The British aircraft actually came from the Canadian production line and were SBW-1B models. Produced by Canadian Car & Foundry Company. Made no difference to how good/bad they were.
Improved Skua for FAA?
- Thread starter Admiral Beez
- Start date
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Geoffrey Sinclair
Staff Sergeant
- 927
- Sep 30, 2021
Britain, SBD-5 Dauntless arrivals, 2 in November 1943, 1 in February and 6 in April 1944. For evaluation. The SBD-5 went out of production in April and the SBD-6 in August 1944. Canadian Car and Foundry built the SBW September 1943 to September 1945. Fairchild Canada built the SBF October 1943 to May 1945. Canada says 835 SBW built, the U.S. says 834. The first SBW-5, USN Bureau Number 60210, was never accepted by the USN.
835 SBW, 40 -1, 26 -1B (British), 413 -3, 270 -4/4E and 86 -5. The SBW-1B acceptances were 1 in September, 6 in November, 8 in December 1943, 7 in January and 4 in February 1944. The USN reports JW100 to 125 were BuNo 60010 to 60035 but 60023 crashed, while BuNo 21198 was an XSBW-3 but crashed. The SBW-1/1B (and in fact all CCF Helldiver) orders were NXs-LL-139A on 23 May 1942 for 450 aircraft (BuNo 60010 to 60459) and NOa(s)-1733 on 17 September 1943 for 550 aircraft (BuNo 21192 to 21741).
300 SBF, 1 X-1, 49 -1, 150 -3 and 100 -4E.
Britain Helldiver (SBW-1B) arrivals 3 in March, 1 in May, 4 in August and 1 in September 1944, 1 in January 1945, the remaining 16 were presumably assigned to 1820 squadron which arrived in Britain on HMS Arbiter in July 1944 after training in the US and losing some aircraft there.
The other Helldiver family export. The Australian Minister of External Affairs, Dr. H.V. Evatt's 1943 mission to the US resulted in additional aircraft for the RAAF, including 3 types not previously allocated, 150 A.25, 12 PBM and 14 UC-64, notified to Australia on 17 July 1943. The A-25 were ordered under RAAF Overseas Indent 2225. The USAAF reports it delivered 1 A-25 in August and 9 in September for the RAAF, serials 42-79673 to 42-79682.
As of end July 1943 the RAAF reports the 150 A-25 Shrike shipments were to begin in August, then in September it was none yet arrived but shipments were expected to finish in December. By mid September "Due to temporary restrictions on West Coast shipping the aircraft are moving to the East Coast for shipment."
10 reported en route mid October. By November shipments expected to be completed in January 1944. The RAAF reported the 10 sent arrived 23 to 25 November 1943 as uncrated deck cargo on the Port Caroline, adhesive plaster used to protect flaps, joints etc. and were A25-A-15-CS models.
Mid December, "Shipments being held until clarification of radio equipment."
Mid January 1944 "Action taken to cancel 142 dive bombers from RAAF allocations, it is understood most will be Shrikes" the A-25 order was cancelled by the end of the next week.
In February "Possibility of returning the Shrikes to US authorities being investigated." and "9 aircraft not erected to stay that way, will be returned to USA".
A69-4/42-79676 was allocated for target towing trials and performance testing in February/March 1944.
October 1944 A-25 Shrike "Approval to dispose of aircraft to USAAF given." December 1944 "5 issued to USAAF.", January 1945 remaining 5 issued to USAAF.
835 SBW, 40 -1, 26 -1B (British), 413 -3, 270 -4/4E and 86 -5. The SBW-1B acceptances were 1 in September, 6 in November, 8 in December 1943, 7 in January and 4 in February 1944. The USN reports JW100 to 125 were BuNo 60010 to 60035 but 60023 crashed, while BuNo 21198 was an XSBW-3 but crashed. The SBW-1/1B (and in fact all CCF Helldiver) orders were NXs-LL-139A on 23 May 1942 for 450 aircraft (BuNo 60010 to 60459) and NOa(s)-1733 on 17 September 1943 for 550 aircraft (BuNo 21192 to 21741).
300 SBF, 1 X-1, 49 -1, 150 -3 and 100 -4E.
Britain Helldiver (SBW-1B) arrivals 3 in March, 1 in May, 4 in August and 1 in September 1944, 1 in January 1945, the remaining 16 were presumably assigned to 1820 squadron which arrived in Britain on HMS Arbiter in July 1944 after training in the US and losing some aircraft there.
