John Boyd, opinions?

Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules

Victory:

You are correct in just about all areas describing Boyd, particularly as a husband & more so as a father. Insofar as what the book has described him, he wasn't physically abusive but his absence from his family coupled with his disdain for things he considered luxury, when oftentimes they were actually a necessity, really took its toil. His house was a small ramshackle place in a bad neighborhood & he professed ignorance at what was taking place in the family when his own world was flying & theory.

Note: I mentioned "the" family instead of using the proper syntax "his" family because it was exactly as how he treated them. He professed his puzzlement about youngest daughter whom he called "snookem" when she turned to drugs & went downhill fast & violently took her actions against him. Yet despite please from his wife to do something, John just turned he back & went to work as if nothing had happened.

His theories & codes were at farsighted, at least in his time, which were well over 50 years ago. True, Navy & Air Force were dogfighting for years & the kill ratio fell dismally low during the Viet Nam War. As the book described it, very little was done about it.

As it was stated " the air force pilots were turning & learning" wasn't all that cut out to be. If they were truly learning as they were turning the kill ratio would ( or at least should ) be different.

The overstatement of John as 40-second Boyd may have been true, but it was backed up by countless witnesses & was well documented. So there has to be some validity somewhere.

The "blue suiters" as John so disdainfully put it, loved to add systems to an otherwise clean design & just as well continue managing their careers to retirement.

The F-111 Aardvark program, a plane that was shoved down the Navy's throat was a very good example of the blue suiters & McNamara's "Wiz Kids" & their collective actions.

John said it best when asked his opinion on the swing-wing bomber: "Just rip the wings off, give it a bench seat in the back & paint it yellow."

In his later years, McNamara admitted his mistakes in forcing the services to accept a multipurpose aircraft that could do a "little bit of everything but accomplished nothing."

If the Marines were the only service to accord John the honors of a soldier, then so be it. One must remember that at the time of John's passing he was a civilian.
 
Boyd was so obsessed with his thrower, he simply ignored the reality that it was political restrictions that limited the effect of USAF and USN fighters over Vietnam.
When the gloves were taken off, they had no problem swatting f=down the MiGs.
 
His theories & codes were at farsighted, at least in his time, which were well over 50 years ago. True, Navy & Air Force were dogfighting for years & the kill ratio fell dismally low during the Viet Nam War. As the book described it, very little was done about it.



The overstatement of John as 40-second Boyd may have been true, but it was backed up by countless witnesses & was well documented. So there has to be some validity somewhere.



The F-111 Aardvark program, a plane that was shoved down the Navy's throat was a very good example of the blue suiters & McNamara's "Wiz Kids" & their collective actions.

John said it best when asked his opinion on the swing-wing bomber: "Just rip the wings off, give it a bench seat in the back & paint it yellow."

In his later years, McNamara admitted his mistakes in forcing the services to accept a multipurpose aircraft that could do a "little bit of everything but accomplished nothing."

Little was done about it? Not in the USN. The Ault Report was commissioned resulting in NFWS. A lot was being done about it at every level. The problem is that the lay person isn't aware of the way things work. So much of the issues in SEA were caused by VID requirements and poor tactics that came from above. The services were hamstrung on employing ways to get around it. TCS/TSEO and NCTR resulted, both of which Boyd would have mocked. He trended towards obstinance, probably due to this hatred of Generals and Staff Officers. The Pentagon political realm is a good place to lose your soul.

The 40 second Boyd deal is just another BS story that gets passed along by people who have no way to confirm it. I'm sure he could beat some rookie who didn't know what they were doing.

The F111 mess was being opposed by thousands of Naval Officers across the spectrum. Boyd was merely another voice.
Boyd's mindset was simple in a lot of ways. Reduce complexity, fund and field superior numbers, overwhelm the enemy while taking your losses. Similar to the Cold War Soviet mindset it a lot of ways.

The problem in the cockpit is that you need good systems that give you SA so you dominate the OODA process, That's what bloggers and media don't understand about the F35. Boyd would have hated it, based on Pierre Sprey's, who has never flown a fighter much less under combat conditions, ridiculous comments about the aircraft.

The HM theory was very useful as a tool for basic maneuvering comparison to develop a basic game plan. It's become a holy grail for folks who don't fly airplanes, and have a tendency to view things from a 1v1 perspective. Today, a lot of Boyd's biases have been voided by the advent of EID methodology and reliable radars and weapons. It's a different world that wouldn't exist had industry followed Boyd's precepts.
 
