Japanese Zero vs Spitfire vs FW 190

[Conslaw]

I'm not sure if this was clear, so I'll point this out carefully - the italicized part of my post was from the publishers blurb for the Clarinbould book, South Pacific Air War Volume 5, which is coming out this February. I.e. those are their words, not mine, though they are saying pretty much what i was saying. I would say it sounds like the Japanese air forces in the NG and Solomons region were, to use their words, 'experiencing a crisis' already in Sept to Nov of 1942. This crisis was already starting in other words, before significant numbers of P-38s were deployed.

As for the rest of it, you seem to take this as an attack on or dismissal of the P-38. We have a difference in emphasis, but I am not making such a sweeping argument. I said before - the P-38 was an important type in the region, it was a better fighter than any others in the region when it first appeared in battle, and certainly did have an impact on the enemy. I'm pointing out a nuance. But to reiterate I have stated that though I do think the P-38 was still experiencing some issues in the South Pacific just as it was everywhere else, it was clearly very successful in this Theater. Just having slightly less effusive praise of the aircraft and it's role is not the same as denigrating it. So please don't characterize me as some kind of P-38 detractor.

You have made some definitive factual statements about victory to loss ratios before and after introduction of the P-38. I don't yet have enough data to answer this decisively - part of that will come from Clarinbould's book coming out in February, part perhaps can be found in a couple of other books I should have sooner. Right now, I have several unit histories from the region but they are all the older type which doesn't include the cross-referencing of day by day losses on both sides, (although I do have some histories of Japanese forces and could do some cross referencing of my own if I had the time).

From what I have in my library, I think your claim that P-40 units like 7th and 8th FS of the 49th FG were still achieving a 1-1 victory to loss ratio in the third and fourth quarter of 1942 is incorrect. However, I don't have enough data yet to be certain. I should have more data soon. So I suggest suspending this part of the argument until we can shed more light on it.

As for the subjective side of this (i.e. that P-38 was the decisive factor in the South Pacific air battle, or that the 'tipping point' was in the middle of 1943 vs. the end of 1942), we can probably debate that forever, which could be fun, but won't necessarily get anywhere. I suspect this too will be greatly assisted by having some more data.


It's a documented fact that there were still issues with the P-38 at this time, they didn't disappear when they appeared over the Pacific Ocean. As for attrition rates, I don't have that data. Why don't you post them if you have them.



No doubt P-38 brought new capabilities to the region (especially for offensive operations), certainly no other US aircraft could have killed Yamamoto, and by June 1943 the P-38 was playing a crucial role - again, especially in offensive strikes. But that doesn't change my argument. I was never claiming they didn't, especially by that time period. I was saying that June 1943 was arguably past the tipping point, though clearly heavy fighting was still going on.

When they were just starting to think of the Yamamoto plan, the F4U Corsair was brand new to the theater. There was some discussion of using the F4U. Ultimately, the better choice was made, and the P-38 got the job.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

I think early or maybe most Spitfires were like that, but is that a serious problem for a carrier aircraft? Most were lost or completely wrecked on landing.

This would be a MAJOR problem on any production combat aircraft. Even if wrecked, unless there is fire, you can always find something salvageable.

 

[pbehn]

This would be a MAJOR problem on any production combat aircraft. Even if wrecked, unless there is fire, you can always find something salvageable.

Would it? I have seen lots of planes wrecked on landing or slightly to badly damaged, the engine cowling seems to be the least likely to be damaged and compared to snapped fuselages, collapsed wheels and shattered or bent props just a minor issue, lots were pushed over the side regardless just to get others on the deck.

 

[Shortround6]

2) The Allison intake was smooth inside and they needed to install turbulators inside the minifolds. This was done before the planes got to the Pacific.
3) The first P-38s were jetted to US fuels and they were running UK fuels. There was and is nothing wrong with the fuels used, but they were different from one another. This was corrected within 7 - 8 months and was NOT an issue in the Pacific.

OK, I am confused.

