I am not even sure that explains the disparity in numbers in the CBI; but it certainly does not explain the dispaity in the other theatres.
Japanese Zero vs Spitfire vs FW 190
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I am not even sure that explains the disparity in numbers in the CBI; but it certainly does not explain the dispaity in the other theatres.
The Luftwaffe used the same tactics over France that Mallory and Park used in the BoB, that is they ignored fighter sweeps and attacked only when they had the advantage, the ''leaning on the enemy'' idea was a waste of pilots and planes but Sholto Douglas's ego wanted it's day in the sun after getting rid of the former two. If you read Johnnie Johnson's works he talks about crossing the coast at wave top height before climbing at max boost to counter the ground controllers positioning their planes to gain an advantage, and that was when he was flying MkIX's. As per JG 26's autobiography, in 1941-42 the ''Abbeville Kids'' were at the height of their power, it wouldn't have mattered what planes the RAF had, it still would have been a tough slog.
I think the issues in the Channel / Northern France we mainly due to tactics, and secondarily to configuration and teething issues with the Spit V. I don't think the Spit V was inferior to the Bf 109F at all. They had different strengths and weaknesses but in the MTO / Shores they appear to be about even. Getting there did require an adjustment of Tactics and some modification of the aircraft by the British. MTO is a different Theater of course as both Spitfire and Bf 109 suffered to some extent in performance due to Tropical modifications, which in the case of the former were dramatically improved.
The biggest issue over France though I suspect was the integrated air defense. This was a very tough nut to crack and something the RAF had to adapt to.
The biggest issue over France though I suspect was the integrated air defense. This was a very tough nut to crack and something the RAF had to adapt to.
Well there weren't that many Tomahawks. But I think this deserves a deeper dive which I may now have time to get into.
How well did Spitfires do against the Bf 109 F over Malta?
120 British/Commonwealth fighter pilots lost their lives over Malta in the Spitfire year (January to November 1942), obviously not just at the hands of the Bf 109 F.
55 Luftwaffe day and night fighter pilots were killed in the same period, flying from Sicily, against Malta and the convoys.
During the October Blitz (11th to 17th) 43 Spitfires were shot down or crash landed, more than double the number of Axis fighters, of which just 12 were Bf 109s.
This time the integrated air defence system was British.
120 British/Commonwealth fighter pilots lost their lives over Malta in the Spitfire year (January to November 1942), obviously not just at the hands of the Bf 109 F.
55 Luftwaffe day and night fighter pilots were killed in the same period, flying from Sicily, against Malta and the convoys.
During the October Blitz (11th to 17th) 43 Spitfires were shot down or crash landed, more than double the number of Axis fighters, of which just 12 were Bf 109s.
This time the integrated air defence system was British.
How many Luftwaffe and RAI aircrew were lost in the same period.
How many Spits were downed by Luftwaffe bomber defensive fire and how many were downed by RAI aircraft?
During that Blitz the defenders shot down 32 Ju 88s, 5 MC 202s and 1 Re 2001 and the 12 Bf 109s already mentioned in exchange for 43 Spitfires (another 39 were damaged). Fortunately for the defenders only 12 Spitfire pilots were killed, 7 were wounded and 24 unhurt.
I carefully read his book. Compared it to earlier versions.
Chennault's number one problem was logistics, getting equipment, stuff, food, decent shelter.
Before the Japanese attacked the Philippines even General MacArthur helped by sending three Seaplanes of parts.
Discovered this during research on the CBI 10 years ago. This still took 3 months to get to Burma.
Between practicing and sorties the Flying Tigers never had the supplies or bullets to wreck 600 Japanese planes in 6 months.
They distributed supplies to dozens of underground and safe locations which was smart.
But took a while to haul them back to the bases.
Even their first battle in December 20th 1941 confirmed 3 bombers downed.
Do not think he had more than 20 Flyable P-40's at any one time.
When over run by the Japanese and lost 20 that were being serviced at a CAMCO factory.
What made the P 40 versatile was it had enough fuel to reach combat altitude, stay and fight and enough places to land, RTB.
Chennault Radio Network Systems allowed the P-40 to get to perch altitude and cruising speed.
