Given the engines available, best FAA strike and fighters 1939-1940?

[Admiral Beez]

For the US that rather skips over the Vindicator, the Northrop BT-1 (not the best idea) and the SBD.

Give the dope-covered Vindicator the SBD's all metal construction and the fixed wing SBD the Vindicator's folding wings and we've then matched the Skua's spec.

Not that the Skua was a great execution, but it shows that with its all-metal construction, folding wings and retractable undercarriage in 1935-37 some folks in the Air Ministry, FAA and at the British aeronautical firms had some sense of forward thinking. That same thinking applied to a torpedo bomber and single seat fighter might have put forth some interesting and competitive designs.

 

[Macandy]

Part of the British problem in the 1930s was that they didn't have carriers capable of holding the aircraft that would make this "No one every gave the slightest intellectual thought to, 'maybe we should send up dozens of fighters and shoot them down'." You want three dozen fighters? you need the Courageous, Furious and Glorious all operating together.

Well yes, but they did actually stumble upon the 'right' design by accident, them promptly failed to notice and charged off up the armoured carrier dead end.

HMS Ark Royal, two hangers, little armour, LOTS of aircraft - it was in the same mould that the USN's Fleet Problems had defined as the ideal Fleet Carrier.

Yes, the Fairly Fulmar was fairly useless, but Ark Royal carried enough to at least defend against attacks.

 

[Macandy]

Agreed, and that needs to change. We need a revolutionary figure in the Air Ministry and FAA to see opportunities for improvement. And it's not impossible. For example, look at the Blackburn Skua, the first ever all metal, folding wing, retractable undercarriage divebomber. When it entered service in 1937 the IJN's dive bomber was the Aichi D1A and the USN's the SBC. The USN and IJN wouldn't match the Skua's spec until the SB2C Helldiver and Yokosuka D4Y both entered service in 1942, a year after the Skua retired and five years after its first flight. Even the French beat them to a Skua-like spec with the ultimately terrible, but innovative Loire-Nieuport LN.401 dive bomber.

Now like the LN.401, the Skua DB/fighter was ultimately a flawed design, but it shows that as far back as 1936 or earlier (Spec was 1934) someone in the Air Ministry and FAA saw the potential in an all metal, folding wing, monoplane, retractable undercarriage aircraft. This was leading edge, revolutionary thinking for carrier aircraft at the time. Put that same thinking and specifications into separate torpedo bomber and single seat fighter designs and we have the potential for revolutionary improvement in the FAA.

The problem, the absolute problem with British naval aircraft, was the lamentable designs largely drove doctrine, unlike the USN and IJN were doctrine drove the designs.
No one in the Air Ministry in the late 30's gave even the slightest though to something like the F4U Corsair - a 400MPH monoplane naval fighter? Madness!
But that's the issue, the USN may have had some less than stellar designs in the 30's, but it had developed the doctrine, and had now let very visionary requirements to industry that were the future.

SBD Dauntless - 1937
F4U Corsair - 1938
TBF Avenger - 1939

The much maligned TBD Devastator was a direct contemporary of the laughably obsolete Swordfish, the FAA never developed a naval fighter even vaguely comparable to the F4 Wildcat, and the much later and utterly awful Barracuda wasn't a patch on the old SBD Dauntless - which, despite sinking half the Japanese Navy, was rejected by the British as 'unfit for service'!!!!.

Interestingly, the French Aeronavale had ordered both the F-4F Wildcat and SBD Dauntless prior to the fall of France.

 

[Admiral Beez]

The problem, the absolute problem with British naval aircraft, was the lamentable designs largely drove doctrine...

That's kind of what I'm getting at in my opening post. Given the engines available, what's the best possible for FAA strike and fighters 1939-1940?

If a 230 mph, folding wing torpedo bomber akin to the B5N is available, I expect the FAA and RN might change their doctrine.

 

[Shortround6]

No one in the Air Ministry in the late 30's gave even the slightest though to something like the F4U Corsair - a 400MPH monoplane naval fighter? Madness!

That's kind of what I'm getting at in my opening post. Given the engines available, what's the best possible for FAA strike and fighters 1939-1940?

If a 230 mph, folding wing torpedo bomber akin to the B5N is available, I expect the FAA and RN might change their doctrine.

given-the-engines-available-best-faa-strike-and-fighters-1939-1940.