P-38s started showing up in the Pacific in April of 1942. Granted these are a small handful of planes used as recon planes from Australia.
May of 1942 sees a squadron of P-38Es show up in the Aleutian Islands.
June of 1942 sees the first P-38s fly over the Atlantic to England.
August 1942 is a very busy month for the P-38.
Aug 9th the Aleutian P-38s claim two Japanese flying boats.
Aug 22nd sees a few show up at Henderson Field with the 67th fighter squadron.
Aug 28th sees the the US 1st fighter group go operational in England. However it takes until Oct 15th for the P-38s to fly their first B-17 escort mission in Europe. Operations over Europe are stopped while all available P-38s in Europe (or in route) are readied for deployment to North Africa as part of operation Torch.
Oct. 1942 also sees the 339th squadron show up at Henderson Field with P-38s.
Nov of 1942 sees 2 P-38 fighter groups fly from England to North Africa. A 3rd flies down in Dec.
Dec of 1942 also sees the 70thFS and 39th FS go into action in the South Pacific with P-38s although some of these squadrons are operating a mix of aircraft as there were not enough P-38s as most were going to NA.

Now my confusion comes in with the fact that Allison didn't start working on the turbulators until the winter of 1942/43 or the spring of 1943. By the time they had come up with a satisfactory design and gotten it into production it was the late fall of 1943. It took a while for production engines to be installed in planes on the production lines but Allison also made extra manifolds to be shipped overseas to be installed on engines in the field.
To me it sure looks like P-38 planes were showing up in the Pacific around a year before the turbulators showed up?

In late 42 or very early 43 the JOINT specification for 100/130 fuel for both the British and Americans was changed to ALLOW both higher amounts of lead (from 4.0 cc per US gallon to 4.6cc per US gallon) and higher percentages of certain heavy aromatic compounds. Not all batches of fuel from even the same refineries needed to use the maximum allowable amounts of lead and/or these heavier compounds.
ALL engine companies got samples of fuel blended to the new specification so they could look for, identify, and solve any potential in service problems. This is why Allison started working on the turbulators. The radial engines with their shorter intake pipes didn't seem to suffer much. Some engines needed either different spark plugs or to be cruised at slightly different settings or needed bursts of power to clear the plugs with the higher lead fuels.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Would it? I have seen lots of planes wrecked on landing or slightly to badly damaged, the engine cowling seems to be the least likely to be damaged and compared to snapped fuselages, collapsed wheels and shattered or bent props just a minor issue, lots were pushed over the side regardless just to get others on the deck.

When there are time or combat constraints, salvage would be the last thing a maintenance chief would think of, but if time permits there are many components that are worth stripping. Something like a small access door could prevent an aircraft from flying. When I was in the Navy, if we had an aircraft down for something major, we would continually "borrow" components to keep our other birds flying. This is an aviation norm and I'm sure it was the same way during WW2. It would really suck if you try to salvage a fillet or fairing just to discover the fastener pattern don't match up to your aircraft.

 

[GrauGeist]

The IJN suffered considerable losses just in ground accidents - going by memory, the Tinian Air Group's ground incidents amounted to something like 28% of their numbers.
* Any correction to that percentage would be welcome, as I don't have my books handy - but it was a substantial loss rate.

 

[Schweik]

So did the Allied units, if by ground accidents you include landing and takeoff accidents. Easily 50% in the early days.

 

[ThomasP]

During 'normal' pre-war operations, for carrier squadrons the FAA figured a 15%/month attrition rate and the USN figured 20%/month. These were pre-war estimates, but were found to generally apply during war-time as a minimum non-combat loss rate. When operations intensified the attrition rates were higher, and of course you need to add in the losses due to enemy action.

I have not found readily accessible detailed records of individual carrier squadrons losses, but I have read of 40%/month loss rates being common during sustained operations involving combat.

I have not run across any pre-war operational loss estimates for RAF and USAAF squadrons. Does anyone have any info on this subject?

