Given the engines available, best FAA strike and fighters 1939-1940?

[SaparotRob]

I guess the PBYs were lined up that way to maximize wind flow over the wings during launch.

 

[nuuumannn]

If you are going to foot stamp and name call, you can go on ignore.

Ignore me, then. If you are going to continue to spout unjustifiable statements lacking in truth, I'm going to call you out. This appears to be what you do, Macandy; you say objectionable things that are far from the truth, which is then contested by all and sundry. It happens all the time. There's another thread running at the moment where you've done exactly the same thing.

In the name of good faith, I'll remove the name-calling from my post and offer an apology.

 

[nuuumannn]

It was laughable bad - even more laughable the 'best' replacement Fairy could come up with was the even more awful Albacore, another Biplane - replaced in service by the Swordfish.

Again, more rhetoric with nothing supporting it, despite obvious evidence to the contrary; and you want to ignore me? I'd suggest everyone ignore you

And the Americans were quite capable of carrying out night attacks…

"Yup, cos we got stealth an' nukuluurrr carriers 'n stuff..." Your posts are almost a parody.

 

[nuuumannn]

Yes, the Fairly Fulmar was fairly useless, but Ark Royal carried enough to at least defend against attacks.

So, it wasn't fairly useless, then if Ark had enough to defend against attack. The Fulmar was designed as a long-range catapultable reconnaissance fighter designed to tackle long-range land-based reconnaissance aircraft and bombers bent on taking out British ships far out to sea beyond the range of enemy single-seat fighters. I'd say it was pretty good at what it did. Royal Navy pilots became aces on the Fulmar against single-seaters in the MTO, so it held its own in the right hands.

The problem, the absolute problem with British naval aircraft, was the lamentable designs largely drove doctrine,

Actually, that is simply not true at all. Again, Macandy, you should just step away from the keyboard because this is rubbish and betrays your lack of knowledge.

As has been posted repeatedly in threads about the FAA and British aircraft in general and is easy to find out with a little google search, the aircraft specifications were issued by the Air Ministry, with admiralty input, then they were issued to the manufacturers, who offered tenders, and the tender that matched the specification gained a production order. So, no, the manufacturers DID NOT drive doctrine.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

One is reminded of that bon mot of 'intelligence' fed by there Admiralty to the British Fleet operating off Cylon in 1942 - sagely advising the Admiral to engage the Japanese in night actions as 'the Japanese have poor eyesight and can't see in the dark' - Might not have ended well, see the disaster that befell the USN when it assumed it too owned the night off Savo Island - and was shot to pieces by the Japanese who had superb night optics.

As for IJN pilots 'not being able to see in the dark'? Actually, ALL IJN pilots were selected for visual acuity and night vision - it was one of the reasons they were training so few pilots, they set the bar so high.

Nothing Rob wrote had anything to say about the fables the Allies told themselves about Oriental vision.

But, he did mention that Swordfish carried radar, which kinda addresses that problem in its own way, and which you entirely avoided.

Swordfish attacking the IJN off Midway? If only it wasn't a nice moonlit night and perfect conditions for A6M's to hunt such vulnerable prey.
Hint, the Swordfish was hastily withdrawn from East of Suez, every time it came upon the Japanese, it was shot down at will by the vastly superior Japanese fighters.

Which instances might you tell us of Swordfish attacking Japanese warships? Please be specific.

And the Americans were quite capable of carrying out night attacks…

"...Before the B-17's returned, a flight of four PBY-5A's, each carrying one MK XIII Mod. I torpedo took off on an historic mission, "the first night torpedo attack by our patrol planes on surface ships." The pilots were volunteers, led by Lt. William L. Richards, Executive Officer of Patrol Squadron FORTY-FOUR. The flight commander's orders were to locate the enemy force sighted that morning on bearing 261° from Midway, deliver a torpedo attack and return to base. Priority of targets was aircraft carriers, battleships, transports. The exact composition of the enemy force was unknown, but it was believed to include a carrier. The B-17's had not yet returned and details of their attack were not known.
The flight left Midway at 2115 on June 3d. The weather was clear, with broken cumulus clouds at 1,000 feet. Some hours later (about 2400 and 0100) the third and fourth planes were lost from the formation in passing through cloud banks, but one of them succeeded in finding the target alone.
At about 0115 on June 4th, radar indicated a group of about 10 ships 10 or 12 miles to the port of this group. As our planes approached, the silhouettes of the enemy ships became visible in the moonlight. There were 10 or more large ones in 2 columns, escorted by 6 destroyers. It was probably the same force the B-17's had attacked several hours before, now only about 500 miles from Midway. Our planes approached without lights from down moon, engines throttled back. The target selected was the largest ship, which was leading the northern column. It had been thought that this might be a carrier, but on the approach it was identified as a transport. The planes glided down to 100 feet and the leader dropped his torpedo at 800 yards, then climbed in a turn over the target. It was thought that an explosion followed. Lt. (j. g.) Daniel C. Davis in the second plane was not satisfied with his approach and withdrew for a second. He dropped his torpedo at 200 yards, but no results were observed. As he opened his throttle to pass over the target, he strafed the ship with .50-calibre machine-gun fire, while the leading ships opened fire on him. Subsequent information indicated that this strafing attack caused several enemy casualties.'

