Japanese aircraft were behind in timing to Allied aircraft.

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This is actually true and not some war game dream.
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They were modified for other uses.
 
I think you should look a little more closely at the Ki-43. This is not an outlier point I'm making or a little known point. Double check you'll find that what I was saying is true.

It's also incorrect that more maneuverable planes inevitably have more trouble locking up controls in a dive. The factors which cause this are somewhat complex but became better understood as the war progressed.
I'm afraid that I don't see what you're talking about. Are you saying that the wing area and ailerons are small? They aren't small relative to its weight and wing length.

Look at any schematic of the F4U, F6F (some claim the F6F wasn't a great diving plane), and other planes with good dive performance. You'll notice that the flap area is generally much smaller relative to its size and weight. The Ki-43, on the other hand, has massive ailerons which run from the edge of the wing all the way up to the fowler flaps. There's nothing quite like it that flew during the war, other than the Zero's ailerons.

It works like this: as speed increases, pressure on the ailerons also increases. The larger the aileron, the more the pressure. At a certain level of speed, ailerons become stiff. The larger the aileron, the more power required to move the aileron. This is a universal rule. So either the Ki-43 had hydraulically actuated ailerons or it would have suffered from control stiffening at high speed.

AFAIK, the Ki-43 didn't use any tricks to improve aileron performance at high speed. AFAIK, there were only a few aircraft that had hydraulically actuated ailerons because hydraulically actuated ailerons and big ailerons could overstress the wings. I'd also guess that they didn't actuate fast enough, but that could be specious reasoning on my part.
 
A lot of planes were limited in roll by the mechanics and other things.

There are a number of arguments about how much effort (muscle effort) could be used by the pilots in some planes.
Narrow cockpits vs roomy cockpits. Length of the control stick above the pivot point. Length of the stick below the pivot point to the attachment point/s for the cables/rods.
Now we can try to figure out the control runs, figure out the force transmitted to the ailerons.
Now do we use a small aileron with large deflection or a large aileron with less deflection?
Now we can figure out the deflection of the wing it self.

And we have to figure out what the shape of the wing tips did.

and so on.

Spitfires changed roll rate by using metal covering vs cloth.
They also changed roll rate by just using the clipped wing tips which change the geometry of the wing tip but not much else. It did not change the ailerons themselves.
Corsair changed the roll rate or response early in development without changing anything (or at least not much) to the aileron or wing by changing the throw and/or the mechanical advantage in the linkage. Sometimes the number 17 shows up as the number of tries to get the results the Navy wanted.

Trying to figure out a simple formula doesn't seem to work.
 
Only two planes I can name off the top of my head that had powered controls developed during World War II (developed being the key word, one of the two didn't actually enter service until late 1945 after VJ Day in its earliest form) was the P-38J late versions, P-38L/M, and the P-82 Twin Mustang. And even then, the P-82B/XP-82 had powered rudders and elevators, and though I think they had provisions for powered ailerons, they weren't standardized until the Allison powered F-82E/F/G/H models.

Of course, the powered ailerons there were used to improve roll rate in general, which was a bug bear of twin engine fighters--even if you could get them to turn with a single engine fighter, roll rate was relatively poor until powered controls came in.

That said, this is a bit off topic aside from the fact that I don't know of the IJA or IJN working with such powered controls during the War.
 
I'm afraid that I don't see what you're talking about. Are you saying that the wing area and ailerons are small? They aren't small relative to its weight and wing length.

I am tempted to ask, when you say you don't see what I'm talking about, do you mean in your mind's eye? Looking out the window?

But I can't indulge my instinct for sarcasm here, it would not be fair to you because it's actually quite hard to find much real information about the Ki-43 really anywhere. There is precious little beyond generalities and old tropes about any Japanese aircraft and especially the Ki-43.

We do however have some interesting wartime tests done to compare a Ki-43-I with a P-38 and a P-40. You can find the P-40 test here and the P-38 test here.

These should really be on WW2aircraftperformance.org but I don't know if that very useful site is being updated. They have almost nothing on the Ki-43.

A key moment in this test is in this excerpt of commentary by the (American) Ki-43 pilot in his mock dogfight with the P-38:

"In following the P-38 on the way down, the OSCAR could stay in easy gun range on all maneuvers except fast climbs or dives over 300 mph. The OSCAR followed the P-38 up into an Immelman, rolling out at 50 mph on top. The controls are very loose at that speed but it can stay right on the P-38's tail. On rolls to the right and left--200 to 28O mphâ€"-the OSCAR stayed with the P-38; also in Split S's and rolls straight down up to 300 mph."

So this is in sharp distinction to the A6M which is already starting to 'tighten' in roll quite a bit at 250 mph. This little 50 mph 'window' may not seem like much, especially since the Ki-43 can't even make 400 mph in a dive, but it did prove to be a problem for Allied pilots. More broadly, I recommend reading those reports because it gives you some idea, in detail, what the rather abstract concept of 'maneuverability' really meant in actual air combat.

