Japanese Zero vs Spitfire vs FW 190

[Shortround6]

Getting exact numbers is almost impossible, on many of these synchronized guns the firing rate was dependent on the rpm of the engine.
The British generally figured (or reported) that the Synchronized guns on the Tomahawks and early P-39s were in the 400-500rpm range, some of the early P-40s/Tomahawks had the 600rpm max guns when not synchronized. I have no idea if the guns in the P-39s the Russians could do better when synchronized but at least they were supposed to shoot around 800rpm unsynchronized. Please note the manual for the M2 aircraft gun gives a range of 750-850rpm so none of these numbers is exact.
The Italian Breda 12.7mm is supposed to have fired at 700rpm but as low as 400rpm when synchronized and the Japanese Ho-103 gun also had a very large drop. It wasn't the US M2 but the Browning gun design in general that did not take to synchronization well.

 

[nuuumannn]

I'm familiar with that argument, but I don't buy it. To me that is kind of like pointing out that Hurricanes shot down more Luftwaffe planes than Spitfires so therefore they were more important in the Battle of Britain.

Nothing of the sort. Here is a post by Steve, which I collected when writing an article on Fw 190, but can't find the original post on the forum. it displays figures Steve collected for himself. It's in its original form and based on these figures, prove it.

"Hooton notes that between June - December 1941 RAF FC lost 416 fighters in six months during 20 495 day sorties flown (2 % loss rate), plus BC's 108 bombers in 1406 sorties (7.6 % loss rate...!).
This was pretty much the 109F period, just before the JGs started to convert to the 190A. Luftflotte 3 was flying 19535 sorties but lost only 93 fighters (0.4 % loss rate)..

The numbers pretty much speak for themselves - 4 RAF fighters and a bomber was lost for every German fighter . RAF fighter command at the time was however believed that it had shot down over 700 German fighters.

In the next six months (January - June 1942), when the Fw 190 was making appearance, the RAF lost another 295 fighters in 22 729 (1.2% loss rate) day sorties while BC flew 1007 day sorties and lost only 16 (1.5% loss rate).

It's quite clear that the first six months of Fw 190ish 1942 was much easier on the RAF than the previous six months of 1941. 109F equipped JGs were kicking the brown out of Fighter Command in 1941 much worse than 190As did in 1942. Fighter Command's losses did not, as you'd believe, increase in 1942. In fact they were decreasing, but the RAF had enough. Similar losses for the same period for the Jagdwaffe are not available, but Hooton notes that in the four months leading to June 1942, RAF FC has lost 264 fighters for 58 German

To summerize:

In the second half of 1941 the Germans, largely equipped with 109Fs shot down 416 RAF fighters and 108 bombers, for the loss of 93 of their own fighters - a loss ratio of 5.6 to one!
In the four months leading to June 1942 the Germans, largely re-equipped with 190As shot down 264 RAF fighters and about a dozen bombers, for the loss of 58 of their own fighters - a loss ratio of 4.7 to one!

Thus actually the LW was doing relatively worse with the 190 (meaning that they 'only' shot down about 5 RAF planes for each of their own instead of 6..) and Fighter Command actually slightly better.

All that happened that the RAF was slow to realize it. It took them a year and a number of high profile engagements in the spring of 1942, when JGs practically annihilated a number of Spitfire Squadrons in combat: on 1st June 1942 9 Spitfires of the Debden wing were shot down, the next day seven out of 12 Spitfires of No. 403 Sqn were shot down by JG.

This must have rose some heads in the air ministry and Dougles was told to stop this nonsense over France at once. The RAF began to realize the reality of the situation that was going on for a year and they finally had enough of the hammering they received over France - either from 109Fs or 190As.

They may have perceived that this was caused by the 190s, but with the hindsight it seems it was an easy excuse for everyone, since essentially it was the failure of the tactics and lack of concept, aka the human factor. Surely post-war historians were keen to build on that. After all, 'the Fw 190 menace' and blaming it all on a supposedly unbeatable uberfighter sounds a whole lot nicer in the history books than 'we were banging our head against the concreate hoping it would yield and it took us a year to realize this was a stupid concept'.

So, in short your earlier statement that 'RAF only started to suffer losses which they considered unsustainable after the introduction of the Fw 190' is demonstrably untrue."

