Instead of the ME 262...why not THIS...

[Civettone]

I agree with Tomo.

Non-combat losses accounted for about three times the number of losses as combat related losses. During the war, the Luftwaffe suffered an average monthly loss rate of just under 7% per month due to non-combat related accidents. Introducing new technologies early will increase the unreliability of the machines, and place additional stresses on conversion training schools. It is almost inevitable that loss ratesw to attrition will go up if there is a wholesale conversion to jet technologies. Moreover the supply of pilots and other aircrew will dry up as the idiosyncrasies of this new design slow down the rate of output for new aircrew. The Luftwaffe will fight its final battles with even more numbers stacked against it. And ther is no substantive evidence that I know of that the new Jet equipped uinits of the Luftwaffe historically fielded were significantly better in their kill rates than were conventionally armed units. An Me 262 would get airborne, and maybe shoot down a bomber, as could an Me 109. It might have a better chance of shooting down a fighter , but these were not the determinants to Germany's defeat in the final months of the war.

I have studied all the German fighter losses from December 1943 to May 1944 and non-combat losses were always lower than combat losses. And it was never as low as 7%, but at least double of that! So I don't know where you get your information from ???

Though I agree that numbers were more important than technology and that the Germans had a horrible serviceability rate - I wrote a long post on these shortcomings a while back - I wouldn't exactly say that jets had made it worse. There was such a limit on fuel that few aircraft could fly anyway. So the Luftwaffe couldn't field large fleets in the last months of the war anyway. Also, given the lack of proper training, the low serviceability rates actually meant that there were always more pilots than available aircraft in the Luftwaffe.

And I am sure you are not suggesting that the Luftwaffe would have had a better chance at winning the air war by producing even more Bf 109s and Fw 190s! Even with twice the number they wouldn't have won the war because of a lack of pilots and more importantly a lack of fuel.
I can also say that the Me 262 did actually have a better kill ratio than the Bf 109 or Fw 190. The exact figures are very unclear but they do seem to suggest that this was the case.

Now let me tell you what I think was the solution: a simple jet fighter !
In fact, a jet engine is a rather simple device. Especially the BMW 003 was easy to build and relatively easy to maintain, perhaps easier than a BMW 801! It was also quite reliable, given the standards of the day. The Germans went for the superadvanced but inherently complicated Me 262. This was the result of the pre- and early-war thinking when ease of production and maintenance were not the center point of weapons design. Just think about the Tiger tank for instance. They also chose a two-engined fighter because of the limited power output of those first jet engines. Later engines would have enabled a light single-engined fighter, such as the first jet aircraft, the Heinkel He 178.

I am not saying the He 178 would have made a good fighter but I am saying that this design could have been used for a new fighter design. With the BMW 003 which was available at the end of 1944 - or perhaps a bit sooner under higher priority - a similar light fighter but with the needed armour and armament would have made a perfect little interceptor. The nose is clear for at least a couple of cannons, perhaps a couple more in the wing roots. Range will be limited but that is fine.

Also, these aircraft were rather easy to fly. It's like Galland said: "as if an angel was pushing me". The single BMW 003 in a relatively simple and straightforwrd aircraft would have been all what was needed.

I am sure that the connection with the Volksjaeger is clear. And it's a valid comparison. Of course what went wrong was that it was designed, contructed, test flown, put into production much too fast. But given a normal development time and flown by decently trained pilots the Volksjaeger could have been quite succesful. Pleaae not that this does not necessarily have to be the He 162 but could be any of the other contenders. For instance, originally the B&V P.211 won the competition.

This was probably the most simple fighter of WW2. Easy to build, maintain and repair. And given its straight wings probably easier to fly than the Me 262 or He 162.

Another option is the Lippisch P.20, which was derived from the easy-to-fly and maintain Me 163. But then with a jet engine.

All of these would have required some time to become operational and also advanced flight training would have to be done on these jet fighters, perhaps even two-seat variants. But I very much doubt they would necessarily be much more difficult to fly than the Bf 109K...

Also, there would be more fuel available for these jet engines.

