Impact of USAAC strike on Formosa, Dec 1941
- Thread starter Admiral Beez
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buffnut453
Captain
Which is why we only ever have operational successes and intelligence failures.
buffnut453
Captain
I used to train newbie intel officers. One of our very first lessons included one of my favourite quotes on the topic, "Senior officers use intelligence in the same way a drunk uses a lamppost...more for support than for illumination."
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SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
Did General MacArthur ever explain his side of that story?
swampyankee
Chief Master Sergeant
- 4,022
- Jun 25, 2013
Were there any orders not to? In any case, MacArthur certainly had near-total authority over the USAAF units under his command, including ordering strikes, dispersal, and reconnaissance flights.
Orders not to attack Formosa? Quite the opposite was reality. From Airforce Magazine, "Disaster in the Philippines":
USAFFE heard the news from a commercial radio station around 3 a.m. and alerted base commanders. Sutherland awakened MacArthur at 3:30 when official notice was received. At 3:40, Brig. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow, chief of the Army War Plans Division, called MacArthur from Washington, D.C., with a longer account.
At 4 a.m. Gen. George C. Marshall sent MacArthur a cablegram directing him to "carry out tasks assigned in Rainbow 5 as they pertain to Japan." The War Plans Division called again at 7:55 to check on the situation in the Philippines and to give an additional warning.
Brereton, seeking permission to strike the Japanese bases on Formosa, tried to see MacArthur at 5 a.m. but was denied access by Sutherland. With the B-17s standing by for takeoff, Brereton made another attempt to see MacArthur at 7:15 but was again turned away by Sutherland. At 8:50, Sutherland instructed Brereton to "hold off bombing of Formosa for the present."
In his memoirs, published in 1946, Brereton laid out his side of the story. Among other things, he said that, "Neither General MacArthur nor General Sutherland ever told me why the authority was withheld to attack Formosa."
The mission under War Plan Rainbow 5 was not defensive. It was to take offensive action. MacArthur had been specifically reminded to implement Rainbow 5. It can be debated whether it would have worked, but a B-17 strike was of definite concern to the Japanese.
yes and yes
MacArthur lied in trying to explain his side of the story. From the Airforce Magazine article, Disaster in the Philippines:
MacArthur reacted with a 400-word statement to The New York Times. "General Brereton never recommended an attack on Formosa to me, and I know nothing of such a recommendation having been made," he said. "Such a proposal, if intended seriously, should have been made to me in person by him." In any case, an attack on Formosa "would have had no chance of success."
Furthermore, "the overall strategic mission of the Philippine command was to defend the Philippines, not to initiate an outside attack," MacArthur said.
As for the B-17s, "I had given orders several days before to withdraw the heavy bombers from Clark Field to Mindanao, several hundred miles to the south, to get them out of range of enemy land-based air."
None of this is substantiated in records or documents from 1941, however. Brereton attempted several times to present his proposal "in person." There is no explanation of why MacArthur did not find time to consult with the commander of his most important forces.
FEAF Commander MG Lewis H. Brereton attempted to meet with MacArthur twice, at 0500 and again at 0715 to gain approval to execute a strike against the airfields on Formosa IAW Rainbow 5. MacArthur's gatekeeping Chief of Staff, MG Sutherland refused to allow Brereton access to MacArthur (who was rumored to be in a semi-comatose stupor and incapable of executing the responsibilities of command). Sutherland directed that Brereton hold off on attacking Formosa for the time being at 0850 and again at 1000. Failing in his efforts to launch a strike, Brereton ordered the FEAF into the air, so at least the bombers wouldn't be caught on the ground like had occurred in Hawaii. At 1014, MacArthur, having sorted himself out a bit, called Brereton directly and finally authorized a Formosa strike. Brereton recalled his forces so they could refuel, complete arming and eat lunch, and it was when the FEAF had returned to the ground that the Japanese struck. Like so many other things that had gone wrong on this first day of the war, communications between the few functional radar sites, the ground observers and the Interceptor Command failed to issue sufficient warning.
I do. The Brits had been at war for 2 1/4 years by this time, had been through a blitz at home, and had every reason to have an alert, no nonsense war-fighting mindset, likely to trust the intelligence they had available.
