Japanese aircraft were behind in timing to Allied aircraft.

[marathag]

What were they diving this thing at?

Curtiss Wright Hawk 75A-1 | This Day in Aviation

Buffalo, N.Y., January 24—(AP)—A Curtiss Hawk 75A pursuit plane, one of 100 being constructed for the French Government, has "substantially exceeded all known speed records" with a free dive of more than 575 miles an hour, it was announced today.

The speed mark was established yesterday while the ship was undergoing acceptance tests, officials of the Curtiss Aeroplane Division of the Curtiss Wright Corporation said.

The tests were made by H. Lloyd Child, chief test pilot of the Buffalo Curtiss plant, who said he "felt no ill effects and did not realize" that the speed was presumably the fastest man has ever traveled."

National Aeronautic Association officials said that no Federation Aeronautique Internationale records "even approached this speed."

The speed of the dive was so great that the marker on the recording airspeed indicator exceeded the instrument's range and moved off the paper on which the graph of the dive was recorded.

Aviation experts, who declined to be quoted directly, estimated that the speed might have exceeded 600 miles per hour, compared with the normal falling rate for a 170-pound man of 150 miles an hour.

The dive was begun at an altitude of 22,000 feet, and the record speed was attained during a 9,000 foot dive.

At no time during the dive, Child said, did the engine exceed 2,550 revolutions a minute, its normal rated speed in level flight. Hence, he explained, the strain on the motor during the dive was not increased, but was held to the speed of normal operation by the Curtiss electric propeller, with its unlimited blade pitch range.

Since the motor's speed was kept at normal during the dive, it was a "free," rather than a "power" dive as when the motor throttle is opened wide, aviation experts explained.

Previously, company officials explained, a limiting factor in the speed at which an airplane could dive was the engine's revolutions each minute, since overspeeding would result to serious damage to the motor.
Jan 24 1939

Now he didn't go that fast. How fast really was the Vne, and how much did Child exceed the Vne?? Who knows, the next generation of speed recorders later introduced as compressability was explored, and P-40 manuals later had Vne as 485mph at 10,000

This all got started with US Aircraft producers doing the Power Dive test, as much power as could be supplied without over revving the motor, but being able to pull out of the dive without damaging the airframe, either.

Most important, that 1939 test impressed the French that they ordered more Curtiss Aircraft.
Even a Comic over that fear.

so it played for a lot of PR

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Was just reading an interesting tidbit, here...

A Massive Torpedo

The capabilities of the Type 93 torpedo were such a well-kept secret, and so far beyond those of U.S. torpedoes, that the U.S. Navy did not appreciate the threat it faced in the Solomon Islands campaign.

www.usni.org

... to wit:

"It often has been claimed that the U.S. Navy was unaware of the potential for night torpedo attacks, but that was hardly the case. Like other sea services, the U.S. Navy had long seen the torpedo as a potent equalizer. In war games at the Naval War College, large numbers of destroyers often delivered massive torpedo salvoes, particularly at night. U.S. Navy strategists understood that Japan needed such equalizers, because the interwar naval treaties had left it on the short end of various tonnage ratios. One less-often noted equalizer was the Imperial Japanese Navy's (IJN) superior night binoculars, which sometimes contributed more to situational awareness than early radars.

Uniquely among the world's navies, Japan's destroyers carried reload torpedoes with fast-reload mechanisms for the launchers. Its cruisers were equipped with heavy torpedo batteries, and just before the war the Japanese fleet converted some old light cruisers into specialized torpedo ships armed with 40 torpedoes.

The IJN considered the Type 93 its most important secret weapon—the best equalizer. Torpedo officers were forbidden to discuss torpedoes with officers not directly concerned with them, and speed and range settings—and the use of pure oxygen—were omitted from manuals used in torpedo schools. The night glasses that made long-range torpedo attacks practical must have been at least as secret.

The U.S. Navy received its first clear evidence of Japanese 24-inch torpedoes when the wreck of the destroyer Kikuzuki was examined in the summer of 1943 (she had been sunk at Tulagi in May 1942). The oxidizer was not discovered at that time, however, and U.S. Navy Bureau of Ordnance (BuOrd) estimates of performance were far below reality. BuOrd previously had rejected a prewar report by a U.S. naval attaché who had been told that the destroyer he visited carried 24-inch torpedoes.