Kris

 

[parsifal]

I was referring to the losses for the entire war. It may well be in the proportions you suggest. Although my own research does suggest that non-combat loses outstripped combat losses. There is no real need to argue that point just now. What is important at this point for the purposes of this thread is that numbers were far more important to the outcome of the battle to technological excellence. I think we are in basic agreement on that score.

Regarding the kill rates issue, remember that the Me 262 units were generally crewed by elite pilots hand picked for the job. This would probably have a skewed effect on the kill ratesw of those units. Further, are you taking into account the serviceability rates of the new technology....the Me 262 had a production run of about 1500 yet in service there were never many more than 100 available at any given moment, and of these, only about 25 or so were able to get airborne at any given time. So if the Me 262 units are shooting down say 1.5 Allied planes per sortie, compared to say 1.0 per conventional aircraft but the conventional aircraft has a serviceability rate of 50% compared to 25%, the conventionally equipped unit in fact has a higher kil rate than the jet equipped unit for the overall force structure.

There was no solution for Germany after the US entered the war. Even before then there was only a small chance at outright victory. So the question for me is not if they adopted a different policy whether they could win, but if they adopted a differnt policy, whether they could do better than they did. And i happen to think that the Germans were wasteful in their R&D resources because they expended resources on projects that had no chance in improving their immediately available technologies (like the 109 and the 190) they might have had a better chance.

The other thing that killed them was oil. Or lack of it. Their early war strategy should have been aimed at augmenting their meagre supplies of the stuff. Then perhaps they may have been able to expand their training establishments, and churn out pilots in the required numbers.

The other thing they needed to do was integrate the European industrial base rather than just rip it off blind for short sited theoretical gain only. Nazi economic policy during the war was incredibly short sighted. By setting the exchange rate at artificailly low levels they ensured that all goods made outside of germany were worthless, and so firms in these occupied countries shut down or reduced to the absolute minimum of activity for the duration. The germans also systematically plundered many factories of essential items like machine toools and the like, which destroyed the viability of theose factories, with the added irony that the tools expropriated were generally never used anyway

Certainly your ideas on simplification are on the right track. In the wider context this points to a rationalization of production across the board....for example an abandonment of Tiger Tanks to build something more in keeping with German industrial capabilities....like the SGIII perhaps

 

[tomo pauk]

...

There was no solution for Germany after the US entered the war. Even before then there was only a small chance at outright victory. So the question for me is not if they adopted a different policy whether they could win, but if they adopted a differnt policy, whether they could do better than they did. And i happen to think that the Germans were wasteful in their R&D resources because they expended resources on projects that had no chance in improving their immediately available technologies (like the 109 and the 190) they might have had a better chanc

The other thing that killed them was oil. Or lack of it. Their early war strategy should have been aimed at augmenting their meagre supplies of the stuff. Then perhaps they may have been able to expand their training establishments, and churn out pilots in the required numbers.

The simple, single engined jet fighter might replace the 109 and 190, while using fuel that could be easier obtained. The Wolksjaeger, but one year before for exmple. I agree that hey $crewed it big time by not tanking care if their stocks enough, not only the fuel stocks.
The plane would not save Germany though, since Germans blew their chances in previous years.

The other thing they needed to do was integrate the European industrial base rather than just rip it off blind for short sited theoretical gain only. Nazi economic policy during the war was incredibly short sighted. By setting the exchange rate at artificailly low levels they ensured that all goods made outside of germany were worthless, and so firms in these occupied countries shut down or reduced to the absolute minimum of activity for the duration. The germans also systematically plundered many factories of essential items like machine toools and the like, which destroyed the viability of theose factories, with the added irony that the tools expropriated were generally never used anyway

Well put.

Certainly your ideas on simplification are on the right track. In the wider context this points to a rationalization of production across the board....for example an abandonment of Tiger Tanks to build something more in keeping with German industrial capabilities....like the SGIII perhaps
IMO the Tiger could've replaced 2-3 Pz-IV tanks in WW2 era, but, in the air, it took two 262 to replace, say, 3 Bf-109. So, yes for Tiger/Panther, but Germany needed a jet plane that could afford.

.

 

[psteel]

In terms of man hours I believe you could build and operate two panthers for every Tiger tank. Even in resources given enough time you could do the same.

