Lancaster as an escorted, daylight bomber ala B-17/24?

[nuuumannn]

A couple of obvious responses to your comments

I suspect our colleague is merely trolling, as some of his statements are bordering on the ridiculous and are very much unsubstantiated.

Out of general interest, in 1942, the Air Fighting Development Unit at RAF Duxford carried out tactical trials by day and night using a 44 Sqn Lancaster I. Subsequently, a 'flying circus' of three Spitfires visited all the squadrons within No.5 Group Bomber Command to carry out familiarisation flights with the bomber crews. The following is taken from the report, No.47 Tactical Trials - Lancaster Aircraft. Under the heading Fighting Manoeuvres For Formations, there is a description of what action Lancasters should take when formation flying by day.

"28. It has also been found in the majority of recent daylight operations that the German fighters are shy of the power-operated turrets and stand off at 600-400 yards using their cannon. The result is that if any close formation is adopted by the bombers they present a mass target while adding nothing to their mutual fire support, owing to the extreme difficulty of achieving a correct aim at long range with our present sights.""29. It has therefore been necessary to develop a form of evasive action, which will give the bombers a chance to carry out individual evasion while maintaining their track to the target and giving each other assistance. Just before the fighters attack the Lancasters should climb up to 600 feet and numbers 2 and 3 should come well up on the beam of the leader."

"When the fighters close in the leader of the vic should undulate violently between 600 feet and ground level, while Nos. 2 and 3 carry out a modified form of corkscrew on either side of the leader beginning with a diving turn outwards of about 20 degrees and varying their height between 600 and 100 feet. Practise is necessary to ensure that the outside aircraft are never more than 300 to 400 yards from the leader and that they do not mask his guns by sliding in behind him during their inward movement. Nos. 2 and 3 should attempt to keep as close as possible to the leader until an attack actually develops so that during their evasion they will not go too far away from him. This evasive manoeuvre enables the formation to continue upon track while it gives the fighters difficult deflection shooting."

"The fighters found it hard to attack the leader as he was protected by the guns of the outside aircraft, and if they followed an outside aircraft in its corkscrew, they were soon drawn under the leader's guns. A further advantage of this manoeuvre is that the slip stream of the formation is fanned out over a large area and frequently upsets the fighter's aim, being particularly unpleasant near the ground."

These manoeuvres were practised at low level, which makes them remarkable. In a paragraph about high altitude formation flying it states that they could also be carried out to the detriment of the fighters pursuing, but that good fighting control from the lead aircraft was essential.

 

[nuuumannn]

A Lancaster carried more bomb load only because it had less armament, less armor and, this is a big one, it had less redundancy of systems.

Actually no, not at all. It does depend on which model of the B-17 we are discussing, because the early B through D models had an all hand held armament of four or five machine guns. The Manchester was designed from the outset to have four power operated gun turrets, with a total of no less than ten machine guns, and that was with that massive 33 foot long bomb bay that was unique in any in-service bomber of the war. Obviously, between the Manchester and the Lancaster, the four Merlins as opposed to two Vultures enabled the Lancaster to have a greater MTOW and thus a larger bomb load, but certainly not at the sacrifice of armament or armour or anything. In fact, the Lancaster was faster, had a larger load lifting capability, longer range and greater ceiling than the Manchester, yet could carry the same armament of ten machine guns.

The underside turret on both types was removed because it proved uncomfortable to use, not to save weight. This reduced both types' armament to eight machine guns, but still all contained in power operated turrets. The B-17E and F sometimes had fewer guns than the Lancaster/Manchester was designed to carry, and only four of them were in two power turrets; the 'G certainly had more than the Lancaster was nominally fitted with, but it wasn't until the 'G model that the B-17 had an equal number of powered turrets. Lots of guns doesn't mean accuracy. Power turrets proved to be far more accurate than hand held guns.

The Lancaster had plenty of redundancy built in, systems wise. It had an engine driven hydraulic pump on both inboard engines and a hand pump as a back up, as well as an accumulator, and the gun turrets, driven through the aircraft's hydraulic system each had their own engine driven pump in the different engines aside from the main hydraulic system pumps. There was also a vacuum pump fitted to both inboard engines, again for redundancy in case of failure of one, for the instruments and gyros for the Mk.XIV bomb sight. The electrical system was based around two 1,500 watt generators, as well as the 24 volt battery. Each fuel tank was fitted with its own electrically driven fuel booster pump, and a back-up system was was provided in the form of suction by-pass lines when the pumps were not in use.

