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That's my point. The US would have declared war on Germany eventually, if the US support for Britain didn't eventually cause a German declaration. In the mean time it would have gone to great lengths (even more than historically) to maintain British survival. Don't forget that a huge majority of Americans supported this option even at the risk of war.
Cheers
Steve
why are the germans out of naval options in 1942
In October 1941, Hitler ordered Dönitz to move U-boats into the Mediterranean to support German operations in that theatre. The resulting concentration near Gibraltar resulted in a series of battles around the Gibraltar and Sierra Leone convoys. In December 1941, Convoy HG 76 sailed, escorted by the 36th Escort Group of two sloops and six corvettes under Captain Frederic John Walker, reinforced by the first of the new escort carriers, HMS Audacity, and three destroyers from Gibraltar. The convoy was immediately intercepted by the waiting U-boat pack, resulting in a brutal battle. Walker was a tactical innovator, his ships' crews were highly trained and the presence of an escort carrier meant U-boats were frequently sighted and forced to dive before they could get close to the convoy. Over the next five days, five U-boats were sunk (four by Walker's group), despite the loss of Audacity after two days. The British lost Audacity, a destroyer and just two merchant ships. The battle was the first clear Allied convoy victory.
Through dogged effort, the Allies slowly gained the upper hand until the end of 1941. Although Allied warships failed to sink U-boats in large numbers, most convoys evaded attack completely. Shipping losses were high, but manageable.
The British convoy system had defeated them by late 1941.
As a result Hitler shifted Uboat ops south to around North Africa. They failed there too.
By December 1941 Doenitz had admitted defeat against British convoys, so pushed Hitler to expand the war so he could go after unconvoyed shipping on the US coast.
Hitler obliged him, but was the only one that wanted to in the command structure (other than Doenitz who had a very narrow service perspective).
So unless Germany is dead set on war with the US, which only Hitler and Doenitz were in 1941, and is willing to expand the Uboat war to the shores of the US and mid-Atlantic US security zone, the Uboats can no longer score success in the British security zone East of Iceland.
Doenitz himself admitted as much, which is why he was so pro-US, because without that his service had lost its major reason for resources, which would mean the Uboat Waffe gets limited funding and stuck to fighting in the Arctic, Mediterranean, and mine laying off the British coast.
The British convoy system had defeated them by late 1941.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Battle_of_the_Atlantic#Mediterranean_diversion
No, virtually none of it was sunk in the western approaches, most of it was off the US coast, West of Iceland or in the mid/south Atlantic. The Western Approaches were virtually shut down to Uboats by 1942. The losses occurred in the mid-Atlantic gap, which was in the US security zone, not the Western Approaches.I have 3.3 million tons of reasons and more than 800 ships sunk between June 1942 and March 1943 all of it sunk in the western approaches, that shows this to be an incorrect claim. The heaviest monthly sinkings of the war occurred at this this time, not against the Americans, and not against peripheral fronts. it was squarely in the middle of the main defensive area manned by the RN, by her most experienced convoy men.
What major successes were the Uboats scoring in the Atlantic between October 1941-December 1941?Hardly. If you call the redeployment of a maximum of 20 boats out of 280 a major redeployment, then you are right In the fall of 1942 there were six noats in the south Atlantic
Sure he never admitted defeat publicly, he just kept pushing for new hunting grounds as his old ones dried up. Courting war against the US to satisfy his service's demands/priorities is very narrow minded. It was up to Hitler to reign him in and prevent the war from expanding any further, which was not Hitler's strong suit.Wrong again. Dontiz never admitted defeat until after March 1943, and even then, he never gave up. he was tireless and tenacious,. and he always considered the critical battle to be the convoy battles occurring in the sea apraoches to Britain. His decision to press hitler to undertake a pre-emptive strike ointo the neutral zone was a response to the now undeclared war that was occurring between the USN and the US merchant fleet, and the German armed forces. It was inevitable thjat they clash, unless US attitudes to the freedom of movement on the seas was changed, and that was never going to happen. Donitz saw the expansion of operations into the pan-American neutral zone as a pre-emptive strike mostly and then as a means of thinning British defences. he did not extend operations into this zone because he was facing defeat. he extended it, to hurt the Americans more, and finish off the British who would be forced to spread their defences even thinner. he failed to appreciate the shipbuilding capabilities of the US, which really saved the allies from defeat. in no way can German operations at this time be seen as the last death throws of the U-Boat arm.