Dan Ford calculated about 100 to 120 planes destroyed or shot down.
Which was more realistic and a heck of a lot better than the British.
Don't forget there were quite a few Italian casualties as well.
That's actually a pretty good ratio - 50 aircraft vs 43, which is about even, but multi-engine aircraft have more value generally speaking in this kind of exhange, they cost more in both kit (especially engines) and most importantly crew. RAF lost 12 Spitfire pilots, the Axis probably lost up to 146 crew based on the numbers above, mostly from the Ju 88s.
The job of the Spits in this case was to get the bombers, which they did. 32 Ju 88s in that short of a period is too high of a price for the LW. Presumably some of the crew made it back to base one way or another so maybe not 146 lost, but almost certainly close to ten times as many as the British lost.
I would love to see a chart, if someone could provide it, showing a breakdown of speed and climb at three altitudes (sea level, 10,000 ft, 25,000 ft) for the following:
Spit Va - 9 lbs boost
Spit Vb - 9 lbs boost
Spit Vb - 12 lbs boost
Spit Vb - 16 lbs boost
Spit VC / 4 - 9 lbs boost
Spit VC / 2 - 9 lbs boost
Spit VC / 4 - 12 lbs boost
Spit VC / 2 - 12 lbs boost
Spit VC / 2 LF - 12 lbs boost
Spit VC / 2 - 16 lbs boost
Spit VC / 2 LF - 16 lbs boost
Spit Va - 9 lbs boost
Spit Vb - 9 lbs boost
Spit Vb - 12 lbs boost
Spit Vb - 16 lbs boost
Spit VC / 4 - 9 lbs boost
Spit VC / 2 - 9 lbs boost
Spit VC / 4 - 12 lbs boost
Spit VC / 2 - 12 lbs boost
Spit VC / 2 LF - 12 lbs boost
Spit VC / 2 - 16 lbs boost
Spit VC / 2 LF - 16 lbs boost
Ok Stig1207, so lets talk about this disparity in numbers, as it pertains to Aces.
We have previously discussed this famous engagement on Nov 22, 1941 in the Western Desert, between two RAF squadrons flying Tomahawks (112 RAF and 3 RAAF) and 3 squadrons plus one Stab of the famous JG 27 (1., 4., and 5./JG 27 plus Stab II./JG 27).
These engagements involved at least three British / Commonwealth Tomahawk Aces making claims that day: Alan Rawlinson (8 victories with P-40s) and Bobby Gibbes of 3 RAAF (10 victories with P-40s), and Neville Duke of 112 RAF (8 Victories in P-40s).
There were also at least three German Aces: Wolfgang Lippert and Wolfgang Redlich, and Otto Shulz. All the German piots were flying Bf 109F-4 (Trop).
This is covered in quite a bit of detail (including some extended pilot commentary) in Shores MAW Vol I, pgs 323-333.
- As the DAF deployed to support the army during heavy ground fighting, there were two sets of engagements on that day, which cost 3 RAAF particularly dearly, but also impacted JG.27 enough so as to cause a policy change (according to Shores).
- First in the morning, 3 RAAF went out on a bomber escort mission, escorting Blenheims. They were attacked by JG 27 and in the subsequent engagement, three Tomahawks were lost to fighters, and four Blenheims were shot down. The Aussies in turn claimed two Bf 109s which were confirmed by German records. 112 RAF also went out on a strafing mission losing one to ground fire. LW pilots accurately claimed 3 Tomahawks.
- Then in the afternoon 3 RAAF went out again on a fighter sweep over the Luftwaffe bases. The LW decided to make a concerted effort to wipe out these DAF fighters who were 150 miles from their own base. They were attacked by elements of JG. 27 in what turned into an epic hour long engagement which went on until sunset. No less than three LW squadrons 1., 4., 5./JG 27, plus Stab II./ JG 27 all joined the fight. The RAF were assisted by 112 Sqn RAF which also jumped into the fray. So it was 2 DAF Tomahawk squadrons against 3 LW Bf 109F-4 squadrons plus a headquarters flight.
