Japanese aircraft were behind in timing to Allied aircraft.

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I had a thought but it died a lonely death. Anyway, I wondered why the U.S. didn't use British torpedoes as well. Could it be that the Navy believed the ordnance bureau's claims?
It wouldn't fit in the Avenger bomb bay as it was 3 feet longer than the Mark 13. There is little ground clearance under the ventral gun position so external mounting would be problematic. This is why the RN used the Avenger only as a bomber.
 
Well the British did mount them on B-26s apparently. I bet you could fit one under a B-17... if you could, that would have made B-17 quite lethal IMO
 
Part of what I'm getting at is this -

You may have what turned out to be a very good design operational in 1941 or 1942, but which, being very new and innovative, had a lot of bugs to work out and didn't really prove to be effective until say, 1944. Classic example of this is the Typhoon, but to a greater or lesser extent it's also true of the P-38, the F4U, the P-51, and the P-47. An early 1943 mod P-47, I'm not sure if that is terrifying to a Ki-61 pilot. A late 1944 P-47 definitely is though.

Conversely, rather than a 'slightly inferior MC 202', I see the Ki-61 as more like a slightly superior MC 202... equivalent to an MC 205 but with a different design emphasis (i.e. more for maneuverability). Not necessarily less effective. I'd say the same when comparing A6M or Ki-43 to early war Allied and German types.
 
Well the British did mount them on B-26s apparently. I bet you could fit one under a B-17... if you could, that would have made B-17 quite lethal IMO
Ground clearance ofvthe B-26 was minimal

 
Apparently they had some B-26s with torpedoes in New Guinea, but sadly with the defective type torpedoes

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First of all, it became operational in late 1942. First combat was in Jan 1943, that's not precisely the same thing.
Like a lot of Japanese aircraft they were introduced in dribs and drabs and in combat trials before they OK'd them for series production.
I think we are repeating ourselves here. Production of the Ki-61 after the first 12 prototype/trials aircraft.
1942
Aug...............1
Sept..............3
Oct................5
Nov............10
Dec.............15
1943
Jan..............22
Feb.............32
March.......31
April..........37
May..........44
June.........40

Books don't always agree but two say that the first unit equipped was the 23rd Dokuritsu Dai Shijugo Chutai at Ota which acted as a pilot conversion and training unit with deliveries starting in Feb 1943. Combat operations began two months later with the 68th and 78th Sentais which were deployed to the North Coast of New Guinea and/or Rabaul. Another book claims the 68th didn't show up in Wewak New Guinea until June of 1943.
Maybe one of very early ones was deployed to China for some reason? Maybe my books are different than yours.

P-38s despite small numbers (or not so small) are very active in the New Guinea area over the summer. July 21st 1943 sees 39th and 8th squadron P-38s claim 22 aircraft escorting B-25s( no idea of real losses), July 23rd the squadrons claim 12 more. July 28th sees Dick Bong claim his 16th. Aug 15th 1943 sees the 475th fighter group go operational at Eagle Farm Brisbane with 115 aircraft. Aug 17th 1943, 99 P-38s from six squadrons raid Wewak, Next day 74 P-38s escort bombers on another Wewak raid. Aug 31st 1943 the 475th FG claims 53 Japanese aircraft destroyed (how much over claiming?). P-38s are not being replaced as fast they are lost (from all causes).
Second, and more importantly, the MC 202, it's closest analogue in Europe, was hardly out of the fight in Jan
Not out of the fight is not the same as leading the fight.

Much like the Japanese over New Guinea it is not enough to just show up and cause some losses.
Even with the Ki-61s the Japanese cannot control the fighting like they did in much of 1942. The Japanese are being pushed back. They need both quality and quantity, they have neither. By the time the next big jump in JAAF fighter tech shows up it is the fall of 1944 and Japanese defensive perimeter is now back to the Philippines.
 
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I have to double check but I thought one squadron of Ki-61 were active out of Rabaul earlier in 1943.

The P-38 units seem to have had a handful of guys who mastered that rather tricky aircraft and were getting most of the victories, including Bong and McGuire. But I think they were doing well against Zeros and Ki-43s. The series of operational histories I've been relying on to get to the bottom of what really happened around New Guinea and the Solomons has been coming out covering short intervals and hasn't really gotten into the P-38 era yet.

By later 1943 yes there were more and more available. I think maintenance was a challenge but they were slowly accumulating them. 49th FG was still flying IIRC at least one squadron of P-40s in early 1944 though.