The US, OTOH, was coming off a generation of no major wars, a depression, and a period of defense budget austerity, during which huge technological advances had occurred that were changing warfare in ways that remotely situated senior officers weren't always ready to acknowledge. Peacethink and peacehabit die hard; witness the confusion, general disbelief, and miscommunication at American outposts all over the Pacific on this day. Enter the "Billy Mitchell/Claire Chennault gadfly effect". If you were in MacArthur's shoes, with his background and experience and prejudices, would you lend any credence to the claims of fantastical Japanese aircraft performance being pedaled by our British "friends" and that insubordinate rogue, Chennault?
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
We also have to keep in mind that Mac was trying to balance between Washington and President Quezon.
The Philippine Pres. held to the idea that no aggression toward the Japanese would spare his nation from attack - which in all honesty, was a completely naive notion, taking into consideration the Philippines' strategic location as well as Japan's track record.
Mac was screwed no matter which course of action he took.
The Philippine Pres. held to the idea that no aggression toward the Japanese would spare his nation from attack - which in all honesty, was a completely naive notion, taking into consideration the Philippines' strategic location as well as Japan's track record.
Mac was screwed no matter which course of action he took.
Sorry, but Dugout Doug was totally responsible for his failings. The BS about Brereton not talking to MacArthur wasn't Brereton's fault, nor even Sutherland's fault. When you're in charge and a major feces storm is coming your way, you demand the presence of all of your chiefs, including the one responsible for your air power. Everyone expected a strike on the Philippines, while an attack on Hawaii surprised many - Doug had years to prepare!
Cheers,
Dana
Cheers,
Dana
swampyankee
Chief Master Sergeant
- 4,022
- Jun 25, 2013
Do note that the Philippines was not a sovereign state at the time. Quezon may have thought he had a foreign policy, but was there a Philippine embassy in Japan or a Japanese ambassador in the Philippines?
As far as Japan and all the other major powers were concerned, there was no meaningful Philippine sovereignty, just as there was none for Hong Kong.
Peter Gunn
Master Sergeant
I totally agree, I doubt the Zero's ability to intercept the B-17 at those altitudes. Several months later, Zero's had trouble dealing with Col. Sweeneys <sp?> B-17E's at Midway, shooting down I believe a total of zero.
I'd say no pun intended but...
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
Nicely done.
Conslaw
Senior Airman
This passage from Ian Toll's recently released
Twilight of the Gods: War in the Western Pacific, 1944-1945 (Vol. 3) (Pacific War Trilogy)
has an interesting take, that McArthur was culpable for the loss of his airpower in the first Japanese raid, but that there was only a narrow window that he could be held accountable, and that window was gone in an instant because by the time it was known his response (or lack thereof) he was needed as a designated national hero. (I have the book on hold at the library. Amazon wouldn't let me cut and paste from the preview , bloody capitalists.)
Twilight of the Gods: War in the Western Pacific, 1944-1945 (Vol. 3) (Pacific War Trilogy)
has an interesting take, that McArthur was culpable for the loss of his airpower in the first Japanese raid, but that there was only a narrow window that he could be held accountable, and that window was gone in an instant because by the time it was known his response (or lack thereof) he was needed as a designated national hero. (I have the book on hold at the library. Amazon wouldn't let me cut and paste from the preview , bloody capitalists.)
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
The B-17Cs and B-17Es arrived seperately, not in formation, so the Japanese weren't able to concentrate on them, incedintly.
As it was, they shot up Swenson's B-17C as it was trying to land at Hickam, setting it on fire just before touchdown. The crew were able to get out, but the ship was a total loss.
Richard's B-17C, which bellied into a field by Bellows Field, was heavily damaged by gunfire, several crewmen seriously injured.
All the others had harrowing encounters, all the B-17s were shot up and it had nothing to do with speed, but instead, good fortune.
Two points worth mentioning is that one, they arrived separately as I said above. Had they arrived in formation, they would have been a focal point for the A6Ms.
The other point, is in the action reports, there are statements of numerous bullet holes being mentioned (Richard's B-17C had over 73) but no mention of damage from the A6M's 20mm cannon.
Huh? I fail to see what relevance the damage to B17s at Oahu in December has to B17s at Midway in June. Apples to oranges. Single ships at low altitude, unarmed, surprised, in ferry mode vs a formation at altitude, well armed (okay, no chin turrets) and in combat mode deliberately in harm's way. Of course there's a difference, as Kido Butai's CAP soon discovered.