"When the prototype was completed it had the biggest and most powerful engine, largest propeller, and probably the largest wing on any naval fighter to date.[15] The first flight of the XF4U-1 was made on 29 May 1940,"

The FAA did envision something like the F4U, and did it in 1938. Several problems came up including changes in specification (and doctrine, they were still entangled with the turret fighter concept) and the Desired engines either got put on hold and/or suffered development problems. The Griffon was put on hold and then on the back burner. The Sabre was put on life support in intensive care, jury is still out on that one, Any drawings of Centaurus machines had to put on hold for years.
The US got lucky and had Wright R-2600 engines 1-2 years before the Hercules really got up to snuff. And P & W was breathing down their necks.
Granted the R-2800 in the XF4U was a development engine (1800hp ?) and needed some sorting out but it had a two stage supercharger. P & W had time to develop the engine while tooling up making hundreds/thousands of single stage engines.

For 1939-40 the FAA was between a rock and hard place. The existing engines were too small and/or undeveloped/experimental.
It was left to the Merlin to handle the load. And in 1939-40 that meant trying to figure out if you could use 100 octane fuel or if you were stuck with 87 octane.

Another question is how much the monoplane torpedo bombers were really going to change doctrine. If the torpedoes were unchanged and needed to be dropped at 100kts or under and had to be dropped from 80 ft or under you can't change the attack profile or tactics/ doctrine. Cruise out to the target area at 160-180 knots instead of 120kts, drop down to attack height while slowing down to under kts or under with both planes. Fly in straight and level, then try to evade gun fire/fighters while at nearly sea level at about twice stalling speed after the torpedo drops while you either try to gain altitude or try to increase speed while twisting and turning and staying at low level and trying not to stall.

About the only change in doctrine was that the monoplanes had more range and bit higher cruise speed.

 

[Juha3]

...The much maligned TBD Devastator was a direct contemporary of the laughably obsolete Swordfish, the FAA never developed a naval fighter even vaguely comparable to the F4 Wildcat, and the much later and utterly awful Barracuda wasn't a patch on the old SBD Dauntless - which, despite sinking half the Japanese Navy, was rejected by the British as 'unfit for service'!!!!....

Now maybe the Italians at Taranto and the crew of Bismarck did not see Swordfishes very funny.

And maybe the fact that the fixed wing SBD did not fit the elevators of the newer RN carriers (at least those of Ark Royal and the armoured deck carriers) had something to do with the rejection of it.

 

[tomo pauk]

The US got lucky and had Wright R-2600 engines 1-2 years before the Hercules really got up to snuff. And P & W was breathing down their necks.

Beaufighter made it in service by August 1940. That is at least half a year before A-20 powered by R-2600-11 entered service.

 

[Shortround6]

Beaufighter made it in service by August 1940. That is at least half a year before A-20 powered by R-2600-11 entered service.

The Boeing 314 Flying boat first flew in June 1938. Commercial flying from San Francisco to Hong Kong started March of 1939. With 1500hp versions.
Wright built 164 R-2600-3s between April 1939 and Feb 1940, in part for the B-23 bombers. 1600hp T-O engines with two speed superchargers.
The first B-23 flew on July 27, 1939 with the production series of 38 B-23s manufactured between July 1939 and September 1940.
Martin PBM-1s entered service in Sept 1940 with Patrol Squadron 55 with R-2600-6 engines

You have a number of A-20 variants (or prototypes ?) planed with R-2600-7 engines. This was the Turbo R-2600 that did fail spectacularly enough that all the A-20s (and P-70s and..............) were built/competed as something else using different model engines.

DB-7As had Wright R-2600-A5B (commercial engine designation)
DB-7Bs had Wright R-2600-A5B
DB-73s had Wright R-2600-A5B
A-20As had Wright R-2600-3 Double Cyclones (most of them)
Then the R-2600-11 show up.


The Hercules engines in the early Beaufighters (and other planes) were 1375-1400hp versions.
The 1600hp (roughly) MK VI engines don't show up until 1941-42.
By which time the R-2600 is making 1700hp and has been in at least 3 different versions since April of 1941.

The R-2600 gave the US designers a reliable and available 1600hp engine (it might have gone the other way ?) in 1938-41 to design planes around.
The hoped for 1500hp Hercules didn't show up when promised. The Hercules became a great engine but in 1939-40 it was troubled and demand for it meant that only certain planes of high priority were going to get it. Production did expand.

