Inevitable: Why Schweinfurt Had to Happen - Military Aviation History
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Thumpalumpacus
Major
Ordered, thanks for the tip. Off to watch the OP's video in a moment.
Good one!
drgondog
Major
I am ambivalent about the video and the assertions = mostly correct, but overlooking some important facts and context.
I was suprised that he didn't mention AWPD-1 steered by Colonel then General Muir Fairchild, ACoS Plans Division and completed September 1941. The central theme and Objective stated for strategic airpower was to destroy the enemy's national industrial capacity as well as his air, sea and land forces. He was aslo the central author of USAAC FM-1-15 "Tactics and Techniques of Air Fighting" pointing to the primary mission of US Airpower as "Destroy the Hostle Air Force's freedom of the air".
I'm not aware of any plans documents of any other nation that served continuously as 'the Plan'.
Schweinfurt-Regenburg and Schweinfurt must be taken in context of Blitz Week and Ploesti in which for first time 8th AF, and by definition AAF-Hq fed from such claims, that the destruction (and therefore attrition of LW ability to defend) of enemy aircraft by B-17 and B-24 gunners was FAR overstated. Equal mention should have been given to Casablanca and the basis for POINTBLANK/Combined Bomber Offensive as the 'COMMITMENT", come hell or high water.
He didn't quote the one central character (Speer) in the drama about the concerns Speer had about the consequences - had 8th AF mounted immediate and consistent attacks to complete the significantdamage of August 17. Two months gave him adequate time to decentralize production to other sites.
The failures experienced (IMO) were multifold, namely:
1.) Wrong bomb selection. Only 20% were 1000pd GP. Minimum bomb load should have been 1000GP with a large mix of 2000GP. Machine tools experienced far less damage from the Incidiary and 500GP than expected. IMO - this error was a major factor all the way through EOW in ETO.
2.) Lack of strength to go back within 5-10 days and repeat. THAT Does lay on Arnld's shoulders - not Eaker, who had been begging for the 600 bomber strength level as committed after POINTBLANK agreed.
3.) Willingness of Arnold/Combined Chiefs to attrit 8th AF, including dispatch of all B-24BG to Benghazi for 3 mo to train for Ploesti; stripping 8th AF of P-38s in 1942, thereby eliminating an escort force CAPABLE of Schweinfurt. (Regensburg iffy'); No B-24s were even used to attack Schweinfurt on 14 October!
4.) Complex plan logically splitting LW forces by launching the two Task forces at the same time, abandoned by the pressure to Go, when weather said No.
5.) Gross underestimates of LW forces arrayed to defend. Recall that Aug 17 less than 3 weeks after Blitz Week.
The narrator comments regarding 'shutting down 8th AF' while true for deep strikes, was largely due to weather patterns over NW Europe, H2X and H2S was minimally effective - ditto 1944 and 1945. The second reason was the requirement to replace attrition as well as train new incoming bomb groups. That said, Schwinfurt was a defeat to AWPD-1. Conversely, Big Week and the Oil Campaign was a validation to AWPD and USAAC FM-1-15 "Tactics and Techniques of Air Fighting".
Further, for any other reason the author might conjure regarding the failure of AAF doctrine, Airpower (incl RAF) Did destroy Germany's Industrial capability; Airpower DID destroy Japan industrial base And deliver the final blow(s) to Japan - eliminating a long bloody land campaign to subdue Japan.
With Nuclear weapons and LR delivery AWPD-1 still lives.
OTOH BioTech and AI will oulive all of us.
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wuzak
Captain
Did the 8th AF have enough 2,000lb HE bombs available at the time?
Was there a fear that fewer large bombs would lead to much fewer hits? The number of hits on factory buildings was 80.
I had thought that the B-17s carried 5 x 1,000lb each. For those carrying 500lb bombs, how many did they have?
I believe the initial plan was for RAF BC to do a follow up raid that night, but they instead raided Peenemünde and the V-weapons development program.
Their likely load would have been 14 x 1,000lb MC bombs each. A few may have carried a different load include a 4,000lb HC bomb. RAF didn't have a 2,000lb MC bomb, only the 1,900lb GP bomb, which had as much explosive as a 500lb MC bomb, maybe less.
Wasn't there a disparity in training between the two task forces?
I wonder if having the two targets and two task force also caused problems in organising a a follow-up raid, with the Regensburg group heading to Africa after their raid.
If they had gone all-in on Schweinfurt, that would have been 376 bombers instead of 230. A much harder job for the defenders.
