Japanese Versus American Victory Claims (2 Viewers)

[Squish]

Greg postulates (7:00-10:05) that the two losses confirmed by Japanese records would only be the two higher-ranking officers lost in that engagement, and that the records exclude some of the lower-ranking losses (not necessarily up to seven, but some). With the arguments he presents in the aforementioned 3 min 5 sec in mind, how plausible is that theory?

The plausibility is basically nil and this is a very good example of the kinds of intellectual sleight-of-hand that Greg makes often in his videos, where he strings together a few common assumptions and then presents them as an explanation to inconvenient facts. In doing so he also implies that he has reasonably intimate knowledge of the subject matter and that he is a reliable source in-and-of himself. It is cleverly disguised editorializing.

Greg presents a few assumptions here that may or may not be true. There are no sources cited and those assumptions are never called into question.


Greg's explanation is as follows as to why the IJAAF only reported two losses that day;

1. The IJAAF was more concerned with pilot losses than aircraft losses because of the underlying narrative that the axis powers were defeated through largely the attrition of their pilot corps. He further implies that by 1943 the IJAAF pilot situation was considered rather dire while their aircraft supply was considered relatively plentiful. No thought here is given to what the IJAAF believed about itself at the time nor to the specific situation in New Guinea. While pilot attrition overall has an immeasurably large impact on the course of the air war, he presents no evidence that the rate of pilot attrition in 1943 was of great concern to the IJAAF, or that the IJAAF even considered that it had a pilot shortage by Oct. 1943 when the Kearby mission occured.

2. Likewise he claims that aircraft losses might not be mentioned in loss-reports amongst IJAAF because the aforementioned pilot shortage because the loss of the aircraft is immaterial to the loss of the pilots, and that because the Japanese had a surplus of aircraft to pilots (another one of his assumptions) that they would not report the loss of the aircraft in cases where the pilot is recovered. This assumption only makes sense if you do not think about it. First and foremost one of the overarching themes of the Claringbould books is that a lot of Japanese aircraft were destroyed on the ground in comparison to in the air, and he apparently uses Japanese records to substantiate losses from strafing and bombing attacks.

In order for Greg's assumption to be true, we have to assume that the IJAAF in New Guinea had a vast surplus of planes already in-theater and that the losses of those planes never generated any need to request to high command that replacements for losses be shipped in. Also if we are using Claringbould as a reference, then we have to accept the fact that the Japanese reported their material losses on the ground, but somehow only chose to report their material losses in the air if it resulted in the death of a pilot, and only a high ranking pilot.

3. Which gets us into our third assumption, which is that the IJAAF treated its lower ranking pilots poorly, and therefore would not report their losses. I do not think that there is any evidence of this whatsoever. It makes no sense from a logical standpoint; how would a theater commander request pilot replacements etc without reporting their losses to higher command?

Basically in order for this theory to be true, we just have to assume that the Japanese had no functional chain of command, and no real military bureaucracy. Furthermore we have to accept that authors like Clarinbould, Dunn, etc have never considered this alternative explanation to the apparent juxtaposition of kill claims vs loss records. This also means that we have to ignore the whole entire body of scholarly work in the European theater as well that substantiates similar trends of over-claiming, or that we need to consider kill claims made by P-47 pilots as uniquely credible in comparison to their peers in different aircraft types.

 

[andrewgeorge]

I do not recall which WW2 fighter pilot it was, but many years ago I read where one said that each year additional information is uncovered that causes people to be added to the Ace list, as "Damaged" or "Probable" claims turn out to be actual kills. And he pointed out that he had Never seen a case where someone was taken Off the Ace list because a kill was redesignated as something else.

I can think of two reasons that probably explain that taking place:

1. "Confirmed" kills of aircraft that were never shot down are often unfalsifiable. If 5 pilots submitted claims totaling 7 enemy aircraft for an engagement in which 2 enemy aircraft were actually lost, how do you determine which of the claims were accurate/inaccurate? Sometimes a historian can piece together multiple accounts from different perspectives (pilots, ground observers, ground crew back at base) that tend to validate a particular claim. But a lot of the time there's just no way to know.

2. Former combat pilots' service records were extremely important to their military careers and to them personally even after they left the military. Revising someone's combat record *downward* decades after the war ended is not something most people want to do for pretty good reasons. If it turns out Dick Bong probably only *actually* shot down like twenty Japanese planes, there's a constituency of people (relatives, fellow pilots, the state of Wisconsin) that aren't going to want to hear it, understandably. So it's not done—officially, anyway.

