Improved Skua for FAA?

Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules

So, how do we get more speed out of the Skua? In addition to improving the canopy, how about reducing its 46 ft wingspan to something closer to the SBD Dauntless' 41.5 ft span? And retract the tail wheel along with reducing lumps and protrusions.
 
Bf 109 specification was for a monoplane fighter of high maneuverability and greatest speed possible, with good diving and spinning performance. Messerschmitt aircraft pretty much meeting that. Now originally, Messerschmitt wasn't invited to bid due to issues with his earlier M-20 aircraft but that is different issue.

Thank you, you're probably right on that one.

Bf110 was for a monoplane kampfzerstorer with 2-7.9mm &2-20mm forward guns, internal bombay for 2-250kg bombs and transverse-able armament (aka turret) for side and rear defense. The closest to meeting the spec initially was the Fw.57. The Bf.110 skipped the internal bombay and the mg17 for the rear gunner wasn't really what RLM was thinking of. Noting Messerschmitt built the Bf.162 to carry bombs to compliment the Bf.110 in attempt to completely meet the requirement. But other than a couple prototypes it went nowhere.

German-language Wikipedia says this, on the 'Zerstoerer' entry:

Die Bomberrolle entfällt vorübergehend

Als das RLM 1935 eine neue Anforderungen für einen Schnellbomber definierte (500 km/h, 500 kg Bombenlast) und Junkers ein Konzept vorstellte, das sogar 500 km/h Höchstgeschwindigkeit und 1000 kg Bombenlast versprach, wurde nicht länger vorgesehen, den "Kampfzerstörer" auch als Bomber einzusetzen. Messerschmitts aus der Bf 161 entwickelte Bf 162 und Henschels aus der Hs 124 entwickelte Hs 127 unterlagen in der Schnellbomberausschreibung aber schließlich der Junkers Ju 88. Damit entfiel die Rolle des Bombers für das Zerstörerflugzeug vorübergehend.


Meaning, roughly, that by 1935, due to the new Schnellbomber spec that called for 500/500 capability (and with Junkers promising 500/1000), it was no longer required that 'Kampfzerstoerer' is required to also bomb things. MTT started developing the Me 162 as a Schnellbomber, Henschell the Hs 127 (from the Hs 124) and Junkers company designing the Ju 88.

Zerstörer (Flugzeug) – Wikipedia , FWIW
 
Combination of roles fighter & dive bomber
This is what Friedman wrote in "Carrier Air Power" about the Skua away back in 1981.

"The Skua is often described as an unsuccessful attempt to combine in one airplane the features of two very contradictory types, the fighter and the dive-bomber. In its time, however, it would appear to have been a perfectly logical consequence of Admiralty policy concerning Fleet Air Arm tactics. By the mid-1930s British naval fighters were in effect strike support aircraft designed to accompany the torpedo bombers attacking enemy battleships. Their primary role was twofold: attack on enemy anti-aircraft weapons, particularly those aboard screening ships; and neutralization of enemy carrier aircraft, preferably by strafing them while they remained on their flight decks. In each case machine-gun fire was likely to be more effective than conventional bombing, given the ability of the target ship to escape damage by radical maneuvering. Only with the advent of the dive-bomber could bomb hits be assured. Even then the tactic was confined to attacks on lightly armoured ships: the bombs still did not attain sufficient terminal velocities to penetrate the protective decks of capital ships. The Osprey and even the Swordfish could dive with light bombs carried underwing, and in effect the Skua carried the Osprey's light bombing role further by providing a crutch for a heavier under-fuselage weapon. It would appear then, that, to the Royal Navy dive-bombing attack on enemy carrier decks and screening ships was a natural extension of fighter-attack doctrine, rather than an attempt to combine in a single aircraft two incompatible roles. The major air superiority role of the fleet fighter, denial of reconnaissance and spotting to an enemy fleet, would not require very high performanace."

So the purpose of the dive-bomber in the RN was not to sink capital ships merely disable the AA firepower of an enemy fleet and to put their carriers out of action. And for that bombs up to 500lb are perfectly adequate. And strike support means being able to find its way back to a parent carrier requiring the second seat.