The other Helldiver family export. The Australian Minister of External Affairs, Dr. H.V. Evatt's 1943 mission to the US resulted in additional aircraft for the RAAF, including 3 types not previously allocated, 150 A.25, 12 PBM and 14 UC-64, notified to Australia on 17 July 1943. The A-25 were ordered under RAAF Overseas Indent 2225. The USAAF reports it delivered 1 A-25 in August and 9 in September for the RAAF, serials 42-79673 to 42-79682.
As of end July 1943 the RAAF reports the 150 A-25 Shrike shipments were to begin in August, then in September it was none yet arrived but shipments were expected to finish in December. By mid September "Due to temporary restrictions on West Coast shipping the aircraft are moving to the East Coast for shipment."
10 reported en route mid October. By November shipments expected to be completed in January 1944. The RAAF reported the 10 sent arrived 23 to 25 November 1943 as uncrated deck cargo on the Port Caroline, adhesive plaster used to protect flaps, joints etc. and were A25-A-15-CS models.
Mid December, "Shipments being held until clarification of radio equipment."
Mid January 1944 "Action taken to cancel 142 dive bombers from RAAF allocations, it is understood most will be Shrikes" the A-25 order was cancelled by the end of the next week.
In February "Possibility of returning the Shrikes to US authorities being investigated." and "9 aircraft not erected to stay that way, will be returned to USA".
A69-4/42-79676 was allocated for target towing trials and performance testing in February/March 1944.
October 1944 A-25 Shrike "Approval to dispose of aircraft to USAAF given." December 1944 "5 issued to USAAF.", January 1945 remaining 5 issued to USAAF.
- Thread starter
- #183
Admiral Beez
Major
It's interesting that the RAF never took interest in dedicated dive bombers. They seemed to have success with the Vengeance. What about an improved Skua for the RAF? Omitting the wing fold mechanism, arrestor hook, catapult fittings and dinghy might shave a few hundred pounds off.
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
And do something about that darned windscreen!
Reluctant Poster
Tech Sergeant
- 1,641
- Dec 6, 2006
I should have noted that the Martin turret was replaced by the Bristol. The Bristol was electrically driven but I don't know what control system it used
Shortround6
Major General
OK, sending over an airplane to serve as a model for the new windscreen.
Hope that meets you expectations.
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
Thanks bro'!
Look closely. Is it really that bad? Note the very narrow not quite vertical panel and the much larger almost triangular angled quarter panels.
Think about pushing the air around the sides of the cockpit rather than over the top.
Blackburn B-24 Skua
A shipboard two seat fighter / dive bomber that was the first British type to shoot down an enemy aircraft during the Second World War.
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
I really wasn't all that serious.
Shortround6
Major General
I agree that people are a bit too hard on the Skua, mostly because to the "fighter" designation.
I get accused of being anti British at times.
So here is a hit on the Americans.
In service in defense of Somoa until June 1943 (?)
It does have a sloped windscreen but it has so much drag from other things that it didn't need dive brakes.
All so note that it is a convertible.
When the enemy approaches from the rear the gunner note only slides the canopy forward, he has to lower the turtle deck to open the field of fire and swing the gun into position.
(British got 5 of them, went straight to training, didn't even try to use them as target towers'
I get accused of being anti British at times.
So here is a hit on the Americans.
In service in defense of Somoa until June 1943 (?)
It does have a sloped windscreen but it has so much drag from other things that it didn't need dive brakes.
All so note that it is a convertible.
When the enemy approaches from the rear the gunner note only slides the canopy forward, he has to lower the turtle deck to open the field of fire and swing the gun into position.
(British got 5 of them, went straight to training, didn't even try to use them as target towers'
- Thread starter
- #191
Admiral Beez
Major
Thumpalumpacus
Major
When the enemy approaches from the rear the gunner note only slides the canopy forward, he has to lower the turtle deck to open the field of fire and swing the gun into position.
(British got 5 of them, went straight to training, didn't even try to use them as target towers'
Didn't the SB2C (which is one of my favorite GI acronyms ever!) have the same deployment process for the rear gunner -- dropping the deck for the field of fire?
Thumpalumpacus
Major
yulzari
Tech Sergeant
Re tail guns; Faireys found the Battle hand held rear VGO reduced performance when deployed with extra drag and the gun was difficult to use in the 200+mph wind. They concluded that keeping the rear closed up and saving the weight of the gun etc. would be of more use. Tried on the post Battle light dive bomber offer and deliberately kept so on the Fulmar.
The gunner in the Battle was much more exposed when using his gun, than the gunner in the SB2C. Small wonder it was difficult to use and caused drag.
Fairey Battle I RAF air gunner mans his Vickers K gun from the rear cockpit
Asisbiz article about Fairey Battle I RAF air gunner mans his Vickers K gun from the rear cockpit
www.asisbiz.com
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The Royal Navy did indeed abandon the armoured box hanger after the Indomitables.