 

[nuuumannn]

I dunno if it has been mentioned yet, but it is worth remembering that when the US 8th AF arrived in the UK in 1942 and begun its daylight raids, the doctrine was that these were to be unescorted and the bombers had to rely on their machine gun and formation defences alone. The British advised that this was folly and mounting losses also proved it. As a result of a US officer flying with a Lancaster crew during night raids and observing, the 422nd Bomb Sqn was assigned to fly on a series of Bomber Command night raids in September 1943. Despite good results and low losses, two B-17s being shot down in 35 sorties, the idea of the 8th flying night raids was not continued.

 

[GrauGeist]

It might be interesting to note, that the powered turrets could not get accurate aim on enemy aircraft (as they passed) during head-on attacks or later, when they encountered the Me262.
The flexible-mount gunners (waist positions, for example) had a better chance at catching an Me262 by "lead shooting" their target because they could swing faster.

 

[fastmongrel]

Testing showed that manually operated beam/waist guns rarely hit anything. They were useful as deterrent guns, no pilot likes flying into fire. Trying to hit anything must have been like trying clay pigeon shooting while standing in the back of a moving vehicle.

 

[Koopernic]

I suspect our colleague is merely trolling, as some of his statements are bordering on the ridiculous and are very much unsubstantiated.

Out of general interest, in 1942, the Air Fighting Development Unit at RAF Duxford carried out tactical trials by day and night using a 44 Sqn Lancaster I. Subsequently, a 'flying circus' of three Spitfires visited all the squadrons within No.5 Group Bomber Command to carry out familiarisation flights with the bomber crews. The following is taken from the report, No.47 Tactical Trials - Lancaster Aircraft. Under the heading Fighting Manoeuvres For Formations, there is a description of what action Lancasters should take when formation flying by day.

"28. It has also been found in the majority of recent daylight operations that the German fighters are shy of the power-operated turrets and stand off at 600-400 yards using their cannon. The result is that if any close formation is adopted by the bombers they present a mass target while adding nothing to their mutual fire support, owing to the extreme difficulty of achieving a correct aim at long range with our present sights.""29. It has therefore been necessary to develop a form of evasive action, which will give the bombers a chance to carry out individual evasion while maintaining their track to the target and giving each other assistance. Just before the fighters attack the Lancasters should climb up to 600 feet and numbers 2 and 3 should come well up on the beam of the leader."

"When the fighters close in the leader of the vic should undulate violently between 600 feet and ground level, while Nos. 2 and 3 carry out a modified form of corkscrew on either side of the leader beginning with a diving turn outwards of about 20 degrees and varying their height between 600 and 100 feet. Practise is necessary to ensure that the outside aircraft are never more than 300 to 400 yards from the leader and that they do not mask his guns by sliding in behind him during their inward movement. Nos. 2 and 3 should attempt to keep as close as possible to the leader until an attack actually develops so that during their evasion they will not go too far away from him. This evasive manoeuvre enables the formation to continue upon track while it gives the fighters difficult deflection shooting."

"The fighters found it hard to attack the leader as he was protected by the guns of the outside aircraft, and if they followed an outside aircraft in its corkscrew, they were soon drawn under the leader's guns. A further advantage of this manoeuvre is that the slip stream of the formation is fanned out over a large area and frequently upsets the fighter's aim, being particularly unpleasant near the ground."

These manoeuvres were practised at low level, which makes them remarkable. In a paragraph about high altitude formation flying it states that they could also be carried out to the detriment of the fighters pursuing, but that good fighting control from the lead aircraft was essential.

So in 1942 RAF bomber command found out it could avoid being shot down by RAF spitfires in pursuit. To bad they didn't explain their tactics to the 8th USAAF as it could have spared them a lot of trouble. How did they handle head on attacks?

 

[Koopernic]

Yes, you're absolutely right. The ability of the Lancaster to carry a typical bomb load of 14,000lb for a range in excess of 2,000 miles is largely due to it having fewer redundant systems.

Oh...and the extra armour which was needed to protect the extra crew which were needed to fire the extra guns...at least 4 of which (depending on the variant) were pintle-mounted and of more use to crew morale than they were a threat to the enemy fighters.

By comparison, the B-24 is carrying a max of 8,000lb over 1,500 miles or the B-17 carrying 6,000lb over 2,000 miles are clearly the better weapons.




Relatively easy to fit Allisons to the B-17? I'm not going to touch that nonsense.

