All reasonable... good point about the bombers of the 5th AF too, F4Fs and even SBDs weren't as effective against ground targets though TBF came in handier there. 5th AF may have even shot down more enemy planes by say, end of 1943, but I think the Navy killed the most elite Japanese pilots by that same timeframe. And did it mainly with Wildcats.
Japanese Zero vs Spitfire vs FW 190
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All reasonable... good point about the bombers of the 5th AF too, F4Fs and even SBDs weren't as effective against ground targets though TBF came in handier there. 5th AF may have even shot down more enemy planes by say, end of 1943, but I think the Navy killed the most elite Japanese pilots by that same timeframe. And did it mainly with Wildcats.
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
Is that your opinion or do you facts to back that up? Again, I think you're really speculating.
special ed
1st Sergeant
- 5,125
- May 13, 2018
Jeff DeBlanc USMC, Medal of Honor at Guadalcanal, said he had just 10 hours in type on his F4F before combat.
I might be wrong about this but I thought carrier strength was built up pretty rapidly in 1943?
Quick check of Wikipedia shows the following six CVs built before June 1943, by my count:
Ranger, Saratoga, Enterprise, Essex, Yorktown (Essex class version), Bunker Hill
The following were also built but sunk before that time - Lexington (sunk May 1942), Yorktown (sunk June 1942), Wasp (sunk Sept 1942), Hornet (sunk Oct 1942)
I see four CVL built before June 1943:
Independence, Princeton (sunk 1944), Belleau Wood, Cowpens
And eighteen CVEs:
Long Island, Charger, Copahee, Nassau, Santee, Sangamon, Altamaha, Chenango, Suwannee, Bogue, Card, Core, Barnes, Princeton (Sunk in 1944), Block Island (Sunk 1944), Prince William, Breton, Croatan
I may have missed or miscounted some...
I know some of those were in the Atlantic or Med, some were away from the combat area escorting supply and cargo ships and on ASW duties and so on, and some of the extant carriers, especially the larger CVs, were in the shipyard getting fixed part of the time. But after all the carnage of 1942, US carrier strength did seem to bounce back before the Hellcat arrived.
Quick check of Wikipedia shows the following six CVs built before June 1943, by my count:
Ranger, Saratoga, Enterprise, Essex, Yorktown (Essex class version), Bunker Hill
The following were also built but sunk before that time - Lexington (sunk May 1942), Yorktown (sunk June 1942), Wasp (sunk Sept 1942), Hornet (sunk Oct 1942)
I see four CVL built before June 1943:
Independence, Princeton (sunk 1944), Belleau Wood, Cowpens
And eighteen CVEs:
Long Island, Charger, Copahee, Nassau, Santee, Sangamon, Altamaha, Chenango, Suwannee, Bogue, Card, Core, Barnes, Princeton (Sunk in 1944), Block Island (Sunk 1944), Prince William, Breton, Croatan
I may have missed or miscounted some...
I know some of those were in the Atlantic or Med, some were away from the combat area escorting supply and cargo ships and on ASW duties and so on, and some of the extant carriers, especially the larger CVs, were in the shipyard getting fixed part of the time. But after all the carnage of 1942, US carrier strength did seem to bounce back before the Hellcat arrived.
Well, we know the numbers from Midway and some of the other major sea battles in 1942 and 43, and the assumption here is that the IJN pilots were the better pilots, which I think is commonly accepted (they had the highest victory claim scores, for example). I believe the IJ Navy had longer training time and more of their pilots were officers, which may or may not mean anything.
And while I am a defender and a 'fan' of the Ki-43, I think the A6M was a better and more dangerous opponent simply because of the 20mm guns, though that is certainly debatable. I believe Ki-43 pilots actually made more victory claims during the war.
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
Overall they probably were, but tactics somewhat took away their advantage in training and experience. The IJN lost their cream of the crop fighter pilots at Midway, but most of the losses were not due to air to air combat. Rich Leonard, who's dad actually fought at Midway has posted tons of information on here, I suggest reading this posts
Oh I agree, the IJN lost a lot of guys to flak and (especially) when their ships got sunk, which is why I included the SBD in my comment. With the improved tactics, F4Fs were slowly becoming more capable, at the time of Midway I think is one of the first times they started trying Thach Weave and Jimmy Thach himself used it successfully. Then IIRC they were also improving fighter direction and coordination. By the end of the year I think they were much more effective with the F4F. Certainly once you are a few months into 1943.
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
I can't remember where I read it but many of the IJN aircrew were picked up and not lost. There were far greater casualties from the maintenance crews who were lost with the carriers.
I can only imagine that those aircrews were banished to forever remain at the front like the others who served at Midway and did face F4Fs, P-400s, P-40s and P-38s.
I have no sources, just that if those pilots were rescued, they didn't go home.