I'm sure someone may be able to provide something more concrete here, but that's my intuition anyway.

 

[GregP]

2. "Former combat pilots' service records were extremely important to their military careers and to them personally even after they left the military. Revising someone's combat record *downward* decades after the war ended is not something most people want to do for pretty good reasons. If it turns out Dick Bong probably only *actually* shot down like twenty Japanese planes, there's a constituency of people (relatives, fellow pilots, the state of Wisconsin) that aren't going to want to hear it, understandably. So it's not done—officially, anyway."

Tell, that to Greg Boyington. As far as I know, he is the only ace to have his kills downgraded since Joe Foss was running for Governor of South Dakota at the time.

Since they can't "take away" his victories, they changed the context to "victories achieved in U.S. service," and then claim that the AVG were a Chinese organization even though we supplied the aircraft, pilots, and most maintenance personnel as well as the few spare parts that actually arrived.

 

[Irregualr23]

Hmm, I can't say I agree with the characterization of these researchers as being sympathetic to the Japanese side…. They do work with Japanese military sources, but that's generally where the "sympathy" ends.

You'll have to give me an example of what you mean with respect to bailouts or crash landings not being counted as aircraft losses and given as examples of overclaiming. That would be an extremely strange methodology and I certainly don't recall anyone I've read tallying up American and Japanese operational reports that way. If anything I think the tendency of most folks doing this research is to try to find as much credible evidence for the aviators' claims as possible—after all, the pilots were usually the only first-hand witnesses. If no planes were actually lost in an engagement but some were indeed shot up, or a pilot reports a particular evasive maneuver that might explain an enemy pilot's victory claim, that's almost always highlighted.

As for records, I'm sure incomplete records account for some claims here and there, but it wouldn't make much of a dent in the overall pattern I don't think. Over the course of months of engagements we'd be talking about hundreds and hundreds of aircraft and aircrew that are simply not accounted for in any of the military administrative documents, including records with are otherwise relatively complete, which I find implausible.

This criticism had already been made of Claringbould's work, and I think the same problem appears in many works on this period.

---Gary Connor

The problem is mainly caused by comparing selected losses and claims from IJNAF forces with the total losses and claims of all Allied forces in a theatre. This can make it look as though "Allied victory claims are wildly exaggerated, while Japanese claims are merely inaccurate".

I should admit that I am no expert on the history of the Central Pacific around 1943, but I can offer some examples from Umemoto's Kaigun Zero-sentai Gekitsui Sentōki where he mostly counting losses & claims from 201st, 204th and 253rd Kokutai. (Umemoto's statistics may have influenced Claringbould's narrative, as his work published after Umemoto's.) A good example would be, on July 2, 1943, a joint operation was carried out to bomb Allied installations. Umemoto described the result as one Allied Corsair lost and two more forced to land, with no Japanese losses, and concluded that the exchange was "1:0." However, IJAAF Ki-61s and Ki-43s also took part, and at least three Ki-61s failed to return. These losses were not included in Umemoto's account.

The same series offers another clear example of mixed categories. On July 18, it gives the exchange as "11:3," listing eleven American aircraft losses against three Japanese pilot fatalities. Three dead pilots do not establish that only three Japanese aircraft were lost, yet the figures were used to draw an exchange ratio.

A similar problem appears in the account of March 19, 1945. The 343rd Kokutai has been credited with a 15:14 exchange ratio, but this leaves out IJAAF losses that day, including at least three Ki-43s and one Ki-84 reportedly shot down near Matsuyama. Other IJN and IJA units fighting near Kure were also not included, as well as those been strafed on the ground. Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy loss figure of fourteen included six aircraft lost after ditching or being damaged beyond repair. Those "selected Japanese losses" makes the USN claim of 50 looks like extremely exaggrated, and was clearly a way to doctor figure toward the Japanese side.

It should also be noted that the IJAAF itself acknowledged that its aircraft-loss records had been purposely destroyed by the order from IJAAF generals before the end of the war. As a result, the exact number of Japanese aircraft losses in each combat, especially the IJAAF forces, became difficult to establish and reconstruct, and researchers may find it easier to count pilot losses.

 

[andrewgeorge]

2. "Former combat pilots' service records were extremely important to their military careers and to them personally even after they left the military. Revising someone's combat record *downward* decades after the war ended is not something most people want to do for pretty good reasons. If it turns out Dick Bong probably only *actually* shot down like twenty Japanese planes, there's a constituency of people (relatives, fellow pilots, the state of Wisconsin) that aren't going to want to hear it, understandably. So it's not done—officially, anyway."

