Japanese aircraft were behind in timing to Allied aircraft.

[GrauGeist]

In regards to the earlier statement that an alarm sounded before batteries opened fire, this was done at all times, in all weather, by virtually all navies. It was a warning to keep Clear and prepare for concussion - it had literally zero to do with night vision.

As for "flashless powder":
From NavWeaps:

Flashless Propellants

Due to the presence of calcium in the small amount of chalk used to counteract traces of residual acids, SC cordite had a very bright "flash," a characteristic which led to the development of flashless propellants. British flashless propellants in use during World War II were produced in primarily in slotted tubular form. The most used was NF, originally known as NFQ, and this was composed of 55% picrite (nitroguanidine), 16.5% nitrocellulose (12.1% N), 21% ntroglycerin, 7.5% centralite and 0.3% cryolite. NF was not easy to make and the basic initial material required for picrite was calcium carbide, which required large amounts of electricity during the manufacturing process. For this reason, the only plant making this propellant was located at Welland near Niagara Falls in Canada. Canada also produced Cordite N during World War II which was widely used as a propellant for aircraft gun ammunition. Cordite N is another triple-base propellant that was very cool burning and produced little smoke and almost no flash. The composition was 55.0% nitroguanidine, 19.0% nitrocellulose, 18.5% nitroglycerin and 7.5% ethyl centralite. Cordite N does not appear to have been used as a naval gun propellant in the Royal Navy, but a variation of it was used by the USN (see below).
Flashless propellant was in great demand during the war, however, for guns larger than 5.25" (13.3 cm), full flashless charges became too bulky for existing turret arrangements and so the only larger weapon issued these was the 6" (15.2 cm) Mark XXIII. These were actually "reduced flash" or "non-blinding" charges and were designated as NQFP. This propellant was issued in cord form and differed from NF by having 4.5% more nitrocellulose, 4.5% less centralite and 2% potassium sulfate.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Sorry, it doesn't state that at all. Your above quote states that for RN guns larger than 5.25in a reduced flash propellant was used. The quote I gave was for a RN destroyer flotilla equipped with 4.7in guns. The 2nd paragraph of your quote discusses USN flashless and reduced flash propellants.

If we were to pit two identical destroyers against each other at night, one with flashless propellant and one without, it should be readily apparent which one would have a huge advantage over the other.

I didn't say it didn't confer an advantage, but it's equally true that your implied blanket statement that flashless powders had no flash is off-base. Once above certain calibers, it was most definitely imperfect.

And yes, I know the two paragraphs discuss two different navies. If you recollect, we were talking about naval engagements in the Pacific as well, so it seemed meet to make mention of both navies and the imperfection of their "flashless" powder.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Interesting that they had flashless powder for aircraft guns. I bet that helped a lot in night combat between bombers and night fighters, or between night fighters.

 

[Shortround6]

I find it a bit strange that anything the USN doesn't have is immediately discounted as useless anyways.

Well,

The USN had some radar in the summer/fall of 1942 but it turned out to be pretty useless to them in actual combat.

Now this is about 1 1/2 years later than the British used radar to track/follow the Bismarck in North Atlantic squalls/storms and at night.
Different radar?
Different standard of training/experience?
Battle of Matapan night action also shows that radar, while very important was not omnipotent.
Orion is supposed to have detected the Pola at 6 miles (?) to start the night action.

But that was March of 1941.

The US did better, a lot better, in later engagements. But US performance at Salvo and a few other battles is no indication than the RN would have performed as poorly on radar watch.

Keeping your own main battery gunners/director operators from being flash blinded seems to have been fairly simple. However than may entail not using secondary battery armament from Cruisers or battleships and it does not prevent problems of flash blindness from screening ships (DD/s between friendly Heavies and enemy ships in the line of sight.)

What was desired for propellents vs was could be supplied is part of the question and when.

When comparing aircraft we can average out scores if not hundreds of engagements. We do get different results against different opponents or different theaters at times.

