If the US is neutral, how does the air war in Europe play out?

[Garyt]

It couldn't, assuming that the war ended in 1945 still. Not a chance, even assuming that the many and important British scientists who contributed to the US programme had been involved in a home grown one. They might have pushed it ahead of the actual 1952 date on which an independently (though incorporating knowledge from the Manhattan Project) developed British nuclear device was exploded, but not by much. I doubt that Britain could have afforded the huge investment needed whilst still fighting a conventional war.
The Soviets, also with extensive knowledge of the Manhattan Project, managed to build one by 1949 with a massive industrial effort and huge funding.

I guess the other question - If the US were not involved in a true World War, but only a regional clash with the Japanese, would they have comitted the resources to researching and building the atomic bomb?

This is a true question I have, not a rhetorical statement.

 

[wiking85]

I guess the other question - If the US were not involved in a true World War, but only a regional clash with the Japanese, would they have comitted the resources to researching and building the atomic bomb?

This is a true question I have, not a rhetorical statement.

Very good question; I think so given that they were reacting to the perceived need to eventually face down the Germans and they feared the Germans would have a nuclear bomb at some point; they had the money and means, but without British help in this situation it would take longer to get a usable bomb.

 

[RCAFson]

It couldn't, assuming that the war ended in 1945 still. Not a chance, even assuming that the many and important British scientists who contributed to the US programme had been involved in a home grown one. They might have pushed it ahead of the actual 1952 date on which an independently (though incorporating knowledge from the Manhattan Project) developed British nuclear device was exploded, but not by much. I doubt that Britain could have afforded the huge investment needed whilst still fighting a conventional war.
The Soviets, also with extensive knowledge of the Manhattan Project, managed to build one by 1949 with a massive industrial effort and huge funding.

I think a generation raised in the shadow of thousands of nuclear war heads may have forgotten just how difficult they were to make. The only other modern nations to have developed such devices have had direct and sometimes illegal help (Israel, Pakistan) from other nuclear powers

Cheers

Steve

The UK had correctly chosen the right path to develop a bomb, but one of the complicating factors was that when the USA decided to go all out to produce the bomb they also bought up almost the entire world's supply of fissionable materials, including a monopoly on Canadian Uranium production which the Cdn government couldn't challenge because the USA was an Allied power at war with Germany. This greatly hampered the UK's ability find the needed material for weapon development. However, with the USA a neutral power against Germany, the Cdn government could have barred the USA from monopolizing uranium ore extraction.

 

[wiking85]

The UK had correctly chosen the right path to develop a bomb, but one of the complicating factors was that when the USA decided to go all out to produce the bomb they also bought up almost the entire world's supply of fissionable materials, including a monopoly on Canadian Uranium production which the Cdn government couldn't challenge because the USA was an Allied power at war with Germany. This greatly hampered the UK's ability find the needed material for weapon development. However, with the USA a neutral power against Germany, the Cdn government could have barred the USA from monopolizing uranium ore extraction.

Considering how dependent Canada was on US imports, that might be difficult. Also you are suggesting that because the British decided to focus on one development path that they would have been able to actually follow through on it by 1945 or 46 and not suffer serious impacts to other programs. They could focus on one path, but it doesn't mean they would be able to achieve a working bombing in a reasonable amount of time; in fact historically the British were convinced they couldn't, which is why they tried to piggyback on the US program.

 

[RCAFson]

Considering how dependent Canada was on US imports, that might be difficult. Also you are suggesting that because the British decided to focus on one development path that they would have been able to actually follow through on it by 1945 or 46 and not suffer serious impacts to other programs. They could focus on one path, but it doesn't mean they would be able to achieve a working bombing in a reasonable amount of time; in fact historically the British were convinced they couldn't, which is why they tried to piggyback on the US program.

Historically, the UK asked the Cdn government to disallow the sale of the uranium but what grounds could Canada use to challenge the sale? How could Canada favour the UK when it was not giving Tube Alloys highest priority? With the USA neutral in Europe it would be pretty obvious that the Tube Alloys was a vital program for Commonwealth victory, with much of the development work to be done in Canada and the Cdn government, which was also at war with Germany, would have acted to safeguard Tube Alloys access to Cdn uranium. The UK had developed a method for enriching uranium and had also formulated the design of a uranium bomb but they never gave it high priority because they never had to.

