Japanese Versus American Victory Claims (5 Viewers)

Greg postulates (7:00-10:05) that the two losses confirmed by Japanese records would only be the two higher-ranking officers lost in that engagement, and that the records exclude some of the lower-ranking losses (not necessarily up to seven, but some). With the arguments he presents in the aforementioned 3 min 5 sec in mind, how plausible is that theory?
Deleted.
 
Last edited:
I do not recall which WW2 fighter pilot it was, but many years ago I read where one said that each year additional information is uncovered that causes people to be added to the Ace list, as "Damaged" or "Probable" claims turn out to be actual kills. And he pointed out that he had Never seen a case where someone was taken Off the Ace list because a kill was redesignated as something else.

I can think of two reasons that probably explain that taking place:

1. "Confirmed" kills of aircraft that were never shot down are often unfalsifiable. If 5 pilots submitted claims totaling 7 enemy aircraft for an engagement in which 2 enemy aircraft were actually lost, how do you determine which of the claims were accurate/inaccurate? Sometimes a historian can piece together multiple accounts from different perspectives (pilots, ground observers, ground crew back at base) that tend to validate a particular claim. But a lot of the time there's just no way to know.

2. Former combat pilots' service records were extremely important to their military careers and to them personally even after they left the military. Revising someone's combat record *downward* decades after the war ended is not something most people want to do for pretty good reasons. If it turns out Dick Bong probably only *actually* shot down like twenty Japanese planes, there's a constituency of people (relatives, fellow pilots, the state of Wisconsin) that aren't going to want to hear it, understandably. So it's not done—officially, anyway.

I'm sure someone may be able to provide something more concrete here, but that's my intuition anyway.
 
2. "Former combat pilots' service records were extremely important to their military careers and to them personally even after they left the military. Revising someone's combat record *downward* decades after the war ended is not something most people want to do for pretty good reasons. If it turns out Dick Bong probably only *actually* shot down like twenty Japanese planes, there's a constituency of people (relatives, fellow pilots, the state of Wisconsin) that aren't going to want to hear it, understandably. So it's not done—officially, anyway."

Tell, that to Greg Boyington. As far as I know, he is the only ace to have his kills downgraded since Joe Foss was running for Governor of South Dakota at the time.

Since they can't "take away" his victories, they changed the context to "victories achieved in U.S. service," and then claim that the AVG were a Chinese organization even though we supplied the aircraft, pilots, and most maintenance personnel as well as the few spare parts that actually arrived.
 
Hmm, I can't say I agree with the characterization of these researchers as being sympathetic to the Japanese side…. They do work with Japanese military sources, but that's generally where the "sympathy" ends.

You'll have to give me an example of what you mean with respect to bailouts or crash landings not being counted as aircraft losses and given as examples of overclaiming. That would be an extremely strange methodology and I certainly don't recall anyone I've read tallying up American and Japanese operational reports that way. If anything I think the tendency of most folks doing this research is to try to find as much credible evidence for the aviators' claims as possible—after all, the pilots were usually the only first-hand witnesses. If no planes were actually lost in an engagement but some were indeed shot up, or a pilot reports a particular evasive maneuver that might explain an enemy pilot's victory claim, that's almost always highlighted.

As for records, I'm sure incomplete records account for some claims here and there, but it wouldn't make much of a dent in the overall pattern I don't think. Over the course of months of engagements we'd be talking about hundreds and hundreds of aircraft and aircrew that are simply not accounted for in any of the military administrative documents, including records with are otherwise relatively complete, which I find implausible.
This criticism had already been made of Claringbould's work, and I think the same problem appears in many works on this period.

1791620241900.png
---Gary Connor

The problem is mainly caused by comparing selected losses and claims from IJNAF forces with the total losses and claims of all Allied forces in a theatre. This can make it look as though "Allied victory claims are wildly exaggerated, while Japanese claims are merely inaccurate".

I should admit that I am no expert on the history of the Central Pacific around 1943, but I can offer some examples from Umemoto's Kaigun Zero-sentai Gekitsui Sentōki where he mostly counting losses & claims from 201st, 204th and 253rd Kokutai. (Umemoto's statistics may have influenced Claringbould's narrative, as his work published after Umemoto's.) A good example would be, on July 2, 1943, a joint operation was carried out to bomb Allied installations. Umemoto described the result as one Allied Corsair lost and two more forced to land, with no Japanese losses, and concluded that the exchange was "1:0." However, IJAAF Ki-61s and Ki-43s also took part, and at least three Ki-61s failed to return. These losses were not included in Umemoto's account.