And there may have been more bombers left in good condition that could do a follow-up attack.
drgondog
Major
Don't know what inventory was, but even 1000# far better than 500GP
Considering bomb drop was salvo vs timed spread, the probability of even fewer hits with much larger bomb implies more serious damage.
Usual load out for that range was 10x500GP, but Mixes were also frequent.
Why did Harris ignore the plan if originally agree?
Not really, and the lead boxes were long on experience. Lead crew system in effect for 8+ months.
Worth consideration for a raid within 5 days or so, but the real issue was depletion of B-17s an crews and the absence of 2nd BD still recovering from Ploesti attack. Recall that Ploesti suffered more losses than either 1stBD or 3rdBD on Aug 17.
In retrospect, considering the highest priority was Schweinfurt, and that October 14 attack was 'all in', it begs the question 'what were they thinking'?
Hard to say. The LW was surprised and unable to mount effective attacks on LeMay's force en route to Africa. I suspect that had the Regensburg force returned to UK, that their losses would have been much higher due to pretty well known return route, and plenty of time to rearm and refuel LW forces. They had nealy 20% as it was.
The next mission to Germany was in September - Stuttgart, but ability to mount 300 ship attack was extremely hard until October only because 2BD/BW was again operational..
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- #8
wuzak
Captain
I think it was because of the intelligence they had received about the V-weapons, as well as the reconnaissance photos they had taken.
The V-1 was seen as a very big threat.
Thumpalumpacus
Major
Harris was notoriously skeptical of "panacea" targets of any sort. Wasn't he ordered to bomb Peenemunde?
Middlebrook's book on Peenemunde is excellent. Yes they were directed to bomb it.
14,000 lbs was the maximum load carried by the standard Lancaster (I.e. Non-special). The load would have been less because of the distance to Schweinfurt, and also Halifaxes carried less. Almost certainly the 4,000 lb cookie would have been part of the load, had they gone to that target.
Last edited:
Geoffrey Sinclair
Staff Sergeant
- 923
- Sep 30, 2021
Schweinfurt, Bavaria on river Main, population around 36,500, industries: machinery, soap, paint, tobacco. Around 450 air miles from London. Finding a target that size by night in early 1944 was a challenge. Harris considered the Schweinfurt ball bearings plants would require 6 or 7 attacks to destroy and knew if fires could be started they tended to do more damage to machine tools than HE. 14 January 1944, Air Marshal Bottomley (Deputy Chief of Air Staff) to Harris,
"6. It is particularly important that you should do your utmost to destroy at an early a date as possible, the town of Schweinfurt and the ball bearing factories which it contains. One third of the town's population is employed in the ball-bearing industry; the "de-housing" of the town and the infliction of heavy casualties amongst those workers would, in itself, be a valuable contribution."
Bomber Command did two main raids in 1944, (Richard Davis figures)
24 February, 662 attacking, 33 lost, in short tons 1,372.8 HE, 1,160.8 incendiary, total 3,533.6
26 April, 217 attacking, 23 lost, in short tons 155.0 HE, 593.2 incendiary, total 748.2.
The 24 February raid was the follow up to the USAAF raid earlier that day, in part hope the fires started during the day would act as a guide at night. Raid split into two parts. Looks like the German raid report is the combined result of the day and night raids,
SCHWEINFURT, E.2606 - Min. of Arm. & War Prod, 24/25 FEBRUARY. This is the only source available and information refers to the ball-bearing works only. No details are available of any other results of the raid.
Estimated No. of Aircraft: 1100
Weight of Bombs dropped: 102681 kg. H.E. & incendiary
Weight of Bombs on work areas: 68330 kg. H.E. & incendiary
Floor area of works buildings destroyed: 79435 sq. metres.
The 24/25 February raid, HE bombs dropped: 6x8,000, 429x4,000, 147x2,000, 600x1,000, 174x500 pound, table is by aircraft type and function, long tons
According to Richard Davis the earlier that day USAAF strike had 238 attacking, dropping 399.3 short tons of HE and 175.3 of incendiaries, total 574.6 short tons or 4,828.6 pounds per bomber
SCHWEINFURT, 8a 2341 - LGK VII War Diary, E.2606 - Min. of Arm. & War Prod, 26/27 APRIL. Between 0054 and 0143 hours a force estimated at 400 to 500 aircraft entered the area and steered an E course between Mannheim and Stuttgart and later a N course to Schweinfurt.
Bombs dropped: 6 mines, 300 H.E., 5000 phosphorous bombs, 20000 incendiary bombs.
Houses: 122 destroyed, 120 severely damaged, 64 medium damage, 335 slightly damaged.
Casualties: 5 dead, 45 injured.
