FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
There was a time when Kelly Johnson was denied use of a wind tunnel so the issue wasn't initially captured, I'll have to look up specifics.
Japanese Zero vs Spitfire vs FW 190
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FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
From Wiki with references -
Johnson said in his autobiography[52] that he pleaded with National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics to do model tests in its wind tunnel. They already had experience of models thrashing around violently at speeds approaching those requested and did not want to risk damaging their tunnel. Gen. Arnold, head of Army Air Forces, ordered them to run the tests, which were done up to Mach 0.74.[53] The P-38's dive problem was revealed to be the center of pressure moving back toward the tail when in high-speed airflow. The solution was to change the geometry of the wing's lower surface when diving to keep lift within bounds of the top of the wing. In February 1943, quick-acting dive flaps were tried and proven by Lockheed test pilots. The dive flaps were installed outboard of the engine nacelles, and in action they extended downward 35° in 1.5 seconds. The flaps did not act as a speed brake; they affected the pressure distribution in a way that retained the wing's lift.[54]
Schweik,
As Shortround mentioned, the colder it gets the harder it is to keep warm. In planes that cruise for long periods at altitude a phenomenon called soaking occurs. Cold soaking in this case, heat soaking in the case of the Reno warbirds trying to win a race. The plane feels okay when you get to altitude , but several hours later it's colder than hell (I've experienced this numerous times in the Eagle). Also remember that the planes were unpressurised and drafty, so you fought cold with minimal heat that could be vacuumed overboard.
The Europe template called for extended high altitude cruise in sometimes extremely cold temperatures. It is my understanding the SWP did not use the same profile. 10k with oxygen mask off until nearing the threat area then push it up and take it up. Post fight cruise descent until 10k, then lower as you neared the field. The plane had the same problems regardless of where it was, they just weren't obvious (cockpit temp wise) in the SWP.
There are also physiological problems with extended cruise. Frostbite if it's cold enough, sinus pain from extended breathing of cold air (sinus drip which in turn can cause problems clearing your ears) and oxygen saturation of the inner ear. The latter rears it's head, not painfully but uncomfortably, during the time post flight when you are sleeping. Oxygen gets absorbed into the inner ear canal and then vents out causing you to keep clearing. This would wake me several times usually after each extended high altitude flight.
Cheers,
Biff
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special ed
1st Sergeant
- 5,125
- May 13, 2018
The book: Lindbergh, 1976
The author: Leonard Mosley
"When he (Lindbergh) ventured to suggest at one Washington lunch table - at which Brigadier General Louis E. Wood of the Marines happened to be present-that someone with expert knowledge of the new Corsair ought to go out to the Pacific and see how it was behaving, Wood said: 'Why not you?' "I'm not in the service," said Lindbergh simply. " What does that matter?" replied Wood, "Why can't you go as a civilian?" "The White House would never allow it," he said. [ Lindbergh & Roosevelt ware at odds] Wood: "Why does the White House have to know?" Admiral DeWitt Ramsey had been bought in to provide a cover for Lindbergh's new mission: take a Corsair to the combat areas of the South Pacific and demonstrate how to get the best out of it. He spent four months in the South Pacific.
There were four Corsairs in his flight. They were to cover a raid on Rabaul. No Japanese planes appeared, so on the was home they strafed targets on Green Island. On return the C.O. was waiting, "you didn't fire your guns, did you?"
General Kenney heard of Lindbergh's presence and cleared it with MacArthur to have him assist the P-38 pilots. He shot down the Japanese plane, 28 July. flying Col. Charles Mac Donald's wing. A few days later, he came close to getting shot down himself. The next day the news spread through the American command. It was bad enough to have him, a civilian, to shoot down an enemy, but what if he had been shot down? He was recalled from the combat area to Brisbane. Forty two was too old for a fighter pilot. He had taken part in fifty combat missions,179 combat hours.
The author: Leonard Mosley
"When he (Lindbergh) ventured to suggest at one Washington lunch table - at which Brigadier General Louis E. Wood of the Marines happened to be present-that someone with expert knowledge of the new Corsair ought to go out to the Pacific and see how it was behaving, Wood said: 'Why not you?' "I'm not in the service," said Lindbergh simply. " What does that matter?" replied Wood, "Why can't you go as a civilian?" "The White House would never allow it," he said. [ Lindbergh & Roosevelt ware at odds] Wood: "Why does the White House have to know?" Admiral DeWitt Ramsey had been bought in to provide a cover for Lindbergh's new mission: take a Corsair to the combat areas of the South Pacific and demonstrate how to get the best out of it. He spent four months in the South Pacific.