 

[Admiral Beez]

And maybe the fact that the fixed wing SBD did not fit the elevators of the newer RN carriers (at least those of Ark Royal and the armoured deck carriers) had something to do with the rejection of it.

Had HMS Glorious and Courageous survived into late 1940 they would have been ideal for any SBDs procured by the FAA. If the RN and FAA had a different doctrine based on more powerful aircraft presumably in greater number we might not have seen either of these carriers deployed and lost as they were.

 

[Juha3]

Bigger air group would have not helped either. Maybe with planes with longer loiter time Courageus would not have turned into wind on just wrong moment. But if the RN had not use its big carriers in A/S work with a small escort force at the beginning of the war, Courageous might well have survived into late 1940, but why order planes which your newer carriers could not use. HMS Courageous had 4 DDs as escort but 2 of them had been sent away to help a merchant vessel when the U-boat (U-29?) strike.

On the Glorious case, a sane captain was what was needed. There was no combat air patrol or even one Swordfish flying A/S patrol, no aircraft were ready on the deck for quick take-off and there was not even lookout in Glorious's crow's nest. It does not matter what kind of planes you have or how many, it they all were in the hangar.

 

[Shortround6]

. Maybe with planes with longer loiter time Courageus would not have turned into wind on just wrong moment.

Problem was the tactic/s.

They didn't launch staggered patrols. All planes (that were suppose to launch) launched at the same time and then all planes would land at the same time and after refueling/servicing all available planes would re-launch. Which kept then number of times the carrier had to turn into the wind to a minimum but it meant no air patrols for over an hour (?) while the planes were being serviced. For some reason they had not figured out that planes had to be kept in the air whenever there was daylight and it was possible to fly. Launch 1/2 the planes, wait 1-2 hours, launch the 2nd 1/2, when first group needs to land, take them aboard, refuel and relaunch before taking the 2nd group on board, adjust as needed for the required refueling time.

 

[nuuumannn]

Oh dear...

This doctrine saw the laughably bad Swordfish brought into service, hopelessly obsolete before it even entered FAA service

Actually it wasn't. The Swordfish entered service in 1936, what else was in service round the world? The Martin BM in US Navy service, the Mitsubishi B2M in IJN service, all welded steel fabric covered biplanes with similar performance and capability to the Swordfish, so....

A perfect example of the deranged British naval view of aircraft interwar? Look at the Blackburn Balckburn, a plane so bad, they named it twice!

Again, sweeping incoherent statements. The Blackburn was indeed a bit of an ugly beast alright, the Avro Bison to the same requirement for an observation airframe, but you're hanging the FAA out to dry on this? Come now... The Fairey Flycatcher, Hawker Osprey, Fairey IIIF, Blackburn Ripon and Baffin for example were equal to and better than their global naval aviation contemporaries.

Indeed, but the whole culture was utterly toxic to naval aviation.

No it wasn't utterly toxic, again an enormous dramatisation of the situation you are demonstrating a complete lack of knowledge of. So much so that indulging your statements is simply laughable.

But, you are right, Macandy in saying the FAA's Air Ministry driven doctrine required changing. The thing about doing so was that there was not the perceived need to do so in the early 1930s, precisely when it should have happened. Britain had suffered far greater than either Japan and the USA, both big carrier nations between the wars, during the Great War and armaments was simply not something the British government saw fit to throw large sums of money at. Peacetime is the great leveller when it comes to pre-WW2 military aviation. Britain simply did not have the funding nor the desire to improve on what it had in service or for the immediate future. Now, the biggest fallout from this was the decision not to develop a modern single-seater, but in terms of torpedo and attack aircraft, the FAA is in good hands. Seriously. The problem is the persistent need to combine roles within existing aircraft that went on from when the RAF took over from the RNAS and created the Fleet Air Arm. The Skua, Fulmar and Barracuda are pertinent examples of this, which during the age of biplanes with open cockpits and fixed gear, that role sharing policy is okay, as the Hawker Osprey reconnaissance bomber was almost as fast as contemporary carrier-based fighters, but in the age of all-metal monoplanes with sophisticated role specific requirements? Not smart.