 

[wiking85]

Historically, the UK asked the Cdn government to disallow the sale of the uranium but what grounds could Canada use to challenge the sale? How could Canada favour the UK when it was not giving Tube Alloys highest priority? With the USA neutral in Europe it would be pretty obvious that the Tube Alloys was a vital program for Commonwealth victory, with much of the development work to be done in Canada and the Cdn government, which was also at war with Germany, would have acted to safeguard Tube Alloys access to Cdn uranium. The UK had developed a method for enriching uranium and had also formulated the design of a uranium bomb but they never gave it high priority because they never had to.

By when and with what resources could they develop it into a working model?

 

[stona]

With the USA neutral in Europe it would be pretty obvious that the Tube Alloys was a vital program for Commonwealth victory,

Why?

Even if it was deemed a vital programme (and I can't imagine why) the Germans will still attack the USSR, this was a fundamental requirement of the Nazi geo-political world view. Britain might well be better advised to throw her expertise behind a joint Anglo-Soviet nuclear programme. No problem of raw materials there!

Steve

 

[Juha]

Hello Stona
thanks for the info you gave in your messages #87 and 94. All I can add without too much digging is that according to The Blitz Then and Now Vol 3 p.412 the First air launching against Britain happened on early morning 7 July 44, the target was London.

 

[stona]

Hello Stona
thanks for the info you gave in your messages #87 and 94. All I can add without too much digging is that according to The Blitz Then and Now Vol 3 p.412 the First air launching against Britain happened on early morning 7 July 44, the target was London.

There is some doubt about the first air launched operation. In late June and early July British radar tracking approaching V-1s noted that some were already at operational height when first located. This suggested that they were not climbing to height from launch ramps but may have been air launched. The scant German records suggest that these may have been operational training missions for the KG 3 crews.

On the night of 9/10 July nine air launched missiles flew up the Thames estuary, clearly launched from the east. Four of the missile tracks were back plotted to a point on the German occupied coast near Blankenberge (Netherlands). The tracks were roughly parallel showing a good directional setting. Due to the distance flown and no known launch sites existing in this area, air launching was suspected, but not confirmed until later.
One of these V-1s fell at Colledge Farm, Ovington, Norfolk. There were no casualties and the damage was limited to broken windows. One fell at Gosfield and one at Ongar, both in Essex. One fell at Radlett in Hertfordshire. One fell at Upminster, on the northern edge of London. Three may have reached London though they cannot be distinguished from the ramp launched missiles coming from France on the same night. One is unaccounted for and did not cross the English coast.
This is generally considered KG 3's first identifiable operation, but as 'The Blitz Then and Now' shows there is some uncertainty. We are splitting hairs over a couple of days anyway.
A quick look on Google Earth will illustrate the dispersion. Ovington, the most inaccurate, is about 100 miles from London! Upminster, the nearest miss, is still about 20 miles from central London.
This is how the British plotted the results of this raid.

The story of the subsequent Southampton attacks illustrates many of the problems the Germans faced. The agent (mentioned earlier by someone else) signalled that there was considerable damage to Southampton, a main supply port for the Allied bridgehead in Normandy. The German LXV Corps HQ staff were surprised as they had made no attempt to bombard the port. They assumed that some missiles intended for London had been misdirected or gone astray. Contrary to later mythologizing they did not assume that most missiles were falling short and adjust their aim. That was British propaganda. They were however tempted by the idea of striking at an important allied supply port. 22 ramp launched missiles were deliberately targeted on Southampton. Von Runstedt, the then C-in-C West, received a warning from Hitler's HQ ordering a cessation of this diversion from the attacks on London and complied. Shortly thereafter (early July IIRC) he was replaced by Von Kluge who approved an attack on the port but restricted it to air launched missiles. This attack took the form of four operations by KG 3 between 10 and 15 July.

Cheers

Steve

 

[mhuxt]

It's not if you use the performance charts found in either the pilot's flight manual or the flight engineer's manual (I believe they had similar, if not the same performance charts). I also believe a special slide rule was used to calculate performance as well.