Combination of roles Dive bomber and torpedo bomber
Earlier the RN was being criticised for combining the dive and torpedo bomber roles in the Barracuda. Actually this makes complete sense due to the tactics that the FAA adopted during the 1930s. It has been discussed before on other threads. I can't do better than quote from Hobbs "The Dawn of Carrier Strike" with my emphasis:-

"The classic RN aerial torpedo attack did not involve a long, low approach like that employed by the USN. It involved radical changes of height and bearing intended to make an enemy ship's anti-aircraft gunfire control solution more difficult to achieve.; it did, however, make the attack itself more difficult, and the technique required extensive training and constant practice. The approach to the target by a twelve-aircraft squadron was made at about 10,000 feet in four flights of three aircraft, each in a V formation. They would set themselves up to attack from different directions so that whichever way the target ship turned it would find it difficult to evade every torpedo once they were running. The leader would manoeuvre into a position a mile or two ahead of the target and order his own numbers 2 and 3 into line astern by hand signals. They would drop back into positions 300 and 600 yards behind him and when they had taken up positions they would dive, in sequence, vertically onto the target. The other flight leaders would take up positions at 90-degree intervals around the target and carry out similar diving procedures in synchronisation with the overall leader. From roughly 2 miles high the descent took about half a minute during which time individual pilots had to maintain their position relative to their leaders, identify the target and estimate its course and speed and make the torpedo ready for release. Below 1,000 feet pilots would ease their aircraft out of the dive, retrimming as necessary, and use the sights to aim-off before release to allow for target movement as the weapons ran towards it. The ideal release point was at about 1,000 yards, half a nautical mile, from the target. At the moment of release the aircraft had to be at about 200ft, straight and level with no side slip so that the weapon entered the water cleanly with no risk of breaking up...."

So a torpedo attack was being set up exactly the same way as a dive-bombing attack. Medium altitude and a steep dive. With bi-planes like the Swordfish and Albacore there was sufficient drag on the airframe that diving speeds never exceeded about 200 knots. That changed with the advent of monoplanes. The only difference is where you position the aircraft relative to the target. But with the same stresses on the airframe from both types of attack combining the roles then makes some sense. In fact it can be argued that the FAA was ahead of the field.

Over in the US Curtiss designed the SB2C Helldiver for the USN from 1938. Along the way between prototype and production it gained the capability to drop the MK.13 torpedo. It was never used in combat in WW2 but attempts were made to resurrect it in 1945 as the shape of CAGs was being changed to reduce the numbers of TBM Avengers being carried. I've got a recollection somewhere that USN torpedo tactics changed by late war with Avengers starting attacks from higher altitudes, but with the inability to carry out a steep dive like the FAA.

Over in Japan from 1941 the IJNAF combined the torpedo and dive-bomber roles in the Aichi B7A Ryusei "Grace" that finally entered service in small numbers in late 1944.


Low production volumes for the FAA
When the entire front line strength of the FAA on the 5 operational carriers (Ark Royal only entered service in Dec 1938 and Argus was in reserve for most of the decade) in the 1930s was only about 160-170, and aircraft are evolving quickly, there is no room for large orders. Even with the Swordfish the orders from 1935-37 only totalled c430 (c130 required at any one time to equip the carriers). It was only from 1938 that orders began to take off with the prospect of the expansion of the FAA.

The story was the same over in the US even though their carriers had larger airgroups. Most orders by the USN in the 1930s were for 50-100 aicraft of each model at a time. Look at the Douglas TBD Devastator. 130 ordered to equip 4 x 18 plane squadons plus attrition replacements. Order sizes only begin to increase in 1941.

It is also worth remembering that in the early 1930s the torpedo as an air launched weapon fell right out of favour in the USN. It only recovered with the TBD in 1937.

