SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
The like is for the no free lunch. The one thing I could follow.
Japanese doing things different in for before and during ww2?
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Shortround6
Major General
The Kinsei may not have had the low speed/low throttle fuel consumption that the 1 speed Sakae had.
One source claims as little as 16.4 US gal per hour at 180kts (translation of captured document by Allied intelligence and units converted) but increasing to 24.04 US G at 190 kts.
Model 32 Zero listed at 21.98USG per hour at 180kts and 24.43lts at 190kts. Fuel burn at 200kts wasn't much different either.
It was this 180kt cruise that gave the Zero part of it's range. perhaps as much as 150 n miles after figuring time for combat.
Somewhere in 1942 would be good for the change over. Either stick the Kensei in instead of the Sakae 21 or build both for while until a full transition can be made.
Range is addressed later.
Well, 8 1/3 shells a second with 123-130gram shells or 12 shells a second with 79gram shells
The velocity is much better with the Ho-5 than with the short Oerlikon but just about equal with the long Oerlikon. With guns in the wing and crossing over I don't think there was much to choose in range between the Ho-5 and the type 99 II.
The Ho-5 is going to be easier to hit with than the Type 99 I and the ammo is going to be lighter.
Sticking a Ho-103 in each wing in 1942 and getting rid of the cowl guns (almost a necessity with the Kinsei engine) gives you room for more fuel where the fuselage gun ammo had been to help offset the increased fuel consumption of the Kinsei engine.
Having two 12,7mm machine guns (even small ones) that are not restricted by synchronizers are going to be more effective than a pair of 7.7mm guns in the cowl. Granted the ammo may not last as long but A6Ms flying around with empty 20mm guns and just a pair of 7.7mm guns is not good. They scored some kills but as Allied planes got tougher in 1942 the 7.7mm guns were getting much less effective (3/4 the rate of fire of a British .303 Browning and that was before you count the synchronizer).
The 12.7mm machine guns and the 20mm Ho-5 cannon are going be a better ballistics match than the type 99 I with most any other gun.
The Japanese may dream of engines that would match the Americans but what they needed was better than the engines that came in 1942 and stayed to0 long and better guns to keep up the fight with the lower powered engines. And supply was very much an issue.
J2M3 Radian with the long barrel high velocity cannon inboard and the short barrel low velocity cannon outboard.
you have got about 33 rounds per sec and since the out board guns have about 80% of the velocity of the inboard guns unless the range is close (or the target is big) the shells are not going to wind up in the place in the sky.
The Japanese cannot afford numerous heavy guns like the M2 Browning and their heavy ammo.
They also cannot afford to build thousands of Ki-43s with all the material and effort to just get a pair of machine guns into the air.
- Thread starter
- #103
Trick with the Ho-5 was that it was a bit too late - some 3 years after the 'short' Type 99, and 1 year after the 'long' Type 99. In the other words, by the time Ho-5 was in service, the 'short 99' was superseded by the 'long 99' a long time ago.Well, 8 1/3 shells a second with 123-130gram shells or 12 shells a second with 79gram shells
The velocity is much better with the Ho-5 than with the short Oerlikon but just about equal with the long Oerlikon. With guns in the wing and crossing over I don't think there was much to choose in range between the Ho-5 and the type 99 II.
The Ho-5 is going to be easier to hit with than the Type 99 I and the ammo is going to be lighter.
By that time, Japanese need to have something with a better punch - not the "Shvak_minus" that Ho-5 was - to deal with heavy bombers, medium bombers, and the tough 1-engined jobs, like the R-2800-powered fighters of the TBF.
As above - by the time Ho-5 entered service, the short Type 99 was long gone as primary weapon of the navy fighters.
Several things IJN could've do about that:
- assuming that IJA and IJN actually get together (yes, a long shot if I ever saw one), as well as decent engines in the nose of the fighters, the IJN can install two long Type 99s and two Ho-5 on their fighters from early 1944 on
- introduce the 100+- gram shell for the short Type 99, so the ballistics is a closer match to the the long Type 99, while accepting a tad lower punch of the short 99 now (still compares well for the faster-firing Ho-5, while beating a HMG in that regard)
- with 1800-2000 HP engines, arm the fighters with four long Type 99s
- introduce the German Mine shell for the short 99 (for better ballistics due to better MV, since the shell was very light as far as the 20mm shells went)
Granted, it is the Army that needs to up their game wrt. the actual introduction and use of 20mm cannons (and bigger/better, as the war drags on) for their fighters.