The ball-bearing works sustained fairly heavy damage. No. 1 Works of the United Ball-bearing Co. were obliged to reduce their production for some days. At Fichtel & Sachs the gas generator plant was put out of action for some time as a result of fire and the Star Co. suffered very severe damage, resulting in a 100% drop for some time. The Rotenburger Metal Works also suffered a 100% drop for about a fortnight as a result of severe damage by H.E. bombs.
In the Armaments Ministry document the weight of bombs dropped on Star Kugelhalter Gesellschaft, Kugellager Fichtel & Sach and Kugelfischer, Georg Schaefer & Co. is given as about 22000 kg of mines, H.E. and incendiary bombs. The greatest weight fell on Kugelfischer, Georg Schaefer & Co. but 68% (16625 sq metres) of the works area of the Star Kugelhalter Gesellschaft was destroyed.
Bomber Command War Diaries indicate lots of undershooting in February and a raid failure in April. The Bomber Command Intelligence reports for the April raid says little cloud but an effective smoke screen, plus poor communication between the bombers.
The earlier USAAF raids on Schweinfurt by factory (Richard Davis Figures)
The difficulties in hitting the factories even by day. Second Schweinfurt raid analysis, from Americas Pursuit of Precision Bombing, MacFarlane. 14 October 1943, 16 Bomb Groups, 229 Bombers, 1st and 3rd wings. 459 1000 lb bombs, 663 500lb, 1751 100 lb (482.2 tons), 3 groups missed the target, 5 had less than 10% of bombs within 500 feet of the target, the 351st with 29% hits were the most accurate, around 10% of the bombs were within 500 feet of the aiming point, 63 direct hits, around 10% of the machinery damaged or destroyed.
SCHWEINFURT, E. 1679 - Chief, Orpo, 8a 1151 - Min. of Pub. Inf. & Prop., E. 2576 - LGK XII summaries, E. 2606 - Min. of Arm. & War Prod., 17 AUGUST, (USAAF). Approximately 270 aircraft took part in this raid from 1600 until 1700 hours. The main weight of the attack fell on the Central Station, Old Town and the industrial and barracks area.
Bombs dropped: 1 mine, 1317 H.E. (59 duds), 27 phosphorous bombs 1800 oil bombs.
Houses: 160 destroyed and 1010 damaged.
Fires: 19 major and 150 medium to small fires.
Casualties: 249 dead, 639 injured.
The firms of Kugelfischer, Georg Schaefer & Co., Fichtl & Sachs Ballbearing Works and the Rothhenburger Metal Works were severely damaged. No. 2 Works of the Vereinigte Kugellager Works was partially damaged.
The Central Station was destroyed and a few trains burnt out. The Goods Yards were also hit, damaging buildings, tracks and rolling stocks. Damage was also caused to 2 barracks. The Municipal Gas Works were destroyed and Post Office buildings badly damaged. On the firm of Kugelfischer, Georg Schaefer & Co. 33500 kg of H.E. and 3900 kg of incendiary bombs were dropped, destroying 19000 sq. metres = 8% of the total area of the factory.
SCHWEINFURT, E. 2576 - LGK XII summaries, E. 2606 - Min. of Arm. & War Prod., 14 OCTOBER (USAAF). There are no German documents available which give details of where the bombs fell but it is evident from the following the ball-bearing works were mainly affected. About 250 - 300 aircraft took part.
Bombs Dropped: A number of mines, 1200 H.E., 1500 oil bombs.
Houses: 107 destroyed and 280 damaged.
Casualties: 283 dead and 359 injured.
Of the bombs dropped, 3600 kg of mines, 35500 kg of H.E. and 2400 kg of incendiary bombs fell on the factory area of the Kugellagerwerk Kugelfischer, Georg Schaefer & Co. They destroyed 19400 sq. metres of the factory area, equal to 8.5% of the total area. In addition 45 1000 lb (2 duds) H.E. and 43 261b (2 duds) incendiary bombs fell on the factory area of the Vereinigten Kugellager-fabrik, Works I and II.
When it came to the idea of co-ordinated day and night raids in 1943/44 Bomber Command and the 8th Air Force had problems due to the way over the time period one then the other had more tactical freedom. And different ideas about what to hit. When it came to raids on German aircraft production from the Casablanca directive Air Marshal Bottomly actually mentioned 6 cities to Harris, of these 4 were attacked,
Kassel, hit on 3/4 October and 22/23 October 1943.
Leipzig 20/21 October and 3/4 December 1943 also 19/20 February 1944,
Brunswick hit 14/15 January 1944.
Augsburg hit on 25/26 February 1944
The 8th hit Kassel on the 28th and 30th of July 1943, then again on 19 April 1944.