Naval battles are a lot rarer, The study of the Japanese surface torpedo engagements lists 27 engagements over 3 1/4 years. Maybe they missed a few gun only actions but I hope the idea gets across.
Trying to draw conclusions gets a lot harder with the differences in equipment and training on both sides and often, with naval engagements the importance of luck.
Who saw who first,
who fired first.
who hit first,
where did that hit land,
effects of early hit/s.

Bismarck classic case of this one as is the PoW 1st torpedo hit. 100-150 ft either further or aft and the results might have been war different.

 

[RCAFson]

I didn't say it didn't confer an advantage, but it's equally true that your implied blanket statement that flashless powders had no flash is off-base. Once above certain calibers, it was most definitely imperfect.

And yes, I know the two paragraphs discuss two different navies. If you recollect, we were talking about naval engagements in the Pacific as well, so it seemed meet to make mention of both navies and the imperfection of their "flashless" powder.

I didn't make an implied blanket statement. I gave a quote that clearly stated the gun calibre and the trial results by a flotilla of destroyers armed with that gun calibre.

The USN and RN used different gun propellants.

 

[GrauGeist]

This is a very relevant article, told from a first person account that covers many aspects of this discussion.

Beep, Beep, BOOM!

A former destroyerman remembers, in gripping detail, a clash with a Japanese convoy on his "most exciting night of World War II."

www.usni.org

 

[RCAFson]

Well,

The USN had some radar in the summer/fall of 1942 but it turned out to be pretty useless to them in actual combat.

Now this is about 1 1/2 years later than the British used radar to track/follow the Bismarck in North Atlantic squalls/storms and at night.
Different radar?
Different standard of training/experience?
Battle of Matapan night action also shows that radar, while very important was not omnipotent.
Orion is supposed to have detected the Pola at 6 miles (?) to start the night action.

But that was March of 1941.

The US did better, a lot better, in later engagements. But US performance at Salvo and a few other battles is no indication than the RN would have performed as poorly on radar watch.

Keeping your own main battery gunners/director operators from being flash blinded seems to have been fairly simple. However than may entail not using secondary battery armament from Cruisers or battleships and it does not prevent problems of flash blindness from screening ships (DD/s between friendly Heavies and enemy ships in the line of sight.)

What was desired for propellents vs was could be supplied is part of the question and when.

When comparing aircraft we can average out scores if not hundreds of engagements. We do get different results against different opponents or different theaters at times.

Naval battles are a lot rarer, The study of the Japanese surface torpedo engagements lists 27 engagements over 3 1/4 years. Maybe they missed a few gun only actions but I hope the idea gets across.
Trying to draw conclusions gets a lot harder with the differences in equipment and training on both sides and often, with naval engagements the importance of luck.
Who saw who first,
who fired first.
who hit first,
where did that hit land,
effects of early hit/s.

Bismarck classic case of this one as is the PoW 1st torpedo hit. 100-150 ft either further or aft and the results might have been war different.

In many cases the USN's radar advantage was nullified by an over reliance on it, as they were basically fighting blind without it. A notable exception was USS Washington's use of Mk3 FC radar, used for ranging, with optical training on the selected target, aided by her rigid fire control discipline. A study of the battle from both side's perspective indicates that the only USN ship to have scored any hits was USS Washington; South Dakota and the 4 USN destroyers failed to score any hits at all.

The USN didn't conduct realistic night action training prior to 7 Dec 1941. We know this because USN torpedoes were unreliable and yet the USN didn't realize this until well after their entry into the war! They simply didn't conduct adequate training, because, if they had, they would have quickly discovered the faulty torpedoes.

If we create a series of hypothetical night actions and run them through a simulator, alternating the RN and USN versus the IJN we would find that:

RN night action doctrine was superior to USN night action doctrine.

The RN had flashless propellant and it's use would have made RN optical gunnery more accurate and IJN gunnery less accurate.

The RN had reliable torpedoes, 2nd only to the IJN, so the IJN would receive more torpedo hits.

The RN's use of flashless propellant would aid in the use of radar ranging with optical training (tracking) along with greater experience in the use of radar.

This doesn't mean that the RN would inevitably win every battle, but it does mean that the IJN would suffer, on average, higher attrition per battle and that the RN had a much better chance of winning night surface actions than the USN did during 1942.

