Japanese aircraft were behind in timing to Allied aircraft.

[Shortround6]

We have the advantage of hindsight including after action battle reports.

What different classes of ships were designed to do is something else.
And a lot of this stuff took place over 10-12 years and since it takes around 3 years to build a cruiser there was a lot overlap.

You also were dealing the aftermath of the treaties and with radar coming it to disrupt the preconceived notions of night (poor weather) combat.

The US had maxed out their allotment of heavy cruisers with 8in guns. Due to the treaty language anything with an 8" gun (aside from carriers) was a heavy cruiser, didn't matter how many guns or the tonnage as long as it was under 10,000ton.
Also by treaty the next break was 6"in guns for light cruisers, mostly. However the "light cruiser" was also capped at 10,000tons and at times (depends on the treaty) the tonnage was not which lead to the Mogami class and the Brooklyn class

Fifteen 6" guns. The US built 9 of these things which were basically 10,000 ton cruisers were different turrets/guns.
The US guns could range to just over 25,000yrds but a lot these max ranges were somewhat of an illusion.
However in a closer range night battle the high rate of fire (up to 10rpm per barrel) was considered to be quite an advantage over the 2-3 rpm of the 8' guns.

However at 10,000tons they were bit expensive to use as destroyer leaders in a night torpedo attack, they were also, shall we say, HUGE in size for night torpedo attack (1936-38 here, forget radar). The old Omaha class, which was similar in age to the Japanese light cruisers, had a number of problems. While low and fast they took water over bow/sides, the hull was weak and the fuel tanks leaked contaminating the fuel oil.
This was part of the reasoning for the Atlanta class. A 6,000 ton ship that was fast enough to keep up with/lead destroyers, better protected than a destroyer and with enough firepower to overwhelm one or more destroyers or a small light cruiser (5-6000 tons). Also kept ammo supply easy.

Now please note that the Cleveland class kept almost the same hull and swapped one triple 6" turret for two twin 5" turrets.
The US called all the 6" gun cruisers CLs but they often made up a fair amount of the cruiser forces in many of the early Pacific battles.

Battle of Empress Augusta Bay (Nov 1-2 1943) was all Cleveland class light cruisers and destroyers and while not a very decisive battle it was a win for the US navy and was the last battle of the Solomons/first battle for Bougainville. Radar had also come quite far since the late summer of 1942.

Only one Baltimore class cruiser showed up in combat in 1943 (Nov) with the 2nd one showing in Jan 1944.
The Wichita showed up in the Spring of 1939 and is the only US 8" cruiser to be completed between Vincennes (Spring 1937) and the Baltimore.

Flashless powder may have not worked in battle quite as intended but it did form part of the planning during 1941-42.
A lack of actual night battle practice in the USN during the peace time years may have hidden a number of things. It did reduce peacetime collisions though.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

We have the advantage of hindsight including after action battle reports.

Agreed

What different classes of ships were designed to do is something else.
And a lot of this stuff took place over 10-12 years and since it takes around 3 years to build a cruiser there was a lot overlap.

I think the missions of a lot of vessels (and aircraft) evolved during development

You also were dealing the aftermath of the treaties and with radar coming it to disrupt the preconceived notions of night (poor weather) combat.

The US had maxed out their allotment of heavy cruisers with 8in guns. Due to the treaty language anything with an 8" gun (aside from carriers) was a heavy cruiser, didn't matter how many guns or the tonnage as long as it was under 10,000ton.
Also by treaty the next break was 6"in guns for light cruisers, mostly. However the "light cruiser" was also capped at 10,000tons and at times (depends on the treaty) the tonnage was not which lead to the Mogami class and the Brooklyn class
View attachment 732040
Fifteen 6" guns. The US built 9 of these things which were basically 10,000 ton cruisers were different turrets/guns.
The US guns could range to just over 25,000yrds but a lot these max ranges were somewhat of an illusion.

Yes I agree, but the bigger guns did seem to outrange the smaller ones by a good margin in most of the actual battles.

However in a closer range night battle the high rate of fire (up to 10rpm per barrel) was considered to be quite an advantage over the 2-3 rpm of the 8' guns.