Battle of Midway: 3-6 June 1942 Combat Narrative

Copy No. 286 Combat Narratives Battle of Midway June 3-6, 1942 U.S. Confidential ** British Secret [declassified] Office of Naval Intelligence U.S. Navy

www.history.navy.mil

Americans indeed used PBY5s for night patrol and attack, especially once the campaign in the Solomons heated up. They certainly achieved nothing like the offensive British success at Taranto.

 

[Shortround6]

So, it wasn't fairly useless, then if Ark had enough to defend against attack. The Fulmar was designed as a long-range catapultable reconnaissance fighter designed to tackle long-range land-based reconnaissance aircraft and bombers bent on taking out British ships far out to sea beyond the range of enemy single-seat fighters. I'd say it was pretty good at what it did. Royal Navy pilots became aces on the Fulmar against single-seaters in the MTO, so it held its own in the right hands.

agreeing here.
And that is pretty much the heart of the Fulmar Doctrine, if we can call it that. The Italians didn't have any torpedo bombers when the Fulmar went into service and the Germans were using the He 115(?) or He 59 biplane. There were no He 111s with torpedoes. The German had level bombers with bombs. The Italians had level bombers with bombs. The Fulmar carried double the amount of ammo as the RAF short ranged interceptors so the Fulmar could (if the pilots were good) perform several intercepts before having to land for more ammo.

Actually, that is simply not true at all. Again, Macandy, you should just step away from the keyboard because this is rubbish and betrays your lack of knowledge.

As has been posted repeatedly in threads about the FAA and British aircraft in general, the aircraft specifications were issued by the Air Ministry, with admiralty input, then they were issued to the manufacturers, who offered tenders, and the tender that matched the specification gained a production order. So, no, the manufacturers DID NOT drive doctrine.

Just like the Americans and the Germans and the Japanese and the French and the Italians and the Russians (Unless you were Stalin's buddy) if a British manufacturer did not meet the goals (or at least come close) the of Air Ministry put out, they weren't going to place a production contract. If you want to stay in business you try to provide what the customer wants.

Now there were screw ups with the Air ministry dictating what engine could or could not be used but that more common than the manufacturer picking the powerplant.

 

[nuuumannn]

Now there were screw ups with the Air ministry dictating what engine could or could not be used but that more common than the manufacturer picking the powerplant.

Agree, the Air Ministry suffered a fair few screw-ups, particularly when it came to the FAA. Again, as mentioned, the insistence of co-sharing role responsibilities in one aircraft worked when simpler biplanes inhabited carrier decks, but to do it to modern aircraft with tasks that required complex role-specific equipment owing to technology changes is a mistake waiting to happen. The Barracuda is a classic example. Sure, the Barra's issues were the fault of the manufacturer, but these were driven by this desire to produce one airframe that could dive-bomb, drop torpedoes and serve as a recon platform. Dive bombers don't need to be big, torpedoplanes do need to be big and stalky, and fitting a smoker's lounge under the wing for the observer/navigator made the thing unnecessarily bulky. Its aerodynamic issues delayed the aircraft into service and delay was really not what the FAA needed with its entry into WW2 with its motley collection of aircraft, some of which with one foot in the past and gaps in capability.

 

[Shortround6]

Blackburn didn't want to use the Perseus in the Botha, they were told to use it.
The Taurus was specified for a number of projects but it wasn't working properly (or couldn't be made fast enough or a combination).

Something else for people to remember is that in 1938-39 87 octane was the fuel of the day, They knew 100 octane was coming but they didn't know when, how much was coming or even what the exact level of performance would be. Fedden was big proponent of 100 octane but the Bristol engines had more trouble with it than RR did. Air cooled engine can make more power with 100 octane than the cooling fins can deal with and using a lot more boost in an engine with 7or 9 pistons acting on one crankshaft throw is tougher than only two pistons acting on a single crankthrow (even if there are more throws per crankshaft).

