If the US is neutral, how does the air war in Europe play out?

[wiking85]

That's my point. The US would have declared war on Germany eventually, if the US support for Britain didn't eventually cause a German declaration. In the mean time it would have gone to great lengths (even more than historically) to maintain British survival. Don't forget that a huge majority of Americans supported this option even at the risk of war.
Cheers
Steve

Right, the implication being the risk would be Germany DoWing the US. Germany really is out of options as far as the naval war in 1942; it can either DoW the US and hope for the best, or acknowledge defeat and try to force and end in the East, while keeping Britain at bay. The Uboats were no longer effective in the Atlantic short of extending to war to the the US coast. Had Germany acknowledged defeat in the naval realm, the US would lose all means of entering the war; as it was the only potential thing to get US entry at that point would be if a US warship were sunk after December 7th in the security zone; that would be impossible if the Germans step back and shift Uboat operations out of the North Atlantic and the increasing tempo in the Pacific would serve as a distraction once British supply lines were secure. At that point the US public would feel its obligation was fulfilled as Britain would not be able to be defeated without a Uboat campaign in the North Atlantic. The Soviets would be secure due the Pacific and Iranian supply lines, while Murmansk would be Britain's problem (they controlled that convoy on their own).

 

[parsifal]

why are the germans out of naval options in 1942

 

[wiking85]

why are the germans out of naval options in 1942

The British convoy system had defeated them by late 1941. As a result Hitler shifted Uboat ops south to around North Africa. They failed there too. By December 1941 Doenitz had admitted defeat against British convoys, so pushed Hitler to expand the war so he could go after unconvoyed shipping on the US coast. Hitler obliged him, but was the only one that wanted to in the command structure (other than Doenitz who had a very narrow service perspective). So unless Germany is dead set on war with the US, which only Hitler and Doenitz were in 1941, and is willing to expand the Uboat war to the shores of the US and mid-Atlantic US security zone, the Uboats can no longer score success in the British security zone East of Iceland. Doenitz himself admitted as much, which is why he was so pro-US, because without that his service had lost its major reason for resources, which would mean the Uboat Waffe gets limited funding and stuck to fighting in the Arctic, Mediterranean, and mine laying off the British coast.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Battle_of_the_Atlantic#Mediterranean_diversion

In October 1941, Hitler ordered Dönitz to move U-boats into the Mediterranean to support German operations in that theatre. The resulting concentration near Gibraltar resulted in a series of battles around the Gibraltar and Sierra Leone convoys. In December 1941, Convoy HG 76 sailed, escorted by the 36th Escort Group of two sloops and six corvettes under Captain Frederic John Walker, reinforced by the first of the new escort carriers, HMS Audacity, and three destroyers from Gibraltar. The convoy was immediately intercepted by the waiting U-boat pack, resulting in a brutal battle. Walker was a tactical innovator, his ships' crews were highly trained and the presence of an escort carrier meant U-boats were frequently sighted and forced to dive before they could get close to the convoy. Over the next five days, five U-boats were sunk (four by Walker's group), despite the loss of Audacity after two days. The British lost Audacity, a destroyer and just two merchant ships. The battle was the first clear Allied convoy victory.
Through dogged effort, the Allies slowly gained the upper hand until the end of 1941. Although Allied warships failed to sink U-boats in large numbers, most convoys evaded attack completely. Shipping losses were high, but manageable.

 

[parsifal]

The British convoy system had defeated them by late 1941.

I have 3.3 million tons of reasons and more than 800 ships sunk between June 1942 and March 1943 all of it sunk in the western approaches, that shows this to be an incorrect claim. The heaviest monthly sinkings of the war occurred at this this time, not against the Americans, and not against peripheral fronts. it was squarely in the middle of the main defensive area manned by the RN, by her most experienced convoy men.

As a result Hitler shifted Uboat ops south to around North Africa. They failed there too.

Hardly. If you call the redeployment of a maximum of 20 boats out of 280 a major redeployment, then you are right In the fall of 1942 there were six noats in the south Atlantic

By December 1941 Doenitz had admitted defeat against British convoys, so pushed Hitler to expand the war so he could go after unconvoyed shipping on the US coast.

