Japanese Zero vs Spitfire vs FW 190

[FLYBOYJ]

Overlooked this - with regards to cockpit heating issues in the Pacific...

"The P-38 was used most extensively and successfully in the Pacific theater, where it proved more suited, combining exceptional range with the reliability of two engines for long missions over water. The P-38 was used in a variety of roles, especially escorting bombers at altitudes of 18,000–25,000 ft (5,500–7,600 m). The P-38 was credited with destroying more Japanese aircraft than any other USAAF fighter.[4]​ Freezing cockpit temperatures were not a problem at low altitude in the tropics. In fact, the cockpit was often too hot since opening a window while in flight caused buffeting by setting up turbulence through the tailplane. Pilots taking low-altitude assignments often flew stripped down to shorts, tennis shoes, and parachute"

 

[Schweik]

Read my post AGAIN (1415)

From your post;

I'm not sure if this was clear, so I'll point this out carefully - the italicized part of my post was from the publishers blurb for the Clarinbould book, South Pacific Air War Volume 5, which is coming out this February. I.e. those are their words, not mine, though they are saying pretty much what i was saying. I would say it sounds like the Japanese air forces in the NG and Solomons region were, to use their words, 'experiencing a crisis' already in Sept to Nov of 1942. This crisis was already starting in other words, before significant numbers of P-38s were deployed.

As for the rest of it, you seem to take this as an attack on or dismissal of the P-38. We have a difference in emphasis, but I am not making such a sweeping argument. I said before - the P-38 was an important type in the region, it was a better fighter than any others in the region when it first appeared in battle, and certainly did have an impact on the enemy. I'm pointing out a nuance. But to reiterate I have stated that though I do think the P-38 was still experiencing some issues in the South Pacific just as it was everywhere else, it was clearly very successful in this Theater. Just having slightly less effusive praise of the aircraft and it's role is not the same as denigrating it. So please don't characterize me as some kind of P-38 detractor.

You have made some definitive factual statements about victory to loss ratios before and after introduction of the P-38. I don't yet have enough data to answer this decisively - part of that will come from Clarinbould's book coming out in February, part perhaps can be found in a couple of other books I should have sooner. Right now, I have several unit histories from the region but they are all the older type which doesn't include the cross-referencing of day by day losses on both sides, (although I do have some histories of Japanese forces and could do some cross referencing of my own if I had the time).

From what I have in my library, I think your claim that P-40 units like 7th and 8th FS of the 49th FG were still achieving a 1-1 victory to loss ratio in the third and fourth quarter of 1942 is incorrect. However, I don't have enough data yet to be certain. I should have more data soon. So I suggest suspending this part of the argument until we can shed more light on it.

As for the subjective side of this (i.e. that P-38 was the decisive factor in the South Pacific air battle, or that the 'tipping point' was in the middle of 1943 vs. the end of 1942), we can probably debate that forever, which could be fun, but won't necessarily get anywhere. I suspect this too will be greatly assisted by having some more data.

P-38s began major operations staring in late 1942/ early 1943

You claim there were still issues with the P-38 at this time - tell us what they are, if they hampered operations and what the attrition rates were!

It's a documented fact that there were still issues with the P-38 at this time, they didn't disappear when they appeared over the Pacific Ocean. As for attrition rates, I don't have that data. Why don't you post them if you have them.

This is the reason why Yamamoto launched I-GO

The Pacific War Online Encyclopedia: I-Go

pwencycl.kgbudge.com

"The exaggerated claims of success prompted Yamamoto to visit the forward air bases to personally congratulate the air crew. However, Yamamoto's itinerary was broadcast in a code the Allies were able to penetrate, and his aircraft was intercepted and shot down on 18 April 1943. None of the passengers and crew of Yamamoto's aircraft survived. (Shot down by the only aircraft in theater that was able to pull off this type of mission, the P-38)

The "Big Raid". Another series of raids began on 7 June 1943. On that day and on 12 June, Japanese aircraft raided Guadalcanal but again failed to achieve decisive results. On 16 June came a much larger raid by over 100 aircraft. Two Allied ships were forced to beach and six Allied fighters were shot down, but the Allies claimed 98 Japanese aircraft destroyed, and the Japanese admitted the loss of about 30 aircraft."

