Impact of USAAC strike on Formosa, Dec 1941

[Admiral Beez]

MacArthur for some reason left his Air Force on the ground, where it was destroyed.

Battle of the Philippines finds MacArthur unprepared

How is the war impacted if MacArthur launches a strike against the IJAF aircraft awaiting for the fog to clear on Formosa? Presumably the B-17s won't see through the fog.

 

[swampyankee]

MacArthur for some reason left his Air Force on the ground, where it was destroyed.

Battle of the Philippines finds MacArthur unprepared

How is the war impacted if MacArthur launches a strike against the IJAF aircraft awaiting for the fog to clear on Formosa? Presumably the B-17s won't see through the fog.

There would probably be some reallocation of fighter resources to reduce the impact of a second strike, but the more important issue may have been some indication that MacArthur was actually willing to use his air forces for something other than as Japanese bombers' practice targets.

 

[Admiral Beez]

There would probably be some reallocation of fighter resources to reduce the impact of a second strike, but the more important issue may have been some indication that MacArthur was actually willing to, oh, listen to what he was being told about the imminence of a concerted military attack instead of ignoring the possibility.

Why wasn't MacArthur tossed after this screw up? Peacetime commanders with arguably less culpability such as Rear Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short were recalled to Washington and retired.

 

[SaparotRob]

I'm surprised that General MacArthur wasn't tossed for that as well. Perhaps he was politically well connected. That's not my area of expertise.

 

[SaparotRob]

(Like I have one.)

 

[Admiral Beez]

I'm surprised that General MacArthur wasn't tossed for that as well. Perhaps he was politically well connected.

He must have been. After fleeing to Australia he was made commander of all US land forces.

 

[rednev]

Vision down thru fog is often not to bad . lots of landing accidents caused by pilots
thinking vision was good enough to land only to find once they where in it forward vision
was bad
So maybe the bombers can be effective maybe not

 

[SaparotRob]

Vision down thru fog is often not to bad . lots of landing accidents caused by pilots
thinking vision was good enough to land only to find once they where in it forward vision
was bad
So maybe the bombers can be effective maybe not

Definitely better use of equipment than letting these planes be destroyed on the ground.

 

[SaparotRob]

He must have been. After fleeing to Australia he was made commander of all US land forces.

Either I read it or someone mentioned to me years ago that US needed heroes. The General was manufactured to be one.

 

[tyrodtom]

He must have been. After fleeing to Australia he was made commander of all US land forces.

I'm not a MacArthur admirer, but maybe they thought they needed someone with enough seniority and familiar with the local situation to take over immediately.
They didn't have the time to pick the perfect man and get him there.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

Why wasn't MacArthur tossed after this screw up? Peacetime commanders with arguably less culpability such as Rear Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short were recalled to Washington and retired.

MacArthur was retired from US Army, after being Chief of Staff before George Marshal. He was actually employed as advisor to the Phillipine armed forces, though he tended to act like their commander, and the Philipino troops worshipped him. Relations between MacArthur and Marshall (and the rest of the active US Army) could be described as strained at best.
At some point before Pearl Harbor he was called back into US service by FDR, as he was a highly experienced and knowledgeable "Asia hand". I have read of friction between MacArthur and some of the much younger USAAC officers that arrived with the B17s and P40s. There's been speculation that he didn't believe the Japanese on Formosa had the range to reach him, and he didn't want to provoke a visit by an IJN carrier strike force.
MacArthur and FDR went back a long ways (WWI and before), and a heave-ho from Roosevelt wasn't going to happen.

 

[Admiral Beez]

I'm not a MacArthur admirer, but maybe they thought they needed someone with enough seniority and familiar with the local situation to take over immediately.
They didn't have the time to pick the perfect man and get him there.

IDK, isn't anyone who doesn't leave his entire Air Force on the ground to be destroyed hours after Pearl Harbour a better choice, just about anyone?

 

[Admiral Beez]

Definitely better use of equipment than letting these planes be destroyed on the ground.