You can disbelieve it all you want, doesn't change the facts. The Air Ministry knew that the Bf 109F was doing enormous damage and was superior to the Spitfire V, Sholto Douglas wrote a secret memorandum in August 1941 drawing urgent attention for the need to improve performance of the Spitfire V, which it was acknowledged was inferior to the Bf 109F in speed and climb.

The essential issue was the foolishness of the 'Leaning into France' policy, as Sholto Dougllas called it and the belated realisation that it was taking an enormous toll on Fighter Command. Allocating blame was easy.

 

[pinsog]

Nothing of the sort. Here is a post by Steve, which I collected when writing an article on Fw 190, but can't find the original post on the forum. it displays figures Steve collected for himself. It's in its original form and based on these figures, prove it.

"Hooton notes that between June - December 1941 RAF FC lost 416 fighters in six months during 20 495 day sorties flown (2 % loss rate), plus BC's 108 bombers in 1406 sorties (7.6 % loss rate...!).
This was pretty much the 109F period, just before the JGs started to convert to the 190A. Luftflotte 3 was flying 19535 sorties but lost only 93 fighters (0.4 % loss rate)..

The numbers pretty much speak for themselves - 4 RAF fighters and a bomber was lost for every German fighter . RAF fighter command at the time was however believed that it had shot down over 700 German fighters.

In the next six months (January - June 1942), when the Fw 190 was making appearance, the RAF lost another 295 fighters in 22 729 (1.2% loss rate) day sorties while BC flew 1007 day sorties and lost only 16 (1.5% loss rate).

It's quite clear that the first six months of Fw 190ish 1942 was much easier on the RAF than the previous six months of 1941. 109F equipped JGs were kicking the brown out of Fighter Command in 1941 much worse than 190As did in 1942. Fighter Command's losses did not, as you'd believe, increase in 1942. In fact they were decreasing, but the RAF had enough. Similar losses for the same period for the Jagdwaffe are not available, but Hooton notes that in the four months leading to June 1942, RAF FC has lost 264 fighters for 58 German

To summerize:

In the second half of 1941 the Germans, largely equipped with 109Fs shot down 416 RAF fighters and 108 bombers, for the loss of 93 of their own fighters - a loss ratio of 5.6 to one!
In the four months leading to June 1942 the Germans, largely re-equipped with 190As shot down 264 RAF fighters and about a dozen bombers, for the loss of 58 of their own fighters - a loss ratio of 4.7 to one!

Thus actually the LW was doing relatively worse with the 190 (meaning that they 'only' shot down about 5 RAF planes for each of their own instead of 6..) and Fighter Command actually slightly better.

All that happened that the RAF was slow to realize it. It took them a year and a number of high profile engagements in the spring of 1942, when JGs practically annihilated a number of Spitfire Squadrons in combat: on 1st June 1942 9 Spitfires of the Debden wing were shot down, the next day seven out of 12 Spitfires of No. 403 Sqn were shot down by JG.

This must have rose some heads in the air ministry and Dougles was told to stop this nonsense over France at once. The RAF began to realize the reality of the situation that was going on for a year and they finally had enough of the hammering they received over France - either from 109Fs or 190As.

They may have perceived that this was caused by the 190s, but with the hindsight it seems it was an easy excuse for everyone, since essentially it was the failure of the tactics and lack of concept, aka the human factor. Surely post-war historians were keen to build on that. After all, 'the Fw 190 menace' and blaming it all on a supposedly unbeatable uberfighter sounds a whole lot nicer in the history books than 'we were banging our head against the concreate hoping it would yield and it took us a year to realize this was a stupid concept'.

So, in short your earlier statement that 'RAF only started to suffer losses which they considered unsustainable after the introduction of the Fw 190' is demonstrably untrue."

You can disbelieve it all you want, doesn't change the facts. The Air Ministry knew that the Bf 109F was doing enormous damage and was superior to the Spitfire V, Sholto Douglas wrote a secret memorandum in August 1941 drawing urgent attention for the need to improve performance of the Spitfire V, which it was acknowledged was inferior to the Bf 109F in speed and climb.

The essential issue was the foolishness of the 'Leaning into France' policy, as Sholto Dougllas called it and the belated realisation that it was taking an enormous toll on Fighter Command. Allocating blame was easy.