Also, IJN should take note of the Army's 'fuseless' shells, that were much cheaper and easier to produce than the shells that were using the 'classic' fuses.
Agreed all the way.
IJA cancelled a wrong fighter when they cancelled the Ki-44.
Well, I think this goes back to finding a way for better strategic cooperation between the axis. For Japan, the last thing I would want to do is wage war against the US. A different path to alleviate the impact of the embargo and possibly victory would be to support Germany by declaring war against Russia (pinning Russian troops in the east) and only invading British or French colonies in the Pacific for raw materials. By not attacking the US, you undermine American emotion for war and probably keep the US neutral. The UK and France don't have the resources to fight the Japanese and Russia is forced to choose whether to commit more resources to the German front. In return Japan needs to get greater technical/material support from Germany. Also, Germany doesn't declare war against the U.S. further tipping the war in its favor.
Shortround6
Major General
Not sure that any of that is viable.
"A different path to alleviate the impact of the embargo and possibly victory would be to support Germany by declaring war against Russia (pinning Russian troops in the east)"
That would take place in June 1941 at the earliest and American lead embargo was increasing at that time. Scrap iron, copper and passage through the Panama canal were already restricted.
" only invading British or French colonies in the Pacific for raw materials."
The US was not going to stand by and let Japan invade British, French or Dutch colonies for raw materials. At least not for long. The oil embargo was in response to Japanese moves in French Indo-china. The war may not have started in Dec of 1941 but going into 1942 things get even hotter.
" Also, Germany doesn't declare war against the U.S. further tipping the war in its favor."
US Germany was only a matter of time. The USN was already dropping depth charges on German U-boats and the Germans had not only torpedoed American Merchant ships but the USS Rueben James in Oct 1941. It was only a matter of time before one or more "incidents" pushed the US and Germany into war.
" In return Japan needs to get greater technical/material support from Germany."
They weren't going to get much more. Once Japan formally supports Germany (declares war on Russia or engages in sizable combat)) the British are going to at the very least, try to stop all shipping from connecting the two, they were already blockading Germany. Japanese merchant ships anywhere in the Indian Ocean or Pacific would be fair game.
Trade by Submarine?
Technical support also means the ability to turn drawings into actual products. doesn't matter how good the drawings are if you don't have the ability ( raw materials & manufacturing capabilities) produce them.
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
Stoopid facts.
Thumpalumpacus
Major
Not much oil deposits found in Siberia in 1941 ... and it was oil that drove Japan to war. They weren't about to take NEI without securing the flank against the Philippines, by their own notions of military ops.
The Japanese got many resources from Manchuria, except for the one they really needed -- oil.
The Japanese got many resources from Manchuria, except for the one they really needed -- oil.
Shortround6
Major General
And Rubber.
That's why Burma became more important to them as the war went on.
Hong Kong was pretty much isolated from the rest of China from 1938 after the Japanese occupied Canton and the surrounding area. Canton had been the major port of entry for materials to support the Chinese fight against the Japanese.
Japanese pressure in June 1940 on FIC forced the closure of the route into southern China from the port of Haiphong, and led to the Japanese occupation of northern FIC in Sept 1940 to ensure that it wouldn't be reopened.
The final route was from Rangoon, up the Irrawaddy river, over the mountains via the Burma Road into China. Japanese pressure on Britain forced a short closure in July 1940 for 3 months. American pressure saw its reopening. It was closed again in March 1942 when the Japanese captured Rangoon and only reopened in Jan 1945 after the recapture of northern Burma allowed a road to be built from eastern India to join the existing Burma Road. In the interim China was kept supplied via "The Hump" air route.
In April 1942 the Japanese captured the oil fields in central Burma, but not before the wells and refinery had been destroyed by the retreating British forces. Unlike other oil fields and refineries in the DEI the Japanese were slow to bring the Burma fields back on line, so they made little difference to the Japanese war effort. They were recaptured in Feb 1945.
Thank you for your reply, Shortround6,
Here is a better description of my thoughts now that I'm not trying to post through my phone.
Those are my thoughts. Since it's a what if thread, I am admittedly optimistic in the outcomes of these actions. Ultimately, I still believe the Allies would emerge victorious.
Kk
Here is a better description of my thoughts now that I'm not trying to post through my phone.
