Influence of Khalkhin Gol in the Japanese decision not to invade the USSR

[Jenisch]

Hello,

Conventional wisdom puts the Japanese defeat for the Soviets in 1939 as the decisive element in the Japanese decision to not attack the Soviet Union in 1941.

I created this thread because I want to play the devil's advocate with something that I was thinking about this. Here's what I reasoned:

Even if the Japanese had not invaded Southern Indochina and instead had attacked the USSR, I guess that would have triggered the Western oil embargo anyway. Because, I would argue, the Soviet survival was a much more sensible subject for the Western Powers than the European colonies in the region.

That in turn, would not have made a Japanese war with the West inevitable, even if they invaded the USSR?

If what I have argued is plausible, it does not somewhat challenges this vision of the influence of Nomonhan that is pretty much consolidated in the Western historiography? Of course one could argue that if the Japanese felt they could fight the Soviets in 1941, they could have attacked the Soviets and then turn towards the West. But even so, that would still not make a war with the West inevitable if an oil embargo followed the invasion? In other words: war with the north, if one follows my argumentation, would like likely lead to war in the South. Plausible?

 

[Jenisch]

Actually I think my argumentation (again, if it's plausible) boosts the Nomonhan conventional wisdom rather than contest it. Because if the Japanese knew (and I actually don't know if they knew at the time) that there was a plausible risk of an Western oil embargo in case they continued with their expansionism, had they attacked the Soviets and simply did not win quickly (they didn't even need to lose), they would be in deep trouble, because they would "have" to attack the West due to the oil embargo while they were also in a war with the USSR. I guess this view, again: if plausible, explains better why the Japanese went to war in 1941 only with the Western powers. It seems to me that the Soviet question more complex than just Nomonhan, as important as Nomonhan was.

 

[Shinpachi]

Emotionally, Japanese did not necessarily hate Russians.
Even today.

 

[Shinpachi]

Western countries claimed the interests in Manchuria after Japan won it from Russia in 1905.
Japan took all of the interests in 1932 as Manchukuo.
Western countries and Japan also had the interests in China with Chiang Kai-shek.
As Japan was smoky for Chiang, he began to exclude Japan tying up with the communist Mao.
As Japanese hated the communists, Japan decided to exclude Chiang from China in 1937.
Western countries had been imposing the embargo on Japan since 1932 and it was to be tightened until Pearl Harbor.

Did the western countries have such interests in Soviet Union ?
I don't think so, Jenisch.

 

[michaelmaltby]

".... I guess that would have triggered the Western oil embargo anyway"

The embargo was pushed out as U.S. foreign policy in support of China ... and your case ignores the obvious ... Japan was already at war in China with no intention of leaving, they were still there undeated after the atomic strikes, and, had Japan headed East for resources in Russia instead of south and west they would have been at war with the Allies the moment the US entered the war in support of Stalin.

Nomonhan was and is a pivotal event that foreshadowed Japan's entire campaign .... great courage and elan but supreme arrogance and unwillingness to accept reality .... if Soviet Russia could out arm, out supply and out fight Japan in 1939 already, what could the USA do to Japan 2,3, 4 years later?

 

[Jenisch]

Shinpachi,

I think the interest in place the embargo would not because the Allies liked from the Soviets, but simply because the Japanese would have entered in a war against a country that was taking the Lion's share of the German armed forces.

 

[Jenisch]

Michael,

As I have said to Shinpachi, even if the embargo was historically about supporting China, what I'm trying to argue here is that had the Japanese been agressive to the Soviet Union, they would also suffer the embargo even if they had not invaded Southern Indochina. Why the Americans specially, would allow the Japanese to march against the country that was taking the majority of the German military?

 

[michaelmaltby]

agreed

 

[GrauGeist]

Japan attacking the Soviet Union prior to June 1941 would have created an interesting scenario, as Russia was up until that time, an Ally of Germany and Japan was a member of the Axis.

It seems to me that had Japan NOT attacked Pearl Harbor, making the U.S. directly involved in the Pacific war, than Japan attacking the Soviet Union may have gone unchallanged militarily by the U.S.

While the battle of Khalkhin Gol may have been a mistake by Japan, they could have waited until Germany invaded Russia, which pulled many of the commanders out to the west, and then drive in hard from the east creating a two-front war for Stalin.

Add to that, avoiding war with the U.S. (no Pearl Harbor attack), and Russia would have been placed into a very difficult situation.

 

[michaelmaltby]

"....While the battle of Khalkhin Gol may have been a mistake by Japan,"
It was an act of military insubordination by rogue officers ... it was a blunder ... not a strategic consideration.

 

[Jenisch]

I think one can perfectly make the case that without the defeat of Nomonhan, the Japanese could well have attacked the Soviets and then turned towards the West. My conjecture is just perhaps a way explain this in more detail. From the Japanese perspective, it would simply not be tolerable to move against the Soviets and risk the oil embargo and therefore war with the West. Therefore avoiding the Soviets was also a way to avoid a possible two-front war with the West and the USSR.