Hunter111:

I tend to agree on just about everything you said. It sounds like you're speaking from experience so you'll get no argument from me here.
 
Acheron: Rutowski wrote a paper while at Douglas, but his application was time to climb performance for general aircraft usage and therefore economize the required fuel to get to altitude. Boyd took that general approach and applied it to all axis while in combat.
Yeah, the basic concept for climb performance and sustained maneuverability are based on power available versus power required and revolve around excess power for this process.
 
Interesting thread, and yes I have read Boyd's book. I'm familiar with the EM diagrams (for fighter aircraft), particularly the F15, F16, F14, and F18. I may have seen charts for airplanes built by "other" nations. In my opinion one should take everything with a grain of salt, and that applies to Boyd as well. His EM charts are a great thing, and it allows a fighter pilot, or aircraft designer, "see" how an airplane gains, holds, or loses energy. The pilot to understand where his jet is superior (safer to fight in this regime) or not (areas to stay away from). The designer to know what his last designs were deficient in, or what he has to do better than our adversaries.

As for the 40 seconds, from my understanding he would over G / depart the F-100 doing some canned maneuver he had mastered. If you can do something your opponent can't or won't, it's an advantage.

Also, even pioneers don't get everything "right", however they do stretch or expand the current envelope.

My last Operations Group Commander OG/CC on Active Duty was Col Dave Deptula. He was instrumental in Desert Storm planning and execution (as a Lt Col). His boss was removed, and without skipping a beat he picked up the ball and ran with it. He is a fan of Boyds, and has mentioned him plenty of times in conversations. The following two links are about General Dave "Zatar" Deptula. He is also currently the Dean of the Mitchell Institute. For those who have read Boyds book, or any of his writings you should see something of the philosophy in the second link.

Cheers,
Biff


 
The F-111 Aardvark program, a plane that was shoved down the Navy's throat was a very good example of the blue suiters & McNamara's "Wiz Kids" & their collective actions.
The F-111 story was fascinating and ended up becoming a circus. It kind of had to do with the USN & USAF coming up with two different requirements that McNamara asked his "Whiz Kids" if the should be combined into one specification, which they did.
John said it best when asked his opinion on the swing-wing bomber: "Just rip the wings off, give it a bench seat in the back & paint it yellow."
I think that had to do with the aircraft's Ps figures being inferior to all aircraft in the USAF inventory.
In his later years, McNamara admitted his mistakes in forcing the services to accept a multipurpose aircraft that could do a "little bit of everything but accomplished nothing."
I didn't know he said that, but it indicated more maturity.
 
Last edited:
Interesting thread, and yes I have read Boyd's book. I'm familiar with the EM diagrams (for fighter aircraft), particularly the F15, F16, F14, and F18. I may have seen charts for airplanes built by "other" nations. In my opinion one should take everything with a grain of salt, and that applies to Boyd as well. His EM charts are a great thing, and it allows a fighter pilot, or aircraft designer, "see" how an airplane gains, holds, or loses energy. The pilot to understand where his jet is superior (safer to fight in this regime) or not (areas to stay away from). The designer to know what his last designs were deficient in, or what he has to do better than our adversaries.

As for the 40 seconds, from my understanding he would over G / depart the F-100 doing some canned maneuver he had mastered. If you can do something your opponent can't or won't, it's an advantage.

Also, even pioneers don't get everything "right", however they do stretch or expand the current envelope.

My last Operations Group Commander OG/CC on Active Duty was Col Dave Deptula. He was instrumental in Desert Storm planning and execution (as a Lt Col). His boss was removed, and without skipping a beat he picked up the ball and ran with it. He is a fan of Boyds, and has mentioned him plenty of times in conversations. The following two links are about General Dave "Zatar" Deptula. He is also currently the Dean of the Mitchell Institute. For those who have read Boyds book, or any of his writings you should see something of the philosophy in the second link.