Agreed as to summer/fall of 1941. The embargo was the tipping point in Japan's decision to attack the United States and move to capture critical resources in the Pacific Rim. My point is that the decision to attack the U.S. ensured that Japan would lose the war. However, the majority of resources that Japan sought were not in U.S. territories and could have been secured without the attacks on Pearl Harbor and the Philippines. On the other hand, declaring war on the Soviet Union helps Axis partner Germany and strengthens Axis allegiances. The Soviet Union had been keeping significant military resources in the east and the reassignment of these forces to the German front was a critical factor in the winter 1941 counteroffensive. Japan doesn't need to invade the Soviet Union, but it does need to close the Pacific Ports through which lend-lease supplies are beginning to move.
I'm not so sure on this point. American public opinion is still heavily on the side of neutrality, or at the very least of remaining a non-combatant. Without a Pearl Harbor it will be much more difficult to build momentum to join the war. My guess is that the U.S. could remain neutral for two more years and depending on the impact of a Japanese embargo on Russian ports the war could look vastly different than what happened in actuality.
Same as above. Without a major incident and without Germany declaring war it's unlikely that public sentiment would demand the U.S. enter the conflict as a belligerent. Without Japan initiating war with the U.S. it's unlikely Germany declares war prior to a greater likelihood of success against the Soviet Union. It's worth remembering that Germany appeared to be on the verge of defeating the Soviet Union in December 1941, which probably influenced the decision to declare war against the U.S. Without the U.S.S.R's influx of troops around Moscow in the winter 1941/1942 its conceivable that the German summer 1942 offensive would have had a different outcome.
It was brought up earlier in this thread that Germany had withheld a number of technical advances such as turbocharging. At the very least greater transfer of technical knowledge could have aided the Japanese cause. In the spirit of this thread, without having to fight the U.S.N in the Pacific, the Japanese Navy would be on better footing to engage the British Fleet and possibly gain control of large portions of the Indian Ocean sea lanes. By NOT fighting the U.S. the Japanese merchant fleet doesn't suffer and is more able to maintain shipping of war resources. Control of the Indian Ocean would also provide the opportunity to close, or prevent, the Persian Corridor further cutting off the U.S.S.R. from much needed support.
See above. Japan would be more able to move raw materials without the critical loss of merchant shipping.
Those are my thoughts. Since it's a what if thread, I am admittedly optimistic in the outcomes of these actions. Ultimately, I still believe the Allies would emerge victorious.
Kk
Shortround6
Major General
The US embargo against Japan was in several stages. The Scrap Iron, copper embargo and Panama canal traffic was a number of months before the oil embargo.
The US doesn't have a lot of choices after the oil embargo.
Japan doesn't either.
Even if Japan just blocks Aid to Vladivostok that is not going to be take kindly by either the UK or the US let alone Russia.
The US and the UK and the DEI have imposed the oil embargo to stop Japanese aggression/expansion in China and SE Asia.
Japan ignoring it and thinking that by passing the Philippines and invading more of SE Asia and the Dutch East Indies will keep the US out of the war is poor planning on Japans part.
All the resources have to go right by the Philippines to get back to Japan. How long before the US says enough is enough and tries to stop the cargo ships? How long does Japan not invade the Philippines allowing the the US to improve ports/bases, move in more troops, move in more bombes/fighters, more ships and submarines before actually firing?
The US Navy expansion plans had been announced in US news papers and from 1937 these increases had been substantial. The First of the modern BB had been authorized in FY 38 and by 1940 the first two Iowa's were authorized eight BB total and more to come. Other ships, carriers, cruisers, Destroyers and subs in proportion. On July 19 1940 after France fell, the 2 Ocean navy bill had been Approved.
In the Fall of 1941 the US would never be weaker as new ships were arriving all the time, The US was outbuilding the Japanese at a tremendous rate so the Japan to US force ratio would never be better for years to come. If the US stayed neutral for a year it would only be stronger compared to the Japanese. The ships the US would use to fight the Japanese with in 1943/44 had been authorized and paid for in 1939-40.
If the Japanese by pass the Philippines and attack the DEI they are gambling that the US will stay out of it forever because if the US decided to come in with expanded bases in the Philippines and the other Islands Japan is going to be screwed. A long hard fight but the raw materials can be cut off.
Against Germany it was only a matter of time before there were more major incidents. It was not a matter of IF but WHEN.
USS Kearny Oct 17th 1941.
Under 2 weeks before the Rueben James.
The USS Greer had been fired at by U-boat on the 7th of Sept 1941 and missed. President Roosevelt had issued a "shoot on sight" order.