There were four Corsairs in his flight. They were to cover a raid on Rabaul. No Japanese planes appeared, so on the was home they strafed targets on Green Island. On return the C.O. was waiting, "you didn't fire your guns, did you?"
General Kenney heard of Lindbergh's presence and cleared it with MacArthur to have him assist the P-38 pilots. He shot down the Japanese plane, 28 July. flying Col. Charles Mac Donald's wing. A few days later, he came close to getting shot down himself. The next day the news spread through the American command. It was bad enough to have him, a civilian, to shoot down an enemy, but what if he had been shot down? He was recalled from the combat area to Brisbane. Forty two was too old for a fighter pilot. He had taken part in fifty combat missions,179 combat hours.
wuzak
Captain
Are you talking about the ventral radiator that was initially fitted to the Tornado?
My understanding is that the radiator didn't work in that location because of boundary layer buildup on the lower surface of the fuselage and wing roots. I don't think that is related to compressibility, but I could be wrong.
Which brings up the issue of when was the tipping point in the PTO. It's say probably a fairly wide period (~ 6 months) was still fiercely contested, but if I had to put the middle of the tipping point in that Theater I'd place it near the end of 1942. At that time you still had a lot of P-38G and then H with the various issues.
And by that point, the older types had already in large part broken, or at least severely blunted the air superiority of the Japanese in New Guinea and the Solomons. The Navy and then Marines had developed their Thach Weave tactic (and others) with the Wildcat, the Army and ANZAC units had figured out effective escape maneuvers with the P-40 and how to use BnZ tactics, increased their horsepower and largely resolved their issues with ammunition. In both places they had improved their coast watcher network and had developed effective pilot rescue systems (something the Japanese severely lacked). If you read pilot interviews from 49th FG or 76 Sqn RAAF there is a major shift in tone from spring to fall 1942, by the latter period they are much more confident.
I don't know there is any, though I'll look into it. I just doubt it would be an issue in say, Tunisia or Algeria but not in New Guinea.
I'm not blaming it all on Lockheed, I'm just pointing out there were issues and it took a while to resolve them all. Aside from problems with the actual machine there was also the training issue which seemed to get better in 1943. In the interview I linked one of those guys mentioned that each new group that came in was assigned a veteran to show them the ropes so that has to be helpful. But when they went in (earlier) they had very little time on type.
Regardless, the P-38 units were doing pretty well and giving worse than they got by early 1943, which was not the case in the MTO. German and Italian fighters could escape a P-38 more or less at will in a vertical dive, and depending on the specific opponent and the altitude, P-38s did not necessarily have a speed advantage. In the PTO they did, and even the fastest Japanese planes really couldn't outrun them. Some could out-climb, but the P-38s high speed climb abilities allowed them to extend away in relative safety without needing to dive precipitously. They couldn't do that against a Bf 109G or a Macchi C.205 though.
Yes I have experienced that in an APC - especially once they stop and the heater is turned off. That thick aluminum alloy can suck the life out of you.
Read the post upthread with the P-38 pilots interview. They routinely flew 3-4 hours long missions at 25,000 ft, it was the preferred operating altitude and they even refused to fly lower in some cases.
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
The P-38s first missions in force were actually flown in late 1942 so how can that be? If you want a start of the "tipping point" research the mission flown on December 31, 1942
On December 31, 1942 took off from 14 Mile Drome (Schwimmer) near Port Moresby piloted by 2nd Lt. Kenneth Sparks as one of twelve P-38s led by Thomas J. Lynch on a mission to escort A-20 Havocs, B-25 Mitchells and B-26 Marauders on a bombing mission against Lae Airfield near Lae. Over the target, the P-38s engaged eight Zeros (actually Ki-43 Oscars from the 11th Sentai). During the combat, Sparks fired at a Zero (actually a Ki-43 Oscar) and witnessed it crash. During the combat, Ki-43 Oscar pilot Hasegawa collided with this P-38, damaging the right aileron and wingtip. Returning, to 14 Mile Drome Sparks made a direct landing approach and nearly collided with P-38F piloted by 1st. Carl G. Planck who was also damaged and landing in the opposite direction. To avoid a head on collision, Planck swerved off the runway. jammed on his breaks and narrowly missing the control tower. The P-38s claimed a total of ten enemy "Zeros" shot down. In fact, only Ki-43 piloted by Shishimoto was shot down and bailed out and his fighter crashed into the sea.
