Skyediamonds
Staff Sergeant
- 1,204
- May 26, 2018
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His theories & codes were at farsighted, at least in his time, which were well over 50 years ago. True, Navy & Air Force were dogfighting for years & the kill ratio fell dismally low during the Viet Nam War. As the book described it, very little was done about it.
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The overstatement of John as 40-second Boyd may have been true, but it was backed up by countless witnesses & was well documented. So there has to be some validity somewhere.
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The F-111 Aardvark program, a plane that was shoved down the Navy's throat was a very good example of the blue suiters & McNamara's "Wiz Kids" & their collective actions.
John said it best when asked his opinion on the swing-wing bomber: "Just rip the wings off, give it a bench seat in the back & paint it yellow."
In his later years, McNamara admitted his mistakes in forcing the services to accept a multipurpose aircraft that could do a "little bit of everything but accomplished nothing."
Yeah, the basic concept for climb performance and sustained maneuverability are based on power available versus power required and revolve around excess power for this process.Acheron: Rutowski wrote a paper while at Douglas, but his application was time to climb performance for general aircraft usage and therefore economize the required fuel to get to altitude. Boyd took that general approach and applied it to all axis while in combat.
The F-111 story was fascinating and ended up becoming a circus. It kind of had to do with the USN & USAF coming up with two different requirements that McNamara asked his "Whiz Kids" if the should be combined into one specification, which they did.The F-111 Aardvark program, a plane that was shoved down the Navy's throat was a very good example of the blue suiters & McNamara's "Wiz Kids" & their collective actions.
I think that had to do with the aircraft's Ps figures being inferior to all aircraft in the USAF inventory.John said it best when asked his opinion on the swing-wing bomber: "Just rip the wings off, give it a bench seat in the back & paint it yellow."
I didn't know he said that, but it indicated more maturity.In his later years, McNamara admitted his mistakes in forcing the services to accept a multipurpose aircraft that could do a "little bit of everything but accomplished nothing."
Where is this written and does Cheney confirm it? In The Generals War by Michael Gordon & Bernard Trainor, he's never mentioned.Boyd was a substantial part of the initial plans of the Gulf War. Dick Cheney had known about Boyd for years
While a fan of the OODA loop and the thinking espoused by John Boyd, I have to question when people refer to Boyd's book(s). As far as I am aware, he never wrote a single book. Others have written books talking about him and his theories, but John never did. The most he put into writing as far as I am aware were his Destruction and Creation paper and Patterns of Conflict presentations:Interesting thread, and yes I have read Boyd's book. I'm familiar with the EM diagrams (for fighter aircraft), particularly the F15, F16, F14, and F18. I may have seen charts for airplanes built by "other" nations. In my opinion one should take everything with a grain of salt, and that applies to Boyd as well. His EM charts are a great thing, and it allows a fighter pilot, or aircraft designer, "see" how an airplane gains, holds, or loses energy. The pilot to understand where his jet is superior (safer to fight in this regime) or not (areas to stay away from). The designer to know what his last designs were deficient in, or what he has to do better than our adversaries.
As for the 40 seconds, from my understanding he would over G / depart the F-100 doing some canned maneuver he had mastered. If you can do something your opponent can't or won't, it's an advantage.
Also, even pioneers don't get everything "right", however they do stretch or expand the current envelope.
My last Operations Group Commander OG/CC on Active Duty was Col Dave Deptula. He was instrumental in Desert Storm planning and execution (as a Lt Col). His boss was removed, and without skipping a beat he picked up the ball and ran with it. He is a fan of Boyds, and has mentioned him plenty of times in conversations. The following two links are about General Dave "Zatar" Deptula. He is also currently the Dean of the Mitchell Institute. For those who have read Boyds book, or any of his writings you should see something of the philosophy in the second link.
Cheers,
Biff
I believe it is mentioned in this book:Where is this written and does Cheney confirm it? In The Generals War by Michael Gordon & Bernard Trainor, he's never mentioned.
It was shoved down the USAF's throat as well. Lemay favored the Boeing design but it was only about 25% common between the USAF and USN design. The GD design was more like 75% common and thus got the nod, not to mention it being built in Texas, which made Johnson happy.The F-111 Aardvark program, a plane that was shoved down the Navy's throat was a very good example of the blue suiters & McNamara's "Wiz Kids" & their collective actions.