So to go full circle here - I cannot fathom anyone saying that the presence of the P-38 did not make an impact in the SWP. There were other aircraft that performed well but it was the P-38 that brought the fight to the enemy.

No doubt P-38 brought new capabilities to the region (especially for offensive operations), certainly no other US aircraft could have killed Yamamoto, and by June 1943 the P-38 was playing a crucial role - again, especially in offensive strikes. But that doesn't change my argument. I was never claiming they didn't, especially by that time period. I was saying that June 1943 was arguably past the tipping point, though clearly heavy fighting was still going on.

 

[Schweik]

Overlooked this - with regards to cockpit heating issues in the Pacific...

"The P-38 was used most extensively and successfully in the Pacific theater, where it proved more suited, combining exceptional range with the reliability of two engines for long missions over water. The P-38 was used in a variety of roles, especially escorting bombers at altitudes of 18,000–25,000 ft (5,500–7,600 m). The P-38 was credited with destroying more Japanese aircraft than any other USAAF fighter.[4]​ Freezing cockpit temperatures were not a problem at low altitude in the tropics. In fact, the cockpit was often too hot since opening a window while in flight caused buffeting by setting up turbulence through the tailplane. Pilots taking low-altitude assignments often flew stripped down to shorts, tennis shoes, and parachute"

Freezing temps were not a problem at low altitude, agreed.

However, they did routinely fly missions at 25,000 ft (and higher)

I guarantee no P-38 pilot was wearing shorts, tennis shoes and a parachute when flying at 25,000'

 

[FLYBOYJ]

I'm not sure if this was clear, so I'll point this out carefully - the italicized part of my post was from the publishers blurb for the Clarinbould book, South Pacific Air War Volume 5, which is coming out this February. I.e. those are their words, not mine, though they are saying pretty much what i was saying. I would say it sounds like the Japanese air forces in the NG and Solomons region were, to use their words, 'experiencing a crisis' already in Sept to Nov of 1942. This crisis was already starting in other words, before significant numbers of P-38s were deployed.

All good...

As for the rest of it, you seem to take this as an attack on or dismissal of the P-38. We have a difference in emphasis, but I am not making such a sweeping argument. I said before - the P-38 was an important type in the region, it was a better fighter than any others in the region when it first appeared in battle, and certainly did have an impact on the enemy.

And that's been my point from the get go. Although short in numbers it was the most important AAF fighter in the PTO until the P-51 came on board.

It's a documented fact that there were still issues with the P-38 at this time, they didn't disappear when they appeared over the Pacific Ocean. As for attrition rates, I don't have that data. Why don't you post them if you have them.

OK - I'll give you one, a big one off the top of my head. April 18, 1943. 18 aircraft were assigned - 2 aborted. Mission completed, Yamamoto dead. I'll have to sift through some web sites but off the top of my head in the PTO you were looking at about 5% abort rate during this period but I'll have to double check that number

No doubt P-38 brought new capabilities to the region (especially for offensive operations), certainly no other US aircraft could have killed Yamamoto, and by June 1943 the P-38 was playing a crucial role - again, especially in offensive strikes. But that doesn't change my argument. I was never claiming they didn't, especially by that time period. I was saying that June 1943 was arguably past the tipping point, though clearly heavy fighting was still going on.

Your original statement

"The P-38 had the potential to be a game changer but it was not around in enough numbers to really make the difference, and not enough pilots had the skills to deal with all of the challenges of flying it, at least until after that tipping point."

I think it was shown here, even by some of your own posts that this was totally inaccurate!

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Freezing temps were not a problem at low altitude, agreed.

However, they did routinely fly missions at 25,000 ft (and higher)

I guarantee no P-38 pilot was wearing shorts, tennis shoes and a parachute when flying at 25,000'

Agree, but they weren't complaining about being too cold either.

 

[Schweik]

Your original statement

"The P-38 had the potential to be a game changer but it was not around in enough numbers to really make the difference, and not enough pilots had the skills to deal with all of the challenges of flying it, at least until after that tipping point."

I think it was shown here, even by some of your own posts that this was totally inaccurate!

This seems to be a mix of two different points. I'll try to unravel.

