had of defeating Britain was to starve her into submission. Historically they never came close. We are islanders and were acutely aware of the threat. It's why Churchill and others somewhat overstated the importance of the historical Battle of the Atlantic. A different hypothetical scenario might play out very differently.
This has little to do with an air war, though the British would have invested heavily in aircraft to counter the threat which would be to the detriment of Bomber Command.
Cheers
Steve
 

The problem with Uboats is that politically they are too dangerous to use from 1942 on due to the risk of bringing the US into the war; they can't win in British waters beyond 1941 and by 1942 the only 'safe' waters to attack in are US coastal waters or the mid-Atlantic, which is in the US security zone and is thus too risky to fight in unless you want to risk war with the US; Uboats are still viable in the Mediterranean, South Atlantic, and Arctic, but not in the North Atlantic. Starving Britain out is not viable in 1944, though reopening harassment from the new Elektro-boats is a viable option, but it wouldn't be decisive due to lack of numbers and the actually combat quality of these things (they were not very stable when surfaced, which is the best way to spot convoys). They and the coastal variant would be good for deploying the new pressure trigger naval mines in British waters though. Ultimately there would have to be a negotiated peace because Britain cannot be Germany even with Stalin's help and LL, nor can Germany really beat Britain when they are getting LL and have to worry about bringing the US into the war, plus are tied down in the East.
 
Also, the departures from the historical model can work both ways. in fact, the most plausible means by which the US decides to concentrate on the PTO, leaving its allied partners to take care of Nazi Germany on their own is if the war had gone less well for Germany, and germany was much more contained than she had been historically. its hard to see the US not gettying involved in the ETO, if the Allies were as much on the ropes as they were in the historical situation. So what are the possible options that might lead to a greater level of containment of the Germans, and as a result a lower chance of the US getting directly involved

So what are thge plausible alternative that might lead to that situation. Here are some suggestions to consider

1) USSR reamis committed to a collective security arrangement with the weestern powers, does not purge its officers prewar, and provides direct military assistance from 1939. Germany finds herself mired in a two front war from 1939. The Poles dont overextend their frontier defences, staying out of the Danzig corridor and mobilsaing well before the outbreak of the war. By necessity the Poles and Soviets collavorate,and the opening offensive bogs down to a type of trench warfare in the east and the west. Hitler is removed, as is called for in the scenario parameters, and Germany finds herself once again fighting a two front war.

2) Following on from above, the belgians dont withdraw from their treues with the west in 1936, and join the war with the allies in 1939. The French army adopts mandatory retirement for its senior officers at 55, opening up the way for real reforms in the army. The french aero industry reorganises iteslef in 1936, instead of 1938, and goes to war with 4000 modern aircraft instead of 1000. There is considerable technology exchange between Britain and France, so that France has an integrated radar network from 1938. There is considerable collaboration between the two countries regarding issues like aircraft design and equipment commonality. Germany finds herself at the end of 1941, at war with the Soviets, the French, the British and the Belgians all at the same time, and all providing effective resistance to the Germans.

It just seems most unlikely to me that the US would choose not to go to war in the ETO, unless it was satisfied that their help wasn't needed .
 
Enough U boats and Britain is starving by the end of 1940. If the US is going to remain neutral it won't be able to send it's merchant fleet across the Atlantic without getting it sunk. It's Germany's only chance of forcing Britain to terms. If the US will really remain neutral it will have to stand by and watch Britain be starved into submission. Is that really in the best interests of the USA? Otherwise, with no US participation in Europe, the war ends with the Soviets in Berlin and controlling western Europe to the Channel coast. Would the US see that as being in its best interests? It certainly saw the prospect of Soviet expansion in the Far East as undesirable. It was a factor in the decision to use the atomic bombs.
Keeping the US out of the war is going to be a huge problem in any realistic scenario. Neither Nazi nor Soviet domination of Europe was in her best interests.
Cheers
Steve
 