During this fight, RAF pilots claimed 2 confirmed victories and several probables and damaged. The LW pilots claimed 12 (on top of their 3 from earlier). Actual losses were 7 Tomahawks and 4 Bf 109F-4s, plus Bobby Gibbes fighter was seriously damaged though he was able to land it back at base. The DAF fared worse in terms of casualties - the Aussies lost at least 4 pilots KIA plus two PoW. The Germans lost two as PoW and two wounded, one of whom died in a hospital the next day.
So total claims / losses for the day was:
- 4 claims by the British, vs. 6 actual Bf 109s shot down. Two in the morning and four in the afternoon. Of these German losses Shores links three of them to British Aces, one by Neville Duke and two by Alan Rawlinson.
- 15 claims by the LW, vs. 10 actual Tomahawks shot down. Three in the morning and seven in the afternoon.
- Apparently one of the losses on both sides was due to a mid-air collision.
Now I'm not trying to suggest this as a general rule. This is just one example of a significant combat which we have discussed before. Shores says it caused the LW to change policy so as to avoid close sustained engagements with P-40s. Overlaiming of course happened on all sides. DAF pilots certainly overclaimed, so did the LW and RIA pilots. I don't think the Allies did so more necessarily than the Axis. What we can see here is that on this day the British underclaimed and the LW overclaimed. Furthermore at least three British Aces made a total of 4 claims (1 by Duke and Gibbes, 2 by Rawlinson) which appear to be valid or at least highly plausible. So I would say this is evidence (not proof but evidence) that your suggestion that British Tomahawk Aces (or British Aces flying any other aircraft) in the Western Desert weren't actually Aces is basically groundless.
The Wiki on Alan Rawlinson has a description of the battle:
On 22 November 1941, during Operation Crusader, Rawlinson led No. 3 Squadron on a bomber escort mission near Bir el Gubi in the morning, and a fighter sweep south-east of El Adem in the afternoon.[43][44] German Messerschmitt Bf 109 fighters shot down three Tomahawks for the loss of two of their own in the first action, Rawlinson claiming a 109 damaged. In the second action, a drawn-out battle for air superiority, the squadron lost six Tomahawks against two 109s destroyed, one of which was claimed by Rawlinson along with one probable and one damaged.[18][43] He had also taken a shot at a distant 109 and, believing he had missed it, did not claim. After the war it was established that Rawlinson's bullets had damaged the 109 and wounded its pilot, Ernst Düllberg, who made a forced landing back at base.[18][44] Rawlinson was credited with his final victory on 30 November, when he downed an Italian Macchi C.200 in an engagement that saw No. 3 Squadron's tally of claims rise to 106 aircraft destroyed.[45][46]
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There were also two comments in the book about the Germans being surprised at being hit from unusually long range, including in the incident with Rawlinson above.
I also wanted to point out - at this point the DAF tactics were not very good:
They were not flying in pairs but in Vics of three with various experimental formations like 'fluid pairs'.
They were operating at low altitude (usually below 10,000 ft) and flying in combat areas at low speed.
They hadn't established the policies they later used for turning into attacks from above as a group
They had not yet established gunnery training, and they probably weren't doing any overboosting.
All of this would change later when the DAF came under new management in mid 1942.
I also wanted to point out - at this point the DAF tactics were not very good:
They were not flying in pairs but in Vics of three with various experimental formations like 'fluid pairs'.
They were operating at low altitude (usually below 10,000 ft) and flying in combat areas at low speed.
They hadn't established the policies they later used for turning into attacks from above as a group
They had not yet established gunnery training, and they probably weren't doing any overboosting.
All of this would change later when the DAF came under new management in mid 1942.
Glider
Captain
Can I ask where these figures came from? I ask as I have Malta the Spitfire Years and am having difficulty matching these up.
In the vast majority of the actions the Spits were outnumbered and were often bounced by the Attackers.
On the 12th October the RAF seem to have lost:-
7 x Spits destroyed and 6 damaged with three pilots killed
The attackers
4 x Me109G-2 destroyed
11 x Ju88 destroyed
3 x MC202 damaged (the damaged Luftwaffe aircraft are not listed)
Plus at night an He111 and a Z1007bis were shot down by nightfighters.