Dive bomber dimensions
Everyone is comparing the size of the Skua adversely against the SBD. Some comparisons (wingspan / length / wing area):-

USA
Curtiss SBC Helldiver - 34/28/317
Vought SB2U Vindicator - 42/34/305
Douglass SBD Dauntless - 42/33/325
Curtiss SB2C Helldiver - 50/37/422
Douglas AD-1 - 50/38/400

Britain
Blackburn Skua - 46/36/319
Fairey Swordfish - 46/36/607
Fairey Albacore - 50/40/623
Fairey Barracuda I-III - 49/40/367
Fairey Barracuda V - 53/41/435
Fairey Spearfish - 60/45/?

Japan
Aichi D3A Val - 47/33/376
Yokosuka D4Y Judy - 38/34/254
Aichi B7A Grace - 47/38/381

Germany
Ju87 Stuka - 45/36/343

So yes the Skua has a winspan of 46 feet v 42 feet for the SBD. But look at the wing area. The SBD has a whole 6 feet extra wing area. So it is the difference between a short broad wing in the SBD v a slightly longer but narrower chod wing in the Skua. And when you compare the Skua's wingspan with other dive bombers of the period it does not seem excessive. The Judy on the other hand was a particularly small aircraft. But that brought its own problems as it was never able to operate off Japan's smaller carriers.

I've included the various British torpedo bombers of the period because they were, as noted above all used as dive-bombers at some time or other.

Edit:- And in the Skua you have to meet the relatively low landing speeds stipulated by the RN to get an aircraft on and off a carrier.

Edit 2:- another WW2 dive bomber to consider size wise.
Vultee Vengeance - 48/40/332

Edit 3:- In 1934 the Japanese ordered the biplane Aichi D1A as its carrier dive bomber for the rest of the decade. Its dimensions were 37/31/374 and it was capable of carrying a 250kg (550lb) bomb under the fuselage plus 2x30kg (66lb) under the wings.
 
Last edited:
Post-war Buccaneer aside, did Blackburn ever make a competitive aircraft?

The Dart, derived from the Swift was the FAA's first new torpedo type and its concept in turn was derived from the Sopwith Cuckoo, which Blackburn built under licence during the Great War. From the basic design of the Dart came the Baffin and Ripon, although these evolved from the Dart in that it was a single-seater without armament, as was the Cuckoo, to having an observer and defensive gun armament. Both the Baffin and Ripon were very much products of their day and served with the FAA without fuss. Obviously, Blackburn was competing with an ever resourceful Fairey to become the FAA's primary supplier of equipment - Robert Blackburn making it clear during the Great War he wished to become the principal supplier of aircraft to the Admiralty. From what I've read, there were many reasons why the Shark was superior to the Swordfish, and that production of the latter was ceased by Fairey during WW2 and was taken over by Blackburn must have been a bit of a bloody nose for that company. Neverthelss, the Blackburn Blackburn was matched in hideousness by the Avro Bison, both types outward appearance reflecting the navy's desire to provide a big space for the observer and his radio equipment.


The surprising part is that the Roc was to be the replacement for the Skua in the fighter role (actually fighter -observation). It was crippled by the turret fighter concept but also by the requirement to be capable of being catapulted from battleships with floats attached.
We should always bear in mind that the Gun Club ruled in all navies at that time and aircraft carriers were definitely subordinate to the line of battle. Spotting fall of shot on the enemy battle line and shooting down enemy spotters was a prime function. Dive bombing aircraft carriers was important as it took enemy spotters out of service and allowed your spotters to perform unhindered.

That's right, the turret fighter held a particular curiosity in the mid 1930s and the gun turret in particular promised accuracy that was unknown beforehand. How hindsight treated this theory is well-known. Of course, during the 1930s, power operated turrets were incorporated into a wide variety of British specifications, for transports, maritime patrol aircraft, bombers, fighters...