 

[RCAFson]

This is a very relevant article, told from a first person account that covers many aspects of this discussion.

Beep, Beep, BOOM!

A former destroyerman remembers, in gripping detail, a clash with a Japanese convoy on his "most exciting night of World War II."

www.usni.org

It is interesting and it shows how the far the USN had progressed by Jan 1944.


"The American gunfire was not much better than the Japanese. Although each of Burke's destroyers fired on a different target, none of its shells scored. Part of the problem was the poor optical situation. Not only was the enemy's gun flashes invisible,but the U.S. ships exhausted their supplies of flashless powder, forcing them to switch to smokeless powder. The blazes associated with this propellant worsened the Americans's night vision. On the other hand, technicians had recently installed salvo buzzers on (96 Ibid., 15) p.331) Burke's destroyers, a recommendation made nearly a year ago by the Pensacola's gunnery officer in his report on the Battle of Tassafaronga. By sounding just prior to the guns going off, the bridge personnel had the opportunity to close their eyes before the gun flash. However, as Burke later admitted, this new procedure helped, but was no substitute for more flashless powder.(97)"
https://etd.ohiolink.edu/apexprod/r...?accession=ohiou1214239278&disposition=inline (p331-332)

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

In many cases the USN's radar advantage was nullified by an over reliance on it, as they were basically fighting blind without it. A notable exception was USS Washington's use of Mk3 FC radar, used for ranging, with optical training on the selected target, aided by her rigid fire control discipline. A study of the battle from both side's perspective indicates that the only USN ship to have scored any hits was USS Washington; South Dakota and the 4 USN destroyers failed to score any hits at all.

The USN didn't conduct realistic night action training prior to 7 Dec 1941. We know this because USN torpedoes were unreliable and yet the USN didn't realize this until well after their entry into the war! They simply didn't conduct adequate training, because, if they had, they would have quickly discovered the faulty torpedoes.

If we create a series of hypothetical night actions and run them through a simulator, alternating the RN and USN versus the IJN we would find that:

RN night action doctrine was superior to USN night action doctrine.

The RN had flashless propellant and it's use would have made RN optical gunnery more accurate and IJN gunnery less accurate.

That seems very unlikely

The RN had reliable torpedoes, 2nd only to the IJN, so the IJN would receive more torpedo hits.

The RN's use of flashless propellant would aid in the use of radar ranging with optical training (tracking) along with greater experience in the use of radar.

This doesn't mean that the RN would inevitably win every battle, but it does mean that the IJN would suffer, on average, higher attrition per battle and that the RN had a much better chance of winning night surface actions than the USN did during 1942.

That is quite an assumption to make given that you don't seem to have included most of the relevant factors ...

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

This really needs to be saved for the RN vs IJN thread, but I don't have time to do that one justice yet.

Let me just slip this in though. I'm no expert on the RN, but this is what I could find for RN torpedoes used by ships or subs. I can refer to this and a couple of other posts in the other thread or just copy it.

WW2 era torpedoes used by the RN

21 Inch Mark II - Range 7.3 km, speed 29-35 kn
21 Inch Mark IV - Range 8 km - 12.3 km, speed 25-35 kn
21 Inch Mark V - Range 4.6 km - 12.4 km, speed 20- 40 kn
21 Inch Mark VII - Range 5.2 km, speed 35 kn
21 Inch Mark VIII - Range 4.6 km, speed 45 kn
21 Inch Mark VIII (late) - Range 6.4 km, speed 41 kn
21 Inch Mark IX - Range 10 km - 15 km, speed 41 kn
21 Inch Mark X - Range 3 - 12 km, speed 29-47 kn

18 Inch Mark VV - Range 2.9 km, speed 40 kn
(used by torpedo boats)

WW2 era torpedoes used by the IJN

Type 92 (21") Mod 1 and 2 - Range 7 km, speed 28 kn (used by subs)
Type 95 (21") Mod 1 - Range 12 km, speed 49 kn (used by subs)
Type 95 (21") Mod 2 - Range 7.5 km, speed 45 kn (used by subs)
Type 96 (21") - Range 4.5 km, speed 48 kn (used by subs)
Type 93 (24") Mod 1 - Range 20km - 40 km, speed 36 - 50 kn
Type 93 (24") Mod 3 - Range 15 km - 30 km, speed 36 - 50 kn

So unless I am missing something, and unless the RN was only facing submarines, they would be outranged by a drastic margin which was somewhat understated by RCAFSon. At the longest range, IJN torpedoes could attack out to 30 km or more, vs 15km for the absolute maximum range for the best RN torpedo (21" Mark IX). That's a 15 km margin.