Wrong again. Dontiz never admitted defeat until after March 1943, and even then, he never gave up. he was tireless and tenacious,. and he always considered the critical battle to be the convoy battles occurring in the sea apraoches to Britain. His decision to press hitler to undertake a pre-emptive strike ointo the neutral zone was a response to the now undeclared war that was occurring between the USN and the US merchant fleet, and the German armed forces. It was inevitable thjat they clash, unless US attitudes to the freedom of movement on the seas was changed, and that was never going to happen. Donitz saw the expansion of operations into the pan-American neutral zone as a pre-emptive strike mostly and then as a means of thinning British defences. he did not extend operations into this zone because he was facing defeat. he extended it, to hurt the Americans more, and finish off the British who would be forced to spread their defences even thinner. he failed to appreciate the shipbuilding capabilities of the US, which really saved the allies from defeat. in no way can German operations at this time be seen as the last death throws of the U-Boat arm.

Hitler obliged him, but was the only one that wanted to in the command structure (other than Doenitz who had a very narrow service perspective).

wrong again. Donitz made his request to the German admiralty, who supported his request in September 1941. When it was put to hitler, he refused, believing the US would not go to war. It was only after the attack on pearl harbour, that hitler, in one of his more insane moments, decided that the Japanese were capable of defeating the USN, and that Germany would not follow the path the italians had, and remain neutral. giving the treaty that existed between japan and Germany a very liberal interpretation, he decided to declare war because he did not want to missout on the spoils of victory. it had nothing to do with donitzs request, or the war at sea. hilter could have care less about what was happening to the U-Boats. He once said that even looking at a naval chart made him sea sick.

So unless Germany is dead set on war with the US, which only Hitler and Doenitz were in 1941, and is willing to expand the Uboat war to the shores of the US and mid-Atlantic US security zone, the Uboats can no longer score success in the British security zone East of Iceland.

This is just utter fantasy. Sorry. Everything about it is utterly wrong

Doenitz himself admitted as much, which is why he was so pro-US, because without that his service had lost its major reason for resources, which would mean the Uboat Waffe gets limited funding and stuck to fighting in the Arctic, Mediterranean, and mine laying off the British coast.

You do know that donitz was named Hitlers successor at the end, which points to his enormous influence in the regime. he was never in any danger of being sidelined. I suggest you do a little more reading before making claims such as these.

Wiki as a source should be treated fairly cautiously.

 

[Koopernic]

The British convoy system had defeated them by late 1941.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Battle_of_the_Atlantic#Mediterranean_diversion

The defeat of the u-boats is generally seen as Early 1943: (March 1943 to May 1943, "Black May") this is when both convoy losses dropped and u-boat losses dramatically increased. These I would say are the two preconditions required to say they were defeated. It coincides with a combination of long range aircraft, escort carriers and improved radar as well as code breaking and radio direction finding.

The only really important factor is the prevalence of patrol aircraft. Electric submarines had a very low under water speed and endurance. They had to surface to engage a convoy since their underwater speed and endurance was way to limited to intercept a convoy let alone re-engage. An aircraft could then effectively force them underwater and prevent them from engaging while damaging or sinking a number. As Allied assets grew they could saturate an area from which a u-boat could not escape due to their low underwater speed and inability to surface (due to aircraft).

The solution to this problem was u-boats designed for continuous underwater operations. Initial German attempts were based on using Hydrogen Peroxide however the eventual solution was to build u-boats witch quadrupled range and doubled speed using batteries.

The Type XXI u-boat would again have turned the Battle in the u-boats favor: the technologies they had could not have been defeated till the early 1950s. For instance to detect a stealthy mast one must not track the mast but the shadow behind it.

here are the speeds and ranges of German u-boats:
Conventional
Type VII
max speed 8 knots, range 80 nautical miles at 4 knots. This is actually better than most allied boats.


Type XXI
max speed 16.75 knots range 350 nautical miles at 5 knots. (some achieved 17.5 knots)
From Wikipedia.de the full performance.

(With creeper drives)
487 nautical miles at 3 knots
333 nautical miles at 5 Knots
256 nautical miles 6 Knots
(main electric motors)
120 nautical miles 8 Knots
79 nautical miles 10 Knots
26 nautical miles 15 Knots


Type XXI could intercept, attack, withdraw and re-engage. It had the underwater speed and range to escape any practical allied search pattern or individual escort.

It was so silent that post war USN ships had trouble passively tracking it from a stationary ship at 600 yards. It's speed was so high it could exit a sonar beam before the echo returned to the operator and thus break lock.

It had a number of other technologies that had been partially implemented on other u-boats.