As for gunnery spotting using aeroplanes, The legacy of the aerial spotter in RN service has its roots in the Dardanelles campaign in 1915. The British pioneered this when destroying the forts that lined the coast of the stretch of water. Experiments during the war proved that attacking shore targets was not so easy because the fall of shot couldn't be seen, unlike splashes in the water, so the idea that aircraft be used for spotting took hold and the Ark Royal, the 1914 seaplane tender was rushed to the Dardanelles to serve that purpose. Also, the very first warships with aircraft facilities incorporated into their design on the drawing board were heavy gun monitors, the Abercrombie Class ships, equipped with US built 14-in gun turrets. On completion these were sent to the Dardanelles, although they didn't have their own aircraft, having machines supplied from a small pool of equipment spread among naval vessels operating in the Aegean Sea.
 
In the manual section there is a manual for the Douglas SBD-3


The manual is from 1942 ( bit after the heyday of the Skua) but gives a number of weight charts for the SBD with both unprotected tanks and protected tanks.
It also clearly shows the difference between the bomber function (1000lb bomb and 100 gallons of gas or 500lb bomb and 140 gallons of gas) and the scout function, up to 310 gallons of fuel in unprotected tanks or 260 gallons in protected tanks and up to 19 gallons of oil. ALL fuel tanks were internal, no drop tank/s.

This is the 3rd version of the SBD and there is no doubt from the manual that there were two different missions (roles) planned for the SBD.

Weight charts, statement as to roles. Cruising speed charts for the different roles and weights and labeled as such.

The SBD did NOT have folding wings. How this worked with USN carrier decks I don't know but could very well be a reason for the 42ft wing span.

The difference in wing area from the SBD to the Skua was 325 sq ft to 319 sq ft. or just under 2%

The Performance figures in the Manual are for the 1000hp T-O engine, the 1200hp engine showed much later.
 
Of course, during the 1930s, power operated turrets were incorporated into a wide variety of British specifications, for transports, maritime patrol aircraft, bombers, fighters...
The Hawker Demon has a lot to answer for ;)
2864L.jpg

136968-142e94dbe613649659290df7cc0247b6.jpg


It was just the 2nd (?) British aircraft to be fitted with a power turret, plenty more were in the planning stage.
Unfortunately they didn't seem to know when to stop. If four .303s are good then four 20mm guns in each turret must be better?
 
It was just the 2nd (?) British aircraft to be fitted with a power turret, plenty more were in the planning stage.
Unfortunately they didn't seem to know when to stop. If four .303s are good then four 20mm guns in each turret must be better?

The Nash & Thompson FN.1A Lobster Back was in fact the first entirely British designed hydraulic power turret, with hydraulic working gear by Frazer Nash. You can go back even further to the success of the Bristol F.2B two-seat fighter during the Great War if you wanna look for what was responsible for this trend.

The British did go a bit crazy with their power turret ideas at one stage, some of them were a bit bonkers and thankfully were not built, but the essence of the idea was that it provided better means of aiming gunfire than by the old open-topped Scarff ring style mount that everyone else was using. The fact was, by the mid 1930s defensive fire hadn't changed much since the Great War and faster aircraft represented a threat that the old style of defensive position couldn't match. The power turret offered many advantages, such as quicker response in aiming, more accurate aiming and a better (enclosed) environment for the gunner (with the exception of that Lobster back turret). By the time the British were fitting turrets on everything in the late 1930s, only Russia had done the same, but its turrets were not fully powered in azimuth, elevation and loading, unlike the British ones.
 
pyVwf7t.png

A number of companies submitted designs for a specification that called for both a dorsal and ventral turret with four 20mm guns each. In some cases they reached mock up stage.
Unfortunately the size and weight of the proposed turrets required them to be fitted very near the center of gravity fighting it out with bomb stowage.
If some people are wondering what happened to the British bombers that were supposed to come after the Beaufort or the Lancaster or the Halifax, it was this series of designs that gives a large part of the answer. Thousands if not not tens of thousands of hours of design work that went no further than wooden mock ups.
The older bombers with their .303 guns could operate at night at slower speeds and carry as much or more bombs.

The BP Overstrand was the first British plane with a power turret (not hydraulic)
BP_Overstrand.jpg

and was a very useful improvement in bomber defense or at least showed the way.