The same series offers another clear example of mixed categories. On July 18, it gives the exchange as "11:3," listing eleven American aircraft losses against three Japanese pilot fatalities. Three dead pilots do not establish that only three Japanese aircraft were lost, yet the figures were used to draw an exchange ratio.

A similar problem appears in the account of March 19, 1945. The 343rd Kokutai has been credited with a 15:14 exchange ratio, but this leaves out IJAAF losses that day, including at least three Ki-43s and one Ki-84 reportedly shot down near Matsuyama. Other IJN and IJA units fighting near Kure were also not included, as well as those been strafed on the ground. Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy loss figure of fourteen included six aircraft lost after ditching or being damaged beyond repair. Those "selected Japanese losses" makes the USN claim of 50 looks like extremely exaggrated, and was clearly a way to doctor figure toward the Japanese side.

It should also be noted that the IJAAF itself acknowledged that its aircraft-loss records had been purposely destroyed by the order from IJAAF generals before the end of the war. As a result, the exact number of Japanese aircraft losses in each combat, especially the IJAAF forces, became difficult to establish and reconstruct, and researchers may find it easier to count pilot losses.
1791620385601.jpg
 
Last edited:
2. "Former combat pilots' service records were extremely important to their military careers and to them personally even after they left the military. Revising someone's combat record *downward* decades after the war ended is not something most people want to do for pretty good reasons. If it turns out Dick Bong probably only *actually* shot down like twenty Japanese planes, there's a constituency of people (relatives, fellow pilots, the state of Wisconsin) that aren't going to want to hear it, understandably. So it's not done—officially, anyway."

Tell, that to Greg Boyington. As far as I know, he is the only ace to have his kills downgraded since Joe Foss was running for Governor of South Dakota at the time.

Since they can't "take away" his victories, they changed the context to "victories achieved in U.S. service," and then claim that the AVG were a Chinese organization even though we supplied the aircraft, pilots, and most maintenance personnel as well as the few spare parts that actually arrived.

That's certainly different than going back and determining that, since X, Y, and Z confirmed kills did not actually take place, a former pilots official service record will reflect a reduction in confirmed victories.

Honestly, I was not aware that AVG service records were ever considered anything other than Chinese service!
 
This criticism had already been made of Claringbould's work, and I think the same problem appears in many works on this period.

View attachment 898740 ---Gary Connor

The problem is mainly caused by comparing selected losses and claims from IJNAF forces with the total losses and claims of all Allied forces in a theatre. This can make it look as though "Allied victory claims are wildly exaggerated, while Japanese claims are merely inaccurate".

I should admit that I am no expert on the history of the Central Pacific around 1943, but I can offer some examples from Umemoto's Kaigun Zero-sentai Gekitsui Sentōki where he mostly counting losses & claims from 201st, 204th and 253rd Kokutai. (Umemoto's statistics may have influenced Claringbould's narrative, as his work published after Umemoto's.) A good example would be, on July 2, 1943, a joint operation was carried out to bomb Allied installations. Umemoto described the result as one Allied Corsair lost and two more forced to land, with no Japanese losses, and concluded that the exchange was "1:0." However, IJAAF Ki-61s and Ki-43s also took part, and at least three Ki-61s failed to return. These losses were not included in Umemoto's account.

The same series offers another clear example of mixed categories. On July 18, it gives the exchange as "11:3," listing eleven American aircraft losses against three Japanese pilot fatalities. Three dead pilots do not establish that only three Japanese aircraft were lost, yet the figures were used to draw an exchange ratio.

A similar problem appears in the account of March 19, 1945. The 343rd Kokutai has been credited with a 15:14 exchange ratio, but this leaves out IJAAF losses that day, including at least three Ki-43s and one Ki-84 reportedly shot down near Matsuyama. Other IJN and IJA units fighting near Kure were also not included, as well as those been strafed on the ground. Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy loss figure of fourteen included six aircraft lost after ditching or being damaged beyond repair. Those "selected Japanese losses" makes the USN claim of 50 looks like extremely exaggrated, and was clearly a way to doctor figure toward the Japanese side.

It should also be noted that the IJAAF itself acknowledged that its aircraft-loss records had been purposely destroyed by the order from IJAAF generals before the end of the war. As a result, the exact number of Japanese aircraft losses in each combat, especially the IJAAF forces, became difficult to establish and reconstruct, and researchers may find it easier to count pilot losses.
View attachment 898741

This helps me understand what you're referring to.

Regarding Claringbould, I do think you're right he is particularly enthusiastic about pointing out allied overclaiming, but my impression is that is more because he regards that as the more noteworthy part of his research. Popular histories, to the extent they've engaged with Japanese-language archives, have tended to correctly assume a significant degree of Japanese overclaiming, while Allied claims have been mostly left to stand since the war itself. So when he comes across a particularly extreme instance of allied overclaiming, he emphasizes it because it's a more surprising discovery.