Without quoting range altitude your numbers are meaningless for comparison purposes. Why did Coastal command need b24 to close "the gap"?

 

[buffnut453]

Without quoting range altitude your numbers are meaningless for comparison purposes.

Nice to know that range and bomb load are meaningless. I wish you'd been around to share your pearls of wisdom with the men who levied the performance requirements for aircraft.

You should note, however, that altitude is a double-edged sword. While greater altitude may help protect aircraft from flak, it also reduces bombing accuracy which means you need more aircraft to hit the target or repeat trips to finish the job, all of which expose more crews.

Why did Coastal command need b24 to close "the gap"?

Because Bomber Command refused to release any of the Lancaster production for Coastal Command. And the reason the Lancaster was in such high demand was because of its bomb capacity and range.

 

[buffnut453]

So in 1942 RAF bomber command found out it could avoid being shot down by RAF spitfires in pursuit. To bad they didn't explain their tactics to the 8th USAAF as it could have spared them a lot of trouble.

Bomber Command did share knowledge and experience with the USAAF and warned against unescorted daylight raids. The RAF was ignored, with predictable results in the early part of 1943.

How did they handle head on attacks?

With the two machine guns in the power turret fitted to every RAF heavy bomber. Of all the Allied heavy bombers, only the early B-24s and B-17s went to war without forward-facing defences...and it took until the G-variant for the latter to get decent forward protection.

 

[fastmongrel]

Why did Coastal command need b24 to close "the gap"?

Buffnut has already answered this but I will add further information. Postwar the RAF Coastal Command used Lancs as Maritime patrol aircraft regularly flying to the Arctic sea to hunt Soviet naval forces. They were replaced by Avro Shackleton's from 1953.

The Canadian air force also used Lancs as Maritime patrol particularly in the Greenland Straits region. They were used until replaced by the C107 Argus.

France used Lancs as Maritime patrol and air sea rescue into the 1960s.

Several other airforces used Lancs for similar maritime services.

During WW2 the RCAF used specially modified MkX Lancs to ferry aircrew back to America that had flown aircraft to the UK. The usual flight time for these journeys was 13 1/2 hours with 15 hours not unheard of due to weather.

 

[GrauGeist]

With the two machine guns in the power turret fitted to every RAF heavy bomber. Of all the Allied heavy bombers, only the early B-24s and B-17s went to war without forward-facing defences...and it took until the G-variant for the latter to get decent forward protection.

The B-17F had the upper turret, a .50 in the nose and two .50s, one to each side, in the "cheek" area.
The B-24E/D had "cheek" positions as well as the upper turret, the G-1 had the A-6 nose turret.
So both weren't completely helpless to frontal attack, just not as effective as ones with the twin .50 turrets installed in either's next variants.

 

[fastmongrel]

The B-17F had the upper turret, a .50 in the nose and two .50s, one to each side, in the "cheek" area.
The B-24E/D had "cheek" positions as well as the upper turret, the G-1 had the A-6 nose turret.
So both weren't completely helpless to frontal attack, just not as effective as ones with the twin .50 turrets installed in either's next variants.

Who manned the cheek guns was it the Navigator.

 

[MikeMeech]

Because Bomber Command refused to release any of the Lancaster production for Coastal Command. And the reason the Lancaster was in such high demand was because of its bomb capacity and range.

Hi

Not totally correct as Bomber Command did lend Lancasters and crews to Coastal Command during 1942 (although BC were not flush with the type at the time). I have attached a few details from work I undertook for a naval historian in 2006:

I hope that is of interest.

Mike

 

[MikeMeech]

Hi

Not totally correct as Bomber Command did lend Lancasters and crews to Coastal Command during 1942 (although BC were not flush with the type at the time). I have attached a few details from work I undertook for a naval historian in 2006:

View attachment 604412

I hope that is of interest.

Mike

Hi

Further to the above BC's ORBAT for early 1942 shows them to have 55 squadrons, 11 of which are four engine (Stirling, Halifax and Lancaster) of which four are operational. Coastal Command have, on 12 February 1942, ten of its squadrons equipped with LR/VLR aircraft (Liberator, Sunderland, Catalina and Fortress), these would be equipped with ASV.

Mike

 

[GrauGeist]

Who manned the cheek guns was it the Navigator.

Navigator and bombardier (as long as the bombardier wasn't engaged in the bombing run).