I can only imagine that those aircrews were banished to forever remain at the front like the others who served at Midway and did face F4Fs, P-400s, P-40s and P-38s.
I have no sources, just that if those pilots were rescued, they didn't go home.
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FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
IIRC I believe only 2 Japanese POWs were recovered during Midway
Reluctant Poster
Staff Sergeant
- 1,464
- Dec 6, 2006
The most detailed account of Spitfires over Darwin is called oddly enough Darwin Spitfires
Amazon product ASIN B00ONZQ6J2Highly recommended. It describes all the combats in great detail.
The authors makes several points about the real problems. He does not blame the Spitfire itself but rather poor leadership and inexperienced pilots along with constant speed unit failures and cannon failures. Clive Caldwell does not come off well in this narrative. He seems have been a micro manger. He insisted on flying as a big wing which negated the Spitfire's big advantage as a fast climber. As a result the Spitfires never intercepted the bombers until after they bombed and they never had the height advantage they should have enjoyed. In addition once they were up, Caldwell wasted further time by trying to direct the perfect interception. The Japanese refused to cooperate resulting in some of the formation not actually engaging (think Leigh Mallory, Sholto Douglas).
Most of the Spitfires losses were not actually to Zeros in dogfights. "A review of the causes of Spitfire air combat losses in previous combats bears this out: out of a maximum possible 19 Spitfires previously shot down by enemy fighters, no more than five were lost while dogfighting; most were surprised from behind while conducting firing runs or while re-climbing for their next run." This is a problem for any interceptor as they must put themselves in a vulnerable position to attack the bombers which is their primary goal. Escorting fighters should always have a positive kill ratio over the interceptors they are battling.
In the case of the Darwin Spitfires this was compounded by poor situation awareness. As mentioned previously they were flying in obsolete formations, primarily line astern, but also vics. When they did use a finger four formation it was more of a box with the wingmen behind the leaders. These formations quickly deteriorated in combat with the pilots flying individually and hence vulnerable. I was surprised to learn that the pilots were very inexperienced although the units were transferred from the UK the pilots were mostly rookies.
As noted the CSU problems were severe causing about as many losses as the Japanese. Even more troubling were the cannon failures. One in four aircraft that opened fire lost 1 or both cannons.
The Spitfire as an aircraft seems to have performed well but as a weapons system it did not. The author does point out that the Spitfires forced the bombers to fly high with a significant reduction in accuracy to the point that the damage caused was minimal so in that respect the defense was a success. He also states that the performance of the Spitfire VCs wasn't that much worse than VCs in other theaters.
Again I highly recommend reading the book.
Amazon product ASIN B00ONZQ6J2Highly recommended. It describes all the combats in great detail.
The authors makes several points about the real problems. He does not blame the Spitfire itself but rather poor leadership and inexperienced pilots along with constant speed unit failures and cannon failures. Clive Caldwell does not come off well in this narrative. He seems have been a micro manger. He insisted on flying as a big wing which negated the Spitfire's big advantage as a fast climber. As a result the Spitfires never intercepted the bombers until after they bombed and they never had the height advantage they should have enjoyed. In addition once they were up, Caldwell wasted further time by trying to direct the perfect interception. The Japanese refused to cooperate resulting in some of the formation not actually engaging (think Leigh Mallory, Sholto Douglas).
Most of the Spitfires losses were not actually to Zeros in dogfights. "A review of the causes of Spitfire air combat losses in previous combats bears this out: out of a maximum possible 19 Spitfires previously shot down by enemy fighters, no more than five were lost while dogfighting; most were surprised from behind while conducting firing runs or while re-climbing for their next run." This is a problem for any interceptor as they must put themselves in a vulnerable position to attack the bombers which is their primary goal. Escorting fighters should always have a positive kill ratio over the interceptors they are battling.
In the case of the Darwin Spitfires this was compounded by poor situation awareness. As mentioned previously they were flying in obsolete formations, primarily line astern, but also vics. When they did use a finger four formation it was more of a box with the wingmen behind the leaders. These formations quickly deteriorated in combat with the pilots flying individually and hence vulnerable. I was surprised to learn that the pilots were very inexperienced although the units were transferred from the UK the pilots were mostly rookies.
As noted the CSU problems were severe causing about as many losses as the Japanese. Even more troubling were the cannon failures. One in four aircraft that opened fire lost 1 or both cannons.
The Spitfire as an aircraft seems to have performed well but as a weapons system it did not. The author does point out that the Spitfires forced the bombers to fly high with a significant reduction in accuracy to the point that the damage caused was minimal so in that respect the defense was a success. He also states that the performance of the Spitfire VCs wasn't that much worse than VCs in other theaters.
Again I highly recommend reading the book.