 

[Schweik]

It was much harder to land on a carrier than a landing strip, but the Navy also tended to train their pilots a lot more before they got to the combat area.

Some of the Army pilots in New Guinea and the Solomons went into combat with less than 10-20 hours on type, and for many of them that was their first 10-20 hours flying aircraft with retractable landing gear, high landing speed, 1,000+ hp engines with the associated torque, higher wing loading, 300+ mph speed etc. Same for the Aussie guys in 75 and 76 sqn, although from what I understand the New Zealand pilots had more training before they were thrown into the breach.

 

[ThomasP]

I have read that there was a much higher % of high time pilots in the FAA and USN than in the RAF and USAAF, but not from any authoritative detailed sources.

I wonder how much having solid clear carrier decks (despite the small size) made up for inconsistently solid, pot holed, not flat surface landing strips.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

It was much harder to land on a carrier than a landing strip, but the Navy also tended to train their pilots a lot more before they got to the combat area.

Some of the Army pilots in New Guinea and the Solomons went into combat with less than 10-20 hours on type, and for many of them that was their first 10-20 hours flying aircraft with retractable landing gear, high landing speed, 1,000+ hp engines with the associated torque, higher wing loading, 300+ mph speed etc. Same for the Aussie guys in 75 and 76 sqn, although from what I understand the New Zealand pilots had more training before they were thrown into the breach.

During the cadet program before the US was in the war fighter pilots had about 150 - 200 hours before they got their wings. At the beginning of the war, flight training lasted about nine months, with three months of primary, three months of basic, and three months of advanced training. Each pilot had 65 flying hours of primary training and 75 hours of both basic and advanced training at a minimum. In advanced training they were flying an aircraft with retractable landing gear, getting gunnery training and learning to fly instruments.

Flight Training on the Eve of WWII

During the Depression of the 1930s, the number of pilots the U.S. Army Air Corps trained decreased until in 1937 only 184 graduated from advanced pilot training. Facing resurgent German militarism and

www.nationalmuseum.af.mil

 

[Schweik]

Generally USAAF pilots were pretty well trained, but in the "early war*" (including at least the first half of 1942) they had very little time on type. They mention this explicitly in the history of the 49th FG and of the Australian 75th and 76 FS. Both the 49th and the two Aussie units destroyed half of their P-40s just getting them to the combat area around Darwin, flying in stages from Brisbane. For many of them this was their first time ever flying a P-40. If needed I can quote these passages. 49th FG history also mentions that they had no gunnery training and their guns had not even been boresighted. The P-38 pilot in one of the interviews I think I linked upthread mentioned that he was given his first gunnery practice at Guadalcanal by the Navy, and practiced their system. IIRC he also said he had 14 hours on the P-38 when he got to Guadalcanal.

I don't know what they were using for an advanced trainer prior to the outbreak of the war but many of these guys had problems with the landing gear, they kept forgetting to put the gear down in landings and cracking up the aircraft. It was also the same with the AVG (which was also mostly USAAC, Marine or Navy pilots) and the Australian pilots.

All of this changed pretty quickly though, by fall of 1942 I know the US Army pilots arriving in the Middle East were well trained and were familiar with their aircraft, and had received gunnery training etc. The British Aces commented on this favorably as they themselves hadn't recieved gunnery training prior to combat and had come up with their own field expedient methods in the field (including shooting at aircraft shadows).

* Early part of the American involvement in the War, I know the British were already in it for 2 years.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Generally USAAF pilots were pretty well trained, but in the "early war*" (including at least the first half of 1942) they had very little time on type. They mention this explicitly in the history of the 49th FG and of the Australian 75th and 76 FS. Both the 49th and the two Aussie units destroyed half of their P-40s just getting them to the combat area around Darwin, flying in stages from Brisbane. For many of them this was their first time ever flying a P-40. If needed I can quote these passages. 49th FG history also mentions that they had no gunnery training and their guns had not even been boresighted. The P-38 pilot in one of the interviews I think I linked upthread mentioned that he was given his first gunnery practice at Guadalcanal by the Navy, and practiced their system. IIRC he also said he had 14 hours on the P-38 when he got to Guadalcanal.