I suggest you read "Nemisis" Kershaw's bio on Hitler; Hitler was planning for war against the US for a while before December and the Japanese had been approaching him about fighting the US if they attacked and Hitler agreed to sign a new treaty saying Germany would, but Japan attacked a day before the document was finished drafting. Hitler did think war with the US was inevitable and had thought so from the 1920s on, with this unpublished 'second book'. He wanted to put it off, but by late 1941 with the Japanese finally talking about war he thought he finally had an ally strong enough to fight the US with; no one else was that enamored with the idea until Hitler gave his speech declaring war and then they wrote in their journals that they hoped the Japanese would draw American attention away from Europe.wrong again. Donitz made his request to the German admiralty, who supported his request in September 1941. When it was put to hitler, he refused, believing the US would not go to war. It was only after the attack on pearl harbour, that hitler, in one of his more insane moments, decided that the Japanese were capable of defeating the USN, and that Germany would not follow the path the italians had, and remain neutral. giving the treaty that existed between japan and Germany a very liberal interpretation, he decided to declare war because he did not want to missout on the spoils of victory. it had nothing to do with donitzs request, or the war at sea. hilter could have care less about what was happening to the U-Boats. He once said that even looking at a naval chart made him sea sick.
Care to provide some sourcing to prove your assertion?This is just utter fantasy. Sorry. Everything about it is utterly wrong
A lot happened between 1941 and 1945; by 1945 Hitler order Goering arrested and shot for treason, the German generals tried to assassinate Hitler. Hitler really had no one else he could trust by the time he named Doenitz Führer; it shows nothing about Doenitz in 1941.You do know that donitz was named Hitlers successor at the end, which points to his enormous influence in the regime. he was never in any danger of being sidelined. I suggest you do a little more reading before making claims such as these.
Wiki as a source should be treated fairly cautiously.
Just play nice guys...
No, virtually none of it was sunk in the western approaches, most of it was off the US coast, West of Iceland or in the mid/south Atlantic. The Western Approaches were virtually shut down to Uboats by 1942. The losses occurred in the mid-Atlantic gap, which was in the US security zone, not the Western Approaches.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battl...antic_.28July_1942_.E2.80.93_February_1943.29
U-boat Losses during 1942 - Fates - German U-boats of WWII - Kriegsmarine - uboat.net
Looking at the map many of the Uboats were lost getting to station due to the increase in Bay of Biscay aerial patrols.
Cape Farewell - The U-boat War in Maps - uboat.net
Plus the biggest convoy battles happened here, west of Iceland, south of Greenland, square in the US zone of patrol.
Wolfpacks - German U-boat Operations - Kriegsmarine - uboat.net
Check out the 1942 wolf packs and see where the convoys they hit were, they were outside of the Western Approaches.
What major successes were the Uboats scoring in the Atlantic between October 1941-December 1941?
Sure he never admitted defeat publicly, he just kept pushing for new hunting grounds as his old ones dried up. Courting war against the US to satisfy his service's demands/priorities is very narrow minded. It was up to Hitler to reign him in and prevent the war from expanding any further, which was not Hitler's strong suit.
I suggest you read "Nemisis" Kershaw's bio on Hitler; Hitler was planning for war against the US for a while before December and the Japanese had been approaching him about fighting the US if they attacked and Hitler agreed to sign a new treaty saying Germany would, but Japan attacked a day before the document was finished drafting. Hitler did think war with the US was inevitable and had thought so from the 1920s on, with this unpublished 'second book'. He wanted to put it off, but by late 1941 with the Japanese finally talking about war he thought he finally had an ally strong enough to fight the US with; no one else was that enamored with the idea until Hitler gave his speech declaring war and then they wrote in their journals that they hoped the Japanese would draw American attention away from Europe.
Care to provide some sourcing to prove your assertion?
A lot happened between 1941 and 1945; by 1945 Hitler order Goering arrested and shot for treason, the German generals tried to assassinate Hitler. Hitler really had no one else he could trust by the time he named Doenitz Führer; it shows nothing about Doenitz in 1941.
Sure, I wasn't aware we were getting salty.