I don't disagree that the Japanese were certainly starting to be shoved onto their back heels by later 1943. So were the Germans. But I'm not sure I would agree they were out of the fight yet. The Ki-44, and later model A6M3 and Ki-43 were pretty good. The A6M5 was definitely a year late though I would agree.
 
I'm going to be typing this, accepting that different places, different theaters, different circumstances can make a difference.

The engine from the Ki-61 was a license built DB 601, which was no longer in mass production in it's native Germany by the time the Ki-61 entered service in numbers. It had been replaced by the DB 605, which was an uprated, increased displacement version of the 601 design. The DB 601 version that the Ha-40 was based on was basically a Battle of Britain/post BOB version of the 601, which Alfa Romeo built under license for the MC 202 (Macchi used a mix of imported and licensed engines, which the trickle of imports of the former and slow production of the latter meant that the radial engined MC 200 was produced alongside the 202 until 1942 I believe). At least Kawasaki didn't have that issue. But anyways, the Ha-40 was still and evolution behind the late 601s and certainly the 605s, even with the early restrictions they had.

Of course, when facing mostly P-40s (that were equally as fast), this wasn't a major concern. Of course, the Ha-40s durability issues were a much bigger problem, mostly crank failures/early wear due to bearing issues. Since the 601s didn't really have those problems, you have to wonder about the metallurgy that Kawasaki used or was stuck with. This wasn't a smarts or talent problem, it was a tech problem. And it wasn't fixed when the Ha-140 version of the Ha-40 was developed for the Mk II version of the Ki-61. This was intended as a high altitude interceptor, one of the few really good high alt planes that the IJA would've had if the engines weren't so bad in terms of reliability. Those issues and USAAF bombing of Kawasaki's main engine factory crippling production is what brought about the Ki-100 conversion of the Ki-61 to use the Mitsubishi Ha-112 Kinsei engine.

As far as the P-40, it was OK in 1943 in low alt theaters (MTO and Pacific), though it was growing increasingly obsolescent given American, British and German/Italian developments. Of course, on paper the Ki-44 and Ki-84 should've run circles around the P-40, but that didn't pan out in the CBI. Granted, tactics and pilot skill probably played a hand in that as well.

But I do have to ask this, and it's just like in auto racing where there's discussion about driver vs car vs both as far as dominance. I suggest, though an isolated incident, the action where Maj. Bill Shomo won his Medal of Honor in early 1945 over the Philippines. Shomo and his wing man were flying F-6D Mustangs (tactical recon versions of the P-51D) when the encountered 13 Japanese planes. 11 were Ki-61s, one was a Ki-44, and a G4M. Shomo shot down 7, his wingman shot down 3, and the other three Japanese planes managed to escape. Interestingly, Shomo shot down 8 planes, including the 7 in that one engagement. However, though he enlisted in the USAAF in 1941, and had flown missions (tactical fighter recon) dating back to 1942, Shomo himself claims to only have seen less than 15 aircraft in his missions (the first, and his first kill, was a D3A in Dec. 1944).

Point here is was it the planes, the pilots, or both? The P-51D certainly performed better at this stage of the war than the Ki-61 or Ki-44, but especially the Ki-61 still should've been a formidable dogfighter, especially at lower speeds, in the right hands. And Shomo and his wingman showed clearly better airmanship than their opponents, who outnumbered them almost 7 to 1, 6 to 1 if you discount the Betty. Of course, by early 1945, the IJA and IJN were starting to scrape the barrel for pilots, while the Allies were essentially in their prime.

But back on subject. IMO, I do believe that both the Japanese, and even the Allies until later in 1943 and into 1944, were a step behind what was going on in the ETO. That was universal until the USN got Hellcats and Corsairs in numbers, the USAAF until they got P-38s and P-47s (and later P-51s, namely the Merlin variants), and the RAF/Commonwealth with the Spitfire VIII.

I do think a lot of this had to do with the "defeat Germany if possible first" mindset, and that it was known that Germany was working on some wicked stuff (hence probably part of the urgency vs Japan to defeat them). And of course, Japan, being relatively new to industrialization (Japan and much of eastern Asia were about 50-75 years behind Europe and North America to the Industrial Revolution, and were also up to that point heavily isolated from much of the rest of the world) meant the assumption (not 100% unfounded) that they might not keep up with Germany due to industrial infrastructure and technology. Not the smarts of the people involved. How much of this was routed in fact/intelligence, vs predjudice or ignorance, I don't know. We can look back with our hindsight being 20/20, however.

