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Forget it. Any plane built to withstand carrier ops will, by definition, be unacceptable to USAF. And vice versa. Secdefs with the horsepower of McNamara are a thing of the past, and the appetite for overflying dead bodies just isn't there these days.So that got me thinking about if it would have been more practical to develop two joint-service planes.
One for Fighter/Intercept, the other for Attack/Bombing?
At the most basic level I figure that the basic idea wasn't all that out there. There have been aircraft that were suitable for land/carrier operations: The F-4 was a clear example of one. While it was designed as a naval aircraft, it performed well enough that it could be used by the USAF. It wasn't going to fly as fast down-low as the F-105, but it was generally a better aircraft in terms of PS and discrepancies in performance between the two services largely had to do more with training (and the way the USAF variant was configured) than anything else (and I think later F-4's were fitted with a WSO).1. The existing specification: Basically, the idea would be working within the existing specification, but you could modify or change anything within the boundary of it.
2. A different winner: Sometimes the problem wasn't the design so much as the winner to the contender
3. A more realistic/practical specification: Basically the specifications are made more realistic to allow a practical design to be developed.
It was. The attempts to navalize the F111 led directly to the F14.Regardless, even if the USAF managed to simply develop its own aircraft and the USN developed its own interceptor design: I'm curious if the F-111 could have been improved over its actual design...
Regardless, they were fundamentally different aircraft despite using the same radar, missile, and engines (the engines were intended to be an interim design only). It wasn't that they were different derivatives of the same basic design frame (a'la the F-111A/B).The attempts to navalize the F111 led directly to the F14.
There was no way the basic F111 was going to fulfill the Navy's mission without tweaking it into something like the F14. The "flying switchblade's" combination of thrust, weight, and wing area sentenced it to an unacceptable maneuverability deficit, as well as truly marginal behavior getting aboard. Back when all that was going on, I read a quote in Aviation Week and Space Technology from a Navy test pilot that the F111 was "harder to get aboard the boat than a Vigilante". That's a serious accusation, as the Vige was a notorious "Ensign eater". By the time of "the TFX follies" the basic interceptor mission was changing, bombers were becoming faster, more agile, and possibly even escorted, and the shortcomings of the F104 "missile with a man in it" concept were becoming evident. An interceptor might have to take care of itself if it ran into opposition (think Spitfire or MiG21 instead of Me110 or Yak25), something the F111 was never going to do. Despite being sentenced to the same heavy core components, the F14 managed to wring more lift out of its airframe by every imaginable gimmick as well as achieving a reduction in structural weight, thereby gaining a modicum of air combat maneuverability. It still needed the lighter weight, higher thrust F100 engines it was intended for to reach its full potential, which came to pass two decades later, too little, too late.Regardless, they were fundamentally different aircraft despite using the same radar, missile, and engines (the engines were intended to be an interim design only). It wasn't that they were different derivatives of the same basic design frame (a'la the F-111A/B).
I was thinking about the matter of interceptor (USN) and fighter-bomber missions (USAF) and I'm curious if there were any serious interests in a USAF interceptor at the time?
I'd almost swear that most of the problems cited for getting the F-111B aboard a carrier deck were greatly exaggerated because the USN didn't want the plane.There was no way the basic F111 was going to fulfill the Navy's mission without tweaking it into something like the F14. The "flying switchblade's" combination of thrust, weight, and wing area sentenced it to an unacceptable maneuverability deficit, as well as truly marginal behavior getting aboard. Back when all that was going on, I read a quote in Aviation Week and Space Technology from a Navy test pilot that the F111 was "harder to get aboard the boat than a Vigilante".
The chicken or the egg? Perhaps USN didn't want the plane because of the problems getting it aboard a carrier deck?I'd almost swear that most of the problems cited for getting the F-111B aboard a carrier deck were greatly exaggerated because the USN didn't want the plane.
You did read the link, right?The chicken or the egg? Perhaps USN didn't want the plane because of the problems getting it aboard a carrier deck?
There was also the cancellation of the P6M as well.The USN was moving its part of the nuclear triad from carrier based aircraft to Polaris submarines (the first, USS George Washington commissioned in Dec 1959 with 8 in service by the end of 1961 and 34 by the end of 1965). So the A-5 Vigilante under development since 1954 was becoming superfluous as a nuclear delivery system when it finally entered service in 1961.