Germany was pretty well contained historically by December 1941; they were effectively beaten in the Atlantic without being able to move into the US security zone and shifted Uboat ops in October to around West Africa and the Arctic; it was only after the US entered the war that new, safe hunting grounds opened off the US coast. In the East by December 7th the Soviets are on the attack in front of Moscow and pushing the Germans back. By January 1942 Germany is being hammered in the East and giving ground, while the British are in no way in danger of falling to the Uboats. Without US entry the Allies aren't going to lose in Europe and it appears the Germans are going to be beaten in the East. By May 1942 things have changed in the East, but even with the Case Blue offensive, by that point its clear the Germans aren't going to knock Stalin out of the war even if they somehow take Baku and Britain is more secure than ever, in fact going on the offensive and launching 1000 bomber raids on German cities.


Sure in 1940-41 that would be perfect to have 300 Uboats in service, but that's before this scenario starts and by 1944 is a moot point. There is the issue of getting the public to want to fight in Europe; manufacturing consent isn't exactly easy if the Germans don't declare war on the US in December 1941. By January it looks like the Germans are losing badly in the East to the Soviet counter offensive, while the Uboats had been defeated in the British security zone; the Uboats were only useful in US coastal waters from January 1942 on and then in the mid-Atlantic, which historically as in the US security zone. Without Germany trying to provoke the US to enter the war, they cannot attack in the security zone or off the US coast, so in effect the battle of the Atlantic is won by January 1942 and then the Uboats can only operate in the Arctic, South Atlantic, and Mediterranean. FDR was pretty pro-Stalin, so if the US is having a hard time manufacturing consent, if Stalin looks like he's got things handled, its not exactly in FDR's personal interest to intervene to deny Stalin control over Germany. The rest of the government had a variety of views on Europe, from wanting just to fight Japan to wanting to intervene; I don't see a way to manufacture consent for war against Germany in the US without German Uboats going on the offensive hard in the Mid-Atlantic and sinking US war ships and merchant shipping on a greater scale than heretofore. By the time of the battle of Midway Island the US public is going to want to deal with Japan first, especially as its going to be a long bloody war even with the full resources of the US dedicated to fighting the Japanese; as it was the USN didn't build up overwhelming superiority until 1944, so they have years of fighting just to get to a material overwhelming advantage, then have to spend 100s of thousands of lives to invade Japan. Getting the public and government on the same page vis-a-vis Germany is going to be much harder than you think, especially if Hitler is dead and Goering is making sure there isn't a mid-Atlantic incident to give the US Casus Belli.
 
stona said:
There is some doubt about the first air launched operation. In late June and early July British radar tracking approaching V-1s noted that some were already at operational height when first located. Steve
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It's worth noting that V1's, shortly after their initial use, received a minor modification that allowed a single in flight direction change. This allowed a 'dog leg' course to be flown that prevented the technique of radar back tracking (unless conceivably the missile could be detected immediately upon leaving the chemical catapult launch rail.)
 
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Casus Belli? Don't over estimate the isolationist cause by 1940. There was a concerted campaign by elements of the US government and media to whip up support for 'England'. Though various Gallup polls showed that the percentage of those polled thinking that the US should immediately enter the war to aid Britain remained relatively low, wavering between 15% and 20% there was a will to help.

Asked whether "it was more important to keep out of the war ourselves, or to help England even at the risk of war?" 60% of the 5 million Americans polled in November 1940 thought that they should help England. That same month a staggering 90% favoured providing more aid to England.

The most support for Britain came from the Southern States, the least, unsurprisingly the 'West Central States' (as defined by Gallup) with their traditional conservatism and German communities.

As for US interests as understood by the political elite, and article by columnist Walter Lippmann, syndicated nationally, linked the Havana Conference and its implications for the security of the Western Hemisphere with the Anglo-German war.