Agreed, and that did happen a couple of times (first naval battle of Guadalcanal for one, I think maybe at some point in the Action off Samar too...?). I think the 5" / 38 guns on the Atlanta class had a ROF of 15 rpm, at least in theory, and Wikipedia says a good crew could get that up to an impressive 22 rounds per minute.

However at 10,000tons they were bit expensive to use as destroyer leaders in a night torpedo attack, they were also, shall we say, HUGE in size for night torpedo attack (1936-38 here, forget radar). The old Omaha class, which was similar in age to the Japanese light cruisers, had a number of problems. While low and fast they took water over bow/sides, the hull was weak and the fuel tanks leaked contaminating the fuel oil.
This was part of the reasoning for the Atlanta class. A 6,000 ton ship that was fast enough to keep up with/lead destroyers, better protected than a destroyer and with enough firepower to overwhelm one or more destroyers or a small light cruiser (5-6000 tons). Also kept ammo supply easy.

I think Atlanta class was a good ship, especially for AA, but one of the other flaws of the class though was a lack of sonar or depth charges, and they seemed to be pretty vulnerable to submarines.

Now please note that the Cleveland class kept almost the same hull and swapped one triple 6" turret for two twin 5" turrets.
The US called all the 6" gun cruisers CLs but they often made up a fair amount of the cruiser forces in many of the early Pacific battles.

Battle of Empress Augusta Bay (Nov 1-2 1943) was all Cleveland class light cruisers and destroyers and while not a very decisive battle it was a win for the US navy and was the last battle of the Solomons/first battle for Bougainville. Radar had also come quite far since the late summer of 1942.

Only one Baltimore class cruiser showed up in combat in 1943 (Nov) with the 2nd one showing in Jan 1944.
The Wichita showed up in the Spring of 1939 and is the only US 8" cruiser to be completed between Vincennes (Spring 1937) and the Baltimore.

Flashless powder may have not worked in battle quite as intended but it did form part of the planning during 1941-42.

I'm sure it was helpful, I just wouldn't say decisive.

A lack of actual night battle practice in the USN during the peace time years may have hidden a number of things. It did reduce peacetime collisions though.

Definitely cost lives, but they seem to have adapted fairly well to night combat by the end of 1942 or early 1943.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

By the way, a slight detour, but related to OP. A wartime film about a Ki-43 Ace, Lt. Col. Tateo Kato, CO of the 64th Sentai. He was credited with 39 victories, mainly over Malaya and Java, and survived many clashes with both the AVG and RAF, but was killed by the defensive gunner on a Bristol Blenheim in April 1942. Which does highlight both the strengths and weaknesses of the type!


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sneZm8jQ2Dw

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Several interesting combat scenes for example at 34:00 - fight with Brewster Buffaloes and P-40s

 

[Shortround6]

Yes I agree, but the bigger guns did seem to outrange the smaller ones by a good margin in the actual battles.

This is often overlooked or the reason why is overlooked.

According for Navweaps the US 6" gun needed over 77 seconds to reach 26,000ft but this is post war, it needs 44.4 degrees of elevation to reach 26,000yds but the WW II turrets maxed out at 40-41 degrees. Now at 20,000yds the gun was elevated to only 22.33 degrees and took 44.86 seconds so the enemy ship had about 30 seconds less to move before the shells arrive. The mount needed to be lowered to 20 degrees load, so long range fire also took a hit.

The old US 8" gun (pre CA35/37) hit 26,000yds in just 53.9 seconds and hit 20,000yds in 35.23 seconds so you don't have to predict movement quite as much.

The heavy 8" shells only show up in the Baltimore's and need different shell handling equipment so they change the older cruisers to use the new shells.

Since most non-US 8in guns used shells of about the same weight as the older US 8" guns they should be closer to the US shells than to 6" shells.

American 14in BB guns (not used at this time, Solomons) topped out at just under 30 seconds to reach 20,000yds.

Not saying that 30 seconds is a magic goal. Just pointing out major factor in actual long range gunnery vs stationary/low speed targets.

rate of fire is also range dependent. In a close range brawl a lot of the 8" ships could fire 3-4 rounds per minute, however different navies had different loading arrangements (Japanese used a fixed 5 degree elevation) and at the longer ranges the time needed to lower and elevate the guns from/to the firing angle could add up.