1 An anechoic coating called Albrecht that absorbed sonar pulses. The Germans had been experimenting, even deploying these since 1942 and by 1944 they had perfected it (it didn't delaminate anymore). it consisted of a mesh of two different sized holes filled with a rubber like material whose resonances absorbed the sonar pulse.

2 Anti radar coatings for mast head stealth code named schonsteinfehger (chiminey sweep) consisting of Jauman absorbers for cylindrical portions and molded ferritic absorbers for multi dimensional components. Absorbed 95% at 9cm and 90% at 3cm. Combined ferrite, Jaumann absorbers under development. Used on a few conventional boats.

3 Radar detector Athos, detects allied microwave radar from 2.5cm to 20cm.
4 Infrared detector Flamingo that detected heat from aircraft engines when allied radar was switched off, mounted atop the Athos mast.
Both above saw service in the final days of the war.
5 Warning radar called "Lansing" in a single radar pulse could detect any aircraft within 30km. Due to the single pulse it couldn't be direction found with the min max direction finding of the day. This 'cleared the air' before surfacing or raising the mast.
6 Radar directed 30mm guns with full blind fire capability using the 'ballspiel' radar (based on a German night fighter radar FuG 244 and the Rettin system for the quad FLAK)
7 A microwave radar, FuMO 84, that can be used underwater.
8 A very accurate long range array sonar
9 A new type of active sonar, the balkon geraet, that could with a chirp of 3 Doppler pulses ascertain range, direction and closing speed data and accurately blind fire torpedoes. Due to the rapid chirp it could not be direction found.
10 kurier enigma coding system. This used burst mode transmission to minimize chance of interception, which was reasonably successful in. In its 3F form it was essentially untrackable by radio direction finding. This is because it used SSBSC single side band suppressed carrier modulation. IE when the 'dots' and 'dashes' weren't being transmitted the carrier was suppressed. In normal radio the 'silence' could still be detected and tracked. The dots and dashes were also transmitted on different random frequencies and so there was never a long enough transmission to detect let alone track, moreover one could correlate the dots and dashes unless one knew the deviation frequencies.
11 the naval enigma coding machine was the receive a 5th rotor. In addition the UKW-D (rewirable rotor reflector D) which was capable of making the allied code breaking efforts fall apart was already in deployment. If used widely enough 'ultra' would fall apart. The failure to deploy the system widely enough (it forced was used n 1943) kept the codes broken.
12 a new generation of pattern running and decoy resistant homing torpedo (even if the new jamming circuits were seduced the new torpedos simply dog legged around small decoy targets)

Type XXI was supposed to deploy early 1944 or late 43. The bombing campaign delayed them as did natural technical problems.

Without the big allied bombing campaign the Type XXI takes the initiative back from the allies by mid 1944.

These u-boats were 'modern' even by todays standards.

 

[parsifal]

In response to the claim that the U-Boats were under control in 1941.

For 1941, the U-Boats suffered the loss of 35 Boats, the vast majority bing in the Northwestyern approaches with a significant number also lost whilst trying to break into the meditterranean, or just covering the approaches to gibraltar . In the previous year, 24 boats had been lost. .

The following map from UBoat Net shows the location of those losses.


U-boat Losses during 1941 - Fates - German U-boats of WWII - Kriegsmarine - uboat.net


In 1942 the U-boat fleet lost 86 boats during this year, most of them in the latter half the year. A sign of things to come ...

However, the U-Boat fleet, whilst hurting fom these losses were still adding new boats to the fleet at a rate much faster than were being lost. it wasnt until 1943 that the situation was turned around and losses began to exceed new additions


in 1941 about 183 new boats were commission. In january 1942 Donitz had ready about 90 boats, the rest were working up, in refit, or undergoing repairs. he had started the year with just over 50 boats, with an average daily availability of about 20 boats.


In 1942 about the same number of boats were added, most sources say 183 boats added. he had begin the year with an availability of some 90 boats and finished it with an average of about 160 boats.

Returns per boat were dropping as the defences were thickening, but Britain was well on her way to being brought to her knees by the U-Boats. At the beginning of 1942, Britain was down to 16 million tons of undamaged shipping, not including the US fleet of some 7 million tons. The absolute minimum needed for subsistence was 7 million tones, but the minimum needed to continue effective resistance was estimated to be 12 million tons. She was 4 million tons shy of that "line of death". in 1942, British and Commonwealth shipyards were to churn out 1.5 million tons of ships, whilst the Americans constructed more than 7.6 million tons. total losses to all causes, in all TOs was just under 10 million tons. The allies were still losing, but US shipping production was increasing and U-Boat sinkings were shrinking as the winter gales set in. Both sides knew that the year of decisioin was 1943. both sides determined that they would make that year the make or break year......it was a very closely run thing, make no mistake.