Pacific Wrecks - P-38F-5-LO Lightning Serial Number 42-12652 Nose 33
Assigned to the 5th Air Force (5th AF) and served in New Guinea until written off in early 1944 and buried at Finschafen Airfield. During late 1999, dug up and exported to Australia then to the United States and restored.
Although there were overclaims on this mission, the importance was the ability of the P-38 to provide long range escort for the noted bombers.
They did to a point - as stated, the 5th AF with P-39s and P-40s were less than 1 to 1 against the Japanese until the P-38 arrived on scene. Because of their lack of range they were basically fighting on the defensive, your own posts validate this!!! I've shown evidence that proves a lot of the Japanese fighter force was neutralized. Compare the P-40 claims to the P-38 as well as those pilots who shot down 5 or more aircraft from that period until the PI was secured.
Agree
The earlier P-38s I can agree to a point, the P-38J was a different story
They also flew P-40 missions to Lae, going back to mid 1942The P-38s first missions in force were actually flown in late 1942 so how can that be? If you want a start of the "tipping point" research the mission flown on December 31, 1942
On December 31, 1942 took off from 14 Mile Drome (Schwimmer) near Port Moresby piloted by 2nd Lt. Kenneth Sparks as one of twelve P-38s led by Thomas J. Lynch on a mission to escort A-20 Havocs, B-25 Mitchells and B-26 Marauders on a bombing mission against Lae Airfield near Lae. Over the target, the P-38s engaged eight Zeros (actually Ki-43 Oscars from the 11th Sentai). During the combat, Sparks fired at a Zero (actually a Ki-43 Oscar) and witnessed it crash. During the combat, Ki-43 Oscar pilot Hasegawa collided with this P-38, damaging the right aileron and wingtip. Returning, to 14 Mile Drome Sparks made a direct landing approach and nearly collided with P-38F piloted by 1st. Carl G. Planck who was also damaged and landing in the opposite direction. To avoid a head on collision, Planck swerved off the runway. jammed on his breaks and narrowly missing the control tower. The P-38s claimed a total of ten enemy "Zeros" shot down. In fact, only Ki-43 piloted by Shishimoto was shot down and bailed out and his fighter crashed into the sea.
Pacific Wrecks - P-38F-5-LO Lightning Serial Number 42-12652 Nose 33
Assigned to the 5th Air Force (5th AF) and served in New Guinea until written off in early 1944 and buried at Finschafen Airfield. During late 1999, dug up and exported to Australia then to the United States and restored.pacificwrecks.com
Although there were overclaims on this mission, the importance was the ability of the P-38 to provide long range escort for the noted bombers.
That is what I did earlier, comparing 8th to 9th FS of 49th FG. 9th was on P-38s from late 1942, 8th was still flying P-40s into 1944. The 9th had 15 Aces, the 8th had 14. Same number of double Aces (3 each).
The overall rate of victories to losses may have been close to 1-1 with P-39 units and possibly some of the P-40 units, but that was not the case with the 49th FG. There were more than 30 US aces flying P-40s in the PTO (mostly with 49th and 18th FG), compared to 1 flying P-39s. So I don't think it's really comparable.
P-38s scored a lot more claims granted (1700 in the PTO vs 660 for P-40s) but I think that also has to do with when they were operational, as P-40s were kind of left behind in the war due to range. Also without a doubt, later model P-38s were superior to P-40s in combat.
I generally believe that the Allied pilots scored a lot more victories after (and on the downslope of) the 'tipping point' as the Japanese pilot quality declined and Allied numerical superiority, training and logistics ramped up. Look at the number of claims by the F6F (5600!) which is more than P-40 + P-38 claims combined.