BuOrd considered its own Mark 15 destroyer torpedo, which could travel 10,000 yards at 33.5 knots or 6,000 yards at 45 knots, as good as any. U.S. destroyers trained to make massed long-range "browning" attacks on enemy formations, the theory being that the total length of an enemy battle line would be such that hits were inevitable. ("Firing into the brown" means shooting at a flock of birds without aiming at any specific bird—hence, "browning.") To that end, the Mark 15 had a low-speed, long-range setting: 15,000 yards at 26.5 knots. U.S. destroyer torpedoes could be set to turn after they entered the water, so a 16-tube destroyer could fire all its torpedoes in the same direction. The 15,000-yard range was the most that could be achieved in combination with a heavy enough warhead with the fuel space available on a Mark 15. Prewar training for coordinated mass attacks may explain why U.S. destroyers in the Solomons generally were not allowed to operate independently."

and

"The British did notice that the Japanese were firing from very long ranges, accepting low hit percentages. But the first indications of how they did it apparently came only in February–March 1944, by which time the Japanese no longer had much opportunity to practice night torpedo attacks. A February 1944 U.S. Navy survey of Japanese naval ordnance credited the Type 93 with a range of 22,400 yards at 50 knots and 33,000 yards at 32 knots. A March 1944 report based on prisoner-of-war interrogations and captured documents credited the Type 93, nearly correctly, with a range of 32,700 to 33,800 yards at 32 knots and 11,000 yards at 47 knots. The July 1944 edition of "Statistical Summary of the Japanese Navy" (ONI 222-J) described the Type 93 as "probably . . . the most radical and spectacular development in naval ordnance that has appeared in the Pacific Theatre," crediting it with a 1,200-pound warhead and a range of 11,000 yards at more than 45 knots. (The night glasses did not figure in this handbook, although they had been captured and often were used by U.S. officers.)"'


So this does correct some misconceptions, reminds me of a couple of things, and gives us some useful details. In no particular order:

The USN did do night training, including the concept of torpedo volleys launched by destroyers, just with inadequate gear and inferior torpedoes
The nearly 35 km range of the type 93 was with a relatively slow speed of 32 knots, whereas at shorter range it could be launched at a much higher speed, an impressive 50 knots.
The Japanese night binoculars were extremely effective and were an important part of the success of the type 93 and of the IJN in night battles more generally
These binoculars often outperformed radar in detecting and identifying enemy vessels at night
The operational parameters of the type 93 were a secret, with capabilities unknown to both British and US naval intelligence
The secret had in part to do with the use of oxygen instead of air in combination with the (alcohol) fuel as a propellant. An idea they got from the UK but made work.

The type 93, unlike most other torpedoes around the world, outranged even the big battleship guns.

We have a thread on here with ranges, speed and payload of various air-launched torpedoes from around the world. The air launched weapons generally did not have anywhere near the range of the sea-launched types, but it gives us some point of comparison. I'll make another one for ship and sub launched torpedoes.

 

[Clayton Magnet]

What the hell are "night binoculars"?

 

[SaparotRob]

More than I can afford.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

What the hell are "night binoculars"?

I don't know. But apparently Japanese naval binoculars in general were very good. The main factor seems to be the size, hence the nickname 'big eye'.

I think this company sells antiques

WWII Japanese Naval Binoculars: Big Eye Spyglasses of the Rising Sun – House of Whitley

houseofwhitley.com

This company makes high quality (and very expensive) replicas:

History of Japanese Military Binoculars | luxxoptica

History and Models of Japanese Military WWII Binoculars

www.luxxoptica.com

This comment kinda stands out:

"The vast majority of large aperture binoculars that the United States military constructed during this period were essentially copied derivatives of seized Japanese equipment."

Apparently the British did this too. The previous article notes that "The 100mm, 20x instruments designed by Nikon became the templates for ones used on British warships until the turn of the 21st Century."

A bit more here:

Japanese Big Eye Binoculars - A History Lesson

History of Japanese Big Eye Binocular production. 15x80 binoculars through 180mm binoculars

www.luxxoptica.com

"...while the United States of America and Great Britain developed radar in the 1930s and 1940s, Japan continued to focus on binoculars. They felt so secure in their superiority in the optics of binoculars, that they thought they wouldn't need radar."

and

"The Japanese navy equipped all their warships with naval binoculars, set on 90 feet high towers. The binoculars were huge instruments made of brass and steel. The lenses could see up to 20 miles away and were designed to catch as much light as possible. The main purpose of these Big Eye Naval Binoculars was to spot Allied ships during World War II, but they also searched for the enemy's aerial positioning. These Japanese binoculars were indeed very powerful, so much so that the United States would take apart the binoculars from captured Japanese ships in order to reverse-engineer the Japanese technology and copy them for their own Navy."