OK, long-winded basic impressions over. And I do also find it interesting how frank Admiral Yamamoto reportedly was when he gave an almost fatalistic assessment that Japan could run wild for about 6 months, but after that, all bets were off for Japan. And how said prediction aligned with Japan's defeat at Midway.
 
I don't want to take anything away from Major Shomo but by 1945 I think the Japanese training programme had collapsed and they had guys... kids flying a lot of those planes who really weren't trained.

That said the P-51 seemed to do very well in all Theaters, and the US pilots were quite well trained on average by that time, and often very aggressive.

I would agree that the Wildcat was lagging badly behind land based fighters in Europe in 1942 or 1943, but - it was a carrier fighter. It was (arguably) better than any British made carrier fighter and the Germans, Italians, French, and Russians just didn't have any. The A6M was arguably better than the F4F.

As for land based fighters, the US was using P-39s P-38s and P-40s in the Pacific, and the last two anyway seemed to have been holding their own well enough in the MTO against German fighters so maybe they weren't so far behind after all.

Japan had basically still been in the middle ages in the 1860s so they really had a long way to go.

I think Yamamoto's precient prediction was based largely on industrial capacity of the US.
 
Conversely, rather than a 'slightly inferior MC 202', I see the Ki-61 as more like a slightly superior MC 202... equivalent to an MC 205 but with a different design emphasis (i.e. more for maneuverability). Not necessarily less effective. I'd say the same when comparing A6M or Ki-43 to early war Allied and German types.
the Ki-61 may have been better than the MC 202, they did upgrade the armament fair quickly. Here we wind up the some problems. They interspersed planes on the production line with 7.7mm wing guns and 12.7mm wing guns. Lack of Production?
They also built 388 planes with German MG 151 cannon imported by Submarine. Gun doesn't quite fit in wing bay and needs external fairing.
Another puzzle is the later versions with the 20mm cannon mounted in the fuselage and the 12.7mm guns in the wing.
Trying for better roll?
20mm Ho-5 cannon doesn't fit in the wing?
Firing 20mm shells through prop means low rate of fire?

Now being equivalent to the 205 is a lot harder.
The 205 had the DB 605 engine and a speed of just under 400mph.
again guns differed, last 150 or so had the German 151 in each wing.

Some of the later Ki-61s got a new engine with 1500hp but reliability was low. It was this engine that prompted the switch to the radial engine in the Ki-100.
 
Right but this is where we started in the thread this one branched out from - speed isn't necessarily more valuable than agility. Ki-61 was like a more agile MC 202 (instead of a 30 mph faster MC 202, which is basically what the MC 205 was). In some cases with more guns.

But I think guns in the fuselage may indeed have been about roll, the Ki-61 had a middling roll rate and this is how the P-40s were coping with them.
 
For whatever reason, everything I see on the Hellcat is that those were devastating to the Japanese Air Forces. Once the Hellcats showed up in force, I think that was basically doom for the IJA and IJN air forces.
 
For whatever reason, everything I see on the Hellcat is that those were devastating to the Japanese Air Forces. Once the Hellcats showed up in force, I think that was basically doom for the IJA and IJN air forces.
Some of this is just sheer numbers.
In 1943 Lockheed built 2497 P-38s
Bell built almost 5000 P-39s but a lot were going to Russia
Curtiss built about 4250 P-40s and the US was handing them out everybody like last nights popcorn.
Grumman built 2547 Hellcats in 1943 and while some were going to the Atlantic most were going to the Pacific while the P-38s were being sent to just about everywhere but Russia.
The P-38 was the premier US army fighter in 1943, It was being nudged out by the P-47 and P-51 but for most of the year it was the fighter with the best track record and potential.
By Jan/Feb 1944 that had flipped but for most of 1943 every Air Force General was screaming for more P-38s.

F6f was probably the fastest increase in top line fighters in the Pacific.
 
Hey MikeMeech,

?

While what you posted above re Japanese bombing of cities is true, it does not in anyway contradict or modify what I said about the Japanese bombers - ie "The smaller bomb loads of the Japanese medium and heavy bombers is explained by their requirements that did not include carpet bombing of military targets from higher altitudes, or carpet bomb cities at all - unlike the US and UK the Japanese actually intended to hit military targets with precision and did not think it practical to do so from high altitude."

If you are trying to make a point about the Japanese being just as willing to commit war crimes as the US and UK were, relative to bombing civilians in this discussion, then you are perhaps correct - but they did not require such capabilities in their bomber designs. (I think everyone on the forum knows the Japanese were just as capable of war crimes as the other combatants.)
 