Incidentally, I just learned that the 18th FG also got some P-40Fs in Theater. Found pics here
I don't disagree with that. P-38J was clearly a lot more capable. It was also the fastest variant according to Joe Baugher.
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If you combine Wildcat PTO victories (986) with US P-40 (660) and P-39 / P-400 (288) claims, that's almost 2,000 victory claims right there. No doubt many of these were overclaims but it probably boils down to a few hundred Japanese aircraft destroyed during the critical phase of the war, a high percentage of them being manned by elite and highly trained aircrew. Australian and NZ squadrons also shot down at least a couple of hundred enemy planes, and some percentage of the P-38s claims were also in this period too. This was the hardest and most important part of the air war in the Pacific in WW2, IMO.
Later Hellcat (5160), F4U (2140), P-38 (1700), P-47 (695), FM-2 (422) and P-51 (297) claimed almost 10,000 enemy aircraft, (and probably overclaimed a bit less than in earlier periods) but most of these were during the decline for the Japanese forces, after most (though certainly not all) of the elite highly trained pilots were already gone. Not to say it was a cakewalk. But it wasn't quite the same death-struggle.
One big difference from the early days, is that so many of the Allied pilots survived their early catastrophic experiences, compared to the Japanese. When P-40s and F4Fs were being shot down, quite often the pilot would survive and be rescued within a couple of days. When a Ki-43 or A6M was shot down it was far less likely they would survive and if they did, they don't seem to be rescued nearly as often. The knock on effect was more veteran pilots surviving to learn from their mistakes on the Allied side and fewer of the elite and veteran pilots in the Japanese units surviving to 1943.
Later Hellcat (5160), F4U (2140), P-38 (1700), P-47 (695), FM-2 (422) and P-51 (297) claimed almost 10,000 enemy aircraft, (and probably overclaimed a bit less than in earlier periods) but most of these were during the decline for the Japanese forces, after most (though certainly not all) of the elite highly trained pilots were already gone. Not to say it was a cakewalk. But it wasn't quite the same death-struggle.
One big difference from the early days, is that so many of the Allied pilots survived their early catastrophic experiences, compared to the Japanese. When P-40s and F4Fs were being shot down, quite often the pilot would survive and be rescued within a couple of days. When a Ki-43 or A6M was shot down it was far less likely they would survive and if they did, they don't seem to be rescued nearly as often. The knock on effect was more veteran pilots surviving to learn from their mistakes on the Allied side and fewer of the elite and veteran pilots in the Japanese units surviving to 1943.
From what I read that was one problem, another was that the original position on the Tornado increased the maximum cross sectional area and of course the maximum frontal area so it had to be moved either forwards or backwards. The intake/ exhaust and radiator set up on the P-51 was big, but cleverly didnt increase the maximum cross section because most is behind the wings and the radiators are mainly in the fuselage, it didnt hugely increase maximum frontal area either because of the taper in the fuselage.
Simon Thomas
Senior Airman
Herman Glauert published his paper "The Effect of Compressibility on the Lift of an Aerofoil" in 1928.
https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/pdf/10.1098/rspa.1928.0039
In it he has a footnote on page 117 that states:
This result is quoted without proof by Ackeret in the "Handbuch der Physik", vol. 7, p. 340 (1927), as given by Prandtl in his lectures at Gottingen in 1922.
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
They did, but this time they had medium bombers in mass and they were able to be escorted by a fighter that wasn't range limited
And compare them with the 80th and 475th FG as well
You're not going to win a war swapping fighter to fighter with an enemy while flying a range limited aircraft. Again, the P-38 entered the scene and for AAF operations thengs changed quickly.
Sorry but in the SWP especially talking about JAAF pilots, not true. I'll agree with "Allied numerical superiority, training and logistics ramped up." Your time line and area of operation is wrong if you're trying to compare the F6F to the P-38 - the F6F first saw combat in September 1943. The IJN lost many good pilots at Midway and over Guadalcanal but attrition really started to take it's bite by mid-1943. Because of where it was operating (aircraft carriers) and the campaigns it was deployed in, it was able to engage a target rich environment. Lastly when it did engage, it was well after that time the Japanese started losing the best of its pilots.
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Do you have those stats available?