"[the measures agreed] derive their whole significance from the struggle between Britain and the Nazi domination of continental Europe"

If the Axis was to achieve "something like naval supremacy in the Atlantic Ocean, adding the British assets of industry, shipbuilding, foreign investments and finance into the totalitarian system, the problems discussed at Havana would not exist."

He argued that British naval power was protecting the United States from having to compete on equal terms with a 'totalitarian monopoly.' Axis naval supremacy would mean that South American states 'especially of the temperate zone' would have to carry three quarters of their trade with this European monopoly.
Economic dependence he argued, would also mean 'fifth column' uprisings in South America, prejudicial to US security.

'The Battle of Britain [not specifically the air battle] will therefore decide whether the United States must maintain a very large army and whether American industry must be regimented permanently on military lines.'

If Britain were defeated there was little prospect of the United States achieving 'parity, much less mastery in the Atlantic Ocean. Consequently the United States would be driven to maintaining a large army, introducing conscription, and changing its way of doing business.'

Now the article if florid and over dramatic but it does touch on the real reasons why the US entered the European war.

Cheers

Steve
 

The UK had to be prepared in case the Nazis started work on their own bomb and 2ndly, it would give the UK/Commonwealth the means to defeat Germany if the USSR collapsed. The UK's Tube Alloys program was reduced to a research program after the USA entered the war:


and, in actuality, USA entry into the war in Dec 1941 effectively killed Tube Alloys as a wartime weapons project because it was then obvious that the combined Allied industrial and manpower resources made victory almost inevitable. I'm still researching UK/Commonwealth work on Tube Alloys and it's probable progress if the program received full priority.
 

Don't forget to figure out what they would have to give up by spending resources on Tube Alloys instead of the conventional war effort.
 
wiking85 said:
Don't forget to figure out what they would have to give up by spending resources on Tube Alloys instead of the conventional war effort.
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If the USA is not involved in Europe and lend-lease is still in effect, it means that the USA can potentially supply a lot more equipment to the UK/USSR/Commonwealth than historically. Theoretically, the UK might not have to give up anything because reduced UK weapons production can be met with greater USA aid via L-L. Additionally, the Cdn economy had some reserve capacity, as evidenced by the growing Canadian standard of living during the war, which again, was made possible by USA entry into the war. Also, changes in UK policy such as diverting more aircraft toward VLR ASW work, rather than a rather ineffectual night bombing campaign (at least until mid 1942) would have greatly reduced UK shipping losses, so again these changes in policy might have provided the needed resources for Tube Alloys to have produced usable bombs by V-E day but such things are hard to pin down with any exactitude.
 
So Britain is going to opt to go into even heavier debt? Is the US going to retool to make Lancasters or is Britain going to use B-17s and Shermans?
 
In 1942 the Americans tried to cut Britain out of the Manhattan Project altogether. Subsequently there was an effective British 'brains boycott' of the project which certainly had a deleterious effect. To imagine that all was roses in the Anglo-American nuclear project would be very unrealistic.
It was the subsequent post war denial of Manhattan technology and information to the British, whose immense technical contribution was swept under the carpet, that led to the first independent British weapon not being tested until 1952.

More to the point of the thread, the British and their Commonwealth allies could have gone it alone and could have developed a Uranium bomb. I just doubt it would have been done by 1945. They would still have been years ahead of the Germans.

Cheers

Steve
 

In my opinion, it was alsmost a certainty the U-Boat operations would have been extended into the declared neutrality zone regardless of US neutrality, sooner or later. And this was far more likley with hitler out of the picture. In September 1941, Donitz proposed to the German High Command to deploy U-boats to American waters. This was a pre-emptive strike, as Donitz wanted to extend the area of operations into the neutrality zone to weaken the stiffening resistance he was encountering. But Hitler was concerned this might tip the US into the war, and did not believe a war with the U.S. was imminent and denied permission. Despite escalating tensions between Germany and the U.S., which by this time had led to a state of undeclared war at sea, still Hitler continued to ban any intentional sinkings of U.S. ships. With hitler removed from the4 scene, this was likley to have been a decision not likley to be sustained.