B-29 Flight Engineer's Manual pdf is here:

Item 000033 Detail

Edit - *sigh* except that the range chart is all but illegible...

Hmm, some weight / range charts for various cruise settings at the end of this document:

http://aafcollection.info/items/detail.php?key=576&pkg=lx!title!!576!2!title!up!100

 

[stona]

There is serious overestimation of the V-1 threat in this thread.

Churchill in 'Closing the Ring' and in response to the rather alarmist contentions made earlier by Eisenhower.

"The average error of both [incl V-2] these weapons was over ten miles. Even if the Germans had been able to maintain a rate of fire of 120 a day and if none whatever had been shot down, the effect would have been the equivalent of only two or three one ton bombs to a square mile per week. However, it shows that the military commanders considered it necessary to eliminate the menace of the V weapons, not only to protect civilian life and property, but equally to prevent interference with our offensive operations."

This didn't prevent a second large scale evacuation of London. AJP Taylor states that 1.5 million were evacuated by the end of July. Defences were also improved. 1,696 anti aircraft guns were moved to the south coast along with 60,000 tons of equipment and 23,000 personnel in a 48 hour period in the middle of July. German radar stations across the Channel were attacked in order to prevent jamming of the SCR 584 gun laying radar.

The largest number of V-1s launched on a single day was 315 on 2/3 August. British defences were becoming formidable. R.V. Jones cites 28 August as an example. Almost all (92 or 94 depending who you cite) of the 100 or so V-1s launched were shot down. 4 reached London.

Steve

 

[wiking85]

How would the Luftwaffe's night fighter force have evolved after 1942 without the USAAF to worry about? Do all Bf110s end up as night fighters (Me410s as intruders)? What of Ju88Cs, do we see more of them? How about the resumption of intruder operations after Hitler's October 1941 halt order (he'd die right after making this order)? Is there a DO-217 night fighter in this situation, or would Ju88C production be high enough to prevent it? Would the Ju88G appear any sooner? How about size of the force, would there be a larger number of units by the end of 1942/1943 due to the lack of need for a major daylight defense in the West/Mediterranean? Kammhuber wanted 2100 frontline aircraft in 1942, which Goering approved, but Hitler denied; without Hitler around would Goering's historical yes have been kept and what would it mean for the LW to have 2100 front line night fighters in 1943 (not to mention intruders in the form of the Me410)?

 

[wiking85]

There is serious overestimation of the V-1 threat in this thread.

Churchill in 'Closing the Ring' and in response to the rather alarmist contentions made earlier by Eisenhower.

"The average error of both [incl V-2] these weapons was over ten miles. Even if the Germans had been able to maintain a rate of fire of 120 a day and if none whatever had been shot down, the effect would have been the equivalent of only two or three one ton bombs to a square mile per week. However, it shows that the military commanders considered it necessary to eliminate the menace of the V weapons, not only to protect civilian life and property, but equally to prevent interference with our offensive operations."

This didn't prevent a second large scale evacuation of London. AJP Taylor states that 1.5 million were evacuated by the end of July. Defences were also improved. 1,696 anti aircraft guns were moved to the south coast along with 60,000 tons of equipment and 23,000 personnel in a 48 hour period in the middle of July. German radar stations across the Channel were attacked in order to prevent jamming of the SCR 584 gun laying radar.

The largest number of V-1s launched on a single day was 315 on 2/3 August. British defences were becoming formidable. R.V. Jones cites 28 August as an example. Almost all (92 or 94 depending who you cite) of the 100 or so V-1s launched were shot down. 4 reached London.

Steve

Below are the launch sites for the V-1s and the progress of the Normandy invasion. By September the launch sites have been overrun and by mid-August most were only able to come from a very narrow band of launch sites, so it was relatively easy to mass AAA defenses against the missiles.

 

[stona]

AA defences were important because, prior to being over run, the launch sites were surprisingly difficult to hit from the air, even when found. Not only were they well camouflaged but the Germans used dummy sites extensively.