Gross production is fine if your planning to wage a war of attrition against your enemy, however prewar German strategic thinking realised that Germany could not afford to fight wars of attrition, to say nothing of waging a two front war.

I saw a graph once that showed combat and non combat losses over the war years for the Luftwaffe and the combat losses were usually ahead of the non combat losses, but they were pretty close.

I was under the impression that the bulk of the reliablity issue surrounding aircraft had to do with engine reliablity. The German jet experience was corrupted by immature metalurgy being applied to the 'hot' sections of these turbo jets. Western solutions evolved around high nickel /chrome alloys [80% nickel !] which Germany just didn't have supply of , in sufficent quantities. In actual fact there was sufficent quantities but it was being wasted on an inefficent tank production industry.

The solution followed a couple of years later under Max Bentele's "Topfschaufel" turbine blade design, in late 1944. This would not have appeared on german jet engines until a year later when the war was already over. I've heard figures of 150 hours operational usage compared to 10-12 hours for the original models of the Jumo-004 jet engine.

What I'm curious about is the reliablity of the exsisting German piston engines? I read that the BMW-801 was only 25 hours life when it first came out in 1941, which seems hardly much better than the Jet engines.

 

[riacrato]

The kill rates for Me 262 operating squadrons were higher than that of their piston counterparts. and that is taking into account the weapon was new, introduced under worst possible circumstances, with short-lived engines and prime target for any fighter sweep at the time. While I agree that it was no war winning super weapon, one Me 262 was certainly worth a couple of piston engined fighters in terms of effectiveness against bombers. Someone said a Me 262 could go up and kill a bomber and so could a 109. That's simply not as you put it. The chance of a 109 taking off, getting through the escorts to a bomber and killing it were marginal after fall '44. If you compare awarded kills to losses you will see that numerically the ratio ofthe Me 262 is still on a level that the other German planes had the last time in 1943.

The question if or if not the US had the capacity to escalate the air war is not as simple as put here either. If the Me 262 had been available by mid-late '43, in time for raids on Schweinsburg and later the big week, the losses sustained by the 8th *could* have been prohibitively high to continue the bombing campaign altogether. This is speculation, but several statements given by USAAF high staff support this.

And about the B&V P.211: I wonder what makes you think it was probably easier to fly than a He 162. Considering how bad all post war planes with thin boom arrangements did plus the fact B&V had no experience with jet planes. The He 162 was a year ahead in terms of preliminary design. It was a good decision they went with it.

 

[Colin1]

The kill rates for Me 262 operating squadrons were higher than that of their piston counterparts. and that is taking into account the weapon was new, introduced under worst possible circumstances, with short-lived engines and prime target for any fighter sweep at the time. While I agree that it was no war winning super weapon, one Me 262 was certainly worth a couple of piston engined fighters in terms of effectiveness against bombers...

That is pretty much my view
the margin of its speed advantage meant that the Me262 had no reason to engage the Allied escorts, unlike its piston-engined brethren, which invariably had no choice and usually from a position of extreme tactical disadvantage.
The same speed margin gave it a superb close rate on targets (bombers) hence more contacts per sortie. Bomber crews complained that the motor turrets couldn't traverse fast enough to put a bead on the jet.

The Me262's firing solution in any such contact was usually decisive.

With all of the Me262s correctly deployed ie against heavies instead of squandered in ground attack, it could well have considerably prolongued or even wrecked the daylight bombing campaign.

And that from a first-generation jet with more than a few problems; with the time and space afforded by stalling the daylight bombing campaign, we can only guess what improvements/other novel weapons systems the Germans might have come up with.

 

[Civettone]

Regarding the kill rates issue, remember that the Me 262 units were generally crewed by elite pilots hand picked for the job. This would probably have a skewed effect on the kill ratesw of those units. Further, are you taking into account the serviceability rates of the new technology....the Me 262 had a production run of about 1500 yet in service there were never many more than 100 available at any given moment, and of these, only about 25 or so were able to get airborne at any given time. So if the Me 262 units are shooting down say 1.5 Allied planes per sortie, compared to say 1.0 per conventional aircraft but the conventional aircraft has a serviceability rate of 50% compared to 25%, the conventionally equipped unit in fact has a higher kil rate than the jet equipped unit for the overall force structure.