The Americans and Japanese used both dive bombers and torpedo bombers as recon aircraft, and the US even added torpedo dropping to the SB2C- although it had a 1700hp engine.
But ut mostly they were two role aircraft as designed, not three. A lot of planes got roped into doing 3 roles after being designed but usually were not quite what the user wanted but rather what they would put up with

 

[nuuumannn]

Blackburn didn't want to use the Perseus in the Botha, they were told to use it.

Perhaps sensibly. Then it's up to the designer to make sure the aircraft can do what it's supposed to with the given power output. In hindsight we know how that worked out for Blackburn and the Bothersome Botha.

The Americans and Japanese used both dive bombers and torpedo bombers as recon aircraft, and the US even added torpedo dropping to the SB2C- although it had a 1700hp engine.
But ut mostly they were two role aircraft as designed, not three. A lot of planes got roped into doing 3 roles after being designed but usually were not quite what the user wanted but rather what they would put up with

Yes, but the way the British applied the requirement differed simply because of the equipment fit. If a large space was allocated for the nav/observer within the fuselage to sit, with DF and comms radios being the size they were, plus a table for charts and so forth and with adequate windows added so he can see out to take photos and so forth, then the Japanese and US torpedo aircraft would have been considerable larger and more complicated than they were. Although a sizeable aircraft, the Grumman Avenger got it right, simply speaking. No question about it, but it wasn't encumbered with the dive bomber requirement, which might have turned it into a complete pig.

 

[EwenS]

As I've pointed out before on other threads, the FAA developed different torpedo dropping tactics. No long straight in approach. Instead they involved an approach at medium altitude, followed by a steep dive to close to sea level near the target vessel, aim and drop the torpedo & then escape. Couple that with the formation breaking into flights to attack the vessel from different angles. The object of this was to make the job of the AA gunners on the ship that much more difficult as they would be chasing a target with quickly changing altitudes and angles of attack. And with multiple attack directions hopefully fewer routes of escape.

But that means you need a stronger aircraft as your torpedo bomber, more akin to a dive bomber. At that point combining the two roles begins to make sense, especially when aircraft numbers are limited. Bomb loads and torpedo weights were similar - 1,500-1650lbs.

 

[nuuumannn]

As I've pointed out before on other threads, the FAA developed different torpedo dropping tactics. No long straight in approach. Instead they involved an approach at medium altitude, followed by a steep dive to close to sea level near the target vessel, aim and drop the torpedo & then escape. Couple that with the formation breaking into flights to attack the vessel from different angles. The object of this was to make the job of the AA gunners on the ship that much more difficult as they would be chasing a target with quickly changing altitudes and angles of attack. And with multiple attack directions hopefully fewer routes of escape.

But that means you need a stronger aircraft as your torpedo bomber, more akin to a dive bomber. At that point combining the two roles begins to make sense, especially when aircraft numbers are limited. Bomb loads and torpedo weights were similar - 1,500-1650lbs.

It's not about weight and load carrying capability, it's about structural strengthening and the complexity required for dive bombers, as opposed to the structural necessities of a torpedo aircraft. Tall undercarriage, with sufficient space under the fuselage, or in an under-floor bay to accommodate a device around 20 feet long. That makes the aircraft big, which, as I've mentioned here, a dive bomber doesn't need to be; it might be able to carry an equivalent load weight, but its bomb is very highly unlikely to be around 20 feet long. The SBD comparison to the Skua I posted above is evidence of this. The dive bomber requires structural strengthening to withstand the forces impacting the aircraft in the dive and pull-out, which a torpedo aircraft simply doesn't need. Take a look at the Barracuda's flap/dive brake and undercarriage arrangement and compare with that of the Dauntless. Sure, that is entirely how the manufacturer decides, but the Barra's size is a factor in its configuration.

 

[Shortround6]

There is a big difference in the pullout.
As the angle goes up over 60 degrees things get a lot harder,.

Force goes up with the square of the speed.

 

[nuuumannn]

At that point combining the two roles begins to make sense, especially when aircraft numbers are limited.

I fully understand why the decision to do this uniformly across carrier aircraft, and that to a degree makes sense when dealing with biplanes that you simply couldn't put into a 60 plus degree dive carrying 1,000 lb or more load. In hindsight, and purely in hindsight, the decision to combine roles was not a practicable one, even if it might have appeared sensible at the time. It might have stayed that way too, if it weren't for the necessities of the coming war, which, granted, back in the early 1930s the Air Ministry certainly couldn't foresee.

