Japanese doing things different in for before and during ww2?

[Thumpalumpacus]

The Japanese pipeline was certainly not as scalable to the degree that the Empire Air Scheme or US rotational training in terms of providing capable rookies who stood a chance in, say, their first five combats.

 

[tomo pauk]

Japanese pilots and crewmember situation will require for the Japanese brass to look at the air warfare from a different angle. That means acknowledging that these servicemen don't grow on threes, and that a protracted war might see attrition of these.
Several steps can be made in direction of reducing attrition:
- earlier introduction of protection for both men and fuel tanks, so one bullet hole does not spell doom to both the aircraft and it's crew
- start with basic search and rescue service, expend from 1941 on; Japanese were making good flying boats and floatplanes
- don't make under-performing aircraft for too long - a better aircraft improves odds of surviving (both for novices and experienced men) and fulfilling missions; a fighter aircraft that not just survived but helped save a bomber/attacker it escorts is another boon
- for the IJN - having novices do the 1st combat missions against forces at mainland Asia might ease their time once they are set against the USN above Pacific; granted, this requires IJA playing the ball
- either deploy Kido Butai as a full unit, or don't deploy them (advice by our late member parsifal) - there is a good appeal in possessing the overwhelming force; have the enemy retreat instead of the IJN ships so more downed servicemen can be saved; no opportunity for the USN to defeat the KB in detail
- more flexibility in deployment of naval air units - air unit belongs to the IJN, not to 'their' carrier
- having more of experienced and survived aircrew in a unit improves the odds to the novices
- rotate the crewmen in a timely manner
- have the experienced crewmen serve as instructors

Granted, all of this still means that Japanese training program needs to be improved and increased in volume.

 

[tomo pauk]

Ad-hoc/'plan B' Japanese Navy fighters:
- Zero with Kinsei for 1942 and on (no wait until 1945); it was a big mistake for not developing it earlier, even if it is a plan B in case the J2M does not materialize; Zero, especially with a more powerful engine, will need better ailerons for better rate of roll at high speeds - Flettner tabs might help, and/or shortening of ailerons (yes, some low-speed rate of roll will be lost in that case)
- D4Y as a very long-range fighter; this will require a rehash of the fuel system, with introduction of self-sealing tanks and including the bomb bay tank; the outer wing tanks can go and some guns are installed instead; no great deeds can be expected from this conversion, it should be more useful in downing the Allied recon aircraft and bombers than to deal with fighters (plus: the J1N can be canned); the earlier the Astuta engine is replaced by a good radial the better, preferably powered by Homare from 1944
- C6N recon, armed with a pair of front-firing cannons; here too the self-sealing tanks all-around are needed, not just for some tanks as it was the case

Granted, the later two are just a patch to the wound that happened because a proper upgrade/replacement for Zero never happened.

 

[Macandy]

The Japanese pipeline was certainly not as scalable to the degree that the Empire Air Scheme or US rotational training in terms of providing capable rookies who stood a chance in, say, their first five combats.

It was a training program in the sprit of the Samurai - it turned out superb pilots who were Bothe mentally and physically at the peak. No weakness was tolerated.
Par exams;e, many otherwise excellent trainees were washed out by the eyesight test. No, not for poor eyesight, but because the IJN also tested its pilot trainees for night vision and set very high standards. You could score maximum points in every physical attribute, but be discarded for not meeting that requirement.

By the time they realised they needed to churn out pilots in quantity, it was too late. the Cadre of trained pilots were most dead, and a training regime that spent years honing a pilot trainee to the very highest peak of perfection - pre war, a pilot could spend 5 years learning his trade before let loose in the fleet, simply wasn't able to expand to produce large numbers of good enough pilots in quick time.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

It was a training program in the sprit of the Samurai - it turned out superb pilots who were Bothe mentally and physically at the peak. No weakness was tolerated.
Par exams;e, many otherwise excellent trainees were washed out by the eyesight test. No, not for poor eyesight, but because the IJN also tested its pilot trainees for night vision and set very high standards. You could score maximum points in every physical attribute, but be discarded for not meeting that requirement.

By the time they realised they needed to churn out pilots in quantity, it was too late. the Cadre of trained pilots were most dead, and a training regime that spent years honing a pilot trainee to the very highest peak of perfection - pre war, a pilot could spend 5 years learning his trade before let loose in the fleet, simply wasn't able to expand to produce large numbers of good enough pilots in quick time.