The Swordfish was a good aeroplane. Easy to maintain, easy to manufacture, easy to fly. Most suitable for military service and its versatility served it well; it outlived its contemporaries and its intended replacement and saw exceptional service during the war, racking up the highest tonnage of enemy vessels sunk of any aircraft in the ETO/MTO. In the Apple Core as a replacement, yup, it had all the modern accoutrements of a modern aeroplane, all metal construction, enclosed cockpit, landing flaps, but some of the hang-overs of its predecessor in a biplane layout with fixed undercarriage. These offered their own advantages in service in terms of ease of repair and less complication, but indeed, there is no reason the Albacore could not have been a monoplane. It was designed and pressed into service in a hurry though, so it would have been late to the table...

The problem we have with the FAA is that in hindsight it is too easy to criticise. It has a big fat target on it, but let's not get our wires crossed as to what is worthy of criticism and what isn't. The FAA was equal in technology to its foreign contemporaries to a point throughout the 1930s. We know for a fact that the Admirals wanted more modern aircraft on their carriers, we know that even the Air Ministry regarded the Blackburn Skua, a contemporary of the TBD Devastator, the first modern monoplane on US Navy carrier decks as being obsolescent before it entered service (the same year as the TBD), especially since high level discussions were carried out within the admiralty decrying the lack of an advanced fighter like the Spitfire or Hurricane in 1937, so the direction, but not necessarily the technology the FAA was set on since the early 30s most certainly left a lot to be desired.

 

[SaparotRob]

The Swordfish was a brilliant design. British aircraft manufacturers did NOT set out to design ridiculous airplanes and HM's government could take it or leave it. The Air Ministry (or whoever) issued specifications for what it felt were required for an aircraft. Given the parameters specified, that's what the tech and industry of the time could produce to meet those parameters. I checked out the performance of the TBD and the Swordfish a while ago. Close enough. Neither plane puts up really eye catching numbers. The Swordfish, however, could take off and land on shorter flight decks and I'm guessing at lower speeds too. The Swordfish carried and operated radar. It could and did strike at night. The Admiral had brought up an intriguing "what if" about an RN carrier at the battle of Midway launching a night strike. It would be a couple of years until the USN carried out night operations deliberately. The Swordfish was a modern plane built to an obsolete spec.
Plus what nuuumannn said.

 

[nuuumannn]

If we go into this into any depth, we've covered a lot of this stuff before. The answer to the FAA's early WW2 fighter requirement can be covered in two ways; either develop the Spitfire and/or Hurricane for naval service, as was discussed by the Admiralty in the years before WW2, or come up with a new design altogether. As for attack aircraft, same thing. Basing a new strike aircraft on the Hawker Hotspur would be a pertinent decision, given its good performance, although its load carrying ability requires modification, or again producing a totally new design. The suggestion that has been done to death in other threads regarding refining the Skua simply won't provide the aircraft that is required. A total redesign is needed as it is too big for what it's needed for, which again, we've been over before. The Skua was big compared to the SBD Dauntless, whose performance was better than the Skua; (figures from wiki) Skua has 35 ft 7-in length, 46 ft 2-in span and 319 sq ft wing area versus SBD's 33 ft 1.25-in length, 41 ft 6-in span with a bigger wing area at 325 sq ft.

 

[Macandy]

The Swordfish was a brilliant design. British aircraft manufacturers did NOT set out to design ridiculous airplanes and HM's government could take it or leave it. The Air Ministry (or whoever) issued specifications for what it felt were required for an aircraft. Given the parameters specified, that's what the tech and industry of the time could produce to meet those parameters. I checked out the performance of the TBD and the Swordfish a while ago. Close enough. Neither plane puts up really eye catching numbers. The Swordfish, however, could take off and land on shorter flight decks and I'm guessing at lower speeds too. The Swordfish carried and operated radar. It could and did strike at night. The Admiral had brought up an intriguing "what if" about an RN carrier at the battle of Midway launching a night strike. It would be a couple of years until the USN carried out night operations deliberately. The Swordfish was a modern plane built to an obsolete spec.
Plus what said.

The Swordfish would have been a 'brilliant design' in 1918, but when service, its performance was so poor, it was utterly unable to operate in any contested airspace - It was so slow and poorly armed, a WWI Biplane fighter would have been a deadly adversary.
It was laughable bad - even more laughable the 'best' replacement Fairy could come up with was the even more awful Albacore, another Biplane - replaced in service by the Swordfish. The FAA were quite literally catapulted forward two generations when they received their first TBM Avengers!