The US was either escorting convoys or assisting escorts in the Western 1/2 of the Atlantic. It was only matter of time before there would be more incidents, The Kearny episode was mentioned by Hitler in his declaration of war.
The US doesn't have a lot of choices after the oil embargo.
Japan doesn't either.
Even if Japan just blocks Aid to Vladivostok that is not going to be take kindly by either the UK or the US let alone Russia.
The US and the UK and the DEI have imposed the oil embargo to stop Japanese aggression/expansion in China and SE Asia.
Japan ignoring it and thinking that by passing the Philippines and invading more of SE Asia and the Dutch East Indies will keep the US out of the war is poor planning on Japans part.
All the resources have to go right by the Philippines to get back to Japan. How long before the US says enough is enough and tries to stop the cargo ships? How long does Japan not invade the Philippines allowing the the US to improve ports/bases, move in more troops, move in more bombes/fighters, more ships and submarines before actually firing?
The US Navy expansion plans had been announced in US news papers and from 1937 these increases had been substantial. The First of the modern BB had been authorized in FY 38 and by 1940 the first two Iowa's were authorized eight BB total and more to come. Other ships, carriers, cruisers, Destroyers and subs in proportion. On July 19 1940 after France fell, the 2 Ocean navy bill had been Approved.
In the Fall of 1941 the US would never be weaker as new ships were arriving all the time, The US was outbuilding the Japanese at a tremendous rate so the Japan to US force ratio would never be better for years to come. If the US stayed neutral for a year it would only be stronger compared to the Japanese. The ships the US would use to fight the Japanese with in 1943/44 had been authorized and paid for in 1939-40.
If the Japanese by pass the Philippines and attack the DEI they are gambling that the US will stay out of it forever because if the US decided to come in with expanded bases in the Philippines and the other Islands Japan is going to be screwed. A long hard fight but the raw materials can be cut off.
Against Germany it was only a matter of time before there were more major incidents. It was not a matter of IF but WHEN.
USS Kearny Oct 17th 1941.
Under 2 weeks before the Rueben James.
The USS Greer had been fired at by U-boat on the 7th of Sept 1941 and missed. President Roosevelt had issued a "shoot on sight" order.
The US was either escorting convoys or assisting escorts in the Western 1/2 of the Atlantic. It was only matter of time before there would be more incidents, The Kearny episode was mentioned by Hitler in his declaration of war.
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
A beautiful synopsis.
manta22
Banned
Two points:
1. As I have noted here before, the development of the cavity magnetron leapfrogged the development of radar- particularly airborne radar. This was devastating to U-boats later in the War.
2. In his book, Reinhard Gehlen asserts that the Abwehr had evidence that the Soviet Union was building up for an attack on Germany and Germany's attack was a pre-emptive strike before that build-up progressed too far.
Discussion welcomed.
There is a full list of US ships detained (1939/40), damaged and sunk (1940/41) and captured (Dec 1941) here:-
Add to those the US warships:-
www.history.navy.mil
The extension of the Pan-American Security Zone by FDR in April 1941 followed by FDR's agreement in Aug 1941 to use ships of the US Neutrality Patrol to escort convoys to the Mid Ocean Meeting Point south of Iceland made more clashes inevitable. And it should be noted that the threat was seen, not only as U-boats, but also as German raiders like Bismarck, requiring Battleships to be present.
There was another purpose to FDR's decision to extend the use of ships of the Neutrality Patrol in the Atlantic. Given that the US did not want to be seen defending the British Empire in the Far East and having earlier rejected the basing of part of the US Pacific Fleet at Singapore, actions in the Atlantic were intended to free up the old British capital ships for transfer the Indian Ocean as part of an increased deterrent against further Japanese expansion. They had been used as escorts to the most important convoys from Canada in 1940/41. US actions made it possible to deploy them east after refit. The plan was in the process of being implemented when Japan struck firstly at Malaya and then PH.
Repulse - refit July-Aug 1941. Sailed as escort to Cape bound troop convoy WS11 on 31 Aug.
Revenge - sailed for Cape from Freetown at the end of Aug as escort for troop convoy WS10 X.
Royal Sovereign - refit at Norfolk & Greenock May-Oct 1941. Sailed as escort to Cape bound troop convoy WS12Z on 13 Nov.
Ramilles - refitted Sept-Nov 1941. Sailed as escort to Cape bound troop convoy WS14 on 9 Dec 1941.