The Japanese were 'supposed' to have adopted the 5.5" guns for their old cruisers to make ammunition handling easier than 6 in guns (83.4lb vs 100lb shells)

 

[EwenS]

I think Atlanta class was a good ship, especially for AA, but one of the other flaws of the class though was a lack of sonar or depth charges, and they seemed to be pretty vulnerable to submarines.

Again wrong.

As designed they were fitted with sonar and two rails aft each holding 5 DC. Then in Jan 1942 that was expanded to a full destroyer outfit by adding 6 DC throwers each holding 6 DC. But the issue with them was that, as 6,000 tons standard displacement cruisers, they did not have the manoeuverability of a destroyer to go submarine hunting (their tactical diameter was estimated at 900 yards). As the war went on and their use became more focussed on the anti-aircraft role the DC throwers were ordered removed in Feb 1943 and the DC rails in Oct 1944. In both cases the weight saving was used to buy additional light AA weapons.

Their main problem was their relatively small size. So the first 8 ships only got SC radar and not the big SK set with its greater range or the fighter director SP. As the war went on other sacrifices had to be made. In the second group the wing 5" turrets were sacrificed along with the boats and boat crane (a common alteration to US ships) for more Bofors mounts as completed they shipped 8 twins). In 1945 the TT were beginning to be sacrificed, starting with Oakland, for a further increase in the light AA battery.

When the third group was ordered (Juneau, Spokane & Fresno) 5" turrets Nos 2, 3, 4 & 5 were all dropped a deck which bought enough topweight & stability for the full cruiser radar suite and even more light AA.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Again wrong.

As designed they were fitted with sonar and two rails aft each holding 5 DC. Then in Jan 1942 that was expanded to a full destroyer outfit by adding 6 DC throwers each holding 6 DC. But the issue with them was that, as 6,000 tons standard displacement cruisers, they did not have the manoeuverability of a destroyer to go submarine hunting (their tactical diameter was estimated at 900 yards). As the war went on and their use became more focussed on the anti-aircraft role the DC throwers were ordered removed in Feb 1943 and the DC rails in Oct 1944. In both cases the weight saving was used to buy additional light AA weapons.

Their main problem was their relatively small size. So the first 8 ships only got SC radar and not the big SK set with its greater range or the fighter director SP. As the war went on other sacrifices had to be made. In the second group the wing 5" turrets were sacrificed along with the boats and boat crane (a common alteration to US ships) for more Bofors mounts as completed they shipped 8 twins). In 1945 the TT were beginning to be sacrificed, starting with Oakland, for a further increase in the light AA battery.

When the third group was ordered (Juneau, Spokane & Fresno) 5" turrets Nos 2, 3, 4 & 5 were all dropped a deck which bought enough topweight & stability for the full cruiser radar suite and even more light AA.

Woah nelly. They originally did not have any sonar or depth charges, they got it in 1942. Most later had the depth charge projectors taken off.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

I'm all about adding the finer details but some of y'all just love the 'gotcha' game a little too much, especially when your 'gotcha' is some detail which isn't really relevant to the argument. What is your point? Do you really think, are you really trying to argue, that most or even say, more than half of the surface combats (above the level of say, PT boats) in the Pacific War were not decided by heavy (as in, 8" or better) naval guns or torpedoes?

If that isn't what you are saying, make it clear.

 

[Shortround6]

If that isn't what you are saying, make it clear.

Sorry I wasn't clear, that wasn't a "gotcha". it was just extra detail.
However since you seem to think that everything is a "gotcha" I am done replying to this part of the discussion.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Sorry I wasn't clear, that wasn't a "gotcha". it was just extra detail.
However since you seem to think that everything is a "gotcha" I am done replying to this part of the discussion.

Oh I know I wasn't referring to you. I gave you a 'bacon' on your last post.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Sorry I wasn't clear

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

I have no problem with a little bit of nuance added or a yeah but or a yeah and type of post. I guess we all also do the other kind once in a while, it just starts to get out of hand sometimes.

 

[mack8]

That is not true.

The design evolution of the Atlantas went back to mid-1934 to find a smaller successor to the 10,000 ton 6" armed Brooklyn class in light of the negotiations that took place ahead of the Second London Naval Conference (Dec 1935-March 1936) and the resulting 1936 Treaty that limited cruisers to 8,000 tons.