Ah yes, the old' but the Swordfish could operate at night, it could have sunk the Japanese fleet!' canard.

One is reminded of that bon mot of 'intelligence' fed by there Admiralty to the British Fleet operating off Cylon in 1942 - sagely advising the Admiral to engage the Japanese in night actions as 'the Japanese have poor eyesight and can't see in the dark' - Might not have ended well, see the disaster that befell the USN when it assumed it too owned the night off Savo Island - and was shot to pieces by the Japanese who had superb night optics.

As for IJN pilots 'not being able to see in the dark'? Actually, ALL IJN pilots were selected for visual acuity and night vision - it was one of the reasons they were training so few pilots, they set the bar so high.

Swordfish attacking the IJN off Midway? If only it wasn't a nice moonlit night and perfect conditions for A6M's to hunt such vulnerable prey.
Hint, the Swordfish was hastily withdrawn from East of Suez, every time it came upon the Japanese, it was shot down at will by the vastly superior Japanese fighters.

And the Americans were quite capable of carrying out night attacks…

"...Before the B-17's returned, a flight of four PBY-5A's, each carrying one MK XIII Mod. I torpedo took off on an historic mission, "the first night torpedo attack by our patrol planes on surface ships." The pilots were volunteers, led by Lt. William L. Richards, Executive Officer of Patrol Squadron FORTY-FOUR. The flight commander's orders were to locate the enemy force sighted that morning on bearing 261° from Midway, deliver a torpedo attack and return to base. Priority of targets was aircraft carriers, battleships, transports. The exact composition of the enemy force was unknown, but it was believed to include a carrier. The B-17's had not yet returned and details of their attack were not known.
The flight left Midway at 2115 on June 3d. The weather was clear, with broken cumulus clouds at 1,000 feet. Some hours later (about 2400 and 0100) the third and fourth planes were lost from the formation in passing through cloud banks, but one of them succeeded in finding the target alone.
At about 0115 on June 4th, radar indicated a group of about 10 ships 10 or 12 miles to the port of this group. As our planes approached, the silhouettes of the enemy ships became visible in the moonlight. There were 10 or more large ones in 2 columns, escorted by 6 destroyers. It was probably the same force the B-17's had attacked several hours before, now only about 500 miles from Midway. Our planes approached without lights from down moon, engines throttled back. The target selected was the largest ship, which was leading the northern column. It had been thought that this might be a carrier, but on the approach it was identified as a transport. The planes glided down to 100 feet and the leader dropped his torpedo at 800 yards, then climbed in a turn over the target. It was thought that an explosion followed. Lt. (j. g.) Daniel C. Davis in the second plane was not satisfied with his approach and withdrew for a second. He dropped his torpedo at 200 yards, but no results were observed. As he opened his throttle to pass over the target, he strafed the ship with .50-calibre machine-gun fire, while the leading ships opened fire on him. Subsequent information indicated that this strafing attack caused several enemy casualties.'

Battle of Midway: 3-6 June 1942 Combat Narrative

Copy No. 286 Combat Narratives Battle of Midway June 3-6, 1942 U.S. Confidential ** British Secret [declassified] Office of Naval Intelligence U.S. Navy

www.history.navy.mil

 

[Macandy]

Oh dear, the laughable rhetoric-spouting machine that is Macandy is on form here...



Actually it wasn't. The Swordfish entered service in 1936, what else was in service round the world? The Martin BM in US Navy service, the Mitsubishi B2M in IJN service, all welded steel fabric covered biplanes with similar performance and capability to the Swordfish, so....



Again, sweeping incoherent statements. The Blackburn was indeed a bit of an ugly beast alright, the Avro Bison to the same requirement for an observation airframe, but you're hanging the FAA out to dry on this? Come now... The Fairey Flycatcher, Hawker Osprey, Fairey IIIF, Blackburn Ripon and Baffin for example were equal to and better than their global naval aviation contemporaries.



No it wasn't utterly toxic, again an enormous dramatisation of the situation you are demonstrating a complete lack of knowledge of. So much so that indulging your statements is simply laughable.