I think this was more of the exception than the norm and was quickly rectified. The first pilots to be deployed were already serving prior to Pearl Harbor. There was a rush of green pilots at the start of the war to replace early losses and I do know you had some pilots show up minimum or inadequate training as all as minimum time "in type." Stateside there were thousands of pilots going through flight training that was pretty rigorous and ample for the most part. What I posted was about the norm for most of the war. I've seen others post about training on here with references and hours required before a trainee was cut loose.

I don't know what they were using for an advanced trainer prior to the outbreak of the war but many of these guys had problems with the landing gear, they kept forgetting to put the gear down in landings and cracking up the aircraft. It was also the same with the AVG (which was also mostly USAAC, Marine or Navy pilots) and the Australian pilots.

Even with "quick and ample training", this is bound to happen, even with pilots with 2 to 300 hours. Admittingly I've flown aircraft with retractable landing gear and if it wasn't for a checklist I would had scraped some runway. (GUMPS)

 

[GrauGeist]

So did the Allied units, if by ground accidents you include landing and takeoff accidents. Easily 50% in the early days.

That was the Tinian Air Group I referenced, comprised of mostly veteran pilots and a strength of less than 100 aircraft.

So...

 

[Schweik]

No doubt seeing a few people wreck planes, or wrecking one yourself, assuming you survived helped to burn it into the memory. These first few guys rushing into the breach really had a rough go of it, but yeah I agree, training standards seemed to improve very quickly. For the mechanics too.

 

[Schweik]

That was the Tinian Air Group I referenced, comprised of mostly veteran pilots and a strength of less than 100 aircraft.

So...

Finish your thought, that elipsis could be going in a couple of different directions...

 

[GrauGeist]

Finish your thought, that elipsis could be going in a couple of different directions...

Much like this "pseudo P-39" discussion.

The only thing that hasn't entered into the discussion, is the redistribution of armor and the elimination of the IFF.

 

[Schweik]

Ok so now I'm "pseudo P-39 guy" is it? Lol ok bruh.

I haven't engaged in speculation, I'm not talking about re-arranging parts, changing designs or rewriting history. I've posted actual historical facts here, as I try to do regardless of the nature of the discussion - to help keep a fairly high signal to noise ratio in most of my posts on here.

If we all just stay in the ruts established in the 1960s about everything that happened in the war, we won't really learn anything or have much to discuss, since we are already familiar with all those tropes. If that is where you want to stay, by all means block my posts so you don't get offended.

I think it's pretty exciting that the combat records of both sides are really being examined more closely by a variety of researchers, with new data coming to light every few months now. And I personally think that the new data does merit re-examining some of the old legends, which sometimes deserve a bit more nuance or context, and sometimes need to be overthrown.

Let me throw out another provocative concept. Japanese Air power in the Pacific was largely broken by the US Navy and Marine Corps, and until the end of 1943, that meant the humble F4F Wildcat and the SBD bomber. They bore the brunt of the fighting and faced the best (IJN) pilots and the best aircraft. They developed tactics to make their middling fighter into a winner, and their pilots had the skills to turn their 'slow but deadly' dive bomber into a lethal ship annihilator (something Army pilots were unable to do with the same aircraft). And because aircraft carriers, they were able to project power all over the Pacific, with a longer reach than any land based fighter.

The Hellcat pilots shot down many more enemy planes than the Wildcat pilots did, by almost 4-1, but they had much more of a numerical, qualitative and technological advantage (including from things like ship borne radar) and faced an enemy that had already been largely broken in the earlier phases of the war.

When we look back at WW2 aviation, we tend to always lean into the end of the war with the coolest planes. So much ink has been spilled on Spit 21, Ta-152, Ki-84, Me 262, P-51H, P-47M and etc. but these aircraft didn't really have a major impact on the war necessarily, and were only relevant (if at all) for a small part of it. The war took place in many phases, and we each have our own particular interests.

