Japan decides upon the IJA “strike north” plan instead of IJN’s “strike south”

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Just what timescale are you proposing here? Here is a map of Japanese expansion in China.

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Note that the moves in southern China start in 1937 and were designed to cut China off from receiving foreign support from outside, principally the USA. The objective was to enforce a blockade to stop vital war supplies reaching the Chinese. When that didn't work, invasion to seize key ports.

1937 - Canton region. From Nov 1937 blockade, followed by occupation in Oct-Dec 1938.
1938 - May. Occupation of Amoy
1939 - Feb. Hainan Island. Also to provide air bases to bomb targets in southern China
1940 - Northern French Indochina. Again to cut off supplies via Haiphong and leaving only the Burma Road route from Rangoon, up the Irrawaddy River and across the mountains.

Politically, one important date was 26 July 1939 and the US abrogation of the US Japan Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1911 as a protest at Japanese actions in China to that point. It took effect 6 months later. It is all downhill after that. This report has a timetable for moves in 1939.

So you are asking Japan to change its entire China strategy from the time that it was suffering defeat at the hands of the USSR during the Nomonhan Incident in May-Sept 1939. Changing that strategy makes China stronger, militarily if not politically. Japan then potentially has to deploy more troops in China.
 
Every knowledge seems to be mixed altogether from the western capitalists viewpoints.
Japan attacked China in July, 1937 simply because Chian Kai-shek had been hostaged by Mao in December, 1936 to be promised to fight Japan.
As Chiang betrayed his friend Japan, Japan had no choice but to fight him. Western support only made the situation complicated.
 
Xi'an Incident in December, 1936
- Historic turning point of the China-Japan relationships

Chiang Kai-shek, leader of the Nationalist government of China, was detained by his subordinate generals Chang Hsüeh-liang (Zhang Xueliang) and Yang Hucheng, in order to force the ruling Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang or KMT) to change its policies regarding the Empire of Japan and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Prior to the incident, Chiang Kai-shek followed a strategy of "first internal pacification, then external resistance" that entailed eliminating the CCP and appeasing Japan to allow time for the modernization of China and its military. After the incident, Chiang aligned with the Communists against the Japanese. However, by the time Chiang arrived in Xi'an on 4 December 1936, negotiations for a united front had been in the works for two years. The crisis ended after two weeks of negotiation, in which Chiang was eventually released and returned to Nanjing, accompanied by Zhang. Chiang agreed to end the ongoing civil war against the CCP and began actively preparing for the impending war with Japan.

 
Prior to the incident, Chiang Kai-shek followed a strategy of "first internal pacification, then external resistance" that entailed eliminating the CCP and appeasing Japan to allow time for the modernization of China and its military.
Imagine the Japanese Empire allied with Nationalist China, first to eliminate the CCP, and then in a move to push out the Europeans from SEA.
 
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Great Battles on the Eastern Front by T.N. Dupuy and Paul Martell. The chapter on the Soviet Campaign in Manchuria. Strength in the Far East is put at 23 rifle, 1 cavalry, 8 tank and 13 air divisions on 22 June 1941. On 1 December 1941 that had changed to 24 rifle, 2 cavalry, 4 tank and 23 air divisions. On 1 July 1942 it was 29 Infantry, 3 Cavalry, 2 tank and 10 air divisions. During this time period (22 June 1941 to 1 July 1942) an additional 17 infantry and 19 tank brigades were added. Personnel is put at 704,000 on 22 June 1941, to 1,343,000 in December 1941 peaking at 1,450,000 in July 1942 and thereafter kept at around 1,100,000 to 1,200,000 until May 1945
Interesting figures. Did the authors mention the sources? I'm curious because the most common opinion among the post-USSR historians was different: RKKA and VVS reduced the number of personnel in the Far East in 1941-1942.
 
Just to mention there was an attempt to discuss this topic from a slightly different perspective.
 
Interesting figures. Did the authors mention the sources? I'm curious because the most common opinion among the post-USSR historians was different: RKKA and VVS reduced the number of personnel in the Far East in 1941-1942.
I only took notes from the book and failed to include any references it had.

The book dates to 1982, which means written a decade before the USSR dissolved, making it part of the original partial opening, for example John Erickson Road to Stalingrad in 1975 then Road to Berlin in 1983, but predating works like those of David Glantz from 1993. Or Soviet casualties and combat losses in the twentieth century Grigori F. Krivosheev (Editor) in 1997 in English.

It seemed to make sense, the numbers swelled as the country mobilised, but definitely dropped in quality as trained troops were moved out, peaked in the summer of 1942, with the possibility of a joint Japan/Germany summer offensive, then dropped away to over 50% more than the June 1941 figure until the 1945 build up with its more modern weapons. The 35 air divisions reported taking part in the 1945 attack, including 6 from the Pacific Fleet and 1 from the North Pacific Fleet, were 10 fighter, 4 mixed, 7 ground attack, 11 bomber, 1 torpedo bomber, 2 transport. There were another 21 independent air regiments.
 

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