 

[Clayton Magnet]

That is interesting. I am aware of allied commanders using captured German field glasses, but I had never heard of them doing the same with Japanese optics.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

I knew about the Japanese binoculars being good (many of these are too large to use as field glasses) but not quite to the extent I am learning today. Apparently it was the basis for a lot of naval optics both in the RN and USN until pretty recently. The Germans were impressed with them too (even though I think they had supplied the glass).

There was a similar kind of discrepancy though with tank optics in WW2, the German optics being much better and the US, which had been using German made lenses before the war, were lagging badly until around 1943 if I remember right.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I'd heard and read that they were excellent quality, but had no idea the Allies copied them. It stands to reason -- both Germany and Japan had, even then, excellent optical industries producing world-class cameras.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

I'd heard and read that they were excellent quality, but had no idea the Allies copied them. It stands to reason -- both Germany and Japan had, even then, excellent optical industries producing world-class cameras.

Yep it's some pretty familiar names which seem to have been involved with these.

 

[Shortround6]

What the hell are "night binoculars"?

At least with "field glasses" the exit pupil was the same size as the pupil of the human adult eye at maximum dilation.

7 X 35 binoculars have a 5mm Exit pupil.

Once the eye is fully dilated no more light will enter the eye to reach the receptors in the back of the eye.
The formula for this is very simple size of the objective lens (in MM) divided by the power/magnification of the system equals the exit pupil.

In theory this should give a view that in brightness is equal to daylight.

In practice clarity of the glass, polish of the lens surfaces, the coatings on the lenses and the number of the lens (each transition from air to glass causes internal reflections which reduce light transmission) all reduce the actual light transmitted.

Night Binoculars onboard ship are going to be a compromise between desired magnification, size of the desired exit pupil and the size/weight/cost of the binoculars.

20 X 100 Binoculars are going to give an exit pupil of 5mm. the ideal 20 X binoculars are going to need 140mm lenses and now you have build such devices and build/manufacture the larger lenses.

If you want shorter, less cumbersome tubes you actually need more lenses with more air/glass or glass/glass interfaces with their light transmission losses. Prisms help but each time the light path bounces in a prism there is some light loss.

Sometime just before or during WW II the optics industry was shifting from single lens coating to multiple coatings.

 

[RCAFson]

I'd heard and read that they were excellent quality, but had no idea the Allies copied them. It stands to reason -- both Germany and Japan had, even then, excellent optical industries producing world-class cameras.

The UK and USA had excellent optical industries as well, however, can you imagine what happens to your eyesight at night when the guns start firing without flashless powder? There's a reason that the German Navy (KM), IJN and RN used flashless powder in their rapid fire destroyer and cruiser/battleship secondary armament. The RN also used a salvo warning buzzer/bell to warn the FC personnel to close their eyes just before the salvo was fired. IIRC, the IJN did the same as they adopted RN methods, which in turn, were influenced by the German Navy.

To put this in aviation terms, look at the needed preparation on aircraft that are used on night operations.

 

[WARSPITER]

Japanese night binoculars were made by Asashi corp who later became Pentax. Besides the lenses they also developed I think a coating
to change light contrast to allow more light in which gave a better view.

In 1942 it caught out the opposition but once radar was trusted and became more powerful the tactical observation was no longer an advantage.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

I think it took a while for radar to become a consistently useful tool for naval surface warfare, and it didn't happen all at once, but rather in fits and starts. You can see it working in a few battles even in 1942, and more in 1943, but there are also still see cases where it didn't really make a difference because it was too limited or wasn't used properly. The Japanese navy's nighttime combat capability was formidable, and their emphasis on better torpedoes and improved binoculars does not seem to have put them behind the curve.

The IJN did also eventually develop air search, surface search and fire control radar during the war. The type 21 radar was operational in August 1943, the type 22 by Sept 1944. More sophisticated types were under development.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

The UK and USA had excellent optical industries as well, however, can you imagine what happens to your eyesight at night when the guns start firing without flashless powder? There's a reason that the German Navy (KM), IJN and RN used flashless powder in their rapid fire destroyer and cruiser/battleship secondary armament. The RN also used a salvo warning buzzer/bell to warn the FC personnel to close their eyes just before the salvo was fired. IIRC, the IJN did the same as they adopted RN methods, which in turn, were influenced by the German Navy.

To put this in aviation terms, look at the needed preparation on aircraft that are used on night operations.