But, you are right, Rhetoric-Macandy in saying the FAA's Air Ministry driven doctrine required changing. The thing about doing so was that there was not the perceived need to do so in the early 1930s, precisely when it should have happened. Britain had suffered far greater than either Japan and the USA, both big carrier nations between the wars, during the Great War and armaments was simply not something the British government saw fit to throw large sums of money at. Peacetime is the great leveller when it comes to pre-WW2 military aviation. Britain simply did not have the funding nor the desire to improve on what it had in service or for the immediate future. Now, the biggest fallout from this was the decision not to develop a modern single-seater, but in terms of torpedo and attack aircraft, the FAA is in good hands. Seriously. The problem is the persistent need to combine roles within existing aircraft that went on from when the RAF took over from the RNAS and created the Fleet Air Arm. The Skua, Fulmar and Barracuda are pertinent examples of this, which during the age of biplanes with open cockpits and fixed gear, that role sharing policy is okay, as the Hawker Osprey reconnaissance bomber was almost as fast as contemporary carrier-based fighters, but in the age of all-metal monoplanes with sophisticated role specific requirements? Not smart.

The Swordfish was a good aeroplane. Easy to maintain, easy to manufacture, easy to fly. Most suitable for military service and its versatility served it well; it outlived its contemporaries and its intended replacement and saw exceptional service during the war, racking up the highest tonnage of enemy vessels sunk of any aircraft in the ETO/MTO. In the Apple Core as a replacement, yup, it had all the modern accoutrements of a modern aeroplane, all metal construction, enclosed cockpit, landing flaps, but some of the hang-overs of its predecessor in a biplane layout with fixed undercarriage. These offered their own advantages in service in terms of ease of repair and less complication, but indeed, there is no reason the Albacore could not have been a monoplane. It was designed and pressed into service in a hurry though, so it would have been late to the table...

The problem we have with the FAA is that in hindsight it is too easy to criticise. It has a big fat target on it, but let's not get our wires crossed as to what is worthy of criticism and what isn't. The FAA was equal in technology to its foreign contemporaries to a point throughout the 1930s. We know for a fact that the Admirals wanted more modern aircraft on their carriers, we know that even the Air Ministry regarded the Blackburn Skua, a contemporary of the TBD Devastator, the first modern monoplane on US Navy carrier decks as being obsolescent before it entered service (the same year as the TBD), especially since high level discussions were carried out within the admiralty decrying the lack of an advanced fighter like the Spitfire or Hurricane in 1937, so the direction, but not necessarily the technology the FAA was set on since the early 30s most certainly left a lot to be desired.

If you are going to foot stamp and name call, you can go on ignore.

 

[Shortround6]

I am probably going to criticized for it but the Swordfish was "lucky".

I will try to explain, it was lucky not in it's ability to get hits and not in it's crews (who preformed very well indeed and very bravely), but in the situations it often found itself suited it's abilities. It also had some commanders that understood it's ablities and limitations and adjusted their tactics to suit.

How you get to the Swordfish being in the position it was took a lot of years and other things happening or not happening.

Britain had a problem with engines. They were world leaders in 1920s and into the early 30s. They had 4 major companies but two of them faded, they were happy making small profits on existing designs and didn't do enough R&D. RR was doing very well, Bristol entered the Sleeve valve vortex and their poppet engines suffered. We have been over this a lot.

Britain was broke. They had taken a number of used ships ( I won't call them old) and turned them into carriers. Meanwhile the politicians decided there would not be any new wars for 10 years. Britain also had world wide commitments. They needed more small/medium sized carriers rather than a few large ones in the 1920s. The Ark Royal was part of the 1934 building program and was laid down in 1935 and commissioned Dec 1938. Yorktown and Enterprise we both laid down in 1934.

The Swordfish fell into the middle of this. It was not a modern or brilliant design looking at the specifications. However it's rival, the Blackburn Shark wasn't either and the Shark was cursed with a bad engine, the Tiger. Perhaps they could have put the Swordfish engine on the Shark? Who knows, Pegasus engines were powering a host of aircraft for Britain. Then Fairies own replacement for the Swordfish runs into trouble, it is also a bit late in timing. First prototype flew the same month the Ark Royal was commissioned. A lot of advanced features in the initial stages (drawing board) but some were dropped. Production was delayed because of problems with the Taurus engine and this was in 1939 so any alternative ideas (monoplane torpedo bomber?) would hit the same problem. The Taurus engine continued to have problems during 1940 and into 1941. So it was the Swordfish or nothing. Then it turns out that the Albacore didn't handle as well as the swordfish had poor stall behavior, both things you don't want on a carrier plane. The Swordfish turned out to be a mostly ideal plane for escort carriers (crews might have something to say about flying open cockpit planes in the North Atlantic let alone the artic runs) which had nothing to do with its original specification.