 

[Jenisch]

Oh, and I found something written by Japanese historian Akira Iriye who boosts my view about the US posture vis-à-vis a Japanese-Soviet war in 1941:

So Roosevelt, maybe in the sense to gain some time, had some kind of informal conversations in Washington, but then the next phase in the chronology is June 1941 when Germany invades the Soviet Union and then it becomes very important for Roosevelt to prevent the collapse of Russia, because if the Soviet Union collapses and is occupied by Germans it would be devastating for the defence of Great Britain, what was left of Western Europe. So Roosevelt sought tremendous pressure on Japan not to attack the Soviet Union from the rear because he knew that some Japanese in the military were thinking about joining the Germans and attacking the Soviet Union from the rear from Siberia. If the Germans and Japanese combine their forces the Japanese felt that they could just do away with the Soviet Union and remove the Soviet threat to Manchuria under Japanese control.

Roosevelt, of course, knows that and tries to put pressure on the Japanese saying that if Japan did anything like that they would have to face strong US resistance. And in this picture from June to about September 1941 the United States is not interested in negotiating with the Japanese at all because what they're interested in is making sure that Japan will not attack the Soviet Union, and they do that by stepping up US pressure, like the embargoing of Japanese oil that comes as a result of a Japanese invasion [of southern Indo-China]. But I think, the thinking is already there in June; to take a tougher stand towards Japan so that Japan would become very much worried about the possible US response to any act that Japan would commit either against Soviet Union or elsewhere. So the United States takes a very hard stand of no compromise on this - Japan [must] clearly make its policy not to attack the Soviet Union nor anybody else.

American reaction > Professor Akira Iriye > WW2History.com

 

[buffnut453]

Currently reading "Japan Strikes South" by Andrew Roth, a contemporaneous view of the role of (then) French Indo-China in the expansion of the Japanese empire. The book makes an interesting observation that I hadn't seen mentioned in other histories...that Indo-China was the main resupply route into China from the outside world. The French built railways in the 1930s to aid movement of trade between China and Indo-China. As that decade drew to a close, the railways were being used for supplies going to anti-Japanese forces in China at a capacity that put the famed Burma Road very much into second place. Thus the invasion of northern Indo-China is a logical step towards the successful conclusion of Japan's war in China. That it also helped open the door to the Netherlands East Indies was an added benefit. Conversely, attacking the USSR would gain Japan nothing except getting embroiled in another long war over a vast territory.

I agree with others. If Japan had not attacked Pearl Harbor, I see little benefit to the US entering the war once Japan attacked Malaya and Singapore en route to the NEI. The Philippines would remain a threat to Japanese shipping, which may have ultimately dragged the US into the war...but not in December 1941.

 

[GrauGeist]

"....While the battle of Khalkhin Gol may have been a mistake by Japan,"
It was an act of military insubordination by rogue officers ... it was a blunder ... not a strategic consideration.

But it is still considered to be an engagement under the Japanese flag, regardless of whether Tokyo authorized it or not.

The Battle of Gettysburgh was still considered a loss for the Confederacy, even though Lee's subordinates allowed skirmishers to engage Union elements against Lee's explicit orders not to engage - the result was a sporadic meleé that snowballed into a full-blown fight.

 

[Jenisch]

It's interesting to mention that the Japanese did considerate the possibility of a Soviet attack after Pearl Harbor. I remember to have read they let a somewhat considerable number of figher planes in order to defend against possible Soviet bombers against their cities.

 

[Shinpachi]

But it is still considered to be an engagement under the Japanese flag, regardless of whether Tokyo authorized it or not.

Yes, Nomonhan was the Imperial GHQ's responsibility after all as it failed to control the Kwantung Army.
I think the Kwantung Army was thinking of the future independence from Japan.
Emperor of the Manchukuo, Aisin gioro Puyi aka the Last Emperor of the Qing Dynasty, had strong frustration against Tokyo from the beginning. The Kwantung Army understood it well.

 

[vikingBerserker]

Russia fighting a 2 front war against two of the best air forces in the world?

If nothing else I could see the Japanese front siphoning off what was needed on the German front.

 

[The Basket]

Question is why would the Japanese go to war with USSR? Was USSR threat? Could Japan occupy Siberia?
The Japanese Army enemy was the USSR but the IJN enemy was the USA.
In my humble opinion an invasion of the Philippines was always going to happen when the Japanese moved south as it would have been impossible for the Americans to not get involved and use Philippines as a future base. So attack on Pearl Harbour was less important militarily than the defeat of American forces in Philippines.

 

[Smokey Stover]

Im not going to go into what may or may not have happened if there had been any kind of co-operation between Japan and Germany. But one thing is for sure, even if the Japanese had deployed a minimal amount of forces opposite the Russian border it would surely have tied up Russian special forces that were shipped to Moscow in winter 1941 to repel the advanced German units advancing on Moscow. Without these highly trained and hardened winter soldiers, the Wehrmacht might just have had enough momentum to change the course of the battle for Moscow. It's obvious to me that no matter how much the Germans and Japanese were allies, they both had very different agendas. The same can be said for Finland and Spain but hindsight is 20/20 as they say. Make no mistake, the Russians were closer than many realize to total kapitulation in 1941/42.
They are many factors that could have changed the course of history. But alas, we can only speculate as to what might have been. Considering these axis powers described their relations as a pact of steel, im a little confused about the total lack of co-ordination and cooperation intelligence wise. For me there are a lot of things that just dont add up/make sense.