Friedman in his "US Cruisers An Illustrated Design History" devotes a chapter of over 30 pages to their design evolution. In that process they went through some 26 designs with various combinations of size, power and armament before the Atlanta as we know it was arrived at. Those included versions with varying numbers of 5"/38 or combined 6"/47 plus 5"/38 or even 6"/47 DP on tonnages ranging from 3,500 tons to 8,400 tons and speeds from 32.5 to 36 knots.

Throughout the process however what they were seeking was a cruiser that
1. Could work with destroyers for general purposes and
2. Was a general purpose cruiser to work with the battlefleet i.e. a replacement for the Omaha class.

So surface action was very much envisaged when they were designed. Reading Friedman the striking thing is how little there was in the discussions about its main armament anti aircraft capabilities. The emphasis was very much on surface action, hence the debate about 6" v 5" main armament. 6" DP had to be rejected on weight grounds and likely delays to the turret design and the mixed battery on a ship of that size wasn't popular.

It took until July 1938 to come up with a preliminary design and Nov 1938 for it to be finalised and it still didn't suit everyone. Orders were placed in April 1939 for the first 4 ships.

As ordered they were classified as CL i.e. light cruiser. The survivors and subsequent ships of the class were not redesignated as CLAA until Feb/Mar 1949. The CLAA designation did not exist until that point in time and by then half of them had been out of commission for 2-3 years.

Perhaps drifting too much into naval stuff, but the above is very interesting, any explanation why they chose a 6000 ton design instead of an 8000 ton one?

The start of this article shows how the Japanese intended to use a massive night time torpedo strike as part of the "Decisive Battle" with the 24" Long Lance torpedoes and how the torpedo cruisers would have fitted in to that. There is then an analysis of the various battles they were used in and their effectiveness.

History and Technology - Japanese Surface Torpedo Attack: Expectations and Reality - NavWeaps

www.navweaps.com

Good read, however inevitably one can see a bias there. Adding the 1943-44 torpedo launch/hit figures when the IJN was increasingly loosing it's edge due to ship and men losses, faced with an ever increasing and adapting USN is a bit misleading imo. Rather the 1942 statistics, when IJN was at it's peak are a much better indication as to how the hypothetical decisive battle could have went. Note that in 4 of the 6 battles with a large numbers of torpedoes launched (i discount the below 10 numbers for now), IJN scores hovered around 12-13%. The outliers are Java sea (launched from too far?) and second Guadalcanal (not quite sure what happened there, just pure luck for the american BBs not to be hit?).

If the IJN has a really good day during this hypothetical kantai kessen and the hits are hovering in the region of 12-13%, they might just about pull it off!

 

[EwenS]

The whole notion that "flashless" powder is a game changer or a crucial element for surface combat is BS, since it's limited to the smaller caliber guns among other reasons. And the smaller caliber guns did not win the major naval battles of the Pacific War. Even radar doesn't seem to have mattered that much in the early years. It certainly didn't save the Exeter when it went up against the IJN. It wasn't really a major factor for the US until in later 1943, and even then, was probably not decisive for surface combat.

Proximity fused AA shells on the other hand, a British innovation turned into reality by the Americans, did seem to matter. Fire directors mattered. Well trained crews mattered. Effective torpedoes mattered, and the RN did have those. And so did big guns.

Do you fully appreciate the extent to which gunnery radars had been developed and fitted "in the early years"?

Britain.
The first main gunnery Type 284 prototype went to sea in the battleship Nelson in June 1940 with the first Type 285 for secondary directors a couple of months later. Production sets then became available from Nov 1940. Priority was given to new ships completing and then ships in the Home & Med fleets in for refit. But by the outbreak of war in the Far East in Dec 1941 it was by no means a universal fitting. And the Far East had the lowest priority for the latest sets.

USA
After a prototype Mk.1 fire control set was fitted in Wichita in June 1941, the production Mk 3 was first fitted in the cruiser Philadelphia in Oct 1941. But again they took a while to roll out to existing ships. The Mk.4 for use with the Mark 33 & 37 director towers began to be fitted from Sept 1941 starting with the destroyer Roe. The successor to the Mk.3 radar, the Mk.8, only began to appear in new construction ships from late 1942.

So when you look at the various actions through to 1943 the first thing to ascertain is how many of the ships had what radars and what were their capabilities.