 

[Shortround6]

AS Parsifal says, there are two aspects to the U-boat war.
Can the allies sink the U-boats faster than the Germans can build them.
Can the Germans sink the merchant ships faster than the allies can build them.

The shipyards were as important to the "battle" as the weapons and ships/boats.

 

[wiking85]

I have 3.3 million tons of reasons and more than 800 ships sunk between June 1942 and March 1943 all of it sunk in the western approaches, that shows this to be an incorrect claim. The heaviest monthly sinkings of the war occurred at this this time, not against the Americans, and not against peripheral fronts. it was squarely in the middle of the main defensive area manned by the RN, by her most experienced convoy men.

No, virtually none of it was sunk in the western approaches, most of it was off the US coast, West of Iceland or in the mid/south Atlantic. The Western Approaches were virtually shut down to Uboats by 1942. The losses occurred in the mid-Atlantic gap, which was in the US security zone, not the Western Approaches.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battl...antic_.28July_1942_.E2.80.93_February_1943.29
U-boat Losses during 1942 - Fates - German U-boats of WWII - Kriegsmarine - uboat.net
Looking at the map many of the Uboats were lost getting to station due to the increase in Bay of Biscay aerial patrols.

Cape Farewell - The U-boat War in Maps - uboat.net
Plus the biggest convoy battles happened here, west of Iceland, south of Greenland, square in the US zone of patrol.

Wolfpacks - German U-boat Operations - Kriegsmarine - uboat.net
Check out the 1942 wolf packs and see where the convoys they hit were, they were outside of the Western Approaches.

Hardly. If you call the redeployment of a maximum of 20 boats out of 280 a major redeployment, then you are right In the fall of 1942 there were six noats in the south Atlantic

What major successes were the Uboats scoring in the Atlantic between October 1941-December 1941?

Wrong again. Dontiz never admitted defeat until after March 1943, and even then, he never gave up. he was tireless and tenacious,. and he always considered the critical battle to be the convoy battles occurring in the sea apraoches to Britain. His decision to press hitler to undertake a pre-emptive strike ointo the neutral zone was a response to the now undeclared war that was occurring between the USN and the US merchant fleet, and the German armed forces. It was inevitable thjat they clash, unless US attitudes to the freedom of movement on the seas was changed, and that was never going to happen. Donitz saw the expansion of operations into the pan-American neutral zone as a pre-emptive strike mostly and then as a means of thinning British defences. he did not extend operations into this zone because he was facing defeat. he extended it, to hurt the Americans more, and finish off the British who would be forced to spread their defences even thinner. he failed to appreciate the shipbuilding capabilities of the US, which really saved the allies from defeat. in no way can German operations at this time be seen as the last death throws of the U-Boat arm.

Sure he never admitted defeat publicly, he just kept pushing for new hunting grounds as his old ones dried up. Courting war against the US to satisfy his service's demands/priorities is very narrow minded. It was up to Hitler to reign him in and prevent the war from expanding any further, which was not Hitler's strong suit.

wrong again. Donitz made his request to the German admiralty, who supported his request in September 1941. When it was put to hitler, he refused, believing the US would not go to war. It was only after the attack on pearl harbour, that hitler, in one of his more insane moments, decided that the Japanese were capable of defeating the USN, and that Germany would not follow the path the italians had, and remain neutral. giving the treaty that existed between japan and Germany a very liberal interpretation, he decided to declare war because he did not want to missout on the spoils of victory. it had nothing to do with donitzs request, or the war at sea. hilter could have care less about what was happening to the U-Boats. He once said that even looking at a naval chart made him sea sick.

I suggest you read "Nemisis" Kershaw's bio on Hitler; Hitler was planning for war against the US for a while before December and the Japanese had been approaching him about fighting the US if they attacked and Hitler agreed to sign a new treaty saying Germany would, but Japan attacked a day before the document was finished drafting. Hitler did think war with the US was inevitable and had thought so from the 1920s on, with this unpublished 'second book'. He wanted to put it off, but by late 1941 with the Japanese finally talking about war he thought he finally had an ally strong enough to fight the US with; no one else was that enamored with the idea until Hitler gave his speech declaring war and then they wrote in their journals that they hoped the Japanese would draw American attention away from Europe.

