Luftwaffe after BoB: strategy, tactics, tecnology?

stona said:

The root problem with the Me 210/410 seems to have been a misunderstanding at the RLM of what Messerschmitt AG was offering. The RLM was expecting a direct derivative of the trusty and reliable Bf 110, hence the order now seemingly premature order for 2,000 aircraft. Messerschmitt were planning an entirely new design and had come to the conclusion that this was required some time in late 1937 or early 1938, certainly before the RLM issued the contract for the type.

Where the blame lies I know not, but many seem to lay it at Messerschmitt's door, and specifically Messerschmitt himself. This seems a bit unfair as the RLM must have been made aware that Messerschmitt were preparing an entirely new design but failed to appreciate how far removed from the old Bf 110 it was going to be.

The problems were not quickly resolved. The type was designed in 1938, first flew in September 1939, but was still not a 'significant player' (Milch's own words) in 1942. Messerschmitt AG promised 95 completed and modified airframes by the end of 1942 and that is indeed an insignificant number. It took four years to really rectify the problems.

Cheers

Steve

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In Frank Vann's biography of Willy Messerschmitt he reproduces some stenographic minutes of a meeting where Erhardt Milch forces Willy Messerschmitt to modify the Me 210 airframes to the new standard (lengthened tail slats).Milch makes a point of saying they should be "modified to Woldemar Voigts orginal design" to rub it in. It sent Messerschmitt's company broke and lead to Messerschmitt losing control of his own company. The aeronautical engineer Rudiger Kosin (he designed the Ar 234 and invented the Kruger Flap) in his book "The German Fighter" claims that the engineer test pilot for the Me 210 came out of the first flight 'pale' and immediately stated on landing that the aircraft required a longer tail and slats. He also repeats that supposedly Willy intervened in the design process to shorten the tail and remove slats (which had to be added in again). Unfortunatly tooling had been made, aircraft produced.

The problem was fully solved by June 1942 when the Me 210A1(long) entered service.

Of course Messerschmitt was trying to do the best. Basically Willy Gambled, the Luftwaffe Gambled, the RLM Gambled and they lost. I guess they should have just taken it philosophically but the recriminations set in. Nothing peculiar German or Nazi about that. I've seen the same happen when big projects have gone to pot. The recriminations probably damaged a lot of otherwise talented people.

The 'black up' Arado 240 also had problems, they tried a laminar flow profile I think which was troublesome, but they identified too short a tail as well. It was starved of resources and funds even during the prototype stage so the problems were only slightly partially with. It was faster than the Me 210 and managed to fly over the UK unopposed as a recon though it lacked a bomb bay.

Reservations were expressed about the characteristics of the Me 210 V1, according to Wurster, after the very first flight (2nd September 1939) he said that the fuselage would have to be lengthened by a metre to which Messerschmitt replied that he wasn't about to throw away '3 million jigs'.
Nonetheless on 15th September Wurster reported:

"At present no essential changes are required. The minor complaints listed in the flight reports were remedied."

It's this sort of self deception which seems endemic across the German aviation industry that led to all the subsequent problems.

The first lengthened fuselage was the V17. The work was carried out in October 1941 and the aircraft was used for testing until February 1942. It was eventually fitted with DB 605 engines and became in effect the C series prototype.

The idea that the Me 210 was 'fixed' by 1942 is a moot point. The first test reports on the modified aircraft were issued on 27th April. These were reinforced with the results based on 140 test flights issued on 5th May, they too were positive. Despite this on 27th April Milch had emphasised that the decision to stop all work on the type and to divert the sub contractors to other work stood. Nearly 100 short framed Me 210s parked at Obertraubling were earmarked for destruction and in June 1942 some were actually chopped up. The decision to produce 95 of the improved version, taken on the 19th of that month, probably saved the rest. Some sources indicate that about 180 'long' Me 210 A-1s were produced from the 354 Me 210 A-1s finished with the short fuselage from both Augsburg and Regensburg plants. According to documents from the BAL only 160 were converted, which agrees with your source above. You takes your choice!
There were a further 108 unassembled aircraft and 98 in the initial stages of production which is from where the often quoted total of 540 airframes derives.

By September the designation Me 410 starts to appear, the first five were delivered on 8th December. The Luftwaffe was originally supposed to have had 210 (with DB 603) of them by the end of 1942, so things weren't exactly running to the plan, though RLM minutes describe those 8 as being on schedule. They were probably the first batch of the updated plan to modify only 95 airframes.

The modification of an Me 210 to the lengthened and slatted version cost Messerschmitt AG 3,400 man hours per airframe. The total cost of the fiasco to the company has been estimated at 38,000,000 RM. The RLM would not foot the bill, which is hardly surprising. That's why Prof. Messerschmitt was removed from his management role.