190A's had a 5-1 kill ratio over Spitfire Mark V's, 109F's had a 6-1 kill ratio over the Spitfire Mark V's, and Zeroes had a 7-1 kill ratio over Spitfire Mark V's. Interesting.

 

[Schweik]

The 50 BMG rate of fire was reduced when synchronized but not near 50%. When Shortround6 sees this he will probably give us nearly the exact rate of fire, but seems like it was around 500 rounds per minute. Whatever it was, the Russians P39's seemed to do ok with only 2 50's and the 37mm or 20mm. Dauntless SBD's also did ok with only 2 synchronized 50's bringing down several 4 engine Japanese float planes as well as Kates, Vals and the occasional Zero.

And the Tomahawks did quite well with the nose guns too, with the AVG, with the Russians (who sometimes removed the wing guns altogether) and in the Western Desert where quite a few Commonwealth pilots made Ace flying them.

 

[Schweik]

Nothing of the sort. Here is a post by Steve, which I collected when writing an article on Fw 190, but can't find the original post on the forum. it displays figures Steve collected for himself. It's in its original form and based on these figures, prove it.

"Hooton notes that between June - December 1941 RAF FC lost 416 fighters in six months during 20 495 day sorties flown (2 % loss rate), plus BC's 108 bombers in 1406 sorties (7.6 % loss rate...!).
This was pretty much the 109F period, just before the JGs started to convert to the 190A. Luftflotte 3 was flying 19535 sorties but lost only 93 fighters (0.4 % loss rate)..

The numbers pretty much speak for themselves - 4 RAF fighters and a bomber was lost for every German fighter . RAF fighter command at the time was however believed that it had shot down over 700 German fighters.

In the next six months (January - June 1942), when the Fw 190 was making appearance, the RAF lost another 295 fighters in 22 729 (1.2% loss rate) day sorties while BC flew 1007 day sorties and lost only 16 (1.5% loss rate).

It's quite clear that the first six months of Fw 190ish 1942 was much easier on the RAF than the previous six months of 1941. 109F equipped JGs were kicking the brown out of Fighter Command in 1941 much worse than 190As did in 1942. Fighter Command's losses did not, as you'd believe, increase in 1942. In fact they were decreasing, but the RAF had enough. Similar losses for the same period for the Jagdwaffe are not available, but Hooton notes that in the four months leading to June 1942, RAF FC has lost 264 fighters for 58 German

To summerize:

In the second half of 1941 the Germans, largely equipped with 109Fs shot down 416 RAF fighters and 108 bombers, for the loss of 93 of their own fighters - a loss ratio of 5.6 to one!
In the four months leading to June 1942 the Germans, largely re-equipped with 190As shot down 264 RAF fighters and about a dozen bombers, for the loss of 58 of their own fighters - a loss ratio of 4.7 to one!

Thus actually the LW was doing relatively worse with the 190 (meaning that they 'only' shot down about 5 RAF planes for each of their own instead of 6..) and Fighter Command actually slightly better.

All that happened that the RAF was slow to realize it. It took them a year and a number of high profile engagements in the spring of 1942, when JGs practically annihilated a number of Spitfire Squadrons in combat: on 1st June 1942 9 Spitfires of the Debden wing were shot down, the next day seven out of 12 Spitfires of No. 403 Sqn were shot down by JG.

This must have rose some heads in the air ministry and Dougles was told to stop this nonsense over France at once. The RAF began to realize the reality of the situation that was going on for a year and they finally had enough of the hammering they received over France - either from 109Fs or 190As.

They may have perceived that this was caused by the 190s, but with the hindsight it seems it was an easy excuse for everyone, since essentially it was the failure of the tactics and lack of concept, aka the human factor. Surely post-war historians were keen to build on that. After all, 'the Fw 190 menace' and blaming it all on a supposedly unbeatable uberfighter sounds a whole lot nicer in the history books than 'we were banging our head against the concreate hoping it would yield and it took us a year to realize this was a stupid concept'.

So, in short your earlier statement that 'RAF only started to suffer losses which they considered unsustainable after the introduction of the Fw 190' is demonstrably untrue."