This is just utter fantasy. Sorry. Everything about it is utterly wrong

Care to provide some sourcing to prove your assertion?

You do know that donitz was named Hitlers successor at the end, which points to his enormous influence in the regime. he was never in any danger of being sidelined. I suggest you do a little more reading before making claims such as these.

Wiki as a source should be treated fairly cautiously.

A lot happened between 1941 and 1945; by 1945 Hitler order Goering arrested and shot for treason, the German generals tried to assassinate Hitler. Hitler really had no one else he could trust by the time he named Doenitz Führer; it shows nothing about Doenitz in 1941.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Just play nice guys...

 

[wiking85]

Just play nice guys...

Sure, I wasn't aware we were getting salty.

U-boat Losses during 1941 - Fates - German U-boats of WWII - Kriegsmarine - uboat.net
From Parsifal link:
35 Uboats lost in 1941 about half from October-December 1941 in a large part in the Western Approaches. This confirms my point that in the region of British defenses it was getting too hot for the Uboats. Using the 1942 map for losses that I posted it shows that the fighting shifted west of the area of the losses in 1941 as the Uboats were forced further afield to more safely hunt:
http://uboat.net/fates/losses/1942.htm

Compare the two maps. Its clear that it became too hot in 1941 in the Western Approaches and was much safer to hunt in the US security zone

 

[parsifal]

No, virtually none of it was sunk in the western approaches, most of it was off the US coast, West of Iceland or in the mid/south Atlantic. The Western Approaches were virtually shut down to Uboats by 1942. The losses occurred in the mid-Atlantic gap, which was in the US security zone, not the Western Approaches.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battl...antic_.28July_1942_.E2.80.93_February_1943.29
U-boat Losses during 1942 - Fates - German U-boats of WWII - Kriegsmarine - uboat.net
Looking at the map many of the Uboats were lost getting to station due to the increase in Bay of Biscay aerial patrols.

Cape Farewell - The U-boat War in Maps - uboat.net
Plus the biggest convoy battles happened here, west of Iceland, south of Greenland, square in the US zone of patrol.

Wolfpacks - German U-boat Operations - Kriegsmarine - uboat.net
Check out the 1942 wolf packs and see where the convoys they hit were, they were outside of the Western Approaches.

I see you are taking a very narrow view of the definition of the western approaches. Ill redfine the position then. The majority of U-Boat losses remained within the area generally bounded by the southern tip of Iceland, to a meridian east of the easternmost point of Iceland, south of ireland and north of Spain. if you look at the maps you refer to above you will see thats what they are indicating the main zone of operations. Sure, German operational areas did move away from Iceland and the western approaches proper, but they remained .in the north atlantic, and outside both the Pan American Defence Zone, and even their so called "western hemisphere defence zone" (put into place from, April 1941, and thereby allowing US escort almost all the way to Iceland). u-Boat sinkings and losses remained concentrated around this area, throughout 1941. In 1942, there was a shift to the US coast and the Gulf Of Mexico, in terms of merchant sinkings, but in terms of U-Boat losses, the main area remained that mid Atlantic area. There were some increases in deplyments around the area of Sierra Leone and off Gibraltar, but these were small change as to what was going on in the mid North Atlantic. As I said, and perhapos we will disgree on this, the midAtlantic lost more shipping that the US coast except for that opening period in 1942, overall, the US Coastal area lost 2.6 million tons, whilst in the midAtlantic losses were about 3.3 million tons for 1942. Ive got the HMSO records but ive left them at a friends house, i will get them tomorrow and maybe scan or just summarise the losses by cause, and area. They show clearly where the majority of losses were occurring.

It wasnt that Donitz was defeated, or under control. Far from it. He kept shifting the zone of operations for two reasons....Firstly he was following the where the best targets were, and invariably that was moistly in the Atlantic. Even above sinking tonnages, his number one objective was to defeat Britain, and his best option there was in the Atlantic. That did not mean however that he would ignore opportunities when they arose, like the US coast.