All in all I would say that the Spit V did well as no one would deny that a Spit V is outclassed by a 109G-2.
To give some idea of the odds in total over five raids the approx number of aircraft sorties involved are:-
Raid 1
Ju88 15
Axis fighters 25
Spits 22
Raid 2
Ju88 7
MC202 12
Spit x 8
Me109 unknown (indirect escort)
Spit 9
Raid 3
Ju88 8
MC202 10
Me109 20
Spit 21
Raid 4
MC202 23
Me109 8
Re2001 13
Spit 23
Raid 5
Ju88 5
Escort approx. 50 fighter
Spits 16
13th October
Raid 1
Ju88 x 7
Me109 x 30
Spits x 26
Raid 2
Ju88 x 6
MC202 x 28
Me109 x 36
Spit x 16
Raid 3
Ju88 x 6
Me109 x 40
Spit x 24
Raid 4
Ju88 x 7
MC202 x 30
Me109 x 42
Spit x 24
RAAF Spitfire VC Trop and VC Temperate@ 16lb boost and 9lb boost (FTH) (~20k ft) with Merlin 46:
I'd suggest to read Malta Spitfire Pilot, 10 weeks of terror for a good explanation of what really happened, and Malta didn't have an integrated air defence system
I don't think that the over claiming was any higher than anywhere else. in the war. Here are the figures from Hurricanes Over the Sands, vol 1.
30 sqd 26 claims 15-20 verified post war 60-80%
33 Sqd 213 claims 60% verified
73 Sqd 117 claims 65-75% verified
80 Sqd 195 claims 50% verified
Over all average is above 50% which is not too bad.
That was basically my takeaway from reading anecdotes from non-top-ace / sergeant types. These operations seemed to be a continual series of:
- fly in a nice, tight, slow, formation over France
- stare at the sun for an hour trying to find the enemy
- half dozen pilots yelling break as several Spitfires fall away streaming glycol/smoke/flames
- scramble back to England in ones, twos and threes
Try 'Malta:The Spitfire Year 1942' by Shores, Cull and Malizia. That has a day by day account of exactly what happened. It gives a better overall view of 1942 than the memories and opinions of a pilot. I presume this is the Denis Barnham story? If you enjoyed it try and get hold of 'One Man's Window' which was written close to the events. Barnham was quite an artist, I believe one of his works is still in the IWM in London. After the war he was Art Master at Epsom College, Surrey, from 1949 to 1972.
The radar on Malta, initially just four stations, were the first to be used anywhere outside the UK. The British had an experimental installation on the island before the war.
The problem on Malta, prior to Park's arrival, was the way the system was used. It was used defensively, the sector controller sent squadrons into the air and then maintained a running commentary (rather like the late war German system). It was left to formation leaders to decide where to patrol and when to attempt an interception. On 25th July Park issued his 'Fighter Interception Plan'. The fighters would now adopt a far more aggressive, forward defensive posture, reminiscent of 11 Group in the BoB. The object now was to intercept raids north of Malta, BEFORE they crossed the coast. The sector controllers were instructed to make sure that the first squadron launched gained height up-sun and then intercepted the enemy's high fighter cover. The second squadron was to intercept the bombers' close escort, or the bombers themselves if unescorted. The third squadron was to make a head on attack on the bombers about ten miles north of the coast, followed by a quarter attack, to force them to jettison their bombs into the sea. If a fourth squadron was available, it would engage any bombers that broke through the forward fighter screen.
The plan depended on reliable radar warning, competent sector controllers and alert pilots. Take-off were to be much quicker than in the past, control had to be accurate and clear. Squadrons were to obey orders immediately. Wireless discipline was to be strict.
This strategy was only possible with the integrated system that existed on Malta.
It worked. After two weeks only four aircraft had been damaged or destroyed on the ground, compared to thirty four in the first two weeks of July. Luftwaffe raids had been roughly handled, most had been intercepted north of the island, and it had resorted to making high altitude fighter sweeps in an attempt to regain air superiority.
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See p648 and on, Chapter 11 'Aftermath' and various appendices.