The development of radar that would fit into the Swordfish (with it's large cockpit) was another bit of luck. Yes the RN trained in night attack before radar showed up but it sure helped the results. Another bit of luck for the Swordfish was that it actually had torpedoes that worked. Both the US and Germans didn't when they started their parts of the war (at different times).
A monoplane could be designed to have good stall and low landing speed some did not. A monoplane could be designed to do low level (a 100ft off the water) night attacks but that was usually not at the top of the list of characteristics. And sometimes what worked for that hurts the requirement for speed or other performance attribute.

I am using the word "Luck" not in the sense of flipping a coin 6 times and getting heads ever time but more in the sense of being in the right place/s at the right time with the proper characteristics and training (hardwork) to take advantages of the situations.

 

[ThomasP]

Hey Macandy,

If you try and find records of USN or IJN carrier aircraft flying night missions before the late-war you won't have much luck. This is due to the fact that neither service trained for night ops to any degree. Both services had their pilots practice a few landings on the carriers at night in order to ensure that if they returned after dark they would not be at a total loss and have a chance of landing successfully. The IJN pilots practiced night landing more than the USN pilots did. Operationally the most that either the USN or IJN did early- and mid-war was launch strikes at first light, or occasionally launch small numbers of recon aircraft while it was still dark - in all(?) cases with the intent to reach their search areas in half-light or daytime and recover in daylight.

Neither the USN or the IJN operated at night to any extent until late-war, and even then the operations were very limited in comparison to what the RN was engaging in early-war. The USN for example flew its first combat night fighter ops in January 1944, having spent most of 1943 in training involving British advisors. Look up Project Affirm. They did not begin carrier launched night strike ops until late-1944.

Until the USN carrier based night fighters became operational they did not have any real CAP over the fleet at night. They did try some prior to the first night fighter squadrons, but they had very high accident rates, and little or no success.

From a history of Project Affirm:

"From the start, the Navy's requirements were fundamentally different, since Navy planes and equipment had to meet performance standards suitable for carrier use. While land-based air units could accept heavier aircraft which were large enough to accommodate an on-board radar operator, the Navy designed its program, Project Affirm, around single-seat, carrier-type fighters."

"Project Affirm had verified that a qualified naval aviator needed more than ordinary flying skill to become a competent night fighter pilot. Desire and the ability of an individual to function effectively in an unconventional environment were equally important. Accustomed to full use of all one's senses, a psychological adjustment is necessary when one sense is impaired or denied. Some individuals experience panic ranging from mild to severe when subjected to extended periods of complete darkness. Severe claustrophobia can also occur. While the night flying trainees were not superhuman, it was clear that they had to possess certain attributes of stability and be highly motivated."


The RN on the other hand began training for night strike operations in 1935, and by the start of the war were quite good at it. Nearly all FAA pilots and navigators that flew off of carriers were night qualified. They were able to launch, fly their missions, and recover in full dark. And their night operations accident rate and loss rate due to navigation failure were both lower than the USN's daytime rates. As with the IJN and USN, the RN did not fly any kind of standing CAP missions at night until the advent of radar equipped fighters - in the British case the Fulmar which went operational in late-1942/early-1943.

You will find no missions flown by the USN or IJN carrier squadrons - even late-war - that are comparable to what the FAA did during the Taranto raid (1940 with no ASV radar) or the attacks against the Bismarck (1941 with ASV radar).


As with the RN and USN, prior to radar equipped night fighters the IJN SOP was to rely on searchlights and AA to defend the fleet - so the idea that the FAA Swordfish would have been intercepted by Zeroes at Midway in 1942 is just silly, regardless of whether the night was moonlit or not.

 

[SaparotRob]

The Swordfish would have been a 'brilliant design' in 1918, but when service, its performance was so poor, it was utterly unable to operate in any contested airspace - It was so slow and poorly armed, a WWI Biplane fighter would have been a deadly adversary.
It was laughable bad - even more laughable the 'best' replacement Fairy could come up with was the even more awful Albacore, another Biplane - replaced in service by the Swordfish. The FAA were quite literally catapulted forward two generations when they received their first TBM Avengers!