I didn't use proper English there. I was however referencing the book written by Robert Coram.While a fan of the OODA loop and the thinking espoused by John Boyd, I have to question when people refer to Boyd's book(s). As far as I am aware, he never wrote a single book. Others have written books talking about him and his theories, but John never did. The most he put into writing as far as I am aware were his Destruction and Creation paper and Patterns of Conflict presentations:
Is that the less hagiographic one? Or is it Hammond's book?believe it is mentioned in this book:
Coram's book was one of only three books that I've found so intriguing, that I read it, three times. Admittedly, the second & third times I skipped his early years growing up & later working as a lifeguard & marrying his sweetheart & blah, blah; but once the book started delving into the "why" Boyd was able to earn that title "40-second Boyd" by discovering how to wring the max performance out of his Super Sabre, that's when things really get interesting.Is that the less hagiographic one? Or is it Hammond's book?
What is Coram's source? I'm curious because I think it's horseshtt.
I think it's horseshtt that he personally advised Cheney on the Left Hook in Desert Storm. I'm sorry if my positive view of him is limited to energy maneuverability. A very important metric.Coram's book was one of only three books that I've found so intriguing, that I read it, three times. Admittedly, the second & third times I skipped his early years growing up & later working as a lifeguard & marrying his sweetheart & blah, blah; but once the book started delving into the "why" Boyd was able to earn that title "40-second Boyd" by discovering how to wring the max performance out of his Super Sabre, that's when things really get interesting.
Coram wrote it both in first person narrative, meaning he was one of the few fortunate (lucky?) individuals to work alongside Boyd & was supplemented by numerous reference sources from those whom they also worked with Boyd.
Rather than express the whole Boyd "mystique" as horseshit, I encourage you to pick up the book & read for yourself. Then, your opinion may have greater impact (credibility).
A lot of information has come out about how GD got the TFX contract and it ain't pretty. The GD commonality advantage came from them counting fasteners as being common parts. There's a book or a good summary was in the American Aviation Historical Society journal. Amazon.comIt was shoved down the USAF's throat as well. Lemay favored the Boeing design but it was only about 25% common between the USAF and USN design. The GD design was more like 75% common and thus got the nod, not to mention it being built in Texas, which made Johnson happy.
The Super Weight Reduction Program was designed to get the weight down for the USN version and the Air Force suffered the consequences of that for decades thereafter. I spent countless hours inspecting and pressure testing F-111 bleed air ducts, when they could have been made much stronger if they had been manufactured weighing a few ounces more. That was true throughout the F-111.
The USAF did screw up royally by demanding long range supersonic terrain following, and no company could meet the specs, no matter how outrageous the design approach taken, which should have told them a lot right there. Ironically this turned out not only to be an expensive and counterproductive requirement but simply did not work well. Low altitude night attack was the way to go, all right but doing it while supersonic screamed, "Hey! I'm over here!" and actually increased your chance of being shot down. In reality the airplane the USN and USAF really wanted was the A-6. With that big radar in the nose it could have been a better version of the F6D Missileeer concept for fleet defense while with different avionics perfect for low altitude night attack. But while the USAF really wanted an "Attack" airplane, as the head of TAC said about the F-117 later, "This will be flown by our best fighter pilots and none of them will want to fly anything but a Fighter."
It would not have taken much to fix the F-111 for USAF use but the controversy about the airplane made sure that did not occur. Admit some things were wrong and you gave ammo to the critics. So when I went on active duty in 1974 we faced an airplane that had a lot of fixable things wrong with it, if the USAF had admitted it and quit trying to let GS-5's determine priorities, e.g., "So we have wing of F-111D's trying to deploy to fight a potential war in Korea after some US Army troops have been killed but pay attention to the letter from the GS-5 that defines an investigation into a missing flight jacket in another unit as your primary duty."
As for Boyd, his ability to translate fighter air combat maneuvering into a broader strategy is the most impressive thing about him.
Actually, the narrative that Boyd advised Cheney on the "Left Hook" is taken out of context. To read that sentence verbatim suggests that Boyd was called by Cheney into his office & Boyd then advised Cheney on the specifics of utilizing tactics that applied solely to Operation Desert Storm.I think it's horseshtt that he personally advised Cheney on the Left Hook in Desert Storm. I'm sorry if my positive view of him is limited to energy maneuverability. A very important metric.
If he's a personal hero of yours, I apologize.
He was Secretary of Defense not VP. No history of Desert Storm mentions this aside from Boyd's biography. Did Cheney ever confirm meeting him? My condolences to anyone who had to sit through post-EM Boyd's ramblings.It was from this brief that Dick Cheney, as ( then ) Vice President worked with General Schwarzkopf & they came up with this "Left Hook."