In most cases the IJN would be able to set their torpedoes to run at top speed of 50 knots and still outrange the best British torpedoes by a comfortable margin. Torpedoes coming in at 50 knots are going to be extra hard to evade or outrun.



It's also worth pointing out that like the USN, the RN was not aware of the extraordinary range of the IJN Type 93 torpedo. So it's quite likely they would have faced exactly the same problem in early night actions - ships positioned at what they thought was a safe distance from the enemy which were actually anything but.

Oh and by the way, the relatively useless (until later int he war) US Mark 15 torpedo had a range of 5.5 - 13.5 km, and a speed of 33- 45 kn.

 

[Shortround6]

Some of this can be simplified. According to Campbell
British
7770 torpedoes expended.

21 Inch Mark II - 21 torpedoes expended through Sept 1944
21 Inch Mark IV - 516 torpedoes expended, left over WW I, often used in MTB in WW II.
21 Inch Mark V - 198 expended in through Sept 1944, also used in MTBs and to fill in absences
21 Inch Mark VII - 9 expended, originally oxygen enriched. replaced by Mk IX
21 Inch Mark VIII - 3732 expended through Sept 1944, at least 4 variants. Post war versions were used at least until 1983.
21 Inch Mark IX - 361 expended through Sept 1944 First appeared in 1930 modified before 1939
21 Inch Mark X - Used for arming Foreign ships, like Polish destroyers, Ex Brazilian DDs, Dutch subs, etc.

Basically we are dealing with the Mk IV, Mk VIII and Mk IX.

18 Inch Mark XII, 1101 expended through Sept 1944 standard airborne for the first 1/2 of the war and used in limited extent in MTBs.
18 Inch Mark XV, 591 expended through Sept 1944, standard airborne for the later years of the war and used in MTBs.

For the Japanese the long ranges were something of problem.
It would have been a problem for anyone.

It takes about 36 minutes for a 36kt torpedo to run 40,000 meters. (or 19.2 min to run 25,000km at 42 kts) How far will the target ships move in that time?
The next problem is that the torpedoes drift/wander as the range increases. The early type 93 could wander 1500 meters at 40,000 meters and 1000 meters at 32,000. That is either left or right, not combined.
Yes at closer ranges the wander was less and the run time is less and the Japanese torpedoes do have an advantage. But some times it is the choice of high speed or run time.

 

[RCAFson]

USN torpedo performance stats are meaningless because they were unreliable due the USN's "Great Torpedo Scandal". By Mid/late 1944 the USN had overcome the unreliability issue, The 1942 dud/malfunction rate of USN torpedoes was over 70%.

The Mk VIII and variants were submarine and MTB launched.

RN torpedoes were reliable and the main surface launched torpedo was:

"Mark IX
10,500 yards (9,600 m) / 36 knots
13,500 yards (12,350 m) / 30 knots
Mark IX*
11,000 yards (10,050 m) / 36 knots
14,000 yards (12,800 m) / 30 knots

Mark IX**
11,000 yards (10,050 m) / 41 knots
15,000 yards (13,700 m) / 35 knots
First appeared in 1930 and was considerably improved by 1939. (navweaps)

...This was another burner-cycle torpedo which
first appeared in 1930, and it was considerably
improved by 1939. If available it was issued to
the Leander and later cruisers and to destroyers
from the A class onwards...
...The principal war version was Mk IX**, first issued to 'J' and
'K' class destroyers in the summer of 1939. (Naval Weapons if WW2)"

So in any hypothetical engagement we would expect the RN to score more torpedo hits than the USN, regardless of the RN knowledge of IJN torpedo performance.
Basically, the only torpedo of concern in 1942 would be the Mk IX**. It was later improved by using a Torpex warhead.