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Some of this is just sheer numbers.
In 1943 Lockheed built 2497 P-38s
Bell built almost 5000 P-39s but a lot were going to Russia
Curtiss built about 4250 P-40s and the US was handing them out everybody like last nights popcorn.
Grumman built 2547 Hellcats in 1943 and while some were going to the Atlantic most were going to the Pacific while the P-38s were being sent to just about everywhere but Russia.
The P-38 was the premier US army fighter in 1943, It was being nudged out by the P-47 and P-51 but for most of the year it was the fighter with the best track record and potential.
By Jan/Feb 1944 that had flipped but for most of 1943 every Air Force General was screaming for more P-38s.

F6f was probably the fastest increase in top line fighters in the Pacific.

The P-38 was no doubt meant to be the premier US Army fighter in 1943. It was the one the generals were the most impressed by. It was the fastest fighter. And though available in small numbers there, in the Pacific it was turning out to be quite good. In the Med, it wasn't working out so well, and I am not sure what happened in China and Burma - I know they tried some out there, but they didn't really work out there either.

The P-38, like the P-47 and the F4U (and many other aircraft in many other parts of the world) went through a long development process in the field to work out problems and adjust to combat conditions - and to the capabilities of the enemy. We all know about the issues with compressibility, electrical systems, heaters, maneuverability and so on.

We don't really have a terminology for it, but all military aircraft designs go through this uncomfortable phase. Some never get through it. Some are used in spite of it. Others are more fully adapted to the needs of the operational environments where they need to be used, and to their pilots.

We can look at a design which was fielded in 1942 and turned out to be fantastic by 1944, and say it was superior. But in the early years, it maybe was not so apparent. It's hard to know initially whether you have a Typhoon on your hands, or a Tempest. A P-43 or a P-47.

I suspect one of the reasons why the F6F was so successful is that it seems to have had a relatively short, and very well managed 'teething phase'. The USN patiently did a thorough workup, even while many of their pilots were still struggling to cope with A6Ms in their F4F-4s. But then when it was all ready, the F6Fs came in force.

The Ki-43 and A6M, and the Bf 109 and Fw 190, the P-40 and the F4F, the Spitfire and the Hurricane all got through this phase pretty quickly and thoroughly. Or it happened before the war even started. This is why, perhaps, they lingered in service longer than it seems like they should have. A fully functional 'second tier' fighter may be more effective than a potentially first tier fighter that is still going through a rough breaking in phase (and will be for another year or two). Or it may not. Hurricanes probably should have been retired in 1942. Wildcats maybe should have been either retired, or relegated to escort carriers six months earlier than they were. But by introducing the F6F fully worked up and debugged like they did, the USN delivered a blow which hit too hard and to heavy to be adjusted to.
 
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And the thing about these cool planes which have potential to be fantastic, maybe in 3 months, maybe 6 months... maybe in 2 years... is that nobody knows when the war is going to end or when the enemy is going to come out with something that is fully baked and ups the ante on lethality. Many planes which look really good on paper didn't have any impact on the war because they came late and / or never got through this teething or shakeout process before the war ended.

So I think that does have to be taken into consideration when comparing aircraft designs from one nation and another.
 
Final thought in this train, riffing off of SR6's point that the Hellcat efficacy may have been numbers - The P-38 and F4U were introduced to the Pacific Theater in a somewhat piecemeal manner, with considerable teething problems and a fairly steep learning curve for their pilots. Not sure about the P-47. Where they were deployed, they were flying in a largely defensive role with limited enemy targets within range, making them a pretty manageable problem for the Japanese.

The Hellcat got a full, thorough workup, and arrived in force. What's more, on carriers which aggressively attacked Japanese bases of the USN's choosing, often as part of amphibious operations by the USN / USMC which had to be resisted. It is perhaps not surprising that they had such an impact.
 
Final thought in this train, riffing off of SR6's point that the Hellcat efficacy may have been numbers - The P-38 and F4U were introduced to the Pacific Theater in a somewhat piecemeal manner, with considerable teething problems and a fairly steep learning curve for their pilots. Not sure about the P-47. Where they were deployed, they were flying in a largely defensive role with limited enemy targets within range, making them a pretty manageable problem for the Japanese.

The Hellcat got a full, thorough workup, and arrived in force. What's more, on carriers which aggressively attacked Japanese bases of the USN's choosing, often as part of amphibious operations by the USN / USMC which had to be resisted. It is perhaps not surprising that they had such an impact.
Some folk have short memories!!;) Just a couple of weeks ago.
 

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