The approaches to London were well covered along the south coast (where French launches might come from) and though the missiles coming from the east into the Thames estuary initially out flanked these defences a 'gun box' from Clacton to Whitstable, including guns on the seven 'Maunsell Forts' in the estuary, was soon established. The Americans contributed a total of twenty 90mm AA Batteries to this area of defence.

This defence was again out flanked by air launched V-1s from mid September and a 'gun strip' was added north of the box integrated with the existing defences of Harwich and Lowestoft.

General Pile conceded that his AA defences were sorely stretched at this time. On 6th September a planned reduction in AA Command involving the disbandment of 93 Heavy Batteries (744 guns), 31 Light Batteries (372 guns) and 15 search light batteries (360 search lights) had been approved by the Chiefs of Staff. It was only because the War Office was unable to absorb all these men into other areas immediately that they were allowed to stay active in the AAA structure until required elsewhere, lucky.

On 21st October it was decided to extend the coastal gun strip along the east coast as far as the Tees estuary. This was called the 'gun fringe' and 408 guns in 45 Batteries were provided for this.

You can see that attempts to out flank the British defences were constantly countered , and in the case of the 'gun fringe' anticipated. AA Command was also getting very good at shooting down V-1s. By the end of November 82% of targets coming in range of the AA guns were destroyed. The average number of heavy AA rounds fired for each V-1 destroyed was a mere 156.

A missed opportunity for the Germans was a failure to exploit the denuding of AA defences in the rest of Britain to provide units for the various gun belts and boxes. If you draw a line from north of the Humber to west of the Solent you will have a large area to the west which was effectively undefended! The British considered this a safe bet given the limited range of the V-1s and the virtual absence of any conventional Luftwaffe bomber force.

Cheers

Steve

 

[wiking85]

Stona:
Looking at the V-1 launch site map above, how would the defenses have coped with the the Cherbourg peninsula being an active launch site (AFAIK it wasn't historically), while the launch belt remained as wide as above from June 1944-May 1945? How about without the 20 batteries of US 90mm AAA or USAAF bombing of launch sites? Or the addition of the F-1 extended range V-1 able to launch from the Netherlands and even further West in France. How about if the V-1 extended range missiles were able to hit Liverpool from Cherbourg? Would they be able to cope or would the system be overloaded?

 

[stona]

Missiles headed for London and launched from Cherbourg would have to over fly the existing south coast gun belt or possibly a very short westerly extension to it.

If the US batteries were unavailable the Chiefs of Staff would have to reconsider the decision to wind down Britain's own AA Command and maybe consider expanding it. The reason for the reduction was to make men available to support the invasion which, in your scenario, won't have happened and the vast resources that Britain committed to Overlord would be available to be used elsewhere.

If historically the gun belts/fringes were extended along the east coast almost to the Scottish border then an extension along the south and south west coasts, even into Devon or even Cornwall, could have been possible. It's a matter of priorities. With no 1944 invasion to fund, support and equip then anti-diver defences may well have risen up the list.

The V-1 was so inaccurate, even over shorter ranges that a long range attack on northern cities like Liverpool or Manchester might not achieve the results hoped for. As the missiles came down all over the northern counties I wonder if the British would be able to discern the intended target(s).
In any case, historically at least, the purpose of V weapons was not military, they were not for nothing called vengeance weapons. They were indiscriminate by reason of their inherent inaccuracy and unreliability. You'll notice that Hitler considered the attempted attack on Southampton, a vital and valid strategic target, to be a diversion from the real target, London and its population.

Cheers

Steve

 

[wiking85]

As a political weapon it seems to have been quite effective at diverting disproportionate resources away from offensive action on Germany. It also did impact morale in 1944 from what I've read, but not enough to change anything due the war circumstances at that point and the limited duration of the attacks. I'm not suggesting that the actual damage would greatly impact the war economy, however it would suck up a lot of resources, especially without US presence in Europe. Without an invasion plan Britain would be able to better counter the V-1 by expanding AAA, but at the expense of what? They won't be able to invade anywhere else as a result, probably even an Aegean campaign once North Africa bogs down for good. How much would the bomber offensive be affected if it were diverted toward knocking out the launch sites, which you note wasn't that effective, but was nonetheless extensively tried.