49th FG turns out to have had about a 1-1 ratio during their desperate defense of Darwin starting in March through Sept of 42, but by the fall of that year I think they were doing considerably better than that. I believe this is also true for the US 44th Sqn (active from Dec 42) and 76 Sqn RAAF. 14 and 15 RNZAF weren't deployed until Spring 1943 but they were definitely doing better than 1-1.
That is subjective - as is, admittedly, my perception that the P-38 pilots in the PTO were not complaining so much (or we don't read about their complaints if they had them) because they were doing a lot better operationally.
I think our debate hinges on this factor of precisely when the tipping point actually was in the South Pacific. I'd say after the battles of Coral Sea (May 42), Milne Bay (Aug-Sept 42) the end of the first Japanese bombing offensive at Darwin (Sept 42) and the Second Battle of Guadalcanal (Nov 42) the Japanese offensives in both the New Guinea and Solomons were blunted, they no longer had air supremacy and at that point it was up to them to try to regain it. Guadalcanal and Port Moresby were firmly in Allied hands. Darwin was going to suffer another series of raids in 1943 but there was no longer a sense (however misguided) that the Japanese were about to invade Australia.
To me this was the turning point, basically a six month period from August 42 to maybe March 43, with the middle being probably Nov or Dec 42.
It would be really interesting to look at Japanese aircraft losses in this period, I hope to have some new (to me) books arriving in a few weeks which will help with that analysis.
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
I have a list of the entire 5th AF P-38 aces with those units combined
Depending on the timeframe they may have done better than 1:1 but not much better. I have no info on the RNZAF or the RAAF units flying the P-40.
Well that's your opinion - I can tell you there were plenty of Lockheed tech reps in theater assisting with issues. Now IMO there may have not been many complaints (as you put it) because the pilots flying the P-38 basically liked their aircraft. It also comes back to the operational environment.
I disagree - the tipping point started when we (and our allies) went on the offensive and that was in early 1943. The Japanese main supply hub was Rabual and once we started hitting Rebaul and severing the Japanese supply lines, things started changing. During this time the JAAF starting loosing some of their better pilots.
As stated, into 1943.
Please share
Thanks, what I meant by "into the aviation lexicon" was moving out of academia and the design offices of companies into the world where pilots had it and its efects explained and what to do about it. According to wiki wind tunnel testing of the P-38 for these issues started late 1941 which was the same time as the Hawker Tempest with laminar flow wings was ordered.
Gentlemen,
Concerning cockpit heat on the P-38, please see page 3 (near the bottom)of the attachment from Mike William's site. At least for me, a non-pilot, it gave me an idea about the temperatures the pilots dealt with. W.K. Giroux, who flew the P-39, P-47 and P-38 with the 8th FG in the Pacific said about the P-38 that they rarely flew above 25,000 feet, and that cockpit heating was not an issue. He wrote that 'a little coolness at altitude felt very refreshing after a day in the hot jungles.' As for dives, he implied that it was not necessary to dive into the compressibility region to escape a Japanese fighter. Giroux was talking about the "J" model in the book (Source: Pacfic Sweep , by William N Hess)
FWIW
Eagledad
Concerning cockpit heat on the P-38, please see page 3 (near the bottom)of the attachment from Mike William's site. At least for me, a non-pilot, it gave me an idea about the temperatures the pilots dealt with. W.K. Giroux, who flew the P-39, P-47 and P-38 with the 8th FG in the Pacific said about the P-38 that they rarely flew above 25,000 feet, and that cockpit heating was not an issue. He wrote that 'a little coolness at altitude felt very refreshing after a day in the hot jungles.' As for dives, he implied that it was not necessary to dive into the compressibility region to escape a Japanese fighter. Giroux was talking about the "J" model in the book (Source: Pacfic Sweep , by William N Hess)
FWIW
Eagledad
Wildcat
Major
You need the "South Pacific Air War" Series if you haven't already got them. Volume 4 states Japanese losses from 8 Dec 41 - 8 Sep 42 as being 235 aircraft. These are verified losses from Japanese records, not claims. Allied losses in the same time frame were 361 aircraft.
I have been collecting them gradually but don't have them all yet. What are the losses from Sept 42 for the next few months or is that published yet?