You can disbelieve it all you want, doesn't change the facts. The Air Ministry knew that the Bf 109F was doing enormous damage and was superior to the Spitfire V, Sholto Douglas wrote a secret memorandum in August 1941 drawing urgent attention for the need to improve performance of the Spitfire V, which it was acknowledged was inferior to the Bf 109F in speed and climb.

The essential issue was the foolishness of the 'Leaning into France' policy, as Sholto Dougllas called it and the belated realisation that it was taking an enormous toll on Fighter Command. Allocating blame was easy.

Was there a change in tactics involved between 1941 and 42? My understanding was that some of the losses against 190s occurred over the Channel itself? I admit that isn't an area I've spent a lot of time reading about.

 

[Stig1207]

Be interesting to add the Shoot Down Records of the other European Theater
Such as Russia for the P39/400 and P40.
Not much written with other US planes though a few P51's, P47's and P38s were sent.

The range limited Spitfire and Airacobra did well when they could get to the fight.
All the other planes had much better range making for more opportunity.

The various sources don't necessarily agree on the number of 'shoot downs' when it comes to the USAAF USAAF fighter victories

 

[Stig1207]

And the Tomahawks did quite well with the nose guns too, with the AVG, with the Russians (who sometimes removed the wing guns altogether) and in the Western Desert where quite a few Commonwealth pilots made Ace flying them.

Is that still the case adjusting for overclaiming? That 's not always possible, but in the Western Desert at any rate there certainly seems to be a significant amount of overclaiming going by the MAW series.

 

[MycroftHolmes]

The numbers pretty much speak for themselves - 4 RAF fighters and a bomber was lost for every German fighter . RAF fighter command at the time was however believed that it had shot down over 700 German fighters.

I'm afraid those figures are nonsense. They are comparing total RAF losses to all causes - including flak and non-combat losses - to those German planes supposedly destroyed in air-combat - and we know that in 1940-2 the Germans included large numbers of aircraft shot down by the British as 'non-combat' losses. JG2 and JG26 lost 236 aircraft in the second half of 1941, according to official records, but as in the Battle of Britain, these loss-lists were incomplete. As an example, on one day in 1941, Adolf Galland was shot down twice, and on one of these occasions his wingman was also shot down - but only one of these three planes is listed as destroyed.

Another point is that JG2 and JG26 were not alone: there were always at least two other gruppen present, as well as second-line units such as Jagdfliegerschule 5, which also took part in combat. This would have added somewhere between 100 and 150 more losses, to give total German losses of 340-390 planes. Given that the RAF attributed 70 of their losses to flak, it's pretty clear that the RAF at least held their own- indeed, given that the RAF were flying approximately twice as many sorties as the Luftwaffe, and would thus suffer a higher proportion of non-combat losses, it's entirely possible that they achieved a better than 1:1 ratio in the air fighting.

I fear all this is yet another attempt to perpetuate the myth of the uber German fighter-pilots.

 

[tomo pauk]

...
Another point is that JG2 and JG26 were not alone: there were always at least two other gruppen present, as well as second-line units such as Jagdfliegerschule 5, which also took part in combat.
...

(my bold)
What are those two gruppen?

I fear all this is yet another attempt to perpetuate the myth of the uber German fighter-pilots.

You will not hear that myth repeated by nuuumannn or Stona.

 

[PAT303]

I'm afraid those figures are nonsense. They are comparing total RAF losses to all causes - including flak and non-combat losses

As an example, Polish 306 Squadron on a rhubarb over France in August 1942 and lost Four Spitfires to AA shooting up airfields.

 

[Schweik]

Is that still the case adjusting for overclaiming? That 's not always possible, but in the Western Desert at any rate there certainly seems to be a significant amount of overclaiming going by the MAW series.

Lol! What are you trying to imply there, that there were not British Aces in the Western Desert or just the Tomahawk ones?

 

[stona]

given that the RAF were flying approximately twice as many sorties as the Luftwaffe, and would thus suffer a higher proportion of non-combat losses, it's entirely possible that they achieved a better than 1:1 ratio in the air fighting.
I fear all this is yet another attempt to perpetuate the myth of the uber German fighter-pilots.

Let's stick to facts.

On 13th November 1941, in the face of mounting losses, the Air Staff issued a directive stopping all but 'essential' air operations over NW Europe. There was a pause while a period of regrouping and intensive pilot training was undertaken.