"Flashless" powder still had plenty of flash. Enough, I'm sure, to ruin anyone's night vision.

 

[RCAFson]

"Flashless" powder still had plenty of flash. Enough, I'm sure, to ruin anyone's night vision.

That's simply not true; there's a reason that so much time and money was spent on developing flashless powder for naval guns:

"It was reported by the 5th Destroyer Flotilla [RN] from a trial carried out at night in February 1941 that, when firing fullcharges of N.F.Q. in the Q.F. 4.7-inch Mks. IX and XII gun, no flash could be seen by the firing or target ships." ( FLASHLESS PROPELLANTS J.N.PRING )

I find it a bit strange that anything the USN doesn't have is immediately discounted as useless anyways.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

That's simply not true; there's a reason that so much time and money was spent on developing flashless powder for naval guns:

"It was reported by the 5th Destroyer Flotilla [RN] from a trial carried out at night in February 1941 that, when firing fullcharges of N.F.Q. in the Q.F. 4.7-inch Mks. IX and XII gun, no flash could be seen by the firing or target ships." ( FLASHLESS PROPELLANTS J.N.PRING )

I find it a bit strange that anything the USN doesn't have is immediately discounted as useless anyways.

Flashless propellant was in great demand during the war, however, for guns larger than 5.25" (13.3 cm), full flashless charges became too bulky for existing turret arrangements and so the only larger weapon issued these was the 6" (15.2 cm) Mark XXIII. These were actually "reduced flash" or "non-blinding" charges and were designated as NQFP. This propellant was issued in cord form and differed from NF by having 4.5% more nitrocellulose, 4.5% less centralite and 2% potassium sulfate.

[...]

By the summer of 1942, the Naval Powder Factory had the answer in a chemical tablet made of a mixture of potassium nitrate and potassium sulfate, to which was added a small amount of graphite to facilitate pelleting. After extensive testing by the Naval Proving Ground had worked out the details, production was begun in September 1942. The use of these flashless pellets was limited to guns between 3 to 6 inches (7.62 to 15.2 cm) as larger calibers would have required too many pellets. Even in these calibers performance was not always perfect. A fused mass of clinkers could form in the gun chambers, a result of incomplete combustion of the pellets. At high angles of gun elevation, these clinkers could cause gun casualties such as jammed breech mechanisms. To eliminate the hazard, the Research Division of BuOrd, working with the Naval Powder Factory, developed a flashless grain. Known as SPDF, this new material consisted of 5 to 7 percent potassium sulfate mixed with nitrocellulose, colloided as a normal smokeless powder, and extruded in the form of a powder grain. Satisfactory in both ballistic and flash suppression properties, flashless grains of this type were in production at the Naval Powder Factory when the war ended. Meanwhile, pellets continued to serve the need for a flash suppressor for existing propellants. While not completely satisfactory, these two compositions provided the fleet with an essentially flashless charge long before it was possible to have true flashless powder.

History and Technology - Naval Propellants - A Brief Overview - NavWeaps

www.navweaps.com

So according to Navweaps, both British and American "flashless powder" still had some flash to it. This comports with what I've read in the literature, too.

 

[GrauGeist]

The term "flashless" did not mean that there was no muzzle flash.

It meant "reduced" - regardless of which military employed it.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

That's simply not true; there's a reason that so much time and money was spent on developing flashless powder for naval guns:

"It was reported by the 5th Destroyer Flotilla [RN] from a trial carried out at night in February 1941 that, when firing fullcharges of N.F.Q. in the Q.F. 4.7-inch Mks. IX and XII gun, no flash could be seen by the firing or target ships." ( FLASHLESS PROPELLANTS J.N.PRING )

I find it a bit strange that anything the USN doesn't have is immediately discounted as useless anyways.

IMO to me, it's not useless by any means. It is just literally secondary, as in, used with secondary guns. It is pretty clear that it wasn't used with the larger guns which decided most of the Pacific battles.

I think it's interesting that sometimes pointing out that while some British aircraft were fantastic, others were not,
or that while some British technology was game changing innovation, others weren't successful,
or that while the British won some fantastic victories, they also sometimes lost,

(like everyone else in the war)

...somehow gets interpreted as downing the British as utterly failed, or giving them zero credit for anything.

There is a lot of space between "decisive" and "useless".
There is a lot of space between "British were always successful / victorious / best" vs "they were the worst".

But somehow it doesn't seem to get treated that way.

Ultimately how we feel about this stuff doesn't really matter. I don't think most people read forums like this (and far more read than post here) in order to find out people's emotional baggage, so much as the facts.