Interestingly the RA-5C was capable of the nuclear-bombing mission despite being predominantly designed for reconnaissance: While the stores train wasn't effective (they actually carried additional fuel where the bomb was), the aircraft could carry 2 x Mk43 (they could be carried on a pylon under each wing); conventional bombing was also doable as the pylons could allow for 2 x Mk-83 or 2 x Mk-84 to be carried.It has been described as the most advanced aircraft of that era when introduced to service. It was then switched to the reconnaissance role with the RA-5C model which served until 1979.
I'm not so sure if they wanted a new interceptor, or merely more F-106's. If I recall they wanted something like 360 of them. With the aircraft being around $4-5 million a pop (in a time when the purchasing power of a dollar was way higher than now), and McNamara being a classic bean-counter (JFK actually wanted to reduce military expenditures as well, though I'm not sure how often he agreed/disagreed with McNamara).As for the USAF selection of the F4 in 1961, that came about as the AIr Defence Command was looking for a new interceptor. At the time the "new" interceptor was the F-106A which was having its own problems but further acquisitions were being planned. McNamara as the new Defense Secretary in 1961 forced an F-106/F4 flyoff in 1961 (Operation Highspeed) during which the F-4 outperformed the former in just about every way.
ICBM's were the primary threat, but bombers were still seen as having some relevance.with the emphasis moving from the Soviet manned nuclear bomber to the ballistic missile, interceptor aircraft and the then current AA missiles like Nike-Ajax, Nike-Hercules and BOMARC began to have less relevance. Instead money was moved to developing ABM systems like Nike-Zeus (not deployed) and Spartan & Sprint.
Actually, the F-12 was designed to destroy both high-flying and low-flying threats. That was the benefit of the AN/ASG-18 -- it was pulse-doppler.When it came to the YF-12A, the USAF was sufficiently interested to try to acquire some 93 F-12B production versions . . . . As it turned out, the threat that the F-12 was designed to counter (the manned high altitude supersonic bomber) never emerged.
It was largely a pointless exercise: They'd have been hard-pressed to get a design with their specs to do what they wanted. The F-14 ended up weighing around 68000 lb., but it was quite effective even with its limitations.When it came to the development of a new fighter for the USN the limits were firstly weight to allow it to operate from existing ships (they set a landing weight limit of 55,000lb) and the folded dimensions due to limited space on a carrier deck.
Could the A-5's radome be folded up?As regards the second of these points, while an F-111 and an A-5 might be similar in overall length (73ft 6.5in and 76ft 10in respectively), when you fold an A-5 its length reduced to 65ft 6in.
The F-111B came in slower than the F-14 by around 10 kts.
Combine the maneuvering limits, the overweight and the underpowered, and you've completely negated any advantage offered by the slightly lower approach speed. A plane with these characteristics is a prime candidate for backside of the power curve issues, which make carrier approaches especially challenging. This is how "ensign eaters" are made. A jet "flying the ball" that gets a little slow will settle "low on the ball". If it has high wingloading, that downward trend will accelerate exponentially, requiring a rapid corrective response, as the sink rate increases the angle of attack. This is where that "overweight and underpowered" bites you in the butt as it will take a large handful of throttle to overcome the downward inertia of all that mass, tending to lead to "throttle jockeying", overcontrolling, and either a waveoff or a ramp strike. The classic model of the Ensign Eater.there were maneuvering limits (ironically) owing to its swing-wing design, it was overweight and underpowered
I love that kind of talk.Combine the maneuvering limits, the overweight and the underpowered, and you've completely negated any advantage offered by the slightly lower approach speed. A plane with these characteristics is a prime candidate for backside of the power curve issues, which make carrier approaches especially challenging. This is how "ensign eaters" are made. A jet "flying the ball" that gets a little slow will settle "low on the ball". If it has high wingloading, that downward trend will accelerate exponentially, requiring a rapid corrective response, as the sink rate increases the angle of attack. This is where that "overweight and underpowered" bites you in the butt as it will take a large handful of throttle to overcome the downward inertia of all that mass, tending to lead to "throttle jockeying", overcontrolling, and either a waveoff or a ramp strike. The classic model of the Ensign Eater.
Actually, the plane did fine on the carrier-suitability trials: The maneuvering limits and T/W ratio figures described were generally regarded as more a problem for aerial combat rather than simply flying the plane around.Combine the maneuvering limits, the overweight and the underpowered, and you've completely negated any advantage offered by the slightly lower approach speed.