Resolution - refit at Philadelphia and Devonport April-Nov 1941. Sailed as escort to Cape bound troop convoy WS15 in Jan 1942.
Chronological List of U.S. Ships Sunk or Damaged 1939 to 1941
Chronological List of U.S. Ships Sunk or Damaged 1939 to 1941 due to war causes
www.usmm.org
Add to those the US warships:-
Pre-U.S. Entry Into WWII
Pre-U.S. Entry Into WWII The first action between the U.S. and German navies occured on April 10, 1941, when USS Niblack (DD-424) neared the Icelandic coast to pick-up three boatloads of survivors from the Dutch freighter Saleier, which was sunk the previous day. When a submarine was detected...
The extension of the Pan-American Security Zone by FDR in April 1941 followed by FDR's agreement in Aug 1941 to use ships of the US Neutrality Patrol to escort convoys to the Mid Ocean Meeting Point south of Iceland made more clashes inevitable. And it should be noted that the threat was seen, not only as U-boats, but also as German raiders like Bismarck, requiring Battleships to be present.
There was another purpose to FDR's decision to extend the use of ships of the Neutrality Patrol in the Atlantic. Given that the US did not want to be seen defending the British Empire in the Far East and having earlier rejected the basing of part of the US Pacific Fleet at Singapore, actions in the Atlantic were intended to free up the old British capital ships for transfer the Indian Ocean as part of an increased deterrent against further Japanese expansion. They had been used as escorts to the most important convoys from Canada in 1940/41. US actions made it possible to deploy them east after refit. The plan was in the process of being implemented when Japan struck firstly at Malaya and then PH.
Repulse - refit July-Aug 1941. Sailed as escort to Cape bound troop convoy WS11 on 31 Aug.
Revenge - sailed for Cape from Freetown at the end of Aug as escort for troop convoy WS10 X.
Royal Sovereign - refit at Norfolk & Greenock May-Oct 1941. Sailed as escort to Cape bound troop convoy WS12Z on 13 Nov.
Ramilles - refitted Sept-Nov 1941. Sailed as escort to Cape bound troop convoy WS14 on 9 Dec 1941.
Resolution - refit at Philadelphia and Devonport April-Nov 1941. Sailed as escort to Cape bound troop convoy WS15 in Jan 1942.
swampyankee
Chief Master Sergeant
- 3,979
- Jun 25, 2013
In the Atlantic, do remember that an infinitely more isolationist president declared war on Germany after several sinkings of US merchant ships a couple of decades earlier. In the Pacific, Japan was viewed with significant hostility by many Americans, partly on racial grounds, and many politicians who were "isolationists" [1] were more than willing to intervene anywhere outside of Europe, if for no other reason that the US had an empire, in all but name, in the Pacific to which Japan's military activity and talk of the Greater Asian Co-prosperity Sphere was a threat.
My belief is that there would be full-scale war with Germany by mid-1942, following which Japan would directly attack US possessions in the Pacific, especially the Philippines, as the US would be seen as too distracted to respond.
[1] How many isolationists railed against US interventions in Central America and the Caribbean with the sort of furor they opposed actions in Europe? As a group -- the isolationists were a complicated bunch, covering the left-right axis pretty well, with many views of America's interests -- they were not pacifists.
My belief is that there would be full-scale war with Germany by mid-1942, following which Japan would directly attack US possessions in the Pacific, especially the Philippines, as the US would be seen as too distracted to respond.
[1] How many isolationists railed against US interventions in Central America and the Caribbean with the sort of furor they opposed actions in Europe? As a group -- the isolationists were a complicated bunch, covering the left-right axis pretty well, with many views of America's interests -- they were not pacifists.
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I don't think it has been mentioned so far, but Japan concluded a Neutrality Pact with the USSR in April 1941. It effectively helped both sides in the coming year. Japan was free to concentrate its efforts of moving south and the USSR was free to redeploy troops westwards in the defence of Moscow at the end of the year.
As for Lend Lease to the USSR, the Anglo-American Supply Mission (led by Averell Harriman & Lord Beaverbrook) only arrived in Russia on 28 Sept 1941 to negotiate the 1st Protocol for Lend Lease supplies, which covered the period Oct 1941 to June 1942. Initial supplies went via convoy to Murmansk. And very little seems to have gone from the USA at all in 1941, although some may have been diverted from Lend Lease supplies already being made to Britain.