One of the facts seems to be that Nippon Kugako, which became Nikon, was a world leader in optics. According to this site among several others, both the British and the Americans copied their designs during and after the war.

Quoting directly:

"That is what Nippon Kogaku K. K. was created for: to design and produce optical lenses in Japan. After the war had ended, they also started producing photographic lenses, which became the standard for Naval Binoculars used in the second World War. In fact, Nippon Kogaku became the biggest producer of large military binoculars during WWII and their designs were copied by the American and British forces."

After reading all this stuff I'm not starting to want to buy a pair of antique or replica Japanese binoculars. Even though I don't have a battleship or even a Destroyer.

Each nation has their tropes which we grew up with. When I was a kid there were all kinds of exaggerated wartime stories about American victories during WW2 (and many other wars) which I now know were basically propaganda. All those "kill ratios" and so on. Even as a little kid many of these did not ring true to me, and certainly as an old man I'm far more interested in learning what really happened in as much detail as possible.

One of the British tropes seems to be that the Pacific War didn't matter, the Japanese were second rate, and any losses suffered in the 'Far East' were due to inferior kit and inferior men. Aside from being obviously absurd, it's kind of insulting not only to the Japanese and to the Americans, but also to the Commonwealth forces especially Australian, New Zealand, Indian and others who fought in the Pacific, and to the British themselves because many British pilots, sailors and soldiers fought in the Pacific and CBI as well. To assume that all the soldiers "sent East" were somehow inferior would first presume that they could tell who was going to be a good or bad soldier, sailor or pilot in advance. Considering how many of the supposedly best British pilots (based on their own testing) were sent to bomber command that seems a bit odd.

And certainly many of the Commonwealth forces who were fighting in the Pacific weren't sent anywhere, they were fighting close to home.

 

[RCAFson]

Flashless propellant was in great demand during the war, however, for guns larger than 5.25" (13.3 cm), full flashless charges became too bulky for existing turret arrangements and so the only larger weapon issued these was the 6" (15.2 cm) Mark XXIII. These were actually "reduced flash" or "non-blinding" charges and were designated as NQFP. This propellant was issued in cord form and differed from NF by having 4.5% more nitrocellulose, 4.5% less centralite and 2% potassium sulfate.

[...]

By the summer of 1942, the Naval Powder Factory had the answer in a chemical tablet made of a mixture of potassium nitrate and potassium sulfate, to which was added a small amount of graphite to facilitate pelleting. After extensive testing by the Naval Proving Ground had worked out the details, production was begun in September 1942. The use of these flashless pellets was limited to guns between 3 to 6 inches (7.62 to 15.2 cm) as larger calibers would have required too many pellets. Even in these calibers performance was not always perfect. A fused mass of clinkers could form in the gun chambers, a result of incomplete combustion of the pellets. At high angles of gun elevation, these clinkers could cause gun casualties such as jammed breech mechanisms. To eliminate the hazard, the Research Division of BuOrd, working with the Naval Powder Factory, developed a flashless grain. Known as SPDF, this new material consisted of 5 to 7 percent potassium sulfate mixed with nitrocellulose, colloided as a normal smokeless powder, and extruded in the form of a powder grain. Satisfactory in both ballistic and flash suppression properties, flashless grains of this type were in production at the Naval Powder Factory when the war ended. Meanwhile, pellets continued to serve the need for a flash suppressor for existing propellants. While not completely satisfactory, these two compositions provided the fleet with an essentially flashless charge long before it was possible to have true flashless powder.

History and Technology - Naval Propellants - A Brief Overview - NavWeaps

www.navweaps.com

So according to Navweaps, both British and American "flashless powder" still had some flash to it. This comports with what I've read in the literature, too.

Sorry, it doesn't state that at all. Your above quote states that for RN guns larger than 5.25in a reduced flash propellant was used. The quote I gave was for a RN destroyer flotilla equipped with 4.7in guns. The 2nd paragraph of your quote discusses USN flashless and reduced flash propellants.

If we were to pit two identical destroyers against each other at night, one with flashless propellant and one without, it should be readily apparent which one would have a huge advantage over the other.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

The term "flashless" did not mean that there was no muzzle flash.

It meant "reduced" - regardless of which military employed it.

And the issue of needing to deal with bright lights or flashes, which could be from the larger 'friendly' guns, or from explosions from enemy guns striking nearby, or from flares, or from enemy gunfire, was obviously at least considered by all navies well prior to WW2. It wasn't just the British or the Germans who were aware of this.