Ah yes, the old' but the Swordfish could operate at night, it could have sunk the Japanese fleet!' canard.

One is reminded of that bon mot of 'intelligence' fed by there Admiralty to the British Fleet operating off Cylon in 1942 - sagely advising the Admiral to engage the Japanese in night actions as 'the Japanese have poor eyesight and can't see in the dark' - Might not have ended well, see the disaster that befell the USN when it assumed it too owned the night off Savo Island - and was shot to pieces by the Japanese who had superb night optics.

As for IJN pilots 'not being able to see in the dark'? Actually, ALL IJN pilots were selected for visual acuity and night vision - it was one of the reasons they were training so few pilots, they set the bar so high.

Swordfish attacking the IJN off Midway? If only it wasn't a nice moonlit night and perfect conditions for A6M's to hunt such vulnerable prey.
Hint, the Swordfish was hastily withdrawn from East of Suez, every time it came upon the Japanese, it was shot down at will by the vastly superior Japanese fighters.

And the Americans were quite capable of carrying out night attacks…

"...Before the B-17's returned, a flight of four PBY-5A's, each carrying one MK XIII Mod. I torpedo took off on an historic mission, "the first night torpedo attack by our patrol planes on surface ships." The pilots were volunteers, led by Lt. William L. Richards, Executive Officer of Patrol Squadron FORTY-FOUR. The flight commander's orders were to locate the enemy force sighted that morning on bearing 261° from Midway, deliver a torpedo attack and return to base. Priority of targets was aircraft carriers, battleships, transports. The exact composition of the enemy force was unknown, but it was believed to include a carrier. The B-17's had not yet returned and details of their attack were not known.
The flight left Midway at 2115 on June 3d. The weather was clear, with broken cumulus clouds at 1,000 feet. Some hours later (about 2400 and 0100) the third and fourth planes were lost from the formation in passing through cloud banks, but one of them succeeded in finding the target alone.
At about 0115 on June 4th, radar indicated a group of about 10 ships 10 or 12 miles to the port of this group. As our planes approached, the silhouettes of the enemy ships became visible in the moonlight. There were 10 or more large ones in 2 columns, escorted by 6 destroyers. It was probably the same force the B-17's had attacked several hours before, now only about 500 miles from Midway. Our planes approached without lights from down moon, engines throttled back. The target selected was the largest ship, which was leading the northern column. It had been thought that this might be a carrier, but on the approach it was identified as a transport. The planes glided down to 100 feet and the leader dropped his torpedo at 800 yards, then climbed in a turn over the target. It was thought that an explosion followed. Lt. (j. g.) Daniel C. Davis in the second plane was not satisfied with his approach and withdrew for a second. He dropped his torpedo at 200 yards, but no results were observed. As he opened his throttle to pass over the target, he strafed the ship with .50-calibre machine-gun fire, while the leading ships opened fire on him. Subsequent information indicated that this strafing attack caused several enemy casualties.'

Battle of Midway: 3-6 June 1942 Combat Narrative

Copy No. 286 Combat Narratives Battle of Midway June 3-6, 1942 U.S. Confidential ** British Secret [declassified] Office of Naval Intelligence U.S. Navy

www.history.navy.mil

Where did you get Japanese aviators have poor eyesight from my post? Did you read "Samauri" by Saburo Sakai? The pilots of his squadron would pick out the brighter stars during daylight. The Swordfish was a radar carrying night strike capable attacker (not initially). It's one thing to find ships at night from phosphorescent wakes and another to get to the right spot over a big, empty ocean at night to see those wakes without radar. It met the specs issued by the FAA (or whoever) and did its job. Kind of a high scorer at that! Admiral Cunningham would've loved to have HMS Prince of Wales (the current 2022 one). He didn't have it. The RN needed a plane that could operate off the flight decks it had. As to the Swordfish being easily dispatched by Zeroes, are you familiar with Torpedo Squadron 8's experience?
I'm a fan of the PBY. It carried out the only successful American torpedo attack during the battle of Midway against the Akebono Maru. However great it was, and it was, it was a terrible carrier borne strike aircraft though I don't have any stats to back that up.

 

[Shortround6]

I'm a fan of the PBY. It carried out the only successful American torpedo attack during the battle of Midway against the Akebono Maru. However great it was, and it was, it was a terrible carrier borne strike aircraft though I don't have any stats to back that up.

No stats either