Agreed. Saburo Sakai goes into this in his autobiography iirc. By the end of 1942, it was already too late to change their training regime to make up the shortfall, as most of their experienced pilots were already dead, at least in the IJN and who's going to train the cadets?

 

[tomo pauk]

Possible changes for the IJ Army fighters' stocks; some easier to do than the others, and some with greater potential if more complicated:
- a Ki-44 with Ha-115 (Sakae family) and/or Ha-112 (Kinsei engines) - produced instead of Ki-43 (better speed, rate of roll, dive, armament)
- Kawasaki 1-engined fighter(s) - a topic of many discussions, perhaps going early with such a Ki-60 would've netted much more trouble to the Allied airmen than the Ki-45 and Ki-61 combination; Kawasaki aircraft IMO seem to be the least fragile of the Japanese aircraft (yes, that is quite a generalization)
- a Ki-44 with a bit bigger wing and more fuel; bigger wing will make it less intimidating to the new pilots, more fuel is needed for the expenses the IJA air service was supposed to operate
- copy the Fw 190 with Japanese engines/guns/etc incorporated
- take a good and early look on the P-43; try to mimic that layout, but with Japanese engines and better tanks (I'm not expecting this to go 100% without the problems, but it might net better results than trying to shoehorn turboes on the existing fighters)
- the 2-stage superchargers were used in Europe in the 1930s - try to 'militarize' the idea into the workable engines early enough
- introduction of water/alcohol injection system on the engines, especially on the Ha-115 and Ha-109
- Ki-84 with water-injected Ha 109
- lower the compression ratio of the engines down to at least 6.5:1, if not to 6:1 - looses a bit of fuel mileage and power, but much improves the ability of engine to work with lower octane fuel

Granted, some of the suggestions here are also applicable on bombers, as well as on the IJN aircraft. Yes, some of the suggestions will cancel some others, as well as historical programs.

 

[Admiral Beez]

The Japanese pipeline was certainly not as scalable to the degree that the Empire Air Scheme or US rotational training in terms of providing capable rookies who stood a chance in, say, their first five combats.

Japanese modern industrial society was a generation behind the US. Japan didn't have nearly the ratio of engineers, scientists, mechanics, hobby and commercial pilots or even daily automobile tinkerers and users of the US or UK. There's no foundation upon which to scale up.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Japanese modern industrial society was a generation behind the US. Japan didn't have nearly the ratio of engineers, scientists, mechanics, hobby and commercial pilots or even daily automobile tinkerers and users of the US or UK. There's no foundation upon which to scale up.

We were talking about the scaling-up of Japanese flight training, not Japanese industry or civic education. Japanese industry, until the last year of the war, could produce more planes than the military could pilots.

 

[Admiral Beez]

We were talking about the scaling-up of Japanese flight training, not Japanese industry or civic education. Japanese industry, until the last year of the war, could produce more planes than the military could pilots.

Gotcha. What I meant to say is that it's easier to scale up flight training if you have a culture of engineering, mechanics, driving, flying clubs, tinkering, etc. When the Empire flying scheme was set up in Canada, the Air Force wasn't faced with recruiting airmen and mechanics from a population alien to such things.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Gotcha. What I meant to say is that it's easier to scale up flight training if you have a culture of engineering, mechanics, driving, flying clubs, tinkering, etc. When the Empire flying scheme was set up in Canada, the Air Force wasn't faced with recruiting airmen and mechanics from a population alien to such things.

That's fair enough, sorry I didn't read so closely as to pick that up.

 

[WARSPITER]

Similar to the Soviet problem with tanks. Plenty being built but unlike other countries vehicles in the
general population were few and far between. Drivers had to be given crash courses with crash gearboxes.

Availability of tinkerers / mechanics was an add on problem.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Similar to the Soviet problem with tanks. Plenty being built but unlike other countries vehicles in the
general population were few and far between. Drivers had to be given crash courses with crash gearboxes.

Availability of tinkerers / mechanics was an add on problem.

I've heard the argument along these lines regarding USAAF and RAF personnel (and thought they were pretty much bushwah in that case) , but it seems more pointed regarding Japan, being less industrialized, more agrarian, and more impoverished, in general.