Part of what made military aircraft great was being available, and being capable of doing their mission when they were most needed. P-38 ticks both of these marks in the Pacific, but so did the F4F, the P-40, and to some extent the P-39.

I can see that people get upset when certain notions are challenged, and I appreciate the merits of harmony, but I don't think the point of history is to stay comfortable. Your mileage may vary.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Let me throw out another provocative concept. Japanese Air power in the Pacific was largely broken by the US Navy and Marine Corps, and until the end of 1943, that meant the humble F4F Wildcat and the SBD bomber. They bore the brunt of the fighting and faced the best (IJN) pilots and the best aircraft. They developed tactics to make their middling fighter into a winner, and their pilots had the skills to turn their 'slow but deadly' dive bomber into a lethal ship annihilator (something Army pilots were unable to do with the same aircraft). And because aircraft carriers, they were able to project power all over the Pacific, with a longer reach than any land based fighter.

That's arguable - there is no doubt the US Navy and Marine Corps had a huge role in sustaining Japanese expansion in the PTO I think you need to examine where and when they made a difference, and equally across the board with the AAF 5th AF. The 5th AF had bomber and attack aircraft that brought more bomb tonnage to target than what the Navy and Marine Corps were capable of during the early part of the way, especially when the Navy was down to one carrier.

The Hellcat pilots shot down many more enemy planes than the Wildcat pilots did, by almost 4-1, but they had much more of a numerical, qualitative and technological advantage (including from things like ship borne radar) and faced an enemy that had already been largely broken in the earlier phases of the war.

They also had the advantage of being placed in target rich environments being operated from aircraft carriers

When we look back at WW2 aviation, we tend to always lean into the end of the war with the coolest planes. So much ink has been spilled on Spit 21, Ta-152, Ki-84, Me 262, P-51H, P-47M and etc. but these aircraft didn't really have a major impact on the war necessarily, and were only relevant (if at all) for a small part of it. The war took place in many phases, and we each have our own particular interests.

That's your opinion.

Part of what made military aircraft great was being available, and being capable of doing their mission when they were most needed. P-38 ticks both of these marks in the Pacific, but so did the F4F, the P-40, and to some extent the P-39.

The F4F, P-39 and P-40 held the line, the P-38 gave the AAF to expand the line, as did the F4U and F6F. You also have to consider when we had carriers available to support the later.

I can see that people get upset when certain notions are challenged, and I appreciate the merits of harmony, but I don't think the point of history is to stay comfortable. Your mileage may vary.

And so do opinions...

 

[Schweik]

I also think one of the reasons we like to look at some of those 1944-1945 era fighters is that they are closer to being 'without flaws'. If you look at fighters active in 1940-43, they all have flaws, usually quite significant ones. Their pilots learned to minimize the problems and maximize their advantages, they developed tactics to fight to their strengths. Flaws are kind of annoying from a design perspective, but to me part of what makes all these planes interesting is their flaws and the problems with the designs. That was part of the whole package, and part of the reality of what they were really dealing with.

Even when it comes to the elite aircraft, the best designs of the war, quite often when they were doing the heaviest and most consequential fighting, it was the flawed versions that faced the enemy. The F2G is cool as hell, but the old birdcage F4U-1 which probably mattered the most in the war. The P-38L was an outstanding combat machine but the G and H probably did more fighting at the critical moment. Spitfire XIV was a lethal bird but Spit V was the one shoved in the breech for a long time. Etc.*

At the same time, older less capable aircraft were also being improved. The Wildcat didn't change much in the critical period, but I don't think it's realistic to compare the earliest versions of a P-40E to the more perfected (1944) versions of the P-38 or F4U.

*And that is what made the Spit IX so important, because it became available and brought massively improved performance and capabilities early enough to still play a major role. You could say the same for the P-38J, as it was a highly improved version which arrived in time to make a difference.