U-boat Losses during 1941 - Fates - German U-boats of WWII - Kriegsmarine - uboat.net
From Parsifal link:
35 Uboats lost in 1941 about half from October-December 1941 in a large part in the Western Approaches. This confirms my point that in the region of British defenses it was getting too hot for the Uboats. Using the 1942 map for losses that I posted it shows that the fighting shifted west of the area of the losses in 1941 as the Uboats were forced further afield to more safely hunt:
U-boat Losses during 1942 - Fates - German U-boats of WWII - Kriegsmarine - uboat.net
Compare the two maps. Its clear that it became too hot in 1941 in the Western Approaches and was much safer to hunt in the US security zone
You're missing my point; the shift further out was due to the danger of operating in the Western Approaches, the Uboats could only continue being effective if they moved further West. With a new government that isn't led by Hitler, Germany would not be eager to declare war, as they were already on the ropes by December 7th 1941 when the Soviets were in full counter attack mode and the army was panicking that they were going to be overrun in front of Moscow; no one was eager to expand the war other than Hitler. With Goering in charge, who didn't want to go after the USSR until Britain was conquered, he would be unenthusiastic about escalating the war further against the US, so would order the navy to stay out of the US security zone to avoid giving them Casus Belli. That effectively shuts down the Uboats, as the Western Approaches were too dangerous to operate in and successes were falling off. So Goering has two options in 1942 either expand the naval war into the US security zone and deal with the US DoWing Germany soon from a naval incident or keeping the Uboats out of the US security zone, which prevents that incident from occurring, but effectively prevents the Uboats then from attacking trade in the North Atlantic due to the defenses in the Western Approaches making convoy attacks cost prohibitive.I don't understand your approach that because the Germans moved away from the western approaches that the U Boats were somehow on the ropes. Only a fool fights where the risk is greater when bigger losses can be inflicted at lower risk and the Germans who were many things were not fools. From an import / export position it doesn't matter a damn where the ship is lost, it sailed and it didn't arrive.
It took time to get the French and Norwegian bases fully operational and these enabled the U Boats to roam further across the Atlantic, it wasn't just because of better defences which in 1941 were still mainly on the drawing boards and slipways of the builders.
how much tonnage was sunk off of the us coast prior to the us entering the war in 41? it was significant if i remember....
There is no evidence to support that statement, none. The 1941 and 1942 losses were evenly spread across the Atlantic, the Navwar site clearly shows this. There were no stronger defences in real terms as the new ships such as the Flower Class were only starting to be built and it takes time to complete the ship and train the crews and these were more than matched by the production of new U boats. The reason why combat shifted was because the new U Boat bases in Norway and France allowed the U boats to spend longer on patrol in the Atlantic.You're missing my point; the shift further out was due to the danger of operating in the Western Approaches, the Uboats could only continue being effective if they moved further West.
There is no way that Germany is going to conquer the UK the German Navy knew it as did the Luftwaffe, who by then knew it was impossible.With a new government that isn't led by Hitler, Germany would not be eager to declare war, as they were already on the ropes by December 7th 1941 when the Soviets were in full counter attack mode and the army was panicking that they were going to be overrun in front of Moscow; no one was eager to expand the war other than Hitler. With Goering in charge, who didn't want to go after the USSR until Britain was conquered, he would be unenthusiastic about escalating the war further against the US, so would order the navy to stay out of the US security zone to avoid giving them Casus Belli.
As mentioned before there is no evidence to support this, please supply something.That effectively shuts down the Uboats, as the Western Approaches were too dangerous to operate in and successes were falling off.
Which makes this useless without evidence. I repeat, a good chunk of the U Boat losses you are talking about occurred in the Med or around Gibraltar not repeat not in the Western approaches.So Goering has two options in 1942 either expand the naval war into the US security zone and deal with the US DoWing Germany soon from a naval incident or keeping the Uboats out of the US security zone, which prevents that incident from occurring, but effectively prevents the Uboats then from attacking trade in the North Atlantic due to the defenses in the Western Approaches making convoy attacks cost prohibitive.
how much tonnage was sunk off of the us coast prior to the us entering the war in 41? it was significant if i remember....
'Somewhere in southern England'
These 3.7" anti aircraft guns were really no use for anything else. They are not comparable to the famous German 88mm gun, they weigh twice as much for a start. They could be, and I believe were, used in an anti tank role in North Africa, but I understand that they were not at all suited to such a role. I profess no expertise in artillery. In 1944 the British had more of these guns than men to man them. I'm not sure how well off they were in the systems associated with the guns. Manpower is a relatively simple fix...