While I'm sympathetic to the problems faced by the Darwin Spitfire units, many of which were not their fault, this is a bit of a stretch in terms of excuses. I think most fighter shoot-downs occurred 'from behind' and / or when they were concentrating on something else.
As for the 'Big Wing' strategy, that was kind of a life or death thing where Caldwell was coming from in the Western Desert, even though it probably wasn't the right tactic with Spitfires against Japanese fighters.
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GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
There was another, who landed on Niihau, and that turned into a huge mess that provided gravity to the continental internerment decision...
Peter Gunn
Master Sergeant
Shattered Sword, they make the best case for that scenario. Also that Midway was NOT the graveyard of the elite IJN pilot corps, that was the attrition of the Solomon Islands campaign and New Guinea.
Peter Gunn
Master Sergeant
Just out of curiosity, what's the title of this thread again?
That's what I love about this place.
And just so you guys don't think I've gone totally soft, why are we talking about these second rate Hellcat, Corsair and Lightnings? This discussion should now turn toward its rightful subject, the torpedo carrying, A-Bomb dropping P-51. I forgive you all for your negligence in this respect.
That's what I love about this place.
And just so you guys don't think I've gone totally soft, why are we talking about these second rate Hellcat, Corsair and Lightnings? This discussion should now turn toward its rightful subject, the torpedo carrying, A-Bomb dropping P-51. I forgive you all for your negligence in this respect.
One thing I'd say, re: the title - is when it comes to Fw 190 vs Spitfire, the version matters a lot. Spit I and Spit V and Spit IX and XIV are all the same plane in one sense, but in terms of capability they are very different. Spit V is vulnerable to a Fw 190. Spit IX I think it's the other way around, it's going to make the Fw 190 pilot uneasy.
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Clayton Magnet
Staff Sergeant
- 868
- Feb 16, 2013
Unless of course its a Fw 190D-13 fighting a Mk.IX Spitfire, then its the other, other way around again.
As with the Spitfire, the Fw 190 represents a long lineage, all sharing the same name
True but by then you have other improved Spitfire marks right?
I agree Fw also evolved (and I don't know all the subvariants that well) but I gather the really dramatic improvements like the Dora came rather late right? In terms of the same jump in capability as from the V to the IX. Or am I wrong about that. How much faster was an A8 than an A4
I agree Fw also evolved (and I don't know all the subvariants that well) but I gather the really dramatic improvements like the Dora came rather late right? In terms of the same jump in capability as from the V to the IX. Or am I wrong about that. How much faster was an A8 than an A4
Geoffrey Sinclair
Staff Sergeant
- 814
- Sep 30, 2021
Using the Normal Friedman books, end June 1943, commissioned but not sunk.
6 CV Ranger, Saratoga, Enterprise, Essex, Lexington, Yorktown (Essex class versions), Bunker Hill
5 CVL Independence, Princeton, Belleau Wood, Cowpens, Monterey
17 CVE: Long Island, Charger (meant to be training RN personnel), Copahee, Nassau, Santee, Sangamon, Altamaha, Chenango, Suwannee, Bogue, Card, Core, Barnes, Block Island, Prince William, Breton, Croatan,
Thanks, well I was pretty close! So 11 carriers and 17 CVEs. Any ballpark idea how many of those would be operational around the South Pacific? I gather the CVEs were not really used on offensive operations directly but more to protect transports and supply ships etc. right?
GregP
Major
Hi Shortround, Reference Post 1,444.
I am under the distinct impression that the turbulators were needed in Europe due to the British fuel they were using as it tended to separate and thus make some cylinders run lean while other ran rich and some got no additives. Eventually, they resolved the different fuel aromatic issue and it went away. Meanwhile, the early P-38 operating in the Aleutians were using fuel from the U.S.A. and had no such issues.
They DID have cockpit heater issues, no training, etc., but the fuel issue could be looked at on the test stand because they were running US fuel in Alaska and the early Pacific deployments.
Perhaps I am mis-thinking this, but since they had US fuel available, the issues could be looked at rapidly, unlike the issues they saw with early use of British fuel. That took getting some samples of British fuel that could be used in the test stands.
Cheers.
I am under the distinct impression that the turbulators were needed in Europe due to the British fuel they were using as it tended to separate and thus make some cylinders run lean while other ran rich and some got no additives. Eventually, they resolved the different fuel aromatic issue and it went away. Meanwhile, the early P-38 operating in the Aleutians were using fuel from the U.S.A. and had no such issues.
They DID have cockpit heater issues, no training, etc., but the fuel issue could be looked at on the test stand because they were running US fuel in Alaska and the early Pacific deployments.
Perhaps I am mis-thinking this, but since they had US fuel available, the issues could be looked at rapidly, unlike the issues they saw with early use of British fuel. That took getting some samples of British fuel that could be used in the test stands.
Cheers.
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