The 8th hit Brunswick for the first time on 11 January 1944
The 8th hit Leipzig for the first time on 20 February 1944.
The 8th hit Augsburg for the first time on 25 February 1944.
The other two towns mentioned were, according to the British Official History, not hit by the 8th until February 1944.
"6. It is particularly important that you should do your utmost to destroy at an early a date as possible, the town of Schweinfurt and the ball bearing factories which it contains. One third of the town's population is employed in the ball-bearing industry; the "de-housing" of the town and the infliction of heavy casualties amongst those workers would, in itself, be a valuable contribution."
Bomber Command did two main raids in 1944, (Richard Davis figures)
24 February, 662 attacking, 33 lost, in short tons 1,372.8 HE, 1,160.8 incendiary, total 3,533.6
26 April, 217 attacking, 23 lost, in short tons 155.0 HE, 593.2 incendiary, total 748.2.
The 24 February raid was the follow up to the USAAF raid earlier that day, in part hope the fires started during the day would act as a guide at night. Raid split into two parts. Looks like the German raid report is the combined result of the day and night raids,
SCHWEINFURT, E.2606 - Min. of Arm. & War Prod, 24/25 FEBRUARY. This is the only source available and information refers to the ball-bearing works only. No details are available of any other results of the raid.
Estimated No. of Aircraft: 1100
Weight of Bombs dropped: 102681 kg. H.E. & incendiary
Weight of Bombs on work areas: 68330 kg. H.E. & incendiary
Floor area of works buildings destroyed: 79435 sq. metres.
The 24/25 February raid, HE bombs dropped: 6x8,000, 429x4,000, 147x2,000, 600x1,000, 174x500 pound, table is by aircraft type and function, long tons
| Phase | Aircraft | Attack | HE | Incendiary | Total | Lb/bomber |
1 | Mosq Path | 5 | 4.5 | 0 | 4.5 | 2016.0 |
1 | Hali II Path | 1 | 2.7 | 0 | 2.7 | 6048.0 |
1 | Hali III Path | 18 | 30.8 | 3.9 | 34.7 | 4318.2 |
1 | Hali III Main | 123 | 0 | 211.6 | 211.6 | 3853.5 |
1 | Lanc Path | 44 | 160.8 | 10.9 | 171.7 | 8741.1 |
1 | Lanc Main | 162 | 366 | 307.2 | 673.2 | 9308.4 |
2 | Mosq Path | 5 | 4.5 | 0 | 4.5 | 2016.0 |
2 | Lanc Path | 40 | 126.8 | 10.2 | 137 | 7672.0 |
2 | Lanc Main | 264 | 529.6 | 492.6 | 1022.2 | 8673.2 |
| All | Total | 662 | 1225.7 | 1036.4 | 2262.1 | 7654.2 |
According to Richard Davis the earlier that day USAAF strike had 238 attacking, dropping 399.3 short tons of HE and 175.3 of incendiaries, total 574.6 short tons or 4,828.6 pounds per bomber
SCHWEINFURT, 8a 2341 - LGK VII War Diary, E.2606 - Min. of Arm. & War Prod, 26/27 APRIL. Between 0054 and 0143 hours a force estimated at 400 to 500 aircraft entered the area and steered an E course between Mannheim and Stuttgart and later a N course to Schweinfurt.
Bombs dropped: 6 mines, 300 H.E., 5000 phosphorous bombs, 20000 incendiary bombs.
Houses: 122 destroyed, 120 severely damaged, 64 medium damage, 335 slightly damaged.
Casualties: 5 dead, 45 injured.
The ball-bearing works sustained fairly heavy damage. No. 1 Works of the United Ball-bearing Co. were obliged to reduce their production for some days. At Fichtel & Sachs the gas generator plant was put out of action for some time as a result of fire and the Star Co. suffered very severe damage, resulting in a 100% drop for some time. The Rotenburger Metal Works also suffered a 100% drop for about a fortnight as a result of severe damage by H.E. bombs.
In the Armaments Ministry document the weight of bombs dropped on Star Kugelhalter Gesellschaft, Kugellager Fichtel & Sach and Kugelfischer, Georg Schaefer & Co. is given as about 22000 kg of mines, H.E. and incendiary bombs. The greatest weight fell on Kugelfischer, Georg Schaefer & Co. but 68% (16625 sq metres) of the works area of the Star Kugelhalter Gesellschaft was destroyed.
Bomber Command War Diaries indicate lots of undershooting in February and a raid failure in April. The Bomber Command Intelligence reports for the April raid says little cloud but an effective smoke screen, plus poor communication between the bombers.