In early 1942 operations resumed (in time for the infamous Channel Dash) and continued for several months. By June Fighter Command had lost another 335 aircraft, mostly Spitfire Vs. On 13th June Sholto-Douglas was instructed once again to curtail operations over NW Europe.

The facts are that twice in the period between November 1941 and June 1942 Fighter Command had unacceptable losses inflicted on it by the Luftwaffe and twice was ordered to curtail operations over NW Europe. This is not conceivable if Fighter Command was doing as well as you seem to think it was. Indeed, it would have destroyed the Luftwaffe fighter forces in NW Europe!

The only way that the Spitfire V could survive over NW Europe was by an alteration in its tactics, principally adopting a much higher cruising speed, which in turn reduced endurance and the range at which Fighter Command could operate. The situation was not ameliorated until the introduction of the Mk IX, whose performance advantage should not need explanation here. Although it is true that it became available in July/August 1942, significant numbers entered service rather later.

I would remind readers that the AFDU at Duxford flew trials between a Spitfire V and Fw 190 in July 1942. The results were alarming. The Fw 190 was superior in every parameter measured, except in turning circles. It was much faster (at all altitudes up to 21,000 feet), climbed and dived faster, accelerated faster, rolled faster and was more manoeuvrable. The AFDU could not come up with a means by which a Spitfire could make a successful attack on an Fw 190 which was aware of the Spitfire's presence. In all scenarios the Fw 190 was able to evade and draw away from the Spitfire, forcing it to break off the attack. It is very difficult to achieve a 1:1 exchange ratio (or better) against an aircraft with such an advantage.
The Spitfire on the other hand was in trouble. A slow Spitfire could evade initially by turning but that was not going to get the pilot home. A fast cruising Spitfire might evade by opening the throttle and going into a shallow dive, "providing the Fw 190 was seen in time". The AFDU reckoned that this gave the Spitfire a "reasonable chance", of running away to fight another day.

 

[RCAFson]

Let's stick to facts.

On 13th November 1941, in the face of mounting losses, the Air Staff issued a directive stopping all but 'essential' air operations over NW Europe. There was a pause while a period of regrouping and intensive pilot training was undertaken.

In early 1942 operations resumed (in time for the infamous Channel Dash) and continued for several months. By June Fighter Command had lost another 335 aircraft, mostly Spitfire Vs. On 13th June Sholto-Douglas was instructed once again to curtail operations over NW Europe.

The facts are that twice in the period between November 1941 and June 1942 Fighter Command had unacceptable losses inflicted on it by the Luftwaffe and twice was ordered to curtail operations over NW Europe. This is not conceivable if Fighter Command was doing as well as you seem to think it was. Indeed, it would have destroyed the Luftwaffe fighter forces in NW Europe!

The only way that the Spitfire V could survive over NW Europe was by an alteration in its tactics, principally adopting a much higher cruising speed, which in turn reduced endurance and the range at which Fighter Command could operate. The situation was not ameliorated until the introduction of the Mk IX, whose performance advantage should not need explanation here. Although it is true that it became available in July/August 1942, significant numbers entered service rather later.

I would remind readers that the AFDU at Duxford flew trials between a Spitfire V and Fw 190 in July 1942. The results were alarming. The Fw 190 was superior in every parameter measured, except in turning circles. It was much faster (at all altitudes up to 21,000 feet), climbed and dived faster, accelerated faster, rolled faster and was more manoeuvrable. The AFDU could not come up with a means by which a Spitfire could make a successful attack on an Fw 190 which was aware of the Spitfire's presence. In all scenarios the Fw 190 was able to evade and draw away from the Spitfire, forcing it to break off the attack. It is very difficult to achieve a 1:1 exchange ratio (or better) against an aircraft with such an advantage.
The Spitfire on the other hand was in trouble. A slow Spitfire could evade initially by turning but that was not going to get the pilot home. A fast cruising Spitfire might evade by opening the throttle and going into a shallow dive, "providing the Fw 190 was seen in time". The AFDU reckoned that this gave the Spitfire a "reasonable chance", of running away to fight another day.

IIRC, this was the impetous to upgrade the single stage Merlins to 16lb boost and to clip the wings on some Mk Vs. A clipped wing Mk V with 16lb boost is well matched to the 190 below 20k ft.