Your figures are arbitrary.

Their early war strategy should have been aimed at augmenting their meagre supplies of the stuff. Then perhaps they may have been able to expand their training establishments, and churn out pilots in the required numbers.

They went out to conquer the Middle East and the Caucasus.

I was under the impression that the bulk of the reliablity issue surrounding aircraft had to do with engine reliablity.

Exactly. Note that the BMW 003 turned out to be much more reliable due to throttle limiting. [/QUOTE]

And about the B&V P.211: I wonder what makes you think it was probably easier to fly than a He 162. Considering how bad all post war planes with thin boom arrangements did plus the fact B&V had no experience with jet planes. The He 162 was a year ahead in terms of preliminary design. It was a good decision they went with it.

It was easier to fly because it didn't have swept wings. This would reduce the landing and take off speed.
What were the problems with late-war jet planes with boom arrangements? And which were these planes?
The He 162 was not further in its development. Heinkel said they had already been working on it before but this was the P 1073 which was nothing like the projected He 162. Judge for yourself:

Kris

 

[GrauGeist]

If the focus would be on jets at an early stage of the war (which could have happened, but didn't for many reasons), then the best solution would have been the He280 as a true fighter and the Me262 as an interceptor. Also considering an early production, there would have been time and resources to work out the issues with the engines by the time 1944 rolled around.

A dangerous combination would have been the He280 flying top cover for the Me262 as it attacked the bomber stream.

Just an observation here, but had the RLM followed this option early in the war, there's a good chance that many aircraft or thier prototypes would have never made it to the drawing board because aviation would have most likely taken a different path with the early deployment of jet aircraft.

 

[riacrato]

It was easier to fly because it didn't have swept wings. This would reduce the landing and take off speed.
What were the problems with late-war jet planes with boom arrangements? And which were these planes?
The He 162 was not further in its development. Heinkel said they had already been working on it before but this was the P 1073 which was nothing like the projected He 162. Judge for yourself:

Kris

Notice I said preliminary design. A lot of the features that eventually found its way into the He 162 (or not because they came too late) were in earlier projects of Heinkel like the top-mounted engine, the V-tail etc, cockpit arrangement, landing gear design...

The single thin boom was as I recall considered a major flaw i the Bell X-5 design layout, contributing to the aircrafts tendency to spin abruptly.

And the He 162 doesn't have swept wings either. At least I don't think you can call them that with a completely straight leading edge.

 

[Civettone]

GrauGeist, what advantage did the He 280 have over the Me 262 ?

Heinkel didn't have a development contract for the P.1073 and it too was nothing more than a project. Heinkel claimed that it had already been working on a similar project as the He 162 but this was simply not true. It is clear to all that the heavy twin-engined swept wing P 1073 was not like the He 162. Besides, Focke Wulf had made several designs (I-III) of a jet fighter with the engine on top. And so did Arado.

And the swept wings referred to the Me 262. It goes beyond saying that the He 162 was difficult to fly. As to the B&V P 211 it still remains a question as to what it would have been like. But it is telling that the max speed was supposed to be below 800 kmh which indicates to me that it was not a hot rod to fly. As to the tail boom designs ... just because the X-5 had stall issues because of its tail doesn't mean that all tail boom designs were like this. I have never heard it about the Yak-23 or MiG-9 or Saab 29.

Kris

 

[riacrato]

The Mig 9 and Saab have a much larger sturdier boom. The X-5 is much more comparable and even it is more conventional.

The preliminary design phase can take months as was the case for e.g. the Me 262. The P.1073 shares many similarities with the He 162 epsecially considering the fuselage, so I'm pretty sure it gave some advantage or else most publications wouldn't mention it.

 

[parsifal]

should not overlook the development costs for these planes. The lower the production run, the higher the development costs are as a proportion of the overall costs.

The first ring pull can of coke sost the thirty cents or so to pro duce the can and the soft drink, plus the six million dollars it cost to develop the technology, plus the cost of seetting up the plant. The first can of coke probably 50 -60 million dollars at a guess. Of course after untold millions of cans, the development costs and establishment costs per unit produced has shrunk to alsmost negligible proportions

 

[parsifal]

Your figures are arbitrary.