The fog cleared sufficiently for the IJAF to launch their strike, right about the same time that the B-17s should be overhead.

 

[elbmc1969]

Actually ...

There was no love lost between FDR and MacArthur. FDR saw MacArthur as a potential Republican candidate for president, and MacArthur clearly had ambitions in that direction. (Well, ambition, period.) Keeping MacArthur in the southwest Pacific kept him literally about as far from Washington as possible.

And yes, the press and the government had played up the heroism of the American resistance in the Philippines. Cashiering MacArthur would have caused far too many problems.

MacArthur was retired from US Army, after being Chief of Staff before George Marshal. He was actually employed as advisor to the Phillipine armed forces, though he tended to act like their commander, and the Philipino troops worshipped him. Relations between MacArthur and Marshall (and the rest of the active US Army) could be described as strained at best.
At some point before Pearl Harbor he was called back into US service by FDR, as he was a highly experienced and knowledgeable "Asia hand". I have read of friction between MacArthur and some of the much younger USAAC officers that arrived with the B17s and P40s. There's been speculation that he didn't believe the Japanese on Formosa had the range to reach him, and he didn't want to provoke a visit by an IJN carrier strike force.
MacArthur and FDR went back a long ways (WWI and before), and a heave-ho from Roosevelt wasn't going to happen.

 

[GrauGeist]

First of all, people seem to forget that the FEAF in the Philippines was a small force, not some massive war machine.
It was also comprised of older types and very few pilots of the FEAF had any combat experience. The B-17s would have had to fly to Formosa unescorted through areas covered not only by the IJN, but by the IJA as well. This means A6Ms, A5Ms, KI-43s and so on - many of which were piloted by veterans.
The FEAF strengths on 7 December were:
15 B-18
5 B-17C
22 B-17D
24 P-26
26 P-35A
24 P-40B
65 P-40E
2 O-46A
3 O-49
11 O-52

So we need to be realistic and ask how effective this bomber force would have been both in limited numbers, lack of experience as well as survivability.

The question of the USAAC fighter's effectiveness both in terms of limited numbers and experience versus the Japanese needs to be looked at as well.

 

[Admiral Beez]

First of all, people seem to forget that the FEAF in the Philippines was a small force....we need to be realistic and ask how effective this bomber force would have been both in limited numbers, lack of experience as well as survivability.

The question of the USAAC fighter's effectiveness..versus the Japanese needs to be looked at as well.

So your recommended option is to leave them on the ground to be destroyed on day one? Perhaps instead, if the FEAF is deemed ineffective we should at least consider dispersing the aircraft?

IDK a strike of 35-40 B-17/18 escorted by 70-80 P-40s may have been effective. Certainly more so than what the FEAF did in actuality, which was SFA.

 

[GrauGeist]

The distance between Clark Field and Formosa is 750 miles - which US fighter on hand was going to be able to escort the bombers to their target and back?

I never said leave them on the ground, I asked how effective would they have been in engaging numerically superior and seasoned IJN elements?

 

[Admiral Beez]

With no radar or CAP, and with all the IJAF aircraft in neat rows waiting for the B17s, there is no need for fighter escort all the way. But anyway, the FEAF should have something, anything beyond leaving their aircraft in neat rows awaiting the IJAF strike. With the RAF doing the same in Malaya, is there no one who can properly disperse aircraft?

 

[GrauGeist]

The American aircraft weren't in "neat little rows", they were refueling and preparing to go back up on patrol.
It so happens that timing is everything and the bulk of the aircraft were caught on the ground.
Had the Japanese attacked earlier or later, they would have been contested.

 

[swampyankee]

I'm surprised that General MacArthur wasn't tossed for that as well. Perhaps he was politically well connected. That's not my area of expertise.

I suspect political connections* were certainly part of it (I'm sure he got a lot of cred among parts of the US political establishment for riding down the Bonus Army), but I suspect that he was also respected both for his WW1 service and his peacetime service between the wars.

I don't know what his colleagues thought of MacArthur. It's not inconceivable that Marshall, among others, thought there wasn't a better alternative.