It had a fatal flaw that doomed all of them to short lives and early trips to the scrapyard
The very rigid box kept most bombs out, but Newton and his every action has a reaction is a thing.
While on an American carrier, the blast was vented outboard from the hanger, on a British armoured carrier, the shock was fed down through the armoured box into the hull causing structural damage like bent shafts, twisted keels and other not good outcomes.
The other thing was a fire in the hanger - it didn't vent and temperatures reached such high levels, yet again, twisted hull time.
The follow on Audacious class had a much lighter armoured box, little better than splinter levels with armoured patches over the vitals, and Malta class were modelled after the Lexingtons and did away with it.
Also, its claimed the 'stupid Americans' followed British practice and moved the strength deck up from the hanger floor to the flight deck as they had fallen in love with 'armoured carriers'. Nope, they did it because it was the only way to make the huge new carriers hulls stiff enough.
Also, its commonly claimed US wartime carriers weren't armoured - actually, yes they were, but the armoured deck was the hanger floor.
The RN did NOT abandon the armoured box hangar after Indomitable.
Firstly we need to clarify exactly what we are talking about. Carrier hangars can be either "open" or "closed". An open hangar is basically superstructure sitting on the ship's hull girder and extends to the edge of the deck (It needs expansion joints spaced along its flight deck length to cope with bending of the hull girder under it). A closed hangar is usually part of the hull girder itself, and there will be compartments between the ship's side and the hangar walls.
And either can be armoured or unarmoured.
So the US built CV-2 & 3 Lexington and Saratoga with closed hangars before moving to open hangars, until the Forrestal class supercarrier were developed in the early 1950s both for considerations of hull strength and protection from nuclear blast. After considering adding armoured flight decks to a number of carrier designs (Yorktown and Essex) they finally adopted an armoured flight deck in the Midway class, to protect a large part of the hangar space. As in earlier US carrier's the hangar deck was armoured and they added armoured doors to divide up the hangar. All that required support so holes in the hangar walls had to be reduced compared with previous open hangar designs. Additional hangar side protection came from the pedestals for the 5"/54 guns. But no armoured sides to the hangar itself.
The Japanese opted for the closed hangar in their carrier's, adding an armoured flight deck in the Taiho.
Britain also opted for the closed hangar design for its carriers including the 1938 Ark Royal. It was only with the Illustrious class that a move was made to turn that closed hangar into an armoured box.
In the Implacable design they had to save weight to stay within the 23,000 ton Treaty limit and have more speed and the extra half hangar. So the armour on the hangar sides and bulkheads was reduced from 4.5" to 1.5" to compensate. That was then also applied to Indomitable while her design was being modified in 1938. But it was still NC armour plate not ordinary steel plate and it was still used structurally as in the Illustrious class.
The Audacious class as designed in 1942 increased the thickness of the flight deck from 3" to 4" but retained the 1.5" hangar wall NC armour. The double hangar was still closed and an armoured box.
The Colossus/Majestic and Centaur classes still had a closed hangar, but it was left unarmoured.
Ark Royal and Hermes (armoured and unarmoured closed hangar designs respectively) had to have significant strengthening added to their sides when redesigned post-war to incorporate side lifts as the hull girder was being cut into.
As for the Maltas, there was much debate within the Admiralty about whether to adopt an open or closed hangar. The initial design adopted was basically an enlarged armoured closed double hangar Audacious class. Then everyone went back to the drawing board and the final design, which incidentally was never approved by the Admiralty before cancellation, became a US style open hangar design without an armoured flight deck it is the latter that appears in most illustrations and models of the ship.
The stories about the Illustrious class having bent shafts and twisted keels postwar as a result of wartime bomb damage has yet to be evidenced. (I would call it a myth but who knows someone someday might find something buried in the archives that has not yet come to light. Never say never. But not yet.). Illustrious herself served as a trials and training carrier all the way through until the end of 1954 having steamed the equivalent of nearly 18 times around the world. Not something you would expect of a ship of a ship so badly damaged in the way claimed. Only Formidable did not see service post-war, and while in Reserve seems to have been badly neglected being in a "poor material state" by 1949, without any mention of twisted kneels and bent shafts. Indomitable was the other ship that was heavily damaged at different times, but she too saw service between 1950 and 1953 as an operational carrier.
As for fire damage, take a look at the damage reports for Illustrious in 1941 and compare with that for the Franklin in 1945 with her much improved standards if damage control. The hangar fire in Illustrious affected only the after part and was contained there. The fire on the deck below was started by a bomb weighing far in excess of what her armour, or that of any carrier, could have kept out and which hit further forward IIRC (2,200lb). And again where is the evidence that these fires led to more twisted hull damage.