The second reason that he kept moving away from the areas around Britain....what you are referring to as the western approches, was because he was keeping out of the range of escorts, and also keeping out of range of airpower. Easier to sink ships if the escort numbers were less. There was a reeaon why the British pulled boilers out of the four stackers and put extra fuel tanks into the hull. these were the first ships to be able to cross the Atlantic in escort. For a long time, the Allies had a gap in the mid ocean area, where the smaller, more numerous escorts could not reach. Donitz attempted to exploit that by deploying his U-Boats where the majority of Allied escort could not reach him. Eventually he was forced to fight in areas where allied escorts were plentiful, as the numbewrs of allied long range escorts gradually increased, and at least some VLR aircraft werre deployed, hunter killer groups formed and the rest of it. None of this really happened until the winter of 1942-3.

What major successes were the Uboats scoring in the Atlantic between October 1941-December 1941?

The Germans sank 2.6 million tons of shipping in the north Atlantic, most of which was not replaced. They lost 35 U-Boats to do that, whilst adding 180 boats to their fleet. A number of very valuable skippers were lost, and they allowed a naval enigma machine to be captured, which in the longer terms cost them dearly. So, its probably more accurate to describe the year as having some wins and some setbacks, but those shipping losses were crippling the british, as well as the loss of imports, which were sending the country bankrupt. Germany was winning, because her own losses were less serious than the tonnages lost by Britain.

Sure he never admitted defeat publicly, he just kept pushing for new hunting grounds as his old ones dried up. Courting war against the US to satisfy his service's demands/priorities is very narrow minded. It was up to Hitler to reign him in and prevent the war from expanding any further, which was not Hitler's strong suit.

He never admitted any defeat until May 1943, and thats because ther was no defeat to admit

I suggest you read "Nemisis" Kershaw's bio on Hitler; Hitler was planning for war against the US for a while before December and the Japanese had been approaching him about fighting the US if they attacked and Hitler agreed to sign a new treaty saying Germany would, but Japan attacked a day before the document was finished drafting. Hitler did think war with the US was inevitable and had thought so from the 1920s on, with this unpublished 'second book'. He wanted to put it off, but by late 1941 with the Japanese finally talking about war he thought he finally had an ally strong enough to fight the US with; no one else was that enamored with the idea until Hitler gave his speech declaring war and then they wrote in their journals that they hoped the Japanese would draw American attention away from Europe.

Might be worth a look, but If it is saying what you are indicating, I would not think its much good

Care to provide some sourcing to prove your assertion?

Not really

A lot happened between 1941 and 1945; by 1945 Hitler order Goering arrested and shot for treason, the German generals tried to assassinate Hitler. Hitler really had no one else he could trust by the time he named Doenitz Führer; it shows nothing about Doenitz in 1941.

Yes, i agree, but one of the reasons he was chosen was because he never displayed a defeatist attitude. In some ways he was very similar to Richthofen, except that by 1945 richthofen was dead. Hitler never wanted to surrendee,and he believed that Donitz was the best man to follow that to the bitter end. Hitler, as usual, miscalculated....

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Sure, I wasn't aware we were getting salty

You guys are ok.

 

[Glider]

Sure, I wasn't aware we were getting salty.

U-boat Losses during 1941 - Fates - German U-boats of WWII - Kriegsmarine - uboat.net
From Parsifal link:
35 Uboats lost in 1941 about half from October-December 1941 in a large part in the Western Approaches. This confirms my point that in the region of British defenses it was getting too hot for the Uboats. Using the 1942 map for losses that I posted it shows that the fighting shifted west of the area of the losses in 1941 as the Uboats were forced further afield to more safely hunt:
U-boat Losses during 1942 - Fates - German U-boats of WWII - Kriegsmarine - uboat.net

Compare the two maps. Its clear that it became too hot in 1941 in the Western Approaches and was much safer to hunt in the US security zone

I don't understand your approach that because the Germans moved away from the western approaches that the U Boats were somehow on the ropes. Only a fool fights where the risk is greater when bigger losses can be inflicted at lower risk and the Germans who were many things were not fools. From an import / export position it doesn't matter a damn where the ship is lost, it sailed and it didn't arrive.

Edit - I have looked at the December losses and nearly all were in The Med which is a bad place for the U Boats and one of those was sunk by an Italian warship. Or around Gibraltar which being a huge naval base, a narrow stretch of water with strong tidal surges was exceptionally dangerous. Of the November losses two were accidents so I don't see what you are trying to prove.

It took time to get the French and Norwegian bases fully operational and these enabled the U Boats to roam further across the Atlantic, it wasn't just because of better defences which in 1941 were still mainly on the drawing boards and slipways of the builders.