Without going into all the details of the chaos at the various production facilities, lines being built and disassembled, thousands of workers effectively unemployed for periods, train loads of jigs and partially completed airframes heading for Augsburg, it is worth pointing out that between October and December 1941 not a single Bf 109 left the Regensburg plant. Regensburg was supposed to produce 250 Bf 109s per month, but this figure wasn't reached for many months.

Cheers

Steve

ouch!

I confess not knowing much about the Me210 or 410. The 210 had an obvious troubled history. Yet the Hungarians built quite a few of them, and used them extensively. they were apparently very happy with them. Why is that?

parsifal said:

I confess not knowing much about the Me210 or 410. The 210 had an obvious troubled history. Yet the Hungarians built quite a few of them, and used them extensively. they were apparently very happy with them. Why is that?

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They built the 210C variant that corrected all the problems, while in the meantime Germany upgraded the engines to the DB603 and renamed it the Me410.

The Hungarians built 302 Me 210s. The exact number varies slightly from source to source, but not by much.

Hungarian production started late in 1942 and they built the modified version with DB 605 engines. They also reduced the armament and removed all the extra armour the Germans were putting in their version making a lighter aeroplane.

The modified Me 210 did for the most part overcome the problems that had been plaguing the type since 1939. The Luftwaffe finally got an aeroplane which could be flown by service pilots, but more than two years late.

Cheers

Steve

So, after all the trouble, how does the Me410 stack up against the competition?

Shortround6 said:

A little 'selective' in the warload Tomo?

The Early Ju-87s had 'normal' bombload of one 250kg bomb and four 50kg bombs, The Early Hs 129s could carry one 250kg bomb and two 50kg bombs. Doesn't seem like a big advantage for the Ju-87, granted the Ju-87 can go to heavier bombs and ditch the under wing bombs.

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The early Hs-129 could not carry any meaningful bomb load, the Argus engines were simply of a too low power, so the Hs-129A never flew a combat sortie. Unlike the Ju-87B that is, by the time the French radials installed, almost three years in service, with Ju-87D in production for more than half a year.
Basically, Henschel was a much more important asset for the German war effort between 1939 to mid 1942with the biplane Hs-123 than with Hs-129.

Of course the Hs 129 was carrying TWO 20mm MG 151s and TWO MG 17s at the same time as the bomb load compared to the JU-87s TWO MG 17s. DO you think the 20mm cannon (with 125rpg) just might be worth the two extra 50kg bombs? The Hs 129 had better cockpit armor too.

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The Ju-87D have had the increased armor protection installed. One of the bomb loads included 3 x 250 kg of bombs, while the 1x500 kg and 4x70 kg was also an option. All while 2 MG-151 cannons are carried, once introduced on with the Ju-87D-5.
The Ju-87 also carried another crew member, with his gun and ammo, that kinda equalizes the weight of 2 cannons ammo the Hs-129 had.
Even on the best case scenario for the Hs-129B vs. Ju-87D, carrying a same bomb load on a same distance means the Germans need to train 2 times as much of pilots and use twice as much fuel - both resources where Germany was much more thin, then on aircraft.

For most battlefield targets the heavy bombs weren't needed (both planes had options to carry extra machine guns for strafing) and they didn't do the same job a lot of the time. By late in the war the majority of the Ju-87 were operating at night while the Hs 129s were operating by day.

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The Hs-129s that remained until the end of the war were armed with anti tank guns, and indeeed were operating during the day. The Ju-87G, anti tank versions of the Stuka, was also operating (exclusively?) during the day.

The 3-6 comparison is only valid if your are trying to sink battleships or take-out large concrete fortifications.

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No problems about that. I'm trying to point out that most, if not any mission that was performed by the Hs-129 can be performed by the Ju-87. Vice-versa was not possible, like installing drop tanks and a worthwhile bomb load on the same time for the Henschel.

There is also a big difference between a production line than is set up to make a dozen or two dozen engines a month and one that can make two dozen engines a day. Many of the smaller countries had a licence to produce and a 'factory' or shop that turned out engines by the handful per month.
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Some of these countries made some nice airplanes during the 30s but never in enough numbers to really compare to what the major countries were doing in peace time let alone when the shooting started. A years production form some of these factories might make up for a weeks worth of losses in a heavy combat week.

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Agreed all the way. Those factories needed a smart expansion program early on, if the Nazis want to harvest benefits. Again, Nazi Germany went too late into war footing in Germany proper, that expansion of foreign factories will not going to happen until German factories are expanded.

gjs238 said:

So, after all the trouble, how does the Me410 stack up against the competition?