Are you saying that the Me 262 units were not crewed by elite pilots, that their serviceability rates were low or that the kill ratios of 262s to pistion engined aircraft was significantly different. They might have been higher, but not to the extent that they justify all the expenditure needed to get the weapons system operational under wartime conditions. Like nearly all the german uber weapons, poke around a little and you find major problems with them everywhere

They went out to conquer the Middle East and the Caucasus.

In regards to the Middle east it was only an objective, of the vaguest kind, after 1942. Until Rommels final drives, there was never any coherent plan to take over and use the oil fields in the mid east.

Same thing applies to the caucasus oil fields. They were not a priority until the second half of 1942, and then only with inadequate forces. By the time the germans got round to seriously considering their capture, the Russians had undertaken such a thorough demolition that for war purposes they were completely useless.

Germany never gave serious and timely consideration to the capture of foreign oilfields.

 

[GrauGeist]

GrauGeist, what advantage did the He 280 have over the Me 262 ?

The He280 had a slightly smaller and lighter airframe (He280 V-3: 9,470 lb max. - Me262 A-1: 15,720 lb max.) and was proven to be a good handling aircraft. Plus, it was ready tp produce in 1941 (while the ME262 V-1 prototype was still undergoing testing development), which means that *had* it gone into production at that point, it would have had much longer to develop along with the HeS, Jumo and BMW jet engines (which never got the attention or funding they needed).

The Me262 was known more for it's speed and hitting power. Plus, it's pilots were warned that to dogfight with a Schwalbe was to invite trouble.

 

[Civettone]

The Mig 9 and Saab have a much larger sturdier boom. The X-5 is much more comparable and even it is more conventional.

Are you sure this is a result of the sturdiness of the tail boom? The X-5 had problems due to the positioning of the tail surfaces and elevators IIRC. Moving the elevators to the top of the tail might have improved the situation somewhat. I still find it a bit of a long shot to simply discard the B&V P.211 because it had a tail boom like the X-5 without directly linking its problems with the boom.

The preliminary design phase can take months as was the case for e.g. the Me 262. The P.1073 shares many similarities with the He 162 epsecially considering the fuselage, so I'm pretty sure it gave some advantage or else most publications wouldn't mention it.

No that's not true. Most publications simply copy what was given as the official reason why the He 162 was chosen over the B&V P.211. Heinkel said it had been working on a similar project but not only had they been doing little work on it (not even a mock up) it was also not like the He 162 design at all. I have posted the P.1073 image and it is clear that there is nothing more than a superficial resemblance. You claim that the fuselage was similar but the fuselage of the P.1073 was much bigger in every dimension. The P.1073 had one of its wings on top, that's it. Even the Focke Wulf projects look more like the He 162 !

Your figures are arbitrary.
Like nearly all the german uber weapons, poke around a little and you find major problems with them everywhere

I think that is being very simplistic. No one claims the Me 262 was a superweapon. It was an advanced design and thus needed time to grow. It became fully operational at the end of 1944 and by mid 1945 it would have gotten more reliable engines making it the best fighter of the world if it wasn't already.

The Germans were behind in numbers so they simply had to go for better quality. But continuing the production of the 109 or 190 was a dead end, that must be obvious: they built 24,000 of them in 1944 and achieved nothing!! So what they needed was quality which could be built in large numbers. That means the Volksjaeger, the Panzer 38 D, the Sturmgewehr 44, the Type XXIII U-Boot, the R4M and Panzerblitz unguided rockets, etc.

But once again, you made the mistake of bringing in an equation to prove your point. I said your numbers are arbitrary. I think I have a point there.
Other than that, I agree that the Me 262 had more reliability issues than the piston engined fighters. Yet at a certain time the Germans had to move on and stop producing stuff which at best was equal to what the allies had but available in smaller numbers.

Germany never gave serious and timely consideration to the capture of foreign oilfields.

They were going for the quick victory. Until the end of 1941 that worked out perfectly. Then the offensive against the Russians stalled and what was the first thing they did? Plan to capture the Caucasion and Arab oil fields.
They failed to capture the oil fields because Hitler went for Stalingrad instead. They failed to exploit the one they captured in Maikop because of the incompetency of Goering. That is the German tragedy of WW2: idiots in charge...
But to bluntly say that the Germans didn't plan to capture oil fields or secure their oil supply is overoversimplistic.