EDIT: I see Volume 5 isn't out yet. Maybe we'll have some more data next year. From the publishers blurb it sounds like the Japanese were suddenly starting to have major problems:
Volume Five of this series chronicles aerial warfare primarily in the New Guinea theater in the critical period between September and December 1942. It can be read alone or as a continuation of the previous four volumes which span the first nine months of the Pacific War.
By early September the strategic picture in the theater had changed markedly within just six weeks. From their new Buna beachhead, the Japanese Army commenced a Papuan mountain campaign which threatened the Allied bastion of Port Moresby. Meanwhile the battle for Guadalcanal was raging, with the outcome of the wider Pacific War in the balance.
Against this background a strengthened US Fifth Air Force took the fight to the IJA with direct air support. While this was being conducted by P-39s, P-40Es, A-20As and B-25s, raids by B-17s against Rabaul aided US forces in the neighboring Solomons. RAAF Beaufighters, Beauforts, Bostons, and Hudsons also contributed substantially to these efforts.
At Rabaul, a wide variety of fresh IJN fighter and bomber units poured in the theater, although these became focused mainly on the Solomons. Such were the massive losses experienced, by November the IJN undertook a complete operational and administrative reorganization of its air power. Then, despite a strong reluctance to become involved, the IJA sent an advance reconnaissance detachment to Rabaul, the forerunner of major reinforcements that would arrive in December.
Sounds like we are getting close to a tipping point to me, somewhere between September and December. Definitely going to get this book in spite of the high price tag.
EDIT: I see Volume 5 isn't out yet. Maybe we'll have some more data next year. From the publishers blurb it sounds like the Japanese were suddenly starting to have major problems:
Volume Five of this series chronicles aerial warfare primarily in the New Guinea theater in the critical period between September and December 1942. It can be read alone or as a continuation of the previous four volumes which span the first nine months of the Pacific War.
By early September the strategic picture in the theater had changed markedly within just six weeks. From their new Buna beachhead, the Japanese Army commenced a Papuan mountain campaign which threatened the Allied bastion of Port Moresby. Meanwhile the battle for Guadalcanal was raging, with the outcome of the wider Pacific War in the balance.
Against this background a strengthened US Fifth Air Force took the fight to the IJA with direct air support. While this was being conducted by P-39s, P-40Es, A-20As and B-25s, raids by B-17s against Rabaul aided US forces in the neighboring Solomons. RAAF Beaufighters, Beauforts, Bostons, and Hudsons also contributed substantially to these efforts.
At Rabaul, a wide variety of fresh IJN fighter and bomber units poured in the theater, although these became focused mainly on the Solomons. Such were the massive losses experienced, by November the IJN undertook a complete operational and administrative reorganization of its air power. Then, despite a strong reluctance to become involved, the IJA sent an advance reconnaissance detachment to Rabaul, the forerunner of major reinforcements that would arrive in December.
Sounds like we are getting close to a tipping point to me, somewhere between September and December. Definitely going to get this book in spite of the high price tag.
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FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
Read my post AGAIN (1415)
From your post;
P-38s began major operations staring in late 1942/ early 1943
You claim there were still issues with the P-38 at this time - tell us what they are, if they hampered operations and what the attrition rates were!
This is the reason why Yamamoto launched I-GO
The Pacific War Online Encyclopedia: I-Go
pwencycl.kgbudge.com
"The exaggerated claims of success prompted Yamamoto to visit the forward air bases to personally congratulate the air crew. However, Yamamoto's itinerary was broadcast in a code the Allies were able to penetrate, and his aircraft was intercepted and shot down on 18 April 1943. None of the passengers and crew of Yamamoto's aircraft survived. (Shot down by the only aircraft in theater that was able to pull off this type of mission, the P-38)
The "Big Raid". Another series of raids began on 7 June 1943. On that day and on 12 June, Japanese aircraft raided Guadalcanal but again failed to achieve decisive results. On 16 June came a much larger raid by over 100 aircraft. Two Allied ships were forced to beach and six Allied fighters were shot down, but the Allies claimed 98 Japanese aircraft destroyed, and the Japanese admitted the loss of about 30 aircraft."
So to go full circle here - I cannot fathom anyone saying that the presence of the P-38 did not make an impact in the SWP. There were other aircraft that performed well but it was the P-38 that brought the fight to the enemy.