 

[Admiral Beez]

Given all its guns, was the B-17 effective in defending itself from Luftwaffe fighters?

 

[buffnut453]

The B-17F had the upper turret, a .50 in the nose and two .50s, one to each side, in the "cheek" area.
The B-24E/D had "cheek" positions as well as the upper turret, the G-1 had the A-6 nose turret.
So both weren't completely helpless to frontal attack, just not as effective as ones with the twin .50 turrets installed in either's next variants.

Agreed but the the first variants of both airframes to see combat lacked those features, and it rather depends on which build block as to the precise armament that was available. The cheek guns and various ad hoc up-arming of nose guns in general were a reflection of this defensive weakness but, as you point out, the effectiveness was somewhat limited, not least because the lack of space in the nose made it difficult to operate multiple guns at the same time (and only one could be operated during the bombing run).

 

[buffnut453]

Hi

Not totally correct as Bomber Command did lend Lancasters and crews to Coastal Command during 1942 (although BC were not flush with the type at the time). I have attached a few details from work I undertook for a naval historian in 2006:

View attachment 604412

I hope that is of interest.

Mike

Hi Mike,

Thanks for those interesting details.

Yes, there were a few loaned Lancasters but all efforts to officially equip CC with the type failed. It was the lack of a true long-range patrol capability that directly led to the procurement of B-24s.

Such was the attitude of the Air Ministry to CC that, throughout 1942, they barely received enough replacement airframes to make up for losses. It was not until 1943 that CC finally started getting the resources it required, including more B-24s.

 

[Glider]

I suspect our colleague is merely trolling, as some of his statements are bordering on the ridiculous and are very much unsubstantiated.

Out of general interest, in 1942, the Air Fighting Development Unit at RAF Duxford carried out tactical trials by day and night using a 44 Sqn Lancaster I. Subsequently, a 'flying circus' of three Spitfires visited all the squadrons within No.5 Group Bomber Command to carry out familiarisation flights with the bomber crews. The following is taken from the report, No.47 Tactical Trials - Lancaster Aircraft. Under the heading Fighting Manoeuvres For Formations, there is a description of what action Lancasters should take when formation flying by day.

"28. It has also been found in the majority of recent daylight operations that the German fighters are shy of the power-operated turrets and stand off at 600-400 yards using their cannon. The result is that if any close formation is adopted by the bombers they present a mass target while adding nothing to their mutual fire support, owing to the extreme difficulty of achieving a correct aim at long range with our present sights.""29. It has therefore been necessary to develop a form of evasive action, which will give the bombers a chance to carry out individual evasion while maintaining their track to the target and giving each other assistance. Just before the fighters attack the Lancasters should climb up to 600 feet and numbers 2 and 3 should come well up on the beam of the leader."

"When the fighters close in the leader of the vic should undulate violently between 600 feet and ground level, while Nos. 2 and 3 carry out a modified form of corkscrew on either side of the leader beginning with a diving turn outwards of about 20 degrees and varying their height between 600 and 100 feet. Practise is necessary to ensure that the outside aircraft are never more than 300 to 400 yards from the leader and that they do not mask his guns by sliding in behind him during their inward movement. Nos. 2 and 3 should attempt to keep as close as possible to the leader until an attack actually develops so that during their evasion they will not go too far away from him. This evasive manoeuvre enables the formation to continue upon track while it gives the fighters difficult deflection shooting."

"The fighters found it hard to attack the leader as he was protected by the guns of the outside aircraft, and if they followed an outside aircraft in its corkscrew, they were soon drawn under the leader's guns. A further advantage of this manoeuvre is that the slip stream of the formation is fanned out over a large area and frequently upsets the fighter's aim, being particularly unpleasant near the ground."

These manoeuvres were practised at low level, which makes them remarkable. In a paragraph about high altitude formation flying it states that they could also be carried out to the detriment of the fighters pursuing, but that good fighting control from the lead aircraft was essential.

This makes a lot of sense. I was reading about one raid and the Halifax's flew a fairly loose formation and when attacked the target aircraft was instructed to leave the formation in a shallow dive. The idea being that the attacking fighter is being drawn into the fire of the other aircraft and the target has the freedom to evade reducing the chances of a hit.

 

[GrauGeist]

Given all its guns, was the B-17 effective in defending itself from Luftwaffe fighters?

The B-17 was not impervious to attacking enemy aircraft, but it's defenses were such, that the Germans put alot of effort into applying armor to their Fw190A-8/R8 to protect the pilot.