Tell, that to Greg Boyington. As far as I know, he is the only ace to have his kills downgraded since Joe Foss was running for Governor of South Dakota at the time.

Since they can't "take away" his victories, they changed the context to "victories achieved in U.S. service," and then claim that the AVG were a Chinese organization even though we supplied the aircraft, pilots, and most maintenance personnel as well as the few spare parts that actually arrived.

That's certainly different than going back and determining that, since X, Y, and Z confirmed kills did not actually take place, a former pilots official service record will reflect a reduction in confirmed victories.

Honestly, I was not aware that AVG service records were ever considered anything other than Chinese service!

 

[andrewgeorge]

This criticism had already been made of Claringbould's work, and I think the same problem appears in many works on this period.

View attachment 898740 ---Gary Connor

The problem is mainly caused by comparing selected losses and claims from IJNAF forces with the total losses and claims of all Allied forces in a theatre. This can make it look as though "Allied victory claims are wildly exaggerated, while Japanese claims are merely inaccurate".

I should admit that I am no expert on the history of the Central Pacific around 1943, but I can offer some examples from Umemoto's Kaigun Zero-sentai Gekitsui Sentōki where he mostly counting losses & claims from 201st, 204th and 253rd Kokutai. (Umemoto's statistics may have influenced Claringbould's narrative, as his work published after Umemoto's.) A good example would be, on July 2, 1943, a joint operation was carried out to bomb Allied installations. Umemoto described the result as one Allied Corsair lost and two more forced to land, with no Japanese losses, and concluded that the exchange was "1:0." However, IJAAF Ki-61s and Ki-43s also took part, and at least three Ki-61s failed to return. These losses were not included in Umemoto's account.

The same series offers another clear example of mixed categories. On July 18, it gives the exchange as "11:3," listing eleven American aircraft losses against three Japanese pilot fatalities. Three dead pilots do not establish that only three Japanese aircraft were lost, yet the figures were used to draw an exchange ratio.

A similar problem appears in the account of March 19, 1945. The 343rd Kokutai has been credited with a 15:14 exchange ratio, but this leaves out IJAAF losses that day, including at least three Ki-43s and one Ki-84 reportedly shot down near Matsuyama. Other IJN and IJA units fighting near Kure were also not included, as well as those been strafed on the ground. Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy loss figure of fourteen included six aircraft lost after ditching or being damaged beyond repair. Those "selected Japanese losses" makes the USN claim of 50 looks like extremely exaggrated, and was clearly a way to doctor figure toward the Japanese side.

It should also be noted that the IJAAF itself acknowledged that its aircraft-loss records had been purposely destroyed by the order from IJAAF generals before the end of the war. As a result, the exact number of Japanese aircraft losses in each combat, especially the IJAAF forces, became difficult to establish and reconstruct, and researchers may find it easier to count pilot losses.
View attachment 898741

This helps me understand what you're referring to.

Regarding Claringbould, I do think you're right he is particularly enthusiastic about pointing out allied overclaiming, but my impression is that is more because he regards that as the more noteworthy part of his research. Popular histories, to the extent they've engaged with Japanese-language archives, have tended to correctly assume a significant degree of Japanese overclaiming, while Allied claims have been mostly left to stand since the war itself. So when he comes across a particularly extreme instance of allied overclaiming, he emphasizes it because it's a more surprising discovery.

I've never gotten the sense he downplays Japanese war crimes or whitewashes anything—If I recall he's written about the mass murder at Ballale repeatedly, and he notes when downed allied airmen were apparently executed by the Japanese military. I do agree generally that any nuts and bolts assessment of military operations in the Second World War—particularly when it comes to Axis forces—risks tone deafness when it comes to matters of larger importance.

I'm not familiar with Umemoto's work, but those do seem to be methodological flaws to rely on aircrew losses alone without any information about damage to returning aircraft, or to ignore the role of other engaged units just because you aren't working with those records.

I will just add that Claringbould's work isn't really an outlier though. Everyone who has worked with both Japanese and Allied military records seems to come to basically the same conclusions regarding overclaiming—and if you think about it, it's the only one that really adds up in the bigger picture of a given campaign.

 

[MIflyer]

I can recall one book in which a USN pilot claimed that his unit had encountered a large flight of Japanese trainer aircraft and shot down quite a few of them, but then were told that since they were trainers that they did not count.

I do not recall any other cases in which kills were not counted because the enemy aircraft were not armed or otherwise were not described as combat aircraft. When Kamikaze attacks started a trainer was potentially as dangerous as anything else.