As for the notion that tightening in a dive directly correlates to aileron size or wing size, it's just not correct. P-40s rolled well at high speeds but had fairly large ailerons. Bf 109s tended to lock up a bit in a dive but had pretty small ailerons by comparison I think (or at any rate, they look smaller on my 1/72 models sitting behind me). The Ki-43 did have quite large ones though I'll give you that.

Look at any schematic of the F4U, F6F (some claim the F6F wasn't a great diving plane), and other planes with good dive performance. You'll notice that the flap area is generally much smaller relative to its size and weight. The Ki-43, on the other hand, has massive ailerons which run from the edge of the wing all the way up to the fowler flaps. There's nothing quite like it that flew during the war, other than the Zero's ailerons.

I think you mean aileron here not flap. And as I noted, there is no simple correlation of this.

It works like this: as speed increases, pressure on the ailerons also increases. The larger the aileron, the more the pressure. At a certain level of speed, ailerons become stiff. The larger the aileron, the more power required to move the aileron. This is a universal rule. So either the Ki-43 had hydraulically actuated ailerons or it would have suffered from control stiffening at high speed.

AFAIK, the Ki-43 didn't use any tricks to improve aileron performance at high speed. AFAIK, there were only a few aircraft that had hydraulically actuated ailerons because hydraulically actuated ailerons and big ailerons could overstress the wings. I'd also guess that they didn't actuate fast enough, but that could be specious reasoning on my part.

I understand that basics of aeronautic engineering, though admittedly not much more than that. But you need to also check actual wartime operational histories and wartime testing to verify theoretical concepts.
 
Gotcha'! Spitfires changed roll rate by thought. I read the articles posted here.

By just clipping the ends of the wings (and not modifying the aileron size) the Spit went from being one of the slower rolling fighters in WW2 to one of the fastest. Conversely by extending the wingtips just a bit for better high altitude performance, they gave it the agility of something like an airliner.

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I always though it was weird that the Spitfire (without clipped tips) didn't run the ailerons out of the wing tips like almost everyone else did. I think that spoiled the roll rate without the clipped tips until the Mk 20 series had full span ailerons. Though I could be wrong and there's probably other factors at play there as well.
 
I always though it was weird that the Spitfire (without clipped tips) didn't run the ailerons out of the wing tips like almost everyone else did. I think that spoiled the roll rate without the clipped tips until the Mk 20 series had full span ailerons. Though I could be wrong and there's probably other factors at play there as well.

You may be right, at least initially these modifications were done pretty 'quick and dirty' I think. But in general, I find it turns out it's more complicated than I usually think it is.
 
Only two planes I can name off the top of my head that had powered controls developed during World War II (developed being the key word, one of the two didn't actually enter service until late 1945 after VJ Day in its earliest form) was the P-38J late versions, P-38L/M, and the P-82 Twin Mustang. And even then, the P-82B/XP-82 had powered rudders and elevators, and though I think they had provisions for powered ailerons, they weren't standardized until the Allison powered F-82E/F/G/H models.
Dornier's Do-335 had them.
 
It's funny that he says they were at Truk with no major surface engagements happening in 1942.
I think his timeline got a bit distorted.

After supporting the BB during the Aleutian island operations in May/June 1942, their conversion to transports (losing 4 torpedo mounts in the process according to the Combined Fleet site) took place Aug/Sept 1942. They then spent the rest of the year ferrying troops about, visiting ports in Japan, Manila, Truk, Rabaul and as far south as the Shortland Islands (just south of Bougainville) in the Solomons. As transports they were pretty active across the western Pacific an DEI until well into 1944.

You can see their movements on the Combined Fleet site.
 
The Atlanta class was a CLAA - a light anti-aircraft cruiser, designed for shooting down planes. They did not do well in surface actions which they were not designed for. The only two which got into surface actions, Atlanta and Juneau, were sunk at the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal on Nov 1942. Atlanta was crippled by a torpedo and naval gunfire (and later scuttled), Juneau was crippled by a torpedo in the same action and then sunk by an IJN sub (with 100 of her surviving crew tragically abandoned to sharks in the water for 8 days, only 10 eventually being rescued).

That is not true.

The design evolution of the Atlantas went back to mid-1934 to find a smaller successor to the 10,000 ton 6" armed Brooklyn class in light of the negotiations that took place ahead of the Second London Naval Conference (Dec 1935-March 1936) and the resulting 1936 Treaty that limited cruisers to 8,000 tons.