If you look at the losses in 1942 and take out the ones in the Med. The losses in the Atlantic are pretty evenly spread across the east and west Atlantic so again I don't see your point that the Germans moved west as it was to hot in the eastern approaches

 

[wiking85]

I don't understand your approach that because the Germans moved away from the western approaches that the U Boats were somehow on the ropes. Only a fool fights where the risk is greater when bigger losses can be inflicted at lower risk and the Germans who were many things were not fools. From an import / export position it doesn't matter a damn where the ship is lost, it sailed and it didn't arrive.

It took time to get the French and Norwegian bases fully operational and these enabled the U Boats to roam further across the Atlantic, it wasn't just because of better defences which in 1941 were still mainly on the drawing boards and slipways of the builders.

You're missing my point; the shift further out was due to the danger of operating in the Western Approaches, the Uboats could only continue being effective if they moved further West. With a new government that isn't led by Hitler, Germany would not be eager to declare war, as they were already on the ropes by December 7th 1941 when the Soviets were in full counter attack mode and the army was panicking that they were going to be overrun in front of Moscow; no one was eager to expand the war other than Hitler. With Goering in charge, who didn't want to go after the USSR until Britain was conquered, he would be unenthusiastic about escalating the war further against the US, so would order the navy to stay out of the US security zone to avoid giving them Casus Belli. That effectively shuts down the Uboats, as the Western Approaches were too dangerous to operate in and successes were falling off. So Goering has two options in 1942 either expand the naval war into the US security zone and deal with the US DoWing Germany soon from a naval incident or keeping the Uboats out of the US security zone, which prevents that incident from occurring, but effectively prevents the Uboats then from attacking trade in the North Atlantic due to the defenses in the Western Approaches making convoy attacks cost prohibitive.

It becomes a choice of calling off the Uboat offensive in the North Atlantic to prevent a war with the US or expand the naval war and deal with the US entering the war. Of the two choices the former is less damaging in the long run, even if it means losing the Battle of the Atlantic a year early, due to then preventing the US from bringing its full weight into the air war in 1943-45 and of course Operations Torch and Overlord. Even a more powerful Britain from 1942 on is less powerful than the US+Britain in Europe. It allows more concentration of limited resources against a weaker set of enemies and the lack of spending on Uboats that would then result would only strengthen armaments in other directions; considering something like >700 Uboats were completed and several hundred more partially built from 1942-45 that would mean a lot more tanks or even synthetic fuel production expansion.

 

[bobbysocks]

how much tonnage was sunk off of the us coast prior to the us entering the war in 41? it was significant if i remember....

 

[wiking85]

how much tonnage was sunk off of the us coast prior to the us entering the war in 41? it was significant if i remember....

None, it was all sunk after December 1941. Uboats didn't have the range to do so except for the Type IXs and they were operating in other theaters prior.

 

[Glider]

You're missing my point; the shift further out was due to the danger of operating in the Western Approaches, the Uboats could only continue being effective if they moved further West.

There is no evidence to support that statement, none. The 1941 and 1942 losses were evenly spread across the Atlantic, the Navwar site clearly shows this. There were no stronger defences in real terms as the new ships such as the Flower Class were only starting to be built and it takes time to complete the ship and train the crews and these were more than matched by the production of new U boats. The reason why combat shifted was because the new U Boat bases in Norway and France allowed the U boats to spend longer on patrol in the Atlantic.

With a new government that isn't led by Hitler, Germany would not be eager to declare war, as they were already on the ropes by December 7th 1941 when the Soviets were in full counter attack mode and the army was panicking that they were going to be overrun in front of Moscow; no one was eager to expand the war other than Hitler. With Goering in charge, who didn't want to go after the USSR until Britain was conquered, he would be unenthusiastic about escalating the war further against the US, so would order the navy to stay out of the US security zone to avoid giving them Casus Belli.

There is no way that Germany is going to conquer the UK the German Navy knew it as did the Luftwaffe, who by then knew it was impossible.

That effectively shuts down the Uboats, as the Western Approaches were too dangerous to operate in and successes were falling off.

As mentioned before there is no evidence to support this, please supply something.

So Goering has two options in 1942 either expand the naval war into the US security zone and deal with the US DoWing Germany soon from a naval incident or keeping the Uboats out of the US security zone, which prevents that incident from occurring, but effectively prevents the Uboats then from attacking trade in the North Atlantic due to the defenses in the Western Approaches making convoy attacks cost prohibitive.