Operations in the mid Atlantic were not curtailed, however, as only a fraction of U-Boats possesed sufficient range to operate at those ranges.

By the close of this campaign (in June), which spanned the first six months of 1942, German U-boats had sunk over 565 allied ships totaling almost 3 million tons in the entire North Atlantic area. ive not been able to definitively pin down the tonnages sunk in the US zone of operations, but ive seen figures of about 2.6 million tons for that first six months. total Allied losses worldwide inluding the PTO for the whole of 1942 were 1322 ships, totalling 8.5 million tons, including about 3. 5 million tons sunk in the British sector (the western approaches and British coastal waters).
In the US sector, in that first six month in US waters, the Reich had lost only six submarines. Despite the success of Operation Paukenschlag, Donitz understood that the Battle of the Atlantic wasn't just about sinking ships; its primary purpose was to starve Britain into submission. This goal could only be achieved by severing her convoy routes, and that meant a return to the main area of operations in the midAtlantic. this he did from June, and a return to massive sinkings until the following March. Not that they ever abandoned that campaign.

In the east, as you say, the Soviets halted the general advance in front of Moscow, however its a stretch to say German offensive capability was curtailed. In fact, had the Germans been able to strip out their west front defences, which in 1942 averaged about 80 divisions and more than a million flak personnel, they could erll have resumed the general offensive. As it was, they still resumed a major attack in the South, that came close to success, except for Hitlers obsession with the city named after Stalin. Without significant military (army) presence in the west, the Soviets will lack the strength to defeat the germans on their own, though i doubt the germans have the capacity to defeat them outright as you correctly say.
 
Nations go to war to serve their own interests. That's why the U.S. went to war with Germany, Hitler's declaration of war on her was a mere convenience. The war with Germany was coming sooner rather than later. An Atlantic and Europe dominated by the Axis powers was seen as a deadly threat to US interests, not just in those regions but worldwide. Many saw the Axis threat as a more serious threat to US interests than that posed by the Japanese Empire.
You have to look at the geopolitical situation and balances of power as they were in the 1930/40s, not as they appear later. I can't see any way the U.S. was not going to become embroiled in the European war, but would simply fight a war against Japan, a Pacific war if you like, in isolation.
This might be introducing a bit too much reality into an intriguing 'what if' but it is just as unrealistic to deny Germany's best chance of forcing Britain to terms because this might risk a war with the U.S. which was inevitable anyway.
Cheers
Steve
 

The US was not a dictatorship that could declare war on a whim. FDR had been pushing war in Europe since 1940 and had not managed to get the US willing to fight there. With another war on in Asia, it will prove distracting from the situation in Europe, especially once the British win the Battle of the Atlantic, which it basically had by 1942; it was only the extension of war into US coastal waters that renewed the naval war. Doenitz would have begged for it, but I cannot see anyone else that wasn't Hitler DoWing the US. Having read Ian Kershaw's book on Hitler, its pretty clear that the DoW was specifically Hitler's desire, no one else's (other than Doenitz). War was no inevitable between the US and Germany, Hitler made it possible.
SHAFR: September 2000 Newsletter: Hitler's Decision to Declare War
 
stona said:
We'll agree to differ. I don't think much of that article for reasons which have no place in this thread.

Cheers

Steve
Click to expand...

Fair enough. Still Ian Kershaws two part Bio on Hitler does really point to Hitler being the driving reason behind the German DoW and without him Germany wouldn't have initiated it. I'm not saying that the US wouldn't have gone to war later on, but rather that it as not inevitable and would actually be pretty difficult provide Germany publicly declared neutrality and Hitler was dead by this point.
 
That's my point. The US would have declared war on Germany eventually, if the US support for Britain didn't eventually cause a German declaration. In the mean time it would have gone to great lengths (even more than historically) to maintain British survival. Don't forget that a huge majority of Americans supported this option even at the risk of war.
Cheers
Steve
 
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