Plus, it was ready tp produce in 1941 (while the ME262 V-1 prototype was still undergoing testing development), which means that *had* it gone into production at that point, it would have had much longer to develop along with the Hs, Jumo and BMW jet engines (which never got the attention or funding they needed).

But I always read that the HeS 8 and 30 engines were not ready for production so how could the He 280 had been ready for production. And what about its very short range/fligth endurance ?

Kris

 

[psteel]

Civettone I agree with most of what you state. I gather that the initial production of Me-262 was taking something like 24,000 manhours to build when a Me-109 was only about 4300 manhours. By comparison the Ju-88 was about 15,000 manhours to build by 1943 when it started out at 50,000 man hours. The longer a weapon is in production the cheaper it is to build and cost out.

Similarly after the first 1000 Me-262 had been produced the manhours would have dropped to ~ 10,000 man hours and when the production reached many thousand mark , it would have been down to about 3400 man hours, less than the Me-109!


Could the Jumo 004 engines have been reworked to fit into the He 280?

can any one tell me the operational hours of engines like the DB-603 or Jumo Ju-213 , compared to the likes of the Ju-211 or the DB-605 engines?

 

[GrauGeist]

But I always read that the HeS 8 and 30 engines were not ready for production so how could the He 280 had been ready for production. And what about its very short range/fligth endurance ?

The aircraft itself was pretty much a done deal by the V-3 airframe, all that was left to be worked out, were the engines. The V-3 was fitted with the HeS8, and did perform well with those engines, even though it had a short range of 230 miles, it's speed was 512 mph.

One of the main problems with the jet engines, was that the leadership, especially Udet, didn't see a need for aircraft without propellors (and tricycle landing gear was another issue with them). This ideaology ultimately kept the jet engine manufacturers from recieving the funding and manpower that the jet programs sorely needed.

If the leadership had backed the engine builders and Messerschmitt and Heinkel, I believe that they would have made real significant advances both on the aircraft and the engines by the time 1943 rolled around. So what the Germans had on the drawing board and in the air would have been much different than what they actually ended up with by war's end.

By the way, psteel, Heinkel did eventually decide on using the BMW 003 for the He280, and actually had one of the prototypes fly with a pair of Jumo 004 engines installed. The '280 was designed for the smaller lighter HeS family of engines, so the aircraft didn't perform as well as hoped with the additional weight.

 

[Shortround6]

Civettone I agree with most of what you state. I gather that the initial production of Me-262 was taking something like 24,000 manhours to build when a Me-109 was only about 4300 manhours. By comparison the Ju-88 was about 15,000 manhours to build by 1943 when it started out at 50,000 man hours. The longer a weapon is in production the cheaper it is to build and cost out.

Similarly after the first 1000 Me-262 had been produced the manhours would have dropped to ~ 10,000 man hours and when the production reached many thousand mark , it would have been down to about 3400 man hours, less than the Me-109!

That only works to a certain extent. No matter how many planes of a certain type you build getting a heavier airplane to cost less then a ligher one is going to be very tough. Just the fact that you have to use thousands of pounds more raw material cost something. Even the numbe rof peices is exactly the same (including rivets) the work needed on the larger peices is going to take a little longer.

 

[bigZ]

Even if the Germans had these 'uber' jets earlier it is still a weapon of defence and will not in itself change the outcome of the war.

To isolate one branch of the airforce as the weapon that will overturn the situation and bring total victory is folly. I don't think even Goring imagined that.

 

[tomo pauk]

It could be argued that if fighter force (= one branch of aviation) succeeded in it's task (= achieving of air superiority for example), it would enable other branches to do their task.
Now that recon, bomber, attack, anti-shipping planes could be used without enemy fighters to interfere:
1. commanders really know where are enemy forces
2. air attacks reduce enemy combat forces logstics abilities
3. ground forces have a potent support
4. enemy loses more combat support ships, as well as merchant ones

So I'd say that potent fighter force was a great thing to have for last 3/4 of a century. A war winning one.