The Bristol F2B was often misinterpreted. When initially flown as a normal two seat aircraft (steady flying so the gunner could aim) they suffered high losses.
Using the power of it's RR Falcon engine the pilots could turn, climb and maneuver to bring the fixed machine gun to bear while the rear gunner did help defend the rear.
The two guns in the back were not however the key to the F2Bs success, plenty of other two seat aircraft with twin Lewis guns on Scarff mountings didn't fare so well.
The RR Falcons giving around 275hp gave the F2b enough performance mix-it up with the single seaters and the Bristol airframe was strong enough not to break under such treatment. The German 6 cylinder engines in their single seat fighters weren't that much lighter than the RR V-12 and had worse power to weight ratios for the power plants.
 
A number of companies submitted designs for a specification that called for both a dorsal and ventral turret with four 20mm guns each. In some cases they reached mock up stage.

The big round four-cannon turret was the work of Boulton Paul and originated with its P.92 twin engined-bomber interceptor concept. Nash & Thompson designed a similar installation to be fitted to bombers that preferred its designs. The designs reached the mock-up stage because they were designed to fulfil an official specification.

If some people are wondering what happened to the British bombers that were supposed to come after the Beaufort or the Lancaster or the Halifax, it was this series of designs that gives a large part of the answer. Thousands if not not tens of thousands of hours of design work that went no further than wooden mock ups.

Nothing uncommon about that, certainly not a British only issue, if that's what you're insinuating. Every country in that period was pumping out designs that made it no further than the drawing board - again, a complete nothing-burger when placed into context. The Beaufort was a torpedo bomber, but hey ho. The design in the image came from Specification B.1/39, which was deemed "The Ideal Bomber" and the model was the Handley Page HP.60 submission.

As for the turrets, the Overstrand was the first in service with a power turret, but the Handley Page Harrow brought in the first hydraulic power turrets fitted to bombers in 1937 following the Hawker Demon's Lobster Back turret. Handley Page designed the turret, but Frazer Nash supplied the working gear. Vickers did the same in the Wellington Mk.I, providing its own barbettes with FN supplied gear, before the fitting of Nash & Thompson turrets in the Wellington Ia. The Armstrong Whitworth Whitley was the first British bomber fitted with a Nash & Thompson turret, not a barbette designed by the framer with FN working gear, although Armstrong Whitworth designed its own unpowered turrets.

A bit of background, Frazer Nash was initially a different company to the Nash & Thompson turret manufacturer and continued subsequently as a motor car manufacturer. Obviously the "Nash" in Nash & Thompson is the same Archie Frazer Nash, who was a race car driver. Capt A. Gratton-Thompson was the other party and the two were on the board of Parnall Aircraft at Yate, forming Nash & Thompson in 1935. The hydraulic working gear fitted to British turrets was developed by Frazer Nash the guy and supplied by Nash & Thompson the company, so N&T turrets have the suffix "FN" to denote the use of Frazer Nash working gear.

The Bristol F2B was often misinterpreted. When initially flown as a normal two seat aircraft (steady flying so the gunner could aim) they suffered high losses.

Only at the very beginning of its combat career, with 48 Sqn and only for about three weeks, so not long at all. The man responsible for leading the Bristol Fighter into combat for the first time was none other than William Leefe-Robinson VC of 48 Sqn RFC on 5 April, who got a lot of stick for losing Brisfits on its first outing because of his flying the aircraft in a defensive posture. On his first operation, he was shot down and taken prisoner. Manfred von Richtofen managed to claim two of four Bristols lost on that day. 48 Sqn pilots began flying the aircraft offensively individually within that first three weeks, the change of tactics proving the aircraft's credentials and being roundly adopted from the 30th April onwards.
 
Last edited:
Nothing uncommon about that, certainly not a British only issue, if that's what you're insinuating
Excuse me for referring to a few other threads around here, like

You will be happy to hear I will try my best not to let it happen again to save your sensibilities.
 
You will be happy to hear I will try my best not to let it happen again to save your sensibilities.

Why, thank you good sir. I expect nothing less :evil4:

I'm catching up with what's going on so haven't read through a lot of stuff yet, Studying at the moment, with exams in two weeks, so not much time spent on more important things, like this, for example. :D
 
For someone like me not so up on the details, were there recognizable advantages/disadvantages regarding electrically-powered/hydraulically-powered turrets?
 