You mentioned Exeter. This is her in her final configuration after she left the UK in May 1941.

That refit saw her gain Type 279 air warning radar (an aerial at each masthead) but no dedicated gunnery radars (per both Friedman and Raven & Roberts). Looking through R & R. While there was a panel that could be added to Type 279 to provide range data to the guns there is no indication that it was ever fitted to her, and anyway it was seldom used (one exception being at Matapan).

And radar was not a panacea. Much depended on the skills of the operators and the surrounding environment. There were significant problems when ships operated close to land due to clutter from the topography. That was a particular problem in the Solomons in 1942.

 

[EwenS]

I'm all about adding the finer details but some of y'all just love the 'gotcha' game a little too much, especially when your 'gotcha' is some detail which isn't really relevant to the argument. What is your point? Do you really think, are you really trying to argue, that most or even say, more than half of the surface combats (above the level of say, PT boats) in the Pacific War were not decided by heavy (as in, 8" or better) naval guns or torpedoes?

If that isn't what you are saying, make it clear.

I'm not trying to play "gotcha" The problem I have is that so much of what you post is at best inaccurate or ill informed, especially when it comes to anything connected with Britain.. As far as I am concerned it is a question of trying to ensure the information is correct for you and others to understand the true position.

 

[Escuadrilla Azul]

By the way, a slight detour,

Any time a smaller detour than the naval stuff and the flashless powder!

 

[RCAFson]

From an earlier post of mine in another thread:

In May 1941 Suffolk had Type 279 and Type 284, as did KGV and Hood, for example. By 6 Dec almost all battleships and cruisers had at least 1 AW radar and many had AW radar and AA and/or surface FC radar. Type 285 was becoming common on fleet destroyers. I know that 273/279/280/281 SW/AW radar could be used for FC* but it's use for FC meant forgoing the AW/SW function.

In any event the USN had few radars of any kind on 6 Dec 1941, whereas, as of 28 Sept 1941 (Howse, p.99-101) :

84 RN ships had at least one FC radar (284/285)
48 cruisers and larger ships had at least one type 79/279/280/281 AW radar
303 RN ships had AW/SW radar (Type 286/286P/290) and 40 had centimetric 27X series radars.

These numbers would have increased somewhat by 6 Dec 1941.

* HMS Fiji used Type 279 for AA fire control at Crete and KGV used her's for surface FC against Bismarck after her Type 284 broke down.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

I'm not trying to play "gotcha" The problem I have is that so much of what you post is at best inaccurate or ill informed, especially when it comes to anything connected with Britain.. As far as I am concerned it is a question of trying to ensure the information is correct for you and others to understand the true position.

The last several posts were about the Atlanta class light cruiser, nothing to do with England. I haven't made any more errors than you have. Save the angst for the RN vs IJN thread because that is going to happen.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Do you fully appreciate the extent to which gunnery radars had been developed and fitted "in the early years"?

Maybe you didn't grasp the context - I was referring to the early years of the Pacific War, from which the Royal Navy was largely absent.

And radar was not a panacea. Much depended on the skills of the operators and the surrounding environment. There were significant problems when ships operated close to land due to clutter from the topography. That was a particular problem in the Solomons in 1942.

This was my actual point. It clearly helped, but it also very clearly took quite a while for the last 20% of the inevitable 80/20 rule to get sorted out sufficiently that the radar could become a really significant factor.

Most naval engagements going back to the 14th Century took place in and around harbors or islands. Combat in the open sea was relatively rare, so the conditions such as around the Solomons weren't as unusual as one might think.

 

[cherry blossom]

Snip.... The outliers are Java sea (launched from too far?) and second Guadalcanal (not quite sure what happened there, just pure luck for the american BBs not to be hit?).

If the IJN has a really good day during this hypothetical kantai kessen and the hits are hovering in the region of 12-13%, they might just about pull it off!

If you look at Second Guadalcanal, you notice that the destroyers firing most of the torpedoes were old and didn't carry the Type 93. The newer destroyers seem to have used their torpedoes during First Guadalcanal. Of course, Atago and Takao had Type 93s but misidentified their enemy and presumably misjudged their speed. The two destroyers sent by Tanaka also carried the Type 93s but arrived a little late as Lee turned away.