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So, yes, you're clearly right about most of those factors. I'm not saying that you're wrong about the others, only that I haven't dug up anything conclusive one way or the other.There was a need for increased frequency stability for the TR9. Frequency drift resulted from vibration and temperature changes during flight. In April 1937, crystal control was applied to the TR9; that was then designated the TR9C.
Later, to facilitate transmissions for Direction Finding (DF) purposes within a flight of aircraft while still allowing R/T contact to be maintained, a second frequency channel was provided on the TR9; that became the TR9D.
The proposed VHF set was to be built such that it would be physically interchangeable with the TR9, so that the aircraft fit could be changed from VHF to HF, and vice versa, at short notice!
HiVHF radio was just being introduced and production was too slow to equip all of the Hurricanes and Spitfires. It simply took time to ramp up production of this new technology. With the ultra-rigid formations that were the core of Fighter Command doctrine, there was no need for more than one aircraft to have a radio. Was this practical? No. But then, the RAF was doing many, many things that were utterly impractical at the time.
Yes, RAF aircraft had W/T (Morse code) communications long before the Second World War, but that's not relevant here.
Most air forces went through a period where only squadron leaders or flight leaders had radios. Cost was one reason (VHF voice was really, really expensive) and supply constraints was another.
Sorry I don't remember the names of the two RR mechanics who told us this, so I can't provide a "credible source."The October 1939 date was for longer-ranged VHF radios. The RAF had introduced HF radios in 1932-1933 and had experience operating them for over 6 years BEFORE the outbreak of WW2 in September 1939.
The short range of the HF sets was overcome by establishing repeater sites forward of the Sector Stations to ensure coverage.
So, no, my dates don't align with your anecdotal story. Again, please provide a credible source.
Finally, Fighter Command didn't have any trained night fighters in 1939 and they never operated night fighters in formation. And day fighters are not going to be flying formation at night...so even the morse option is not viable. Bottom line - you can't operate night fighters without radios, period.
Sorry I don't remember the names of the two RR mechanics who told us this, so I can't provide a "credible source."
HiIt may have depended where you were, rolling out things like new radios would go where it was most needed, with priority for those in France and SE England. For those up north they probably would have a problem remembering if something was before or after war was declared, until the invasion of France, little happened.
Does heresay and conjecture count as credible sources?
I was thinking more of squadrons in training units when war was declared, a long time passed between the invasion of Poland and the fall of France.Hi
This may not be correct, if Flt Lt K M Stoddart's comments are true, he was on No. 611 Sqn. (Spitfire I) based at RAF Digby in 12 Group which moved south, to Martlesham, to operate over Dunkirk. He states that his squadron were equipped with VHF Radio and this was removed and replaced by a HF Set for operations during the evacuation. Probably not for the reason he states but more likely so every squadron had a standardised communication system for the operation. Here is the text from 'Air Battle Dunkirk 26 May - 3 June 1940 by Norman Franks, page 64:
View attachment 651586
Mike
From 611 Squadron's Operations Record Book:Hi
This may not be correct, if Flt Lt K M Stoddart's comments are true, he was on No. 611 Sqn. (Spitfire I) based at RAF Digby in 12 Group which moved south, to Martlesham, to operate over Dunkirk. He states that his squadron were equipped with VHF Radio and this was removed and replaced by a HF Set for operations during the evacuation. Probably not for the reason he states but more likely so every squadron had a standardised communication system for the operation. Here is the text from 'Air Battle Dunkirk 26 May - 3 June 1940 by Norman Franks, page 64:
View attachment 651586
Mike
HiFrom 611 Squadron's Operations Record Book:View attachment 651588
Great post, its really difficult today to understand today how many problems they had to get over.Hi
That appears to confirm Stoddart's memories, thank you.
The book 'The Battle of Britain - The greatest battle in the history of air warfare' by Richard Townsend Bickers, has a fair summary of the voice procedures developed from 1936 for use in the radar directed system, on pages 35-37:
View attachment 651590
View attachment 651591
View attachment 651592
Mike
You're a trouble maker. We're going to get along well!Does heresay and conjecture count as credible sources?
HiVery interesting about the deWilde ammunition. I didn't think it had made it to the Squadrons at that time.
Does heresay and conjecture count as credible sources?