 

[BlackSheep]

Let's say that Japanese take a good and hard look at what Europeans (and especially Germans) were doing with regard to not just aircraft-related technology, but also with regard to mass production of military hardware. Japanese start their 'investigation' once the Tripartite pact is signed, 27th September 1940, and start employing the knowledge gained by some time Spring of 1941 where possible.

To get the ball rolling, I'd propose a ruthless reduction of aircraft types slated for series production, ASAP, along with requirement for protection for crew and fuel tanks for any new A/C design.

edit: time of interest is now from 1937 on; thread is about IJA and IJN military aircraft and whatever is related to that

The first step Id take as Emperor Hirohito's Minister of Get Our Crap Together would be to create a bureau of design and manufacture which would be responsible for determining what needs are unique to or can be shared by the IJN and IJA. No longer will each service have their own mousetrap design, product id#s, and other egocentric inefficiencies. Having stated that, I'll go even further and state the new bureau would have departments addressing all the friction points between the IJN and IJA such as planning and strategy, also.
In my eyes, eliminating the in-fighting between services would have allowed Japan to stretch her minimal resources into the later years of the war, but only prolonging the inevitable. The only Pacific War, Japan had a chance at winning would have been a minimal war, along the lines of "Asia for Asians" and not reaching out past the Philippines. Minimizing American losses and loss of face would still allow Japan to take the crown's asset's, with England too busy with Europe and the US not fully committed to war in Europe, the chances of pulling off an Asia for Asian war would be good.

Oh boy, I need to stop because the pre-war "what if's" bring out the motor mouth in me.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

The first step Id take as Emperor Hirohito's Minister of Get Our Crap Together would be to create a bureau of design and manufacture which would be responsible for determining what needs are unique to or can be shared by the IJN and IJA. No longer will each service have their own mousetrap design, product id#s, and other egocentric inefficiencies. Having stated that, I'll go even further and state the new bureau would have departments addressing all the friction points between the IJN and IJA such as planning and strategy, also.
In my eyes, eliminating the in-fighting between services would have allowed Japan to stretch her minimal resources into the later years of the war, but only prolonging the inevitable. The only Pacific War, Japan had a chance at winning would have been a minimal war, along the lines of "Asia for Asians" and not reaching out past the Philippines. Minimizing American losses and loss of face would still allow Japan to take the crown's asset's, with England too busy with Europe and the US not fully committed to war in Europe, the chances of pulling off an Asia for Asian war would be good.

Oh boy, I need to stop because the pre-war "what if's" bring out the motor mouth in me.

The only problem with that, but it's a big one, is that either the Navy or the Army could kill a Japanese government by removing their officers from the cabinet. That meant that an oversight office ruling against either service could prompt a crisis in government, bring it down, and let's watch the whole thing repeat again.

 

[Shortround6]

The Japanese were between a rock and hard place. However in some ways they were not that far off from the US.
The US had two major radial engine makers and two major V-12/ liquid cooled engine makers, except one was pretty much a license holder and just built engines with very little actual design work. US had a bunch of small engine makers, both in the size of the engines and in the quantity of production. Britain had 3 companies, France had two, Germany had 3 and Italy had 2/3. Japan had 3 ? the two major radial engine makers and few minors and the two companies with licensed DB 601s. That may have been duplication.

Now the problem with combining companies in the "interest" of standardization is you are putting all or most of your eggs in one basket. Engine "A" may have been world class but when they tried to scale it up or change the number of cylinders if it doesn't go like they plan you have nowhere else to go. You also can't do competitive bids. The engine company tells the government what the engines will cost.
The Homare fell on it's face. In the US the R-2600 made a good bomber engine but it never made it as a fighter engine. But we had the R-2800 so Wright skated.
Maybe the Japanese had a few too many duplicates but you need at least two companies and each company needs more than one model.

The Japanese did screw up weapons/ammo production. Standardize on the ammo, have more than one company make each caliber, make more than one gun in each caliber if you want but have them use the same ammo.

 

[tomo pauk]

Britain had 3 companies, France had two, Germany had 3 and Italy had 2/3. Japan had 3 ? the two major radial engine makers and few minors and the two companies with licensed DB 601s. That may have been duplication.