1) I was contesting your (apparent) claim that P-38 was the single decisive factor in checking and breaking Japanese Air Power in the South Pacific. I think that was actually largely done using 'lesser' fighter types, mainly the F4F and the P-40, and the various bombers in Theater A-20, B-25, and B-17.
2) This largely hinges on when we believe the 'tipping point' actually was in New Guinea and the Solomons. I put it a few months earlier than you seem to do if I understand you correctly.
3) I think P-38 had the potential to be a game changer in the MTO (and probably NW Europe too), but didn't mainly due to technical issues and training. I don't think it was around in enough numbers in the PTO in 1942.
4) There were enough P-38s to make a serious impact in 1943 and they probably were a game changer, I just think their role is a little bit overstated compared to the other fighter types (including the ones mentioned above plus ANZAC units and Marine F4U units).

 

[Schweik]

Agree, but they weren't complaining about being too cold either.

But are we certain of that?

I grant you, so far in the pilot interviews I read the (Pacific Theater) P-38 drivers seem to love their birds. But of the five I have read so far, they were all P-39 pilots before that! Safe bet you'll appreciate the P-38 after combat in a P-400! I still need to read the full interview with Robert DeHaven.

But seriously, most Allied pilots clearly did appreciate the P-38, including those who weren't flying them. They were like the Spitfire in the BoB, they brought a sense of superiority over the enemy, both figuratively and literally (since the P-38s often flew so high). But I am also reading that they had figured out how to fight successfully in the P-40s and F4Fs, same planes more or less but much more confidence and much higher rates of success by the end of 1942 compared to the beginning or even the middle. I think this corresponded with damage to the enemy.

My eyes were opened to the nuances and problems of even very good aircraft when I read a personal commentary by a Marine Corps F4U Ace talking about his ride. He went through this long litany of major problems they were dealing with on a daily basis with Corsairs. He still liked the aircraft, but basically said it was a pain in the ass and only heroic efforts by the maintenance crews kept them mission-capable.

I read a similar description once by a P-38 pilot operating out of England, talking about all the issues he faced and everything you had to do before combat if you got bounced.

And I've also read descriptions like this about P-39s, P-40s, and even the almost universally beloved Spitfire, particularly in the Darwin situation but also in the MTO.

I don't think all those Lockheed reps would have been around in the Pacific region if they weren't having some problems.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

This seems to be a mix of two different points. I'll try to unravel.

1) I was contesting your (apparent) claim that P-38 was the single decisive factor in checking and breaking Japanese Air Power in the South Pacific.

I never said that - but with regards to AAF operations it was the aircraft pushed aerial superiority over the SWP

I think that was actually largely done using 'lesser' fighter types, mainly the F4F and the P-40, and the various bombers in Theater A-20, B-25, and B-17.

Not completely true - as shown in previous posts the P-40 and F4F were range limited. Once fighters with legs (The P-38 and the F4U) entered the scene then longer operations were possible (I'm excluding carrier ops)

2) This largely hinges on when we believe the 'tipping point' actually was in New Guinea and the Solomons. I put it a few months earlier than you seem to do if I understand you correctly.

Ok

3) I think P-38 had the potential to be a game changer in the MTO (and probably NW Europe too), but didn't mainly due to technical issues and training. I don't think it was around in enough numbers in the PTO in 1942.

I can agree with your first statement about numbers and training. MTO technical issues seem to be less reported then in the ETO. Also remember that Kenney was denied P-38s for a while because they went to the Med, that's why he got P-47s

4) There were enough P-38s to make a serious impact in 1943 and they probably were a game changer, I just think their role is a little bit overstated compared to the other fighter types (including the ones mentioned above plus ANZAC units and Marine F4U units).

And that's your opinion. I hold the F4U in the same light when land based units started to replace Wildcats in the theater. We weren't going to win the war with Wildcats, P-40s and P-39s, sustain maybe, but to really go on the offensive better equipment was necessary, that when the P-38 enters (as well as the F4U for the Marines). The ANZAC units did well in a tactical role but even their units eventually received better equipment.

 

[GrauGeist]

Freezing temps were not a problem at low altitude, agreed.

However, they did routinely fly missions at 25,000 ft (and higher)

I guarantee no P-38 pilot was wearing shorts, tennis shoes and a parachute when flying at 25,000'

Eagledad's post Japanese Zero vs Spitfire vs FW 190
covers that.