I've never gotten the sense he downplays Japanese war crimes or whitewashes anything—If I recall he's written about the mass murder at Ballale repeatedly, and he notes when downed allied airmen were apparently executed by the Japanese military. I do agree generally that any nuts and bolts assessment of military operations in the Second World War—particularly when it comes to Axis forces—risks tone deafness when it comes to matters of larger importance.

I'm not familiar with Umemoto's work, but those do seem to be methodological flaws to rely on aircrew losses alone without any information about damage to returning aircraft, or to ignore the role of other engaged units just because you aren't working with those records.

I will just add that Claringbould's work isn't really an outlier though. Everyone who has worked with both Japanese and Allied military records seems to come to basically the same conclusions regarding overclaiming—and if you think about it, it's the only one that really adds up in the bigger picture of a given campaign.
 
Last edited:
I can recall one book in which a USN pilot claimed that his unit had encountered a large flight of Japanese trainer aircraft and shot down quite a few of them, but then were told that since they were trainers that they did not count.

I do not recall any other cases in which kills were not counted because the enemy aircraft were not armed or otherwise were not described as combat aircraft. When Kamikaze attacks started a trainer was potentially as dangerous as anything else.
 
That's certainly different than going back and determining that, since X, Y, and Z confirmed kills did not actually take place, a former pilots official service record will reflect a reduction in confirmed victories.

Honestly, I was not aware that AVG service records were ever considered anything other than Chinese service!
This is like telling Lt. Curdes that his European victories don't count with his Pacific victories.
 
I can recall one book in which a USN pilot claimed that his unit had encountered a large flight of Japanese trainer aircraft and shot down quite a few of them, but then were told that since they were trainers that they did not count.

I do not recall any other cases in which kills were not counted because the enemy aircraft were not armed or otherwise were not described as combat aircraft. When Kamikaze attacks started a trainer was potentially as dangerous as anything else.
That's surprising. Didn't downed transports count?
 
William H. Lewis 343d Fighter Squadron, 55th Fighter Group ace in a day shooting down 5 trainers.
 
This is like telling Lt. Curdes that his European victories don't count with his Pacific victories.

I mean, not really? At least I don't see it that way. He was flying for the Chinese Air Force, paid (well) by the RoC, flying aircraft purchased by the RoC,

Do American eagle squadron pilots have their air to air records counted as RAF service or USAAF et al service?

If it's the latter, I'd agree that it's weird to single out the AVG. Otherwise, I think it would be a bit weird to count their AVG time as US service.
 
Last edited:
Maj Howard, MOH winner, Had both USAAF and AVG victories on his P-51.


Screenshot 2026-10-11 at 16-34-07 Monogram NAA P-51B Mustang.png


Look, it's an apples and oranges thing. Personal scores versus unit scores. There were a few pilots who flew for "both sides" such as Ex-Vichy France, that scored kills over both Allied and Axis aircraft, Wonder what they painted on their airplanes?

Actually, in the ETO they allowed ground strafing kills to be counted during the latter part of the war - very controversial. Have no idea if that was the case in the Pacific and CBI.
 
I mean, not really? At least I don't see it that way. He was flying for the Chinese Air Force, paid (well) by the RoC, flying aircraft purchased by the RoC,

Do American eagle squadron pilots have their air to air records counted as RAF service or USAAF et al service?

If it's the latter, I'd agree that it's weird to single out the AVG. Otherwise, I think it would be a bit weird to count their AVG time as US service.
Donald Blakeslee made ace flying Spitfires for the RCAF and RAF Eagle Squadron, then acquired 10 more victories flying for the USAAF in P-47s and P-51s.

Flying for the RAF's Eagle Squadron would be no different than flying for the Chinese American Volunteer Group.

England and China were allies of the U.S. flying legitimate combat missions against an enemy at war.

And by the way, the USAAF awarded Lt. Curdes a victory for shooting down a U.S. transport that was about to fall into Japanese hands - which is why he had a US star painted on his cowling alongside Japanese and Italian insignias.
 
Umemoto frequently switching name between Hiroshi Ichimura and Hiroshi Umemoto, if you search Ichimura you will find both Dunn and Claringbould used his work as some sort of source, he was also a listed by Claringbould as one of the historical associates.
So where is the evidence that Claringbould or Dunn's claims are derived from Umemotos work? Because your whole reply looks like you are attributing the narrative in a Japanese account as being analogous of the argument made by Claringbould or Dunn.

There is no mention of any Umemoto book in the bibliography of the one Claringbould book that I have.
 
Deleted.
 
Last edited:

Users who are viewing this thread

Back