It depends on what we're counting. Britain have had 2 major and several minor engine companies, with Napier and A-S in-between? Italy 2+2; granted, volume of Italian engines produced was small, bar the indifferent A.74. Japan has 2 companies making their own engines, plus Kawasaki and Aichi making the DB 601As and Nakajima radials under licence, with Hitachi as producer of small engines. Kawasaki was making radials during the whole war, Aichi switched to the meager production of V12s some time in 1941, while phasing out radial engines production.

Now the problem with combining companies in the "interest" of standardization is you are putting all or most of your eggs in one basket. Engine "A" may have been world class but when they tried to scale it up or change the number of cylinders if it doesn't go like they plan you have nowhere else to go. You also can't do competitive bids. The engine company tells the government what the engines will cost.

There was offering of 2 different Nakajima engines before Pearl Harbor, as well as 3 Mitsubishi engines. I don't count the Ha-5 that is being phased out from production.
Both N and M are working on two new engine types from 1942 on, while upgrading the engines that are already in production. So there was a lot of redundancy in case one engine fails.

I have nothing against the DB 601A in 1939-40, even in 1941. However, thinking that in 1942 a 1100-1200 HP V12 will offer an edge over a 1300-1500 HP 14 cyl radial the Japanese companies have experience with, both in design, debugging and production (and with 1500-2000 HP designs in the pipeline) requires a lot of cool aid.
There was no such experience in designing and debugging of V12s in Japan.

With 4 companies producing major radials, Government has a very good knowledge of the actual price of a produced engine.

The Homare fell on it's face. In the US the R-2600 made a good bomber engine but it never made it as a fighter engine. But we had the R-2800 so Wright skated.
Maybe the Japanese had a few too many duplicates but you need at least two companies and each company needs more than one model.

Did Homare really fell on it's face, or the other factors were to blame, like the octan value of Japanese fuel by 1945, and state of Japasese support industry and maintenance? Even if Homare have had it's problems, there was far more to the Japanese engine's problems than just the Homare.
There was certainly two companies designing the radials, plus 2 that can produce them, and there was certainly much more than one model in production. Just by Mitsubishi, in-house production, posted here earlier:

The Japanese did screw up weapons/ammo production. Standardize on the ammo, have more than one company make each caliber, make more than one gun in each caliber if you want but have them use the same ammo.

Agred all the way.
There was like 4 different 20mm ammo types, and several (three?) 30mm types, with the 30 mm barely seeing service. 37mm was okay-ish, if unusable on 1-engined types, while the 40mm was very much meh.
IJA was also very late on adopting 20mm weapons on their 1-engined fighters.

 

[Macandy]

Japanese modern industrial society was a generation behind the US. Japan didn't have nearly the ratio of engineers, scientists, mechanics, hobby and commercial pilots or even daily automobile tinkerers and users of the US or UK. There's no foundation upon which to scale up.

A bit off thread, but some US Army General in Ordnance stipulated that US army equipment should be 'able to be fixed by a farm boy with a basic toolkit' - - he really 'got it' - a war winning strategy.

But back on thread - the US was able to train many thousands of British engineers for all three services in the US thanks to its vast trade school network.

 

[Admiral Beez]

A bit off thread, but some US Army General in Ordnance stipulated that US army equipment should be 'able to be fixed by a farm boy with a basic toolkit' - - he really 'got it' - a war winning strategy.

A good demonstration is the ease of a transmission swap on a M4 Sherman.

Meanwhile on a German Panther the entire front hull has to be torn out, with the transmission being pulled up through the hull where the driver sat.

 

[Macandy]

A good demonstration is the ease of a transmission swap on a M4 Sherman.

View attachment 697324

Meanwhile on a German Panther the entire front hull has to be torn out, with the transmission being pulled up through the hull where the driver sat.

View attachment 697325

The Germans were nuts

Take turret off German tanks - Huge specialist crane that needed a bunch of trucks to move it and hours and a platoon of guys to erect it

Take Turret off American tanks - whistle up 4 guys in a Diamond T or M32 wrecker with an A frame

 

[Admiral Beez]

Bringing us back on topic but still related, the Japanese were deficient in both mechanics and supply chain. The Allies would pull parts off a plane to keep another flying, but the Japanese would just leave any disabled plane sitting there until new parts arrived, or just scrap the plane for want of parts and mechanics to install them.