In SoCal, we often flew from Orange County airport (SNA) out to the desert and back for the day.
The barrier between the Inland Empire and the high desert were the San Gabriel and San Bernardino mountains that had peaks in the neighborhood of 10,000-12,000 feet ASL, which saw us averaging well above that.
At no point were we "freezing", especially with the Ercoupe's canopy partially slid back to keep us cool.

There is a huge difference in upper air temps depending on geographic location and time of year.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

But are we certain of that?

Yes - there are no published reports or documented stories of PTO pilots complaining about cockpit heat in the PTO, at least that I have come across in my 40 years+ studying this stuff

I grant you, so far in the pilot interviews I read the (Pacific Theater) P-38 drivers seem to love their birds. But of the five I have read so far, they were all P-39 pilots before that! Safe bet you'll appreciate the P-38 after combat in a P-400! I still need to read the full interview with Robert DeHaven.

But seriously, most Allied pilots clearly did appreciate the P-38, including those who weren't flying them. They were like the Spitfire in the BoB, they brought a sense of superiority over the enemy, both figuratively and literally (since the P-38s often flew so high). But I am also reading that they had figured out how to fight successfully in the P-40s and F4Fs, same planes more or less but much more confidence and much higher rates of success by the end of 1942 compared to the beginning or even the middle. I think this corresponded with damage to the enemy.

My eyes were opened to the nuances and problems of even very good aircraft when I read a personal commentary by a Marine Corps F4U Ace talking about his ride. He went through this long litany of major problems they were dealing with on a daily basis with Corsairs. He still liked the aircraft, but basically said it was a pain in the ass and only heroic efforts by the maintenance crews kept them mission-capable.

I read a similar description once by a P-38 pilot operating out of England, talking about all the issues he faced and everything you had to do before combat if you got bounced.

And I've also read descriptions like this about P-39s, P-40s, and even the almost universally beloved Spitfire, particularly in the Darwin situation but also in the MTO.

OK

I don't think all those Lockheed reps would have been around in the Pacific region if they weren't having some problems.

Correct - and each manufacturer had reps in the field as well taking care of "issues." Now you say the P-38's role is a little bit overstated compared to the other fighter types, I think some of the issues (with the exception of the compressibility issue) were overstated and have been amplified over the years due to the infamous "Col. Rau Memo" bashing the P-38.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

I read a similar description once by a P-38 pilot operating out of England, talking about all the issues he faced and everything you had to do before combat if you got bounced.

And that's another situation that was stretched and mentioned in the Rau memo -

Look at any other twin engine fighter from the period, very similar controls - throttle, mixture, prop - all had fuel transfer valves and a process that needed to be undertaken before going into combat. You trained to expedite that process.

Again - not a problem for PTO pilots - better trained?

I had a former neighbor who flew both P-38s and P-51s in the ETO and he had no issues flying the P-38, he did say it was a cold airplane at altitude but in some cases preferred it over the P-51, especially when attacking ground targets. As one would expect he said the P-51 was more maneuverable and faster, the P-38 was a better gun platform.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Eagledad's post Japanese Zero vs Spitfire vs FW 190
covers that.

In SoCal, we often flew from Orange County airport (SNA) out to the desert and back for the day.
The barrier between the Inland Empire and the high desert were the San Gabriel and San Bernardino mountains that had peaks in the neighborhood of 10,000-12,000 feet ASL, which saw us averaging well above that.
At no point were we "freezing", especially with the Ercoupe's canopy partially slid back to keep us cool.

There is a huge difference in upper air temps depending on geographic location and time of year.

When I lived in SoCal, I flew out of Mojave - many days in shorts and a T shirt and flew up to 12K. Felt refreshing when the temperature on the ground was 95F

 

[Schweik]

12k feet isn't 25k feet.

Pilots flying out of Algiers and Tunisia were experiencing issues with cockpit heaters along with everything else.

We may have to agree to disagree - on balance, in the PTO, I concede that the P-38 was clearly successful. But I don't think the issues like electrical generators, compressibility, maneuverability, yes heaters, engines / turbos and so on were negligible and I do think they were factors, but it was not enough of a factor to prevent them doing their mission nor was it enough to make a P-38 look like a bad option especially after flying missions in a P-39. Speed, altitude and an extra engine meant a much greater safety margin.

