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If Japan remained the focus in the mid-late 1930s, I wonder what sort of aircraft carriers and carrier aircraft we would have seen the RN, AM and FAA field. HMS Ark Royal was reportedly designed with Japan in mind, but when she entered service in early 1939, her CAG was clearly not optimized to deal with the A5M or B5N then in IJNS service or the Aichi D3A then in development (see prototype image - first flown a year earlier in Jan 1938). Without the threat of the Kriegsmarine or Nazi Germany driving both military expenditures and conscription, I suggest we'd see some rationalization of the RN, with, for example the five Revenge class, at best going into the reserve fleet. What do you think the RN would look like up to 1941 without German-driven re-armament?If you look at many of the British ships designed from the early 1930s, they are not a response to what was happening in Europe, but to what Japan was doing. For example Mogamis triggered the Towns, Fubukis the Tribals with more guns and the need for greater torpedo armament in the J/K class.
Excellent points. So, given your info re. countering Japan, the ten year rule lasting until at least its historical end in 1932, and the British government's parsimonious views on defence spending, what do you see the RN, RAF and HM's Army at home and overseas looking like by 1941? And back to the original question, without the German-focused re-armament and mobilization of 1936-40, will Britain be prepared to deal with Japan in 1941?Japan was seen as a major threat from WW I on.
It shows Singapore in its intended light as a fleet base for a campaign against the Japanese navy. The OTL Japanese response was not to match the Royal Navy at sea but to take the base from inland leaving the Royal Navy an ocean further away. This is not a new tactic. Possibly one of the most indirect ones but not a new concept. Plymouth and other naval ports in Britain were ringed by huge and expensive fortifications in the latter part of the 19th century to guard against just this sort of tactic, although the planned threat was one of landings far nearer than a whole country away, but the principle stands.Japan was seen as a major threat from WW I on.
What Britain was prepared to do about Japan varied.
Excellent points. So, given your info re. countering Japan, the ten year rule lasting until at least its historical end in 1932, and the British government's parsimonious views on defence spending, what do you see the RN, RAF and HM's Army at home and overseas looking like by 1941? And back to the original question, without the German-focused re-armament and mobilization of 1936-40, will Britain be prepared to deal with Japan in 1941?
I would hope in view of British neglect, for example the long delays on the Singapore naval base, that the Australians would expedite or expand their own re-armament.
With FIC firmly in France's hands and Thailand contained the Japanese route inland to Singapore is cut off, which was a foundational assumption of the Singapore strategy. Instead we may see Britain, France (and ROC-friendly Weimar Germany) giving further material support to the Republic of China, giving the IJA further trouble.It shows Singapore in its intended light as a fleet base for a campaign against the Japanese navy. The OTL Japanese response was not to match the Royal Navy at sea but to take the base from inland
Indeed. This is like the fall of France. Something that altered the whole dynamic of the British war effort and required some strategic risks to be taken in order to prosecute the war and defend Britain against the threat of invasion. Which latter was still valid, if increasingly unlikely, until 1942 when military resources could be diverted to offensive deployments away from home defence. Combined with the reduced threat was the increasing ability of the Home Guard to blunt any incursion on land. The Japanese move on Malaya and Burma took advantage of the risk Britain took to consciously neglect that in favour of prosecuting the war elsewhere.With FIC firmly in France's hands and Thailand contained the Japanese route inland to Singapore is cut off, which was a foundational assumption of the Singapore strategy. Instead we may see Britain, France (and ROC-friendly Weimar Germany) giving further material support to the Republic of China, giving the IJA further trouble.
Without their occupation of FIC, Japan is miles away from an overland route to Malaya and Singapore.
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I wonder about fascist Italy's relations with Japan. The Italian navy has their Indian Ocean and Red Sea bases, both of which could prove useful to Japan. Not that Mussolini is going to go to war against Britain and France without some allies.
Had the French government continued to carry on the war from North Africa and colonies then they could have transferred enough military resources to keep the Japanese away from Indo-China. Even if they could not keep them way for ever it would trigger a war with Britain and cause Malaya to be reinforced and the Royal Navy to beef up the fleet in Singapore and integrate the Dutch fleet into operations again deterring an invasion of Malaya. At a very minimum the French would have British resources allocated for them to move their fleet and troops etc. to beef up Indo-China. Enter local butterflies stage right….
