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Thank you.It is not as if the RAF didn't recognise the limitations of the Anson. In 1938 the RAF went looking for a replacement. The result? A June 1938 order for 200 Lockheed Hudson plus another 50 if initial deliveries could be made by 31 Dec 1939. Deliveries by sea began in Feb 1939 with 250 built by Oct and more orders placed.
In May 1939 224 squadron swapped its Ansons for Hudsons. 233 re-equipped between Aug and Oct 1939 followed by 220 in Nov and other squadrons into 1940.
The Bristol Bolingbroke saga.I would also note that Beaufort was supposed to do Maritime recon but was running late.
They had put more fuel into the Blenheim in 1937 for recon work (not maritime).
The Longer nose was supposed to have been for a Canadian requirement for maritime recon? The long nose and extra fuel and a few changes hit the production lines in the Spring of of 1939.
Hi4. Attack,
Optional, depends on weapons/weapon state and other stores. You have to pretty much line the plane up with the U-boat and fly over it much like doing a bomb run even if just using the smoke float/s.
This was also usually a race. The Sub could usually see the airplane before the airplane sighted the sub. Using 20/20 hind sight we can find out that the White painted CC aircraft could, by test, get 20-25% closer to a sub before being spotted than a black painted BC aircraft, how well the prewar or early war aircraft showed up ?????
"Hans, look over here, there is a patch of spinach in that cloud!"
Many of the U-boats could submerge in under 30 seconds, sometimes as little as 20?
The plane commander did not have a lot of time to make decisions.
Also note that may of the weapons had restrictions of height and speed at which they could be dropped.
The main problem with the Anson and the rest of Coastal Command at the start of the war was the lack of any effective AS weapons.I agree and disagree with this. while the Anson was a good training aircraft with viceless handling characteristics, it might be worth pointing out that anti-submarine warfare had not graduated much beyond the Great War. Even by 1939 and the Sunderland having entered service, the human eye was still the most widely employed detection mechanism aboard aircraft. You state that the Anson was restricted in capability, I say how? It didn't need to carry thousands of pounds of bombs, when smoker markers is all it needs to highlight where a submarine is. A small bomb is all that's needed to cripple a submarine.
As I mentioned, the aerial element was to detect the submarine and radio assistance from a nearby warship. The two worked closely together, this was derived from techniques developed during the Great War. The ship would then speed toward the hopefully crippled submarine, or to at least where the aircraft last spotted it on the surface, and remember we are talking submersibles with a maximum speed underwater of less than 10 knots, so with a circling aircraft overhead having dropped marker flares, and a warship, equipped with ASDIC, the submarine is in for a rough time of it. The Anson's pilot was equipped with a forward firing Browning machine gun, so had a means by which to strafe the enemy submarine.
Let's also not forget that the Anson was built to satisfy a requirement for a General Coastal Reconnaissance Aircraft to specification 18/35, the emphasis being on coastal reconnaissance. It was designed for sea patrol; it wasn't specifically designed to hunt down and kill submarines, it was designed to detect, track and disable submarines until more powerful assets arrived at the scene.
That was the state of the art at the beginning of World War Two. The Anson didn't need to be a P-3 in 1939. It was perfectly capable of doing the job when it entered service and even at the outbreak of war as submarine technology and the means with which to detect and destroy them had not advanced much more than twenty years earlier. It had good visibility from its extensive glazing, it was slow enough to loiter around a slow-moving submarine and it could carry the requisite radio and navigational equipment to let a surface ship know where a possible contact was.
The radio operator's station, with the navigator's desk beyond. Note the extensive glazing. Excuse the modern Dave Clark headsets, the aircraft is airworthy.
View attachment 686000Anson interior
The biggest threat to the Anson was enemy aircraft of course, but who in 1936 could have predicted that the Germans were going to have invaded almost all of Western Europe by the end of 1940 and have friendly forces stretching from Spain to the very top of the continent? It was fitted with an unpowered Armstrong Whitworth gun turret fitted with a .303-in MG.
By the way, for the Blackburn Kangaroo to have done that much damage with only eight aircraft in service at any one time in 1918 is quite remarkable.
As is usual, in this thread we are projecting what we know has happened in the past eighty or so years against what was de rigeur back in the late 1930s and by consequence missing the point entirely.