Even after Lend Lease to Russia was up and running, until 1943 it was non-military supplies that were sent via the Pacific route in order to avoid Japanese interference on the basis that the import of war supplies by the Soviets could be regarded as an unfriendly act. And those supplies were being moved in Russian flagged and manned vessels, albeit that some of those began to be supplied from the USA in 1942. The Japanese did use their rights of inspection at times on shipping passing through various bottlenecks. The route was also affected by ice in the winter and the shallow waters of the Tatar Strait round the north of Sakahalin. But as the war went on they became more wary about using them and upsetting the USSR.
The need to get war supplies into the USSR via a safer route was one of the driving forces behind the opening of the Persian Gulf route via the occupation of Iran at the end of Aug 1941.
So any attempt to impede the flow of supplies to the USSR makes immediate conflict with the USSR more likely than conflict with Britain or the US and it is not going to happen until sometime into 1942.
North Pacific routes to USSR
As for Lend Lease to the USSR, the Anglo-American Supply Mission (led by Averell Harriman & Lord Beaverbrook) only arrived in Russia on 28 Sept 1941 to negotiate the 1st Protocol for Lend Lease supplies, which covered the period Oct 1941 to June 1942. Initial supplies went via convoy to Murmansk. And very little seems to have gone from the USA at all in 1941, although some may have been diverted from Lend Lease supplies already being made to Britain.
Even after Lend Lease to Russia was up and running, until 1943 it was non-military supplies that were sent via the Pacific route in order to avoid Japanese interference on the basis that the import of war supplies by the Soviets could be regarded as an unfriendly act. And those supplies were being moved in Russian flagged and manned vessels, albeit that some of those began to be supplied from the USA in 1942. The Japanese did use their rights of inspection at times on shipping passing through various bottlenecks. The route was also affected by ice in the winter and the shallow waters of the Tatar Strait round the north of Sakahalin. But as the war went on they became more wary about using them and upsetting the USSR.
The need to get war supplies into the USSR via a safer route was one of the driving forces behind the opening of the Persian Gulf route via the occupation of Iran at the end of Aug 1941.
So any attempt to impede the flow of supplies to the USSR makes immediate conflict with the USSR more likely than conflict with Britain or the US and it is not going to happen until sometime into 1942.
North Pacific routes to USSR
While in principle I agree with your final statement that the US could outbuild Japan, the longer war was deferred then the longer that advantage would have taken to arrive given peacetime build rates. So at Dec 1941 the scheduled completions of the expanded fleet look like this:-
South Dakota class - June 1942 - Oct 1943 [all completed by Aug 1942]
Iowa class (4 ships) - Nov 1943 - June 1945 [4 completed 1943/44]
Iowa class (2 ships) - May 1945 - May 1946 [construction postponed in 1942]
Montana class - Feb 1946 - May 1947 (work couldn't begin on these until 1942 when the building docks would be completed and eventually cancelled in 1943)
Essex class (11 ships) - Jan 1944 - Dec 1945 [all completed by Oct 1944]
Alaska class CB (6 ships) - Jan - Nov 1945 (3 cancelled)
Baltimore class CA (8 ships) - April 1943 - May 1945 [4 completed in 1943 & 4 from late 1944/45]
Atlanta class CL - (8 ships) - Dec 1941 - Oct 1944 [programme complete 2/45]
Cleveland class CL (32 ships) - July 1942 - Oct 1945 (9 completed as light carriers) [programme incomplete in Aug 1945]
Destroyers (1620/1630 tons) - Dec 1941 - Sept 1943
Destroyers (2100 ton Fletcher 119 ships) - April 1942 - Feb 1945
Gato class submarines - Jan 1942 - March 1945
The whole build programme was rapidly speeded up immediately after PH to generate the fleet of 1943/44 and many more ships were ordered in 1942 under the Maximum War Programme, many of which also completed by 15 Aug 1945, sometimes ahead of the ships of the Two Ocean Navy.
Had the peacetime plan continued for longer with a delay in the start of the war, the navy might have had a different shape come 1944/45. Montanas might have been in build for example.
Shortround6
Major General
You are right about the speed up the program but they had speed up some of it in late 1941 as tensions increased.
However the comparison with the Japanese building plans for 1941-44 as of 1941 and we will see that the Japanese had no hope of matching the US in Carriers, cruisers, destroyers and subs.
If the Japanese were going to challenge the US and not give in (surrender their ambitions) they had to fight in early/mid 1942 and that was before the oil embargo. With the oil embargo the Japanese time span got much shorter.
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