The problem was that the inadequacies of this decision became all too apparent because of this war and even beforehand. As mentioned (lots of times!) before, the admiralty questioned the wisdom of not having a modern single-seat fighter specification before the fighter/dive bomber Skua entered service in 1937, which presages the fact that once war became a reality, the shortfall in capability was plainly evident. We also know the efforts the admiralty went to, to get a decent single-seat fighter before and after it took control of the FAA in 1939. Also, the trouble with the Barracuda was clear evidence that it was too big and too complicated for its own good. Marcel Lobelle could design good, useful aeroplanes, but the combination of requirements made it a bit of a mess and it's not surprising it was not his best work.

Overall, the decision to combine disparate roles in one aircraft, regardless of the practicalities of doing so, was the single most important factor that led to the lack of capability within the FAA in the early years of the war.

 

[Admiral Beez]

The Swordfish was a brilliant design. British aircraft manufacturers did NOT set out to design ridiculous airplanes and HM's government could take it or leave it. The Air Ministry (or whoever) issued specifications for what it felt were required for an aircraft. Given the parameters specified, that's what the tech and industry of the time could produce to meet those parameters.

AIUI, the Swordfish wasn't built to any Air Ministry or FAA formal Specification. It was an unsolicited proposal by Fairey.

 

[nuuumannn]

AIUI, the Swordfish wasn't built to any Air Ministry or FAA formal Specification. It was an unsolicited proposal by Fairey.

Yes and no. It's complex and involves two previous specifications issued by the Air Ministry, to which Fairey hoped to offer the TSR.I, but the TSR.II (Swordfish prototype), also a private venture was offered by the manufacturer to meet S.15/33, which added torpedo dropper to the previous specs that the TSR.I was offered to. Obviously, though, the Air Ministry wrote Specification 38/34 to cover the requirement for the Swordfish.

 

[Shortround6]

The Devastator used a 900hp T-O engine.
The Avenger used a 1700hp engine in it's first prototype, first flight Aug 7th 1941, with two speed supercharger. You can do a lot with that kind of power.
The Americans had also used the torpedo bombers as level bombers and as scouts/recon. As level bombers one of the crewmen used a bomb sight down through the floor.
Avengers even got Nordon bombsights.
The Devastator could carry a single 1000lbs bomb (they didn't have anything larger at the time) and the dive bombers only carried a 500lb bomb until the Dauntless and the last version of the Helldiver Biplane.

The Americans used the dive bombers as scouts and kept the fighters as single role aircraft?( two 100-116lbs bombs are not ship killers)

I have mentioned it before, the Americans, in general, right before the war, had slightly faster carriers with bigger decks, which may have affected design requirements.

I don't know if the British were trying to keep their newer planes capable of operating off the old carriers or not. Or if it had any bearing on requirements.

 

[nuuumannn]

I don't know if the British were trying to keep their newer planes capable of operating off the old carriers or not.

That was pretty much what drove the decision to put disparate requirements into the same aircraft. British carrier deck space available.

 

[nuuumannn]

The Americans had also used the torpedo bombers as level bombers and as scouts/recon. As level bombers one of the crewmen used a bomb sight down through the floor.
Avengers even got Nordon bombsights.
The Devastator could carry a single 1000lbs bomb (they didn't have anything larger at the time) and the dive bombers only carried a 500lb bomb until the Dauntless and the last version of the Helldiver Biplane.

It kinda' makes sense because there's not much far-removed performance or equipment wise between level bomber and torpedo bomber, or dive bomber. It's like using the Swordfish torpedo bomber to fire rockets at and drop depth charges around U boats. From 1941 onwards, Swordfish began to relinquish the torpedo carrier role and saw increasing service in the strictly anti-submarine role, in which it continued until the end of the war. These tasks could be done with the same airframe without sacrificing structural strength and equipment necessary for one role but not for another. Torpedo bombers and dive bombers don't mix. Fighters and dive bombers don't mix. Far too disparate structural, manoeuvrability, and equipment requirements between the roles.

 

[Shortround6]

That was pretty much what drove the decision to put disparate requirements into the same aircraft. British carrier deck space available.

I was thinking more about the Eagle and the Hermes.
Argus was pretty much a training ship if she was in commission at all in the 1930s.
The Eagle and Hermes were 5-6 kts slower and had shorter decks. I don't know if at some point they just wrote them off (even if just in their own minds) when they figuring out the landing speeds and flight deck requirements for the new aircraft.

 

[EwenS]

That was pretty much what drove the decision to put disparate requirements into the same aircraft. British carrier deck space available.

Not flight deck space as in the USN, but hangar deck space.