How long can the public take being showered by unpredicatable missiles, even if only a fraction were coming through?

 

[stona]

The effect on morale was a serious concern.
The London Evening Standard published a statement by Duncan Sandys M.P. Chairman of the 'Flying Bomb Counter-measures Committee' on it's front page on 7th September under the headline 'The Battle is Over'.
It gave the first details of the gunbelts and other defences and claimed that only 9% of V-1s got through.

General Pile wrote a summary of UK air defence against V weapons, published as a supplement to the London Gazette in 1948.

"In many ways it was a pity that so much public stress was laid, at the end of the first phase of the [V-1] battle, on the greatness of the triumph and on the finality of the victory....which had entailed a fearful amount of both physical and mental strain, which, coming as it did at the end of five years of war, had told upon us more than we realised."

He also acknowledged the limitations of AA Command as it was historically at that time. Of course in a what if of this type this need not be the case. This was his reaction to air launched V-1s coming across the coast well to the north of Harwich.

"It looked at that moment as if the Luftwaffe had got us properly on the run. As fast as we moved northward, so might the Hun each time anticipate us and from our point of view there was a limit to this northward trend. The manpower cuts had left us [AA Command] a mere shadow of our former selves. The only thing we could do was to extend our attenuated forces as far as we could and live in pious hope that there was some kind of limit to the area over which the enemy could deliver his attack, or that he would prefer to batter away at London in preference to northern England."

Pile does seem to have been a 'glass half empty' kind of officer, though a very good one. Like many he might have been 'playing up' his role or at least emphasising the difficulties which he overcame, when writing in the immediate post war period. He wouldn't be alone in so doing.

At the end of the day the V-1 was a very poor substitute for a strategic bombing force. In fact it was no substitute at all. If the experiences of other bombed civilians in Europe and particularly Germany are anything to go by the public could take being showered with unpredictable missiles for a very long time indeed.

Cheers

Steve

 

[wiking85]

Sure, if you are comparing the V-1 to Bomber Command the V-1 was a bottle rocket. Germany could not have afforded something like Bomber Command, nor the losses, so the V-1 was a much, much cheaper alternative and really did have an impact on British resources and morale, though obviously not in the way BC did on Germany. However without a strategic bombing force the V-1 was better than nothing and in fact could have allowed for a wider bombing campaign with medium bombers against BC airfields or Channel Ports in this scenario without the US in the war bombing German cities and supporting British defense efforts. My point is that the V-1 is not going to do much on its own even with the US neutral, but it would create a strain on Britain that would tie down so many resources on its own that it would allow for other operations and keep Britain on its back foots by tying down resources that could otherwise be used to attack Germany; in a sense then the V-1 offensive was the best defense against BC, as it sucked up bombing resources (IIRC over 100k tons of bombs in fact), while forcing a major application of defensive resources away from other areas and would, as you acknowledge, prevent offensive ground action in other theaters due to the need to expand AA resources.

To me it seems like a good investment for Germany given the limited cost due to the disproportionate response, which, without the US bombing them, Germany can use its extra resources that did not historically exist by this point, to take advantage of the gaps created by the concentration of AAA around London. Say by bombing BC airfields as bombers return from missions against V-1 sites or even German cities.

 

[stona]

'Somewhere in southern England'

These 3.7" anti aircraft guns were really no use for anything else. They are not comparable to the famous German 88mm gun, they weigh twice as much for a start. They could be, and I believe were, used in an anti tank role in North Africa, but I understand that they were not at all suited to such a role. I profess no expertise in artillery. In 1944 the British had more of these guns than men to man them. I'm not sure how well off they were in the systems associated with the guns. Manpower is a relatively simple fix.

I'm not sure that the V-1 was such a good investment. Being cheap does not automatically return value for money. It did tie up defensive resources in Britain, you could say it gave opportunities that the Germans could not exploit, but might the money not have been better spent elsewhere? The V programmes were politically driven, not militarily.
The supposed historical objective, incredible though it may seem today, was to force a separate peace arrangement with the Western Allies. It was always pie in the sky, and the V weapons never stood a chance of achieving such an outcome.

Cheers

Steve