Friedman in his "US Cruisers An Illustrated Design History" devotes a chapter of over 30 pages to their design evolution. In that process they went through some 26 designs with various combinations of size, power and armament before the Atlanta as we know it was arrived at. Those included versions with varying numbers of 5"/38 or combined 6"/47 plus 5"/38 or even 6"/47 DP on tonnages ranging from 3,500 tons to 8,400 tons and speeds from 32.5 to 36 knots.

Throughout the process however what they were seeking was a cruiser that
1. Could work with destroyers for general purposes and
2. Was a general purpose cruiser to work with the battlefleet i.e. a replacement for the Omaha class.

So surface action was very much envisaged when they were designed. Reading Friedman the striking thing is how little there was in the discussions about its main armament anti aircraft capabilities. The emphasis was very much on surface action, hence the debate about 6" v 5" main armament. 6" DP had to be rejected on weight grounds and likely delays to the turret design and the mixed battery on a ship of that size wasn't popular.

It took until July 1938 to come up with a preliminary design and Nov 1938 for it to be finalised and it still didn't suit everyone. Orders were placed in April 1939 for the first 4 ships.

As ordered they were classified as CL i.e. light cruiser. The survivors and subsequent ships of the class were not redesignated as CLAA until Feb/Mar 1949. The CLAA designation did not exist until that point in time and by then half of them had been out of commission for 2-3 years.
 
It's funny that he says they were at Truk with no major surface engagements happening in 1942.
The start of this article shows how the Japanese intended to use a massive night time torpedo strike as part of the "Decisive Battle" with the 24" Long Lance torpedoes and how the torpedo cruisers would have fitted in to that. There is then an analysis of the various battles they were used in and their effectiveness.
 
The start of this article shows how the Japanese intended to use a massive night time torpedo strike as part of the "Decisive Battle" with the 24" Long Lance torpedoes and how the torpedo cruisers would have fitted in to that. There is then an analysis of the various battles they were used in and their effectiveness.

I'm aware of their doctrinal intentions, thanks. My point is that there were several major surface engagements at the Solomons in the period he says didn't have any. I know he knows there were; he's done an entire series on them.
 
That is not true.

The design evolution of the Atlantas went back to mid-1934 to find a smaller successor to the 10,000 ton 6" armed Brooklyn class in light of the negotiations that took place ahead of the Second London Naval Conference (Dec 1935-March 1936) and the resulting 1936 Treaty that limited cruisers to 8,000 tons.

Friedman in his "US Cruisers An Illustrated Design History" devotes a chapter of over 30 pages to their design evolution. In that process they went through some 26 designs with various combinations of size, power and armament before the Atlanta as we know it was arrived at. Those included versions with varying numbers of 5"/38 or combined 6"/47 plus 5"/38 or even 6"/47 DP on tonnages ranging from 3,500 tons to 8,400 tons and speeds from 32.5 to 36 knots.

Throughout the process however what they were seeking was a cruiser that
1. Could work with destroyers for general purposes and
2. Was a general purpose cruiser to work with the battlefleet i.e. a replacement for the Omaha class.

So surface action was very much envisaged when they were designed. Reading Friedman the striking thing is how little there was in the discussions about its main armament anti aircraft capabilities. The emphasis was very much on surface action, hence the debate about 6" v 5" main armament. 6" DP had to be rejected on weight grounds and likely delays to the turret design and the mixed battery on a ship of that size wasn't popular.

It took until July 1938 to come up with a preliminary design and Nov 1938 for it to be finalised and it still didn't suit everyone. Orders were placed in April 1939 for the first 4 ships.

As ordered they were classified as CL i.e. light cruiser. The survivors and subsequent ships of the class were not redesignated as CLAA until Feb/Mar 1949. The CLAA designation did not exist until that point in time and by then half of them had been out of commission for 2-3 years.

Ok, I stand corrected on the designation - CL or CLAA, it was a light cruiser, during the war it had the most AA capability of any US warship I believe, and it was the class which IIRC first tested the proximity fuse AA guns. It was used most successfully in that AA role, especially protecting carriers. So even if they called it a CL instead of CLAA until after the war, that was the role it played during the war, and it didn't do well in surface combat as i pointed out already.

And as I noted in detail in a previous post, the vast majority of the significant surface combat actions in the Pacific War were decided by 8" or larger guns from CA or BB type vessels and / or torpedoes. Not 5" or 6" guns.
 
The whole notion that "flashless" powder is a game changer or a crucial element for surface combat is BS, since it's limited to the smaller caliber guns among other reasons. And the smaller caliber guns did not win the major naval battles of the Pacific War. Even radar doesn't seem to have mattered that much in the early years. It certainly didn't save the Exeter when it went up against the IJN. It wasn't really a major factor for the US until in later 1943, and even then, was probably not decisive for surface combat.

Proximity fused AA shells on the other hand, a British innovation turned into reality by the Americans, did seem to matter. Fire directors mattered. Well trained crews mattered. Effective torpedoes mattered, and the RN did have those. And so did big guns.
 

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