From what I've read, there were many reasons why the Shark was superior to the Swordfish, and that production of the latter was ceased by Fairey during WW2 and was taken over by Blackburn must have been a bit of a bloody nose for that company. Neverthelss, the Blackburn Blackburn was matched in hideousness by the Avro Bison, both types outward appearance reflecting the navy's desire to provide a big space for the observer and his radio equipment.
When WW2 broke out Fairey's factories at Hayes in Middlesex and Heaton Chapel, Stockport were fully occupied.

Hayes was in the process of finishing up its pre-war Swordfish orders and tooling up for the new Albacore. The first production Albacore rolled off the line in Oct 1939 and the last Fairey produced Swordfish in Feb 1940.

Blackburn seem to have become involved with Fairey designs in Nov 1938 when the Air Ministry suggested that they should build 100 Albacores in a purpose built workshop at at their Brough factory. In 1939 the Admiralty sought, and obtained, Treasury approval for Blackburn to build 400 Albacores (with 480 Taurus engines) to be produced at a rate of 40 per month (alongside 50 per month from Fairey). By 25 Oct 1939 the Admiralty and Air Ministry had had further talks and it had become apparent that, if the Blackburn order was changed to Swordfish, the required production rate could be achieved 4 months earlier. This was because the Swordfish tooling at the Fairey Hayes factory could be transferred to Blackburn and, as the Swordfish used less metal alloys, the materials would be more readily available.

While the Admiralty considered that the "performance of the Swordfish is substantially inferior to that of the Albacore in several respects", it meant getting the aircraft earlier and saving resources and approx £2 million. So the order became 400 Swordfish and 480 Pegasus engines in Oct 1939. Blackburn then began production of Swordfish at its new Sherburn-in-Elmet shadow factory, with the first rolling off the production line in Dec 1940. Orders for a further 1,900 followed (last 600 cancelled) and production by Blackburn continued until Aug 1944.

In Nov 1934 Fairey had acquired the old WW1 National Aircraft Factory No.2 at Heaton Chapel, from Crossley & Willys Overland the vehicle builders. It began by building all 14 production Fairey Hendons in 1936/37 and from 1937 the Fairey Battle, production of which went on until Sept 1940. Production of the Fulmar was due to start in late 1939 (the first rolled off the production line slightly late in Jan 1940). By the outbreak of war plans were already calling for Barracuda production to start there by April 1941 in succession to the Fulmar. The factory also reconditioned 100 Swordfish in 1940. Barracuda production finally commenced in April 1942 continuing until 1947, while the last Fulmar was produced in Feb 1943. Fairey expanded the site by taking over the adjoining Crossley Motor Works in 1940 and went on to build Beaufighters and Halifax bombers there through to the end of the war.

Blackburn also went on to build 700 Fairey Barracudas at its Brough factory between Oct 1942 and June 1945.
 
Last edited:
Skua = 192 built
SBD = 5,936 built

Comparison of "scores" actually tells us nothing.
The SBD was NOT single role. It's designation tells you that.
Scout Dive Bomber

You might check out: U. S. Naval Aircraft Designations 1939-45

SBD meant "Scout Bomber Douglas." SB is Scout Bomber and D is Douglas.

The SB2C was Scout Bomber, 2nd type (2), Curtiss (C).

The Privateer was a PB4Y-2. PB is Patrol Bomber, 4th type (4), Consolidated (Y), -2 second variant.
 
You might check out: U. S. Naval Aircraft Designations 1939-45

SBD meant "Scout Bomber Douglas." SB is Scout Bomber and D is Douglas.

The SB2C was Scout Bomber, 2nd type (2), Curtiss (C).

The Privateer was a PB4Y-2. PB is Patrol Bomber, 4th type (4), Consolidated (Y), -2 second variant.
Thank you for the correction.

I Knew that...........................once upon a time ;)
 

Users who are viewing this thread

Back