 

[Juha3]

One must also remember that Type 93 torpedos were somewhat two-edged weapon, e.g. three out of four Mogami class heavy cruisers (Mikuma, Mogami and Suzuya) were lost because their torpedos/torpedowarheads exploded, and Mogami was at least once saved by jettisoning its torpedoes just before being hit by bombs. That jettisoning of Type 93s just before dangerous situation was not unique.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Yeah sure, any kind of explosive ordinance was dangerous to carry when under fire. US and RN and German ships carried torpedoes too.

But the fact is, the Japanese torpedoes were much better. They wouldn't need to shoot them at targets 30 km away, but they could.
It is a basic military reality that if you can target the enemy beyond their effective range, even at somewhat reduced effectiveness, you will often do so. With the Japanese advantages in detection, they could spot enemy (including RN) ships early and engage them from beyond the maximum range of the British vessels (guns or torpedoes). Japanese ships also carried a large number of torpedoes and often launched a massive spread in the actual Pacific battles.

Japanese Kagero class destroyers carried 8 tubes with 16 type 93 torpedoes. Same for Shiratsuyu class. Akatsuki class carried 9 tubes with 18 torpedoes. In a battle where you have say, 10 such destroyers (there were 11 at the first Naval Battle of Guadalcanal and 9 at the second), they can launch a volley of up to 80 torpedoes and still have 80 more for a second round if they need it. Chances of getting a hit are pretty good.

And the longer the torpedo was set to run, the slower it had to run. That was true of everyone's torpedoes. But the Japanese torpedoes were also potentially extremely fast, up to 50 knots at their shorter range (which is still 20km for the Type 93 Mk 1)

Actual combat distances were typically a fraction of the maximum range, but there was still an expectation of impunity which was based on the traits of the known weapons of the fleet in action, i.e. for the US the American fleet and for the British, their fleet. I'd like to point out (again) that neither US nor British navies apparently knew about the capabilities of the Japanese type 93 torpedo until quite late in the war. It's quite likely that RN would have had their ships blasted out of the water. before they thought they were even in range of torpedoes.



So let's back up and review for a second. So far, we know already that the Japanese had the best carrier fighter in the world in the A6M. No British or American navy fighter was quite as good, and the RN / FAA in particular was very poorly matched if using British aircraft. The IJN also had excellent dive bombers, and good torpedo bombers with excellent torpedoes. They also had land based torpedo bombers capable of sinking ships hundreds of miles off shore. The FAA by comparison has fighters that cant hope to contend with Zeros or protect their (painfully slow, biplane) strike aircraft, which have about half the range of the IJN carrier strike aircraft (D3A).

Then in surface combat, we now know clearly that the Japanese were way ahead in optics, to a point that certainly rivaled the effectiveness of radar in naval combat in the earlier part of the war.

And we can also see now quite clearly that the Japanese torpedoes were not only better than the virtually useless American ones, but also far outmatched the RN weapons.

It starts to look like the only chance the RN really has is if they catch the IJN making rare and uncharacteristic mistakes, or maybe say in bad weather as in squalls, in which they could maybe sneak up their Swordfish using radar, or advance under cover of the rain using surface radar to shoot those all so critical flashless powdered guns...

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

I'm sure most in the forum disagree with me, but I am hard pressed to see a technologically or organizationally inferior enemy here in the Japanese navy.

 

[RCAFson]

This is an excellent and meticulously researched paper that has numerous cited references from primary sources:

The Evolution of the U.S. Navy into an Effective Night-Fighting Force During theSolomon Islands Campaign, 1942 - 1943

https://etd.ohiolink.edu/apexprod/rws_etd/send_file/send?accession=ohiou1214239278&disposition=inline

It's lengthy but worth reading. To get a very quick introduction to the value of flashless propellant, for example, simply search the document for the word 'flash'.

 

[Shortround6]

I have jumped the gun on the RN vs IJN and opened a thread here.