Cheers,
Biff


While a fan of the OODA loop and the thinking espoused by John Boyd, I have to question when people refer to Boyd's book(s). As far as I am aware, he never wrote a single book. Others have written books talking about him and his theories, but John never did. The most he put into writing as far as I am aware were his Destruction and Creation paper and Patterns of Conflict presentations:

 
I believe it is mentioned in this book:

81klPBLAONL._SL1500_.jpg
 
As an Amazon Associate we earn from qualifying purchases.
The F-111 Aardvark program, a plane that was shoved down the Navy's throat was a very good example of the blue suiters & McNamara's "Wiz Kids" & their collective actions.
It was shoved down the USAF's throat as well. Lemay favored the Boeing design but it was only about 25% common between the USAF and USN design. The GD design was more like 75% common and thus got the nod, not to mention it being built in Texas, which made Johnson happy.

The Super Weight Reduction Program was designed to get the weight down for the USN version and the Air Force suffered the consequences of that for decades thereafter. I spent countless hours inspecting and pressure testing F-111 bleed air ducts, when they could have been made much stronger if they had been manufactured weighing a few ounces more. That was true throughout the F-111.

The USAF did screw up royally by demanding long range supersonic terrain following, and no company could meet the specs, no matter how outrageous the design approach taken, which should have told them a lot right there. Ironically this turned out not only to be an expensive and counterproductive requirement but simply did not work well. Low altitude night attack was the way to go, all right but doing it while supersonic screamed, "Hey! I'm over here!" and actually increased your chance of being shot down. In reality the airplane the USN and USAF really wanted was the A-6. With that big radar in the nose it could have been a better version of the F6D Missileeer concept for fleet defense while with different avionics perfect for low altitude night attack. But while the USAF really wanted an "Attack" airplane, as the head of TAC said about the F-117 later, "This will be flown by our best fighter pilots and none of them will want to fly anything but a Fighter."

It would not have taken much to fix the F-111 for USAF use but the controversy about the airplane made sure that did not occur. Admit some things were wrong and you gave ammo to the critics. So when I went on active duty in 1974 we faced an airplane that had a lot of fixable things wrong with it, if the USAF had admitted it and quit trying to let GS-5's determine priorities, e.g., "So we have wing of F-111D's trying to deploy to fight a potential war in Korea after some US Army troops have been killed but pay attention to the letter from the GS-5 that defines an investigation into a missing flight jacket in another unit as your primary duty."

As for Boyd, his ability to translate fighter air combat maneuvering into a broader strategy is the most impressive thing about him.
 
Last edited:
While a fan of the OODA loop and the thinking espoused by John Boyd, I have to question when people refer to Boyd's book(s). As far as I am aware, he never wrote a single book. Others have written books talking about him and his theories, but John never did. The most he put into writing as far as I am aware were his Destruction and Creation paper and Patterns of Conflict presentations:

I didn't use proper English there. I was however referencing the book written by Robert Coram.
 
Is that the less hagiographic one? Or is it Hammond's book?
What is Coram's source? I'm curious because I think it's horseshtt.
Coram's book was one of only three books that I've found so intriguing, that I read it, three times. Admittedly, the second & third times I skipped his early years growing up & later working as a lifeguard & marrying his sweetheart & blah, blah; but once the book started delving into the "why" Boyd was able to earn that title "40-second Boyd" by discovering how to wring the max performance out of his Super Sabre, that's when things really get interesting.

Coram wrote it both in first person narrative, meaning he was one of the few fortunate (lucky?) individuals to work alongside Boyd & was supplemented by numerous reference sources from those whom they also worked with Boyd.

Rather than express the whole Boyd "mystique" as horseshit, I encourage you to pick up the book & read for yourself. Then, your opinion may have greater impact (credibility).
 
Coram's book was one of only three books that I've found so intriguing, that I read it, three times. Admittedly, the second & third times I skipped his early years growing up & later working as a lifeguard & marrying his sweetheart & blah, blah; but once the book started delving into the "why" Boyd was able to earn that title "40-second Boyd" by discovering how to wring the max performance out of his Super Sabre, that's when things really get interesting.

Coram wrote it both in first person narrative, meaning he was one of the few fortunate (lucky?) individuals to work alongside Boyd & was supplemented by numerous reference sources from those whom they also worked with Boyd.

Rather than express the whole Boyd "mystique" as horseshit, I encourage you to pick up the book & read for yourself. Then, your opinion may have greater impact (credibility).
I think it's horseshtt that he personally advised Cheney on the Left Hook in Desert Storm. I'm sorry if my positive view of him is limited to energy maneuverability. A very important metric.
If he's a personal hero of yours, I apologize.
 