MacArthur and Sutherland spent years attempting to pin the blame on Brereton for of the immediate loss of the FEAF caught on the ground on the first day of hostilities when it occurred through their pompous incompetence. Washington contributed to the Pacific disaster because neither of the senior Army commanders in the Pacific were suited for their commands in 1941, and even when Marshall and his staff harbored doubts about their Pacific commander's competency, nothing was done. Both MacArthur and Short were dinosaurs still rooted in a pre-aviation 19th century Army mindset. Neither commander understood or appreciated the advances made in military aviation since WW1, and both severely underestimated the air threat in general and the capability of their main potential enemy, the Japanese. Both Army commanders dismissed warnings, even direct orders, coming from Washington in the fall of 1941, relying on their own superior intellect and man-in-charge in the theater of operations local knowledge, as opposed to that of Army Chief of Staff George Marshall. Short was specifically warned that a carrier-borne air attack was his biggest threat, not home-grown Japanese sympathizing 5th columnists. MacArthur was hand delivered the Rainbow 5 plan by Brereton on 3 November that ordered him to take immediate offensive action against the Japanese as soon as hostilities broke out, but he pooh poohed it, commenting that he was certain that the Japanese wouldn't initiate anything until the spring of 1942 at the earliest. Both of these inept commanders failed to grasp the immediacy of their situations, failed to organize their staffs to be able to coordinate early warning and adequate air defense, and both failed miserably in inter-service coordination with their Navy counterparts. I believe that when faced with the enormity of his miscalculations, MacArthur suffered a complete mental and physical breakdown that incapacitated him for several critical hours on 8 Dec (his time). His toady Chief of Staff, also complicit in the growing debacle, shielded and covered for "The Old Man", and then concocted a series of lies in an attempt to place the blame on others.
Going back to the initial premise of this thread, What if MacArthur's B-17 had executed a strike on Formosa ASAP in accordance with Rainbow 5? What would be the impact on the war?
If Brereton had been given the green light at 0500, by the time the B-17s had been armed and the mission had taken off and flown to Formosa, the fog shrouding Formosa would have dissipated. The Japanese strike departed after 0700 when the ground fog lifted on their mission to strike the Philippines, so the bomber forces would have passed each other in the air with the B-17 flying at a much higher altitude. If the B-17s spot the Japanese, warning can be given to MacArthur to better prepare for the incoming attack. As noted in a previous post, B-17s flying at near their max altitude would be relatively immune from effective attack even if they are detected, but 19 or 20 B-17s dropping a few bombs from high altitude aren't going to create devastation either. What they might achieve however, is to cause the Japanese to question their timeline and force them to hold back forces in the future to provide for a defense of Formosa. As long as Brereton's B-17s and the rest of the FEAF can remain operational, they pose a threat. They may buy time for MacArthur to hastily make better preparations for the Bataan defense. In real life, MacArthur ran out of time on 8 Dec and was in complete react mode for the rest of the campaign. With absolutely nothing to threaten their progress, the Japanese seized and held the initiative and were even able to speed up their timeline. The FEAF not getting decimated on the ground on the first day of the war may have slowed the Japanese advance and given U.S. and Philippine defenders a little breathing room to get themselves organized.
If Brereton had been given the green light at 0500, by the time the B-17s had been armed and the mission had taken off and flown to Formosa, the fog shrouding Formosa would have dissipated. The Japanese strike departed after 0700 when the ground fog lifted on their mission to strike the Philippines, so the bomber forces would have passed each other in the air with the B-17 flying at a much higher altitude. If the B-17s spot the Japanese, warning can be given to MacArthur to better prepare for the incoming attack. As noted in a previous post, B-17s flying at near their max altitude would be relatively immune from effective attack even if they are detected, but 19 or 20 B-17s dropping a few bombs from high altitude aren't going to create devastation either. What they might achieve however, is to cause the Japanese to question their timeline and force them to hold back forces in the future to provide for a defense of Formosa. As long as Brereton's B-17s and the rest of the FEAF can remain operational, they pose a threat. They may buy time for MacArthur to hastily make better preparations for the Bataan defense. In real life, MacArthur ran out of time on 8 Dec and was in complete react mode for the rest of the campaign. With absolutely nothing to threaten their progress, the Japanese seized and held the initiative and were even able to speed up their timeline. The FEAF not getting decimated on the ground on the first day of the war may have slowed the Japanese advance and given U.S. and Philippine defenders a little breathing room to get themselves organized.