The earlier USAAF raids on Schweinfurt by factory (Richard Davis Figures)
| Month | Target | Attack | Short tons | lb/bomber | |
Aug-43 | Kugelfisher | 54 | 113 | 4185.2 | HE/Incend |
Aug-43 | VKF 1 | 78 | 185 | 4743.6 | HE/Incend |
Aug-43 | VKF 2 | 51 | 127.2 | 4988.2 | HE only |
Oct-43 | Kugelfisher | 81 | 165.7 | 4091.4 | HE only |
Oct-43 | VKF 1 | 61 | 137.1 | 4495.1 | HE/Incend |
Oct-43 | VKF 2 | 86 | 180 | 4186.0 | HE/Incend |
The difficulties in hitting the factories even by day. Second Schweinfurt raid analysis, from Americas Pursuit of Precision Bombing, MacFarlane. 14 October 1943, 16 Bomb Groups, 229 Bombers, 1st and 3rd wings. 459 1000 lb bombs, 663 500lb, 1751 100 lb (482.2 tons), 3 groups missed the target, 5 had less than 10% of bombs within 500 feet of the target, the 351st with 29% hits were the most accurate, around 10% of the bombs were within 500 feet of the aiming point, 63 direct hits, around 10% of the machinery damaged or destroyed.
SCHWEINFURT, E. 1679 - Chief, Orpo, 8a 1151 - Min. of Pub. Inf. & Prop., E. 2576 - LGK XII summaries, E. 2606 - Min. of Arm. & War Prod., 17 AUGUST, (USAAF). Approximately 270 aircraft took part in this raid from 1600 until 1700 hours. The main weight of the attack fell on the Central Station, Old Town and the industrial and barracks area.
Bombs dropped: 1 mine, 1317 H.E. (59 duds), 27 phosphorous bombs 1800 oil bombs.
Houses: 160 destroyed and 1010 damaged.
Fires: 19 major and 150 medium to small fires.
Casualties: 249 dead, 639 injured.
The firms of Kugelfischer, Georg Schaefer & Co., Fichtl & Sachs Ballbearing Works and the Rothhenburger Metal Works were severely damaged. No. 2 Works of the Vereinigte Kugellager Works was partially damaged.
The Central Station was destroyed and a few trains burnt out. The Goods Yards were also hit, damaging buildings, tracks and rolling stocks. Damage was also caused to 2 barracks. The Municipal Gas Works were destroyed and Post Office buildings badly damaged. On the firm of Kugelfischer, Georg Schaefer & Co. 33500 kg of H.E. and 3900 kg of incendiary bombs were dropped, destroying 19000 sq. metres = 8% of the total area of the factory.
SCHWEINFURT, E. 2576 - LGK XII summaries, E. 2606 - Min. of Arm. & War Prod., 14 OCTOBER (USAAF). There are no German documents available which give details of where the bombs fell but it is evident from the following the ball-bearing works were mainly affected. About 250 - 300 aircraft took part.
Bombs Dropped: A number of mines, 1200 H.E., 1500 oil bombs.
Houses: 107 destroyed and 280 damaged.
Casualties: 283 dead and 359 injured.
Of the bombs dropped, 3600 kg of mines, 35500 kg of H.E. and 2400 kg of incendiary bombs fell on the factory area of the Kugellagerwerk Kugelfischer, Georg Schaefer & Co. They destroyed 19400 sq. metres of the factory area, equal to 8.5% of the total area. In addition 45 1000 lb (2 duds) H.E. and 43 261b (2 duds) incendiary bombs fell on the factory area of the Vereinigten Kugellager-fabrik, Works I and II.
When it came to the idea of co-ordinated day and night raids in 1943/44 Bomber Command and the 8th Air Force had problems due to the way over the time period one then the other had more tactical freedom. And different ideas about what to hit. When it came to raids on German aircraft production from the Casablanca directive Air Marshal Bottomly actually mentioned 6 cities to Harris, of these 4 were attacked,
Kassel, hit on 3/4 October and 22/23 October 1943.
Leipzig 20/21 October and 3/4 December 1943 also 19/20 February 1944,
Brunswick hit 14/15 January 1944.
Augsburg hit on 25/26 February 1944
The 8th hit Kassel on the 28th and 30th of July 1943, then again on 19 April 1944.
The 8th hit Brunswick for the first time on 11 January 1944
The 8th hit Leipzig for the first time on 20 February 1944.
The 8th hit Augsburg for the first time on 25 February 1944.
The other two towns mentioned were, according to the British Official History, not hit by the 8th until February 1944.