Post-war the RN preferred the light carriers on the front line because it took less crew to man them at a time when the RN had a manning problem. So Victorious, Indefatigable and Implacable spent long periods as training ships only going to sea occasionally, but being manned meant that they were well maintained.
When it came to the 1950s the closed hangar design was just not as flexible when it came to reconstructing them, as the open hangar design in the much larger Essex and Midway classes of the US Navy. After the early experience with Victorious (reconstructed 1950-58) and the headaches from planning the Implacable reconstruction, the RN canned the whole project in 1952. It was just not worth the effort and cost to get a decent carrier capable of taking the types of aircraft expected in service by the end of the decade.
At the end of the day both the US Navy and the RN built the types of carrier that they felt was best suited to the war that they expected to fight.
DK Brown, the naval architect and author, in "Nelson to Vanguard" discusses the pros and cons of open v closed hangars, summarising them like this:--
"Open hangar. Good ventilation, easy to warm up planes, mount large strike, side lifts, more planes.
Closed hangar. Stronger, lighter hull. Much safer against fire, easy to armour, planes protected from weather and some enemy action.
"The choice was not easy, depending on the weight attached to different aspects. Goodall [Sir Stanley Goodall, the wartime Director of Naval Construction] made these points in 1943 under four headings - Aircraft operation, Size and strength of the ship, Protection and Fire risk. He saw the open hangar having a small lead in operation, closed with a big lead in strength and protection and little difference in fire risk. Overall he favoured the closed hangar. I would suggest that both the RN and the US N were right for the wars they planned to fight, the RN in narrow seas, facing shore - based aircraft while the US N expected to engage the Japanese fleet in the open Pacific. The author's choice for The RN in the late 1930s would have been an improved Ark Royal [completed Dec 1938 with hangar capacity for 60 Swordfish / Skua sized aircraft] with better lifts and cleaner run of uptake."
There is plenty of information including damage reports over on the armoured carriers website.
Armoured Aircraft Carriers in World War II
Action reports and battle damage for the armoured aircraft carriers HMS Illustrious, Formidable, Victorious, Indomitable, Indefatigable and Implacable in World War II, 1940-1942
www.armouredcarriers.com
And you can find the Franklin damage report here.
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Reluctant Poster
Tech Sergeant
- 1,641
- Dec 6, 2006
The vented blast myth.
Here are some excerpts from the damage report for the Enterprise when it was struck by a kamikaze on May 14, 1945
The famous photo of a portion of the elevator 400 feet in the air.
Note the flight deck was bulged upwards by 3 and and half feet
Full report is here: USS Enterprise CV6 War History 1941 - 1945
From the Wasp lost in action report
Elevator blown up and over. Side venting doesn't seemed to have helped.
The statement that
" the shock was fed down through the armoured box into the hull causing structural damage like bent shafts, twisted keels and other not good outcomes.
The other thing was a fire in the hanger - it didn't vent and temperatures reached such high levels, yet again, twisted hull" is not true . Bent shafts were caused by underwater explosion from near misses. What specific references to you have for twisted hulls from hanger fires?
As to your statement that the US didn't want armored flight decks here is an excerpt from the USS Franklin damage report
Report is here: USS Franklin CV-13 War Damage Report No. 56
Actually the USN was 'stupid" enough to follow the RN. Every USN fleet carrier after the Essex class was fitted with an armored flight deck. It was a decision based on experience with the survivability of RN carriers. Note that the strength deck was still at the hanger level on the Midway class, the armored flight deck was pure superstructure .
It also important to note that the USN carriers were struck with smaller bombs (500lb) than the RN were hit with in the Med. The destructive power of a 1000 lb bomb was more than twice that of a 500 lb. NO carrier suffered any where near the number of bomb hits the Illustrious took on January 1, 1941 and lived to tell the tale.
As to the closed hanger the USN spent a lot of money post war turning their Essex class carriers into Illustrious look alikes.
Aircraft Carrier Intrepid | Intrepid Museum
Commissioned in 1943, Aircraft Carrier Intrepid survived five Kamikaze attacks and a torpedo strike during WWII. The aircraft carrier later served in the Cold War, Vietnam War and as a NASA recovery vessel.
Another thing to note is the appalling casualty rate on US carriers which was far far greater than on RN ships. I have the stats somewhere and will dig them up.
Attachments
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Enterprise's flight deck, just aft and to port of her forward lift well following the kamikaze damage on 4 May.
One of a series of photos of the Bunker Hill in May 1945
Franklin arriving in New York a month after being bombed
One of a series of photos of the Bunker Hill in May 1945
Franklin arriving in New York a month after being bombed