Which makes this useless without evidence. I repeat, a good chunk of the U Boat losses you are talking about occurred in the Med or around Gibraltar not repeat not in the Western approaches.

 

[parsifal]

how much tonnage was sunk off of the us coast prior to the us entering the war in 41? it was significant if i remember....

From october 2 1939 the Americans set up a zone called the Pan American neutrality zone. It was raised and approved at the Conference of Foreign Ministers of American Republics who called it the Act of Panama. U.S. Navy to patrol a neutrality zone 300 miles wide. The U.S. notified by Germany the merchant ships must submit to visit and search. At the time its legality was questioned, but the U-Boats did not enter the zone until after December 1941.

However surface raiders such as the graf Spee did not recognize the zone and continued to operate within the zone. Ships were sunk within the zone as a result. The Germans also laid mines within known concentrations of allied shipping . This effectively maintained some pressure on the British as the neutrality provisions did not protect British flagged shipping. The Germans simply did not wish to get into a fight with the US Navy. This reluctance peeled away as 1941 wore on.

22 Dec 1939 - NEUTRALITY ZONE. JOINT PROTEST. American Republi...


The US found itself in an undeclared war with the KM because of alegal arrangement known as the Western Hemisphere Defence Zone. The Lend-Lease Act did not solve the problem of how to get American arms and supplies to Britain. German submarines patrolling the Atlantic Ocean were sinking hundreds of thousands of tons of shipping each month, and the British Navy simply did not have enough ships in the Atlantic to stop them.

Roosevelt could not simply order the US Navy to protect British cargo ships, since the US was still technically neutral. Instead, he developed the idea of a Hemispheric Defense Zone. Roosevelt declared that the entire western half of the Atlantic Ocean was part of the Western Hemisphere and therefore neutral. He then ordered the US Navy to patrol the western Atlantic and reveal the location of German submarines to the British.

This arrangement came into being from18April 1941, and was never recognized by Germany. it was anything but the act of a true neutral, and it was this that Donitz and the german admiralty wanted to ignore when they made their submission to Hitler in September

 

[Juha]

'Somewhere in southern England'

These 3.7" anti aircraft guns were really no use for anything else. They are not comparable to the famous German 88mm gun, they weigh twice as much for a start. They could be, and I believe were, used in an anti tank role in North Africa, but I understand that they were not at all suited to such a role. I profess no expertise in artillery. In 1944 the British had more of these guns than men to man them. I'm not sure how well off they were in the systems associated with the guns. Manpower is a relatively simple fix...

I'm not sure on NA but at least once during late summer - autumn 1944 3.7"s were deployed to form an anti-tank screen in ETO. They were sometimes used to beef up 21st AG barrages in ETO. Being capable to fire heavy air bursting shells made them nasty to German infantry but the limitiations in their fuzes limited their use in counter-battery role.

Juha

 

[parsifal]

Ive had the HMSO records returned and can now report as follows

The records analyse shipping losses in a number of ways, includiung cause of loss and loss by location. it defines the main areas as the north atlantic, United Kingdome 9generally within 300km of the coast), South Atlantic, Med, Indian ocean and Pacific.

1941:

Nth Atlantic: 2,421,700
United Kingdom 740,293
South Atlantic 133,916
Med: 501,269
Indian Ocean 73,155
Pacific: 458,131
TOTAL 4,328558

1942
Nth Atlantic: 5,471,222
United Kingdom 214, 885
South Atlantic 464,243
Med 369,127
Indian Ocean 724,485
Pacific 556,749
TOTAL 7,790, 697

of that 5.4 million tons sunk in the North Atlantic 2.6 million was sunk in the US speere of operations, and 3.2 million tons in the mid Atlantic and United Kingdom waters.

There is no denying that the losses off the US east Coast were catastrophic, but it is simply untrue to claim virtually no losses in the mid-Atlantic. Large tonaages continued to be lost in the british zone, even as the Us shipping was being sunk. perhaps this dispute arose because the Western Approaches is not a well defined term. but I think the inference that was made was that the losses in the british defended area were low or negligible. That simply was not the case, and Britain was in fact perilously close to having her imports reduced past the dnager zone, because of the shipping losses she was sustaining.

As a correction, there were ships lost to U-boats within the Pan-American Zone. 6 ships were lost between January and November, though i dont know the tonnages of these losses. They were right on the edge of the zone, so may be actually outside. This is more a technical issue rather than a substantial one