Could that plane be the progenitor of the "missile truck " concept? A not very combat capable aircraft staying out of range, lobbing rockets?
A major shortcoming of the F111 was the weight and structural strength limits of the wing sweep system, with its resulting G limits. The F14 utilized design lessons learned from the F111 experience to produce a lighter, stronger structure. I doubt that a "pioneering" F14 would have done as well as the historical one.I'm curious if the technology existed to produce an earlier F-14 with technology available in 1961?
What kind of design lessons were learned, if they're not classified?A major shortcoming of the F111 was the weight and structural strength limits of the wing sweep system, with its resulting G limits. The F14 utilized design lessons learned from the F111 experience to produce a lighter, stronger structure.
No, I mean if the program started in 1961 (I should have clarified that detail): So, service entry would have been around the same time as the F-111.It also would have had way less capable avionics and weapons.
A plane with the aforementioned high wingloading, underpowered, slow spoolup issues can be flown impressively by an ace test pilot with a thousand traps under his/her belt, and yet be lethal to a less experienced aviator when flying the ball. The old pro will hit the numbers precisely, start and fly a stable approach with only the tiniest of corrections all the way down. He/she will roll out of the final turn in perfect alignment, on speed, with the proper AoA, and proper power setting and descent rate, all based on experience, so the approach is "on rails", with control response lag "old hat" and adeptly accounted for. The nugget, on the other hand will likely overshoot or undershoot the turn to final, be a little above or below glideslope, and be chasing corrections all the way down to an "in close" waveoff or a bolter. A plane that has a lag in control and throttle responses, and especially one that has a penchant for a rapidly developing sink rate if it gets underspeed, can quickly get our nugget aviator in trouble. These are issues about getting aboard, not "flying the plane around".You did read the link, right?
The F-111B came in slower than the F-14 by around 10 kts.: The problem with the plane was not really about getting it aboard the deck
I don't know the details, but that was the accepted wisdom back in the day. You've got to consider that a combat capable swing wing was a new concept at the time, the only precedent being the X5, circa 1950, which was mainly a proof of concept exercise. In terms of engineering experience, it was new ground, solutions and practices yet to be established. Despite all the engineering talent thrown at it, a ground breaking advance like a swing wing fighter seldom turns out exactly as projected, and experience will point out the less-than-optimum design choices.What kind of design lessons were learned, if they're not classified?
So you've got two parallel stab-in-the-dark engineering experiments both based on very limited precedent and experience and likely to make parallel less-than-optimum design choices. Sounds wasteful to me. Without the F111 experience the F14 couldn't have been what it was.No, I mean if the program started in 1961 (I should have clarified that detail): So, service entry would have been around the same time as the F-111.
Actually, you forgot the XF10F Jaguar and the fact that those swing-wing designs were different: The rearward sweep of the wing would shift the C/L aft, so the wing-root was actually translating forward to compensate and offset this. I'm not sure how this worked from a standpoint of scale and stuff, but they ultimately did away with it for one reason or another.I don't know the details, but that was the accepted wisdom back in the day. You've got to consider that a combat capable swing wing was a new concept at the time, the only precedent being the X5, circa 1950, which was mainly a proof of concept exercise.
Actually, when the concept was explained to me that's basically the thought that came to mind (though I thought it was doing this at high altitude from the outset). Regardless, IIRC, the idea seemed to be based around the idea of shooting the weapon out the back to provide maximum clearance without doing a LABS maneuver: Except the plane's clearly doing a LABS maneuver in the pictures, which makes me wonder what's the point?Holy shit, Batman! That plane just crapped all over us!
I do remember there being a proposal for a P6M powered by a nuclear reactor: While I'm not a fan of nuclear-powered aircraft for obvious reasons, we were developing them at the time and the USAF were developing at least two nuclear-powered programsOne more; An improved P6M
Do you mean anti-radiation missiles, or improved jammers only? I am frankly surprised that the USAF didn't devote more effort to ARM's.Anticipate and develop anti-radar countermeasures and weapons in late 50s, early 60s.
While it's beyond the scope of aircraft, it's interesting to note that the USN's modification of the Antietam did appear to be partially out of a mutual-desire to develop the concept. That said, it would have been interesting if the USS United States had been designed with an angled-deck (its shape wasn't too far off).Build angled flight decks right away. Being able to launch and land aircraft at the same time is a game changer! I suspect it was not a big deal.