WWII General

Every WWII related discussion besides aviation.

ww2aircraft.net

 

[RCAFson]

In regards to the earlier statement that an alarm sounded before batteries opened fire, this was done at all times, in all weather, by virtually all navies. It was a warning to keep Clear and prepare for concussion - it had literally zero to do with night vision.

"The American gunfire was not much better than the Japanese. Although each of Burke's destroyers fired on a different target, none of its shells scored. Part of the problem was the poor optical situation. Not only was the enemy's gun flashes invisible,but the U.S. ships exhausted their supplies of flashless powder, forcing them to switch to smokeless powder. The blazes associated with this propellant worsened the Americans's night vision. On the other hand, technicians had recently installed salvo buzzers on (96 Ibid., 15) p.331) Burke's destroyers, a recommendation made nearly a year ago by the Pensacola's gunnery officer in his report on the Battle of Tassafaronga. By sounding just prior to the guns going off, the bridge personnel had the opportunity to close their eyes before the gun flash. However, as Burke later admitted, this new procedure helped, but was no substitute for more flashless powder.(97)"
https://etd.ohiolink.edu/apexprod/r...?accession=ohiou1214239278&disposition=inline (p331-332)

 

[GrauGeist]

"The American gunfire was not much better than the Japanese. Although each of Burke's destroyers fired on a different target, none of its shells scored. Part of the problem was the poor optical situation. Not only was the enemy's gun flashes invisible,but the U.S. ships exhausted their supplies of flashless powder, forcing them to switch to smokeless powder. The blazes associated with this propellant worsened the Americans's night vision. On the other hand, technicians had recently installed salvo buzzers on (96 Ibid., 15) p.331) Burke's destroyers, a recommendation made nearly a year ago by the Pensacola's gunnery officer in his report on the Battle of Tassafaronga. By sounding just prior to the guns going off, the bridge personnel had the opportunity to close their eyes before the gun flash. However, as Burke later admitted, this new procedure helped, but was no substitute for more flashless powder.(97)"
https://etd.ohiolink.edu/apexprod/r...?accession=ohiou1214239278&disposition=inline (p331-332)

I appreciate how you're trying to press your point, but the klaxon sounds twice before the guns fire - day or night, fair weather or poor.

They have done this long before "flashless powder" (like decades prior) and it's a warning to all hands to be clear of the blast and prepare for the concussion.

 

[RCAFson]

I appreciate how you're trying to press your point, but the klaxon sounds twice before the guns fire - day or night, fair weather or poor.

They have done this long before "flashless powder" (like decades prior) and it's a warning to all hands to be clear of the blast and prepare for the concussion.

Not in the USN as per the quoted source. Part of the reason was that the USN's standard gunnery doctrine was "Continuous fire" where each gun fired at it's maximum rate independent of the other guns, rather than "salvo fire" where all guns of that battery were fire together:

"In his endorsement of the Kula Gulf actions, Halsey took the opportunity to question one of the navy's most cherished practices – the use of continuous fire. The light cruiser crews were especially proud of the rapid rate of fire of their six-inch guns.Halsey, however, voiced the opinion that salvo fire (all guns firing in unison) might be preferable to continuous fire (where each gun or turret fired as soon as it was reloaded).Until now the Brooklyn-class light cruisers had mostly employed continuous fire because it produced a higher volume of fire. Halsey conceded that if the guns could be kept on the target, a constant rain of shells was more demoralizing to an enemy ship than intermittent fire. Continuous fire was also less likely to jar loose the radar and communications gear, which had troubled several of Ainsworth's vessels. On the other hand, the constant blazing of the guns (even with the new flashless powder) not only presented a continual point of aim for enemy torpedomen, but made it more difficult for American lookouts to spot incoming torpedoes, a big consideration given the enemy's preference for this weapon. In addition, the relentless roaring of the guns in continuous fire mode provided no opportunities to send and receive messages during a quiet period. Lastly, it was far more difficult for gun directors to stay on the target and spot their shells when the guns were firing continuously. Given these considerations, Halsey recommended the adoption of salvo fire, except when shooting from beyond the range of the enemy's torpedoes. (above source p.238-239)"