 

[Schweik]

How soon were the LF Spitfire Mk Vs in the field?

 

[stona]

IIRC, this was the impetous to upgrade the single stage Merlins to 16lb boost and to clip the wings on some Mk Vs. A clipped wing Mk V with 16lb boost is a well matched to the 190 below 20k ft.

The shortened wing tips did very little for speed The AFDU ran trials with two Mk Vs, swopping the shortened tips between them, and reckoned that at 10,000 feet the clipped version was 5 mph faster, but that at other altitudes the difference was insignificant. 5 mph does not help much with an opponent that is at least 30 mph faster at that altitude. Boscombe Down ran rather more scientific trials and measured the clipped version at just 1 mph faster at 17,000 feet. At 19,600 the two had the same speed and at 25,000 feet the standard version was 4 mph faster.

Rate of climb was somewhat reduced. In zoom climbs from 20,000 feet to 25,000 feet, a useful combat manoeuvre, the standard aircraft was 15 seconds faster, from 10,000 feet to 15,000 feet there was no measurable difference.

The minimum turning circle of the clipped Spitfire at 20,000 feet was 55 feet bigger than standard at 1,025 feet, but this was still well inside the RAE figure for the Fw 190 of 1,450 feet.

So what was the point?

The clipped Spitfire accelerated and dived better than the standard version, an important combat advantage. Crucially it rolled faster. The AFDU report described the response to ailerons as 'very quick and very crisp'. This would certainly be another advantage in combat. In mock dogfights at 10,000 feet and 15,000 feet, the standard Spitfire starting on the tail of the clipped version, the clipped Spitfire was able to evade so quickly in the rolling plane that it was able to lose the standard aircraft and reversed the position in 20 seconds. Only at 25,000 feet was the standard aircraft able to keep the clipped version in sight.

A clipped Spitfire V might not have a much better chance of shooting down a Fw 190, but it certainly had a better chance of getting away.

 

[Schweik]

The clipped wing spit rolled much faster (look at the roll rate chart that is always going around in here) which did make a big difference in terms of overall maneuverability - reducing one of the big advantages of the FW. The +16 boost improved speed I think more than the wings (I don't know exactly how much but I'm sure someone here does). Also with less drag, the CW Spit would have a better overall combat speed particularly down low. Each maneuver that would normally imposed a drag penalty imposed a little less of it.

In other words, normal wing Spit V might have a top speed of ~350 mph at 10,000 ft and clipped wing only 355, but after a few maneuvers normal wing Spit is down to 270 whereas CW is still at 300. Then add an extra +7 lbs boost.

 

[RCAFson]

The shortened wing tips did very little for speed The AFDU ran trials with two Mk Vs, swopping the shortened tips between them, and reckoned that at 10,000 feet the clipped version was 5 mph faster, but that at other altitudes the difference was insignificant. 5 mph does not help much with an opponent that is at least 30 mph faster at that altitude. Boscombe Down ran rather more scientific trials and measured the clipped version at just 1 mph faster at 17,000 feet. At 19,600 the two had the same speed and at 25,000 feet the standard version was 4 mph faster.

.

However, at the latter above altitudes, 16lb boost was ineffective. At 10k ft it would give the CW Spit at least parity with an FW190 and theoretically at 10k ft the CW Spitfire would gain more speed from 16lb boost than the standard wing version.

 

[Dan Fahey]

The various sources don't necessarily agree on the number of 'shoot downs' when it comes to the USAAF USAAF fighter victories

Understand... Dan Ford sure did not agree on CBI Shoot Downs of the Flying Tigers !

 

[nuuumannn]

I fear all this is yet another attempt to perpetuate the myth of the uber German fighter-pilots.

Sholto Douglas, Hooton, Ernest Hives of Rolls-Royce and countless others who recognised that the Spitfire V was not
up to dueling it out with the Bf 109F and Fw 190 must have thought so too, then.

 

[Stig1207]

Lol! What are you trying to imply there, that there were not British Aces in the Western Desert or just the Tomahawk ones?

No, but I am applying a bit of logic. How many Tomahawk victories were there in the Western Desert? As I understand it's only a couple of hunderd, 250 maybe? That is before factoring for overclaiming. That is going to temper how successful they actually were.