For the rest, I think we need more actual data. We can go round and round forever, it's just a slight difference in emphasis really, which is getting widened into a bigger dispute for some reason, but I don't think we are going to get anywhere like this.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

12k feet isn't 25k feet.

No it isn't and on those days it would have been 25F at 20K

Pilots flying out of Algiers and Tunisia were experiencing issues with cockpit heaters along with everything else.

Do you have any examples of this?

We may have to agree to disagree - on balance, in the PTO, I concede that the P-38 was clearly successful. But I don't think the issues like electrical generators, compressibility, maneuverability, yes heaters, engines / turbos and so on were negligible and I do think they were factors, but it was not enough of a factor to prevent them doing their mission nor was it enough to make a P-38 look like a bad option especially after flying missions in a P-39. Speed, altitude and an extra engine meant a much greater safety margin.

The electrical generator is a non issue. One was installed on early models per the original AAF contract. Of course it became an issue if your lost that engine. Corrected on later aircraft.

For the rest, I think we need more actual data. We can go round and round forever, it's just a slight difference in emphasis really, which is getting widened into a bigger dispute for some reason, but I don't think we are going to get anywhere like this.

Agree...

 

[Schweik]

No it isn't and on those days it would have been 25F at 20K

Do you have any examples of this?

yes but it would take me a while to run it down.

The electrical generator is a non issue. One was installed on early models per the original AAF contract. Of course it became an issue if your lost that engine. Corrected on later aircraft.

I guess this is partly subjective, but it does not sound like a non-issue to me.

Agree...

Will revisit all this when we do have a little more data, hopefully shortly after Halloween I'll have something further to contribute.

 

[GregP]

Hi Schweik,

When it first got to Europe, the P-38 had 5 main issues.

1) No pilot training. The new P-38 pilots were going into battle areas with cruise settings and it can take some time to turn on the gunsight, reduce MAP, increase rpm, increase MAP and fight. Many were shot down while doing these tasks. This took a bit of time to correct, but not really that much. Being shot down for this sort of eliminates the issue for next time.
2) The Allison intake was smooth inside and they needed to install turbulators inside the minifolds. This was done before the planes got to the Pacific.
3) The first P-38s were jetted to US fuels and they were running UK fuels. There was and is nothing wrong with the fuels used, but they were different from one another. This was corrected within 7 - 8 months and was NOT an issue in the Pacific.
4) The P-38 had a bad cockpit heater for Europe. This was not an issue in the Pacific.
5) The limiting Mach number was low. This was never corrected but the dive brakes could limit the severity of the issues. Not really an issue against Japan.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

I guess this is partly subjective, but it does not sound like a non-issue to me.

There were dozens of twin aircraft of that day (and even today) designed with only one generator. From what I understand if the generator was knocked off line all electrical power would be run off the battery until it was discharged. Once battery power was gone, the props would remain in the configured pitch setting and of course you would lose all electrical power. Engines would still run because of magnetos. I think the AAF accepted one generator as a weight saver.

Will revisit all this when we do have a little more data, hopefully shortly after Halloween I'll have something further to contribute.

OK

 

[Greyman]

The only negative thing I ever heard about the Zero with regards to maintenance was that part interchangeability was poor as well as the spare part supply chain, but I think this was common across the board for most Japanese aircraft. I don't have a reference for that but I know it's been mentioned several times

A bit from REPORT ON THE BRITISH NAVAL AIR TRIALS UNIT AT CLARK FIELD

The maintenance problems on the Japanese aircraft were numerous and repair difficult as no two planes of the same type had directly interchangeable parts.

...

Interchangeability is extremely poor.

Cowling panels, fairings, wing and stabilizer tips, access doors, etc., seem to be individually fitted. Even with the correct panels for the aircraft the difficulty in removing and replacing them is often great.

It appears that the jigging tolerances in various factories vary widely -- or even that each panel is made to fit one aircraft only.

 

[Schweik]

Goes a ways to explaining why they had so much maintenance trouble

 

[pbehn]

Cowling panels, fairings, wing and stabilizer tips, access doors, etc., seem to be individually fitted. Even with the correct panels for the aircraft the difficulty in removing and replacing them is often great.

I think early or maybe most Spitfires were like that, but is that a serious problem for a carrier aircraft? Most were lost or completely wrecked on landing.