Read my post AGAIN (1415)
From your post;
I'm not sure if this was clear, so I'll point this out carefully - the italicized part of my post was from the publishers blurb for the Clarinbould book,
South Pacific Air War Volume 5, which is coming out this February. I.e.
those are their words, not mine, though they are saying pretty much what i was saying. I would say it sounds like the Japanese air forces in the NG and Solomons region were, to use their words, 'experiencing a crisis' already in Sept to Nov of 1942. This crisis was already starting in other words, before significant numbers of P-38s were deployed.
As for the rest of it, you seem to take this as an attack on or dismissal of the P-38. We have a difference in emphasis, but I am not making such a sweeping argument. I said before - the P-38 was an important type in the region, it was a better fighter than any others in the region when it first appeared in battle, and certainly did have an impact on the enemy. I'm pointing out a nuance. But to reiterate I have stated that though I do think the P-38 was still experiencing some issues in the South Pacific just as it was everywhere else, it was clearly very successful in this Theater.
Just having slightly less effusive praise of the aircraft and it's role is not the same as denigrating it. So please don't characterize me as some kind of P-38 detractor.
You have made some definitive factual statements about victory to loss ratios before and after introduction of the P-38. I don't yet have enough data to answer this decisively - part of that will come from Clarinbould's book coming out in February, part perhaps can be found in a couple of other books I should have sooner. Right now, I have several unit histories from the region but they are all the older type which doesn't include the cross-referencing of day by day losses on both sides, (although I do have some histories of Japanese forces and could do some cross referencing of my own if I had the time).
From what I have in my library, I
think your claim that P-40 units like 7th and 8th FS of the 49th FG were still achieving a 1-1 victory to loss ratio in the third and fourth quarter of 1942 is incorrect. However, I don't have enough data yet to be certain. I should have more data soon. So I suggest suspending this part of the argument until we can shed more light on it.
As for the subjective side of this (i.e. that P-38 was
the decisive factor in the South Pacific air battle, or that the 'tipping point' was in the middle of 1943 vs. the end of 1942), we can probably debate that forever, which could be fun, but won't necessarily get anywhere. I suspect this too will be greatly assisted by having some more data.
P-38s began major operations staring in late 1942/ early 1943
You claim there were still issues with the P-38 at this time - tell us what they are, if they hampered operations and what the attrition rates were!
It's a documented fact that there were still issues with the P-38 at this time, they didn't disappear when they appeared over the Pacific Ocean. As for attrition rates, I don't have that data. Why don't you post them if you have them.
This is the reason why Yamamoto launched I-GO
"The exaggerated claims of success prompted Yamamoto to visit the forward air bases to personally congratulate the air crew. However, Yamamoto's itinerary was broadcast in a code the Allies were able to penetrate, and his aircraft was intercepted and shot down on 18 April 1943. None of the passengers and crew of Yamamoto's aircraft survived. (Shot down by the only aircraft in theater that was able to pull off this type of mission, the P-38)
The "Big Raid". Another series of raids began on 7 June 1943. On that day and on 12 June, Japanese aircraft raided Guadalcanal but again failed to achieve decisive results. On 16 June came a much larger raid by over 100 aircraft. Two Allied ships were forced to beach and six Allied fighters were shot down, but the Allies claimed 98 Japanese aircraft destroyed, and the Japanese admitted the loss of about 30 aircraft."
So to go full circle here - I cannot fathom anyone saying that the presence of the P-38 did not make an impact in the SWP. There were other aircraft that performed well but it was the P-38 that brought the fight to the enemy.
No doubt P-38 brought new capabilities to the region (especially for offensive operations), certainly no other US aircraft could have killed Yamamoto, and by June 1943 the P-38 was playing a crucial role - again, especially in offensive strikes. But that doesn't change my argument. I was never claiming they didn't, especially by that time period. I was saying that June 1943 was arguably past the tipping point, though clearly heavy fighting was still going on.