It was shoved down the USAF's throat as well. Lemay favored the Boeing design but it was only about 25% common between the USAF and USN design. The GD design was more like 75% common and thus got the nod, not to mention it being built in Texas, which made Johnson happy.

The Super Weight Reduction Program was designed to get the weight down for the USN version and the Air Force suffered the consequences of that for decades thereafter. I spent countless hours inspecting and pressure testing F-111 bleed air ducts, when they could have been made much stronger if they had been manufactured weighing a few ounces more. That was true throughout the F-111.

The USAF did screw up royally by demanding long range supersonic terrain following, and no company could meet the specs, no matter how outrageous the design approach taken, which should have told them a lot right there. Ironically this turned out not only to be an expensive and counterproductive requirement but simply did not work well. Low altitude night attack was the way to go, all right but doing it while supersonic screamed, "Hey! I'm over here!" and actually increased your chance of being shot down. In reality the airplane the USN and USAF really wanted was the A-6. With that big radar in the nose it could have been a better version of the F6D Missileeer concept for fleet defense while with different avionics perfect for low altitude night attack. But while the USAF really wanted an "Attack" airplane, as the head of TAC said about the F-117 later, "This will be flown by our best fighter pilots and none of them will want to fly anything but a Fighter."

It would not have taken much to fix the F-111 for USAF use but the controversy about the airplane made sure that did not occur. Admit some things were wrong and you gave ammo to the critics. So when I went on active duty in 1974 we faced an airplane that had a lot of fixable things wrong with it, if the USAF had admitted it and quit trying to let GS-5's determine priorities, e.g., "So we have wing of F-111D's trying to deploy to fight a potential war in Korea after some US Army troops have been killed but pay attention to the letter from the GS-5 that defines an investigation into a missing flight jacket in another unit as your primary duty."

As for Boyd, his ability to translate fighter air combat maneuvering into a broader strategy is the most impressive thing about him.
A lot of information has come out about how GD got the TFX contract and it ain't pretty. The GD commonality advantage came from them counting fasteners as being common parts. There's a book or a good summary was in the American Aviation Historical Society journal. Amazon.com
 
As an Amazon Associate we earn from qualifying purchases.
I think it's horseshtt that he personally advised Cheney on the Left Hook in Desert Storm. I'm sorry if my positive view of him is limited to energy maneuverability. A very important metric.
If he's a personal hero of yours, I apologize.
Actually, the narrative that Boyd advised Cheney on the "Left Hook" is taken out of context. To read that sentence verbatim suggests that Boyd was called by Cheney into his office & Boyd then advised Cheney on the specifics of utilizing tactics that applied solely to Operation Desert Storm.

Nothing could be further from the truth.

Boyd was widely known for giving what is called "The Brief." This "Brief" did not cover any specific tactics relating to Desert Storm. Rather, it was an all-day affair that tested the limits, the patience & indeed, the endurance of those on receiving end of the "Brief" by Boyd.

Boyd discussed energy management, theory, philosophy, Sun Tzu (who was extremely influential in "The Art of War,") Hannibal, Alexander the Great, Gengis Kahn, Napoleon, the "blitzkreig, guerilla warfare, mathematics as it applied to the 3- dimensional world of fighter aircraft, astrophysics, general battlefield tactics that were learned the hard way & more.

None applied directly to Desert Storm.

Taken as a whole, one could apply any combination of these tactics & knowledge to come up with a battle plan that would be decisive in its outcome.

Long story made short; Boyd's "Brief" was getting (unwanted) attention of the blue suiters who were immersed in the Eisenhower Doctrine of bigger, heavier & faster. All this attention was creating a lot of hell for the people in the Pentagon & Dick Cheney got a wind of it & was one of the few willing to keep an open mind & endure the complete brief.

It was from this brief that Dick Cheney, as ( then ) Vice President worked with General Schwarzkopf & they came up with this "Left Hook."
 
It was from this brief that Dick Cheney, as ( then ) Vice President worked with General Schwarzkopf & they came up with this "Left Hook."
He was Secretary of Defense not VP. No history of Desert Storm mentions this aside from Boyd's biography. Did Cheney ever confirm meeting him? My condolences to anyone who had to sit through post-EM Boyd's ramblings.
There's EM Boyd and then there's the Cult of Boyd. I prefer not confusing the two.

Aerial Attack Study is online.
 

Users who are viewing this thread

Back