To put it one way according to the Bomber Command War Diaries some 3,775 Lancasters were lost during the war, or 2.36% of sorties, or to put it another way 56% of the 6,712 Lancasters officially built to the end of April 1945 were lost. One percentage figure tends to look more dramatic than the other.Even in the very worst days of early 1943, Allied Merchant Ship losses never exceeded 2% of Allied sailings
What does destroyed in detail mean? No 1940 Luftwaffe raid on Britain was destroyed in detail, so the RAF was never winning?No Allied convoy was every destroyed in detail by U Boats
and were lost as a result.Thousands of merchant ships travelled alone outside convoys across the oceans from the start to the end of WWII
The Germans/Axis were winning the tonnage war until around late 1942. On top of that comes the flow on effects, the bottleneck of merchant shipping then invasion shipping and their effects on allied operations. The high ship losses in 1942 caused the cancellation of many LST to be replaced by DE, more invasion shipping in 1944 would have enabled more allied operations, Overlord earlier plus Dragoon at the same time. The cost of allied ASW. Convoying cost cargo capacity, the wait times at either end increased, ships were idle for longer.The Germans were never winning.
The main problem with the Anson and the rest of Coastal Command at the start of the war was the lack of any effective AS weapons.
it wasn't specifically designed to hunt down and kill submarines, it was designed to detect, track and disable submarines until more powerful assets arrived at the scene.
As has been pointed out the "detect" phase was dependent on human eyes and every body was pretty much at the same level.
The "Track" phase isn't much different either. It was somewhat weather dependent. In favorable conditions the Aircraft could see down into the water, this depended on lighting, sea color/depth and sea conditions (waves).
The "disable" phase was the hard part.
No homing torpedoes, no retro bombs, no rockets, etc.
The Hudsons were on order and were supposed to carry about 1000lbs of ordnance. Ten of 100lb anti-sub bombs which allowed for a large bomb pattern or repeat attacks or both. Or a fewer number of larger bombs.
It turned out the 100lb AS bomb was just about worthless so the "disable" part wasn't actually possible without a very great deal of luck. And if you can't "disable" the "more powerful assets" showing up "in time" becomes very rare.
The whole "smoke float" thing seems to have been more wishful thinking than working solution. A 20kt escort that sees the smoke float drop 5 NM from the escorts location is going to need 15 minutes to get there and an 8kt sub can cover 2 NM in any direction from the smoke floats location in the same 15 minutes. Sub can't keep goin at high speed without draining the batteries but the odds are not in the escorts favor without more help (plane drops another float on an oil slick or spots a shadow or periscope wake or?)
They had figured out in WW I that long endurance planes (not necessarily long ranged) gave a better return on investment that short endurance aircraft. You needed fewer of them to maintain the same number of patrol hours.
Is there anything Britain could have done between the wars to better prepare the RAF and RN to tackle the ASW needs of 1939-41?
HiThere were things that could have been done in 1938-41 to improve things. Not saying turn the U-boat war on it's head but make things harder for the U-boats while waiting for the better sensors and weapons to show up. Lets remember that hundreds of radar sets were repurposed from naval search radars to Air-to- air radars in 1940-41.
Thank youHey GTX,
Do a search on the "AN/CRT" or "AN/CRT-1" sonobuoy. IIRC that was the first operational system used by the Allies.
Here is a link to start you out: "Firefly - CRT-1 Sonobuoy"
I posted this earlier in the threadThank you
No one thing was going to make a huge change but several small changes could total up to a significant change.
The thing is that the British had the most experience with ASW of any country in the world as result of WW I and they didn't start back up in 1939 with the standard they had at the end of 1918. They added asdic but then regressed backwards in some areas. Relearning what they knew in WW I and having to fight the same battles in Whitehall instead of fighting the Germans wasted time and effort.Which takes time and a whole lot of effort that no individual country could have done without the effort of collective experience brought about through wartime. There was no easy fix and the rapidity that pre-war equipment and techniques were dispensed with during the war reflects this. War equals money and resources. Britain had all the latent capability to do what needed to be done in 1939, including producing more and better aircraft, better munitions, better technology, e.g. radar but without a war it takes a lot longer. Again, though, it's worth remembering that no one else was doing this any different and the same lessons the British had to learn had to be learned by everyone else.
The thing is that the British had the most experience with ASW of any country in the world as result of WW I and they didn't start back up in 1939 with the standard they had at the end of 1918. They added asdic but then regressed backwards in some areas. Relearning what they knew in WW I and having to fight the same battles in Whitehall instead of fighting the Germans wasted time and effort.
Actually the US was building some advanced commercial planes, to the extent that many airlines, companies and countries were buying American aircraft.Perhaps the biggest advance the US had over Europe was propeller design. That's it. All metal aircraft were in production and service in Europe across the board.
It might help if we actually compared like to like.The B-18 Bolo was the US' predominant frontline bomber in the first couple of years of the war and it had poorer performance, defensive armament and bomb load compared to British and German bombers.
Actually the US was building some advanced commercial planes, to the extent that many airlines, companies and countries were buying American aircraft.