Might depend on what year and what else was going on.So, Australia may be demanding Britain not support Washington in an embargo of Japan. Meanwhile, I'm not convinced that without the German occupation, the independently-minded Dutch would acquiesce to any demands from the USA.
Did the Netherlands have the capability to build such ships? If the Weimar Germans are out of the game, would another nation build them? Given the IJN's ineptitude in ASW, the Dutch might be better off focusing on building and fielding in the DEI a greater number of their large submarines rather than playing into Japan's advantages in surface warfare. The DEI air force could also be updated with competitive fighters and bombers, for example a torpedo-capable variant of the Fokker T.IX.By 1938 the Dutch were planning on building 2-3 battlecruisers ( 9 X 11in guns) for Dutch East Indies,
Complicated question. Neglecting the fact that the German right, which dominated the security services, absolutely despised the very idea of a democratic government, so it would require some very serious (and possibly non-democratic) actions to get internal and external security services to be trustworthy. On the other hand, Stalin did want a red Germany, which is unlikely without the help of the Soviet Army, so Germany did need an effective, loyal army. Under Weimar, it may never have gotten that.If with continued US assistance, and German and Allied acceptance the Young Plan, the Weimar Republic lasts through the Great Depression and beyond, will reduced rearmament in Britain leave the Empire unprepared to face Japan in 1941? There's still Mussolini's Italy to deal with in North Africa and Ethiopia, and the civil war in Spain, so Britain won't totally neglect its military, but the huge re-armament programs of 1936-1940 will assuredly be impacted, as will Churchill's chances of becoming PM.
In 1919 the British government enacted the ten year rule, "a guideline, that the armed forces should draft their estimates on the assumption that the British Empire would not be engaged in any great war during the next ten years. In 1928 Churchill, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, successfully urged the Cabinet to make the rule self-perpetuating. There were very large cuts in defence spending as a result of this rule, with defence spending going down from £766 million in 1919–20, to £189 million in 1921–22, to £102 million in 1932. The Ten Year Rule was abandoned by the Cabinet on 23 March 1932, but this decision was countered with: this must not be taken to justify an expanding expenditure by the Defence Services without regard to the very serious financial and economic situation."
Japan may not appear to be a big threat until its successful invasion of China from 1937 onwards, so Tokyo's aspirations may not drive British re-armament. Though as they watch IJN expansion; Australia, NZ, Malaya, Burma and India may be crying out for defences. An expansionist Japan will need to consider facing off against an undistracted if less well armed Britain, France and Netherlands.
Without the risk of Weimar Germany's involvement, perhaps Britain and France would risk a war with Italy over North Africa and the Horn over the Abyssinia Crisis. This likely rapid victory would eliminate Mussolini and the Italian threat and prepare the British (and French) militaries to face Japan later.In the Med, Italy under Mussolini was still a threat to the use of that sea as a transport route, and a threat to Suez. While the Italian Army was, generally, not that good, the British could not know that with surety.
The plan was to build the ships in Dutch shipyards. However the guns, armor and machinery would be provided by German firms.Did the Netherlands have the capability to build such ships? If the Weimar Germans are out of the game, would another nation build them?
We are using the retrospectroscope at high rpm here. In the late 30s nobody had any idea of how good or bad the IJN's ASW capability was. Actually nobody's ASW was all that good. Even the British were vastly over rating their own ASW capabilities.Given the IJN's ineptitude in ASW, the Dutch might be better off focusing on building and fielding in the DEI a greater number of their large submarines rather than playing into Japan's advantages in surface warfare.
Skua gets a crap load of flack here.Skuas
I'm a fan of the Skua. The first all metal, retractible undercarriage, folding wing monoplane carrier aircraft of any type. The Americans and Japanese would not have a dive bomber of this spec until the SB2C Helldiver and Yokosuka D4Y enter service in 1942, four years after the Skua was introduced. Blackburn was ahead of its time with the Skua. I would have liked to have seen a successor powered by the Hercules. As it was, after the Skua everything from Blackburn was rubbish until their swan song, the superlative Buccaneer.Skua gets a crap load of flack here.
Given the Japan-focus, what sort of aircraft do we see the Fleet Air Arm fielding by 1941? Hopefully not Fulmars, Skuas, Albacores and Swordfish. With no imminent threat to the home islands, the Air Ministry might have directed Vickers-Supermarine, Hawker-Siddeley, Blackburn and Fairey Aviation to meet different specifications.