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From what ive read, it had a hard time against the LR US escorts like P-51, but did pretty well in the East, mostly in the GA role. It was fast and heavily armed, a familiar theme for German aircraft, but like all twins, not as manouverable as it needed to be.

parsifal said:

From what ive read, it had a hard time against the LR US escorts like P-51, but did pretty well in the East, mostly in the GA role. It was fast and heavily armed, a familiar theme for German aircraft, but like all twins, not as manouverable as it needed to be.

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I'd agree with that.

It suffered from one of the other typical German problems that even once a decent aeroplane had been resurrected from the ashes of the original Me 210 nobody could make up their mind what exactly should be done with it. A familiar theme.

It also suffered from the usual political interference, for example its use as a 'fast' bomber even though Pelz made it quite clear that he didn't want it. Another familiar theme which echoes the experience of some other types.

Cheers

Steve

tomo pauk said:

Agreed all the way. Those factories needed a smart expansion program early on, if the Nazis want to harvest benefits. Again, Nazi Germany went too late into war footing in Germany proper, that expansion of foreign factories will not going to happen until German factories are expanded.

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Expansion of any factories (over and above adding 2nd/3rd shift) requires floor space (steel beams and concrete), machine tools ( of which Germany was a primary source for many nations in the world) and workers.

The Germans did have plans for Gnome-Rhone engines. The French workers managed to get the production down to about 1/4 of the German plans without provoking any major reprisals. Not sure what happened to the Hispano factory, looted for tools or just passed over? Some French factories built Argus air cooled engines and subcontracted BMW 801 parts.
Radial engine 'factories' (or shops) in occupied countries might be better off building BMW 132 or Bramo 323s (or parts for them) rather than continuing to build old Mercury or G-R engines. Simplify the spare parts and training problems rather than introduce new problems.

Expansion on older factories, particularly in and around European cities was often not an option. The establishment of new ones was often a more viable alternative and this required substantial investment including not just building the factory and warehousing facilities but housing for the workers (the Germans called these 'siedlung' or housing colonies, those at Regensburg cost more than 4 million RM), transport links (typically rail) and in the case of aircraft manufacturers an airfield.
It was often the local authority that would have to provide other vital amenities, electricity, water and gas and, just as today, deals had to be done to secure them. The cronyism endemic in Nazi government certainly didn't help here. Often trade schools were attached to train the skilled workers required. There was a shortage of such people in the pre-war period as workforces across the sector expanded. There no point having a factory without the suitably qualified and skilled people to man it. Skilled people were moved from one place to another, sometimes from one company to another, a classic case of robbing Peter to pay Paul, and exactly the type of short term and short sighted solution so beloved of Nazi administrators.

It is easy to write about a 'smart expansion program' but not so easy to do.
In 1939/40 Germany's premier fighter, the Bf 109, was being manufactured across the aviation industry by AGO, Arado, Fiesler and Focke-Wulf as well as at Messerschmitt's own plants and this despite the rapid expansion of facilities represented by the building between 1936 and 1938 of the Regensburg plant.

Cheers

Steve

Expansion of factories or the addition of 2nd or 3rd shifts wasn't going to happen. You need labour both to man factories or to add shifts. Germany could do neither as it had a labour shortage.

Putting German women into the workforce also wasn't going to happen either. The pre war participation rate of German women was already higher than Britains, limiting the gains possible. The other reason was that Germany had to rely on growing her own food, which she could achieve barely 80% self sufficiency. Britain had a more "modern" trade economy and could achieve only 50% self sufficiency and obtained her food from the USA/Canada and ultimately lend lease since she was in trade deficit and out of gold. German women, mothers, daughters, wives worked the farm while conscriptable sons and husbands were of to war.

The only effective way was automation, mass production etc which requires tooling, investment and time to setup. It was this that produced the so called "armaments miracle" in 43/44. Relatively low German productivity prior to 1941/42 is explained by the fact that the labour was still building the tools and factories.

Foreign workers, indentured labour was of course one way to go and systems were set up, many young Dutch or Norwegian men ended up doing apprenticeships in Germany. French companies produced many components and some complete aircraft eg Ju 52. Though it was possible to get engineering done in France production was often mediocre for more elaborate aircraft. Speer wanted to win the French over to higher motivation but Sauer argued that French labour was far more productive if used in Germany so a contracts system was set up which late war eventually became compulsive conscriptive. Some compulsion was used to temporarily divert French voluntary labour building Atlantic wall defences to clear up the mess left by the dam busters operations for a while and this subsequently made it hard to attract labour.

Yes. There is much romanticisation of the Women's Land Army in the UK, and I am certainly not denying the valuable jobs that those women did, but there were never more than about 80,000 of them and considerably fewer for most of the war.
Substantially more went into industry, worked on the railways etc. More than 2 million extra women entered the work force between 1939 and 1945. They were cheap too, paid on average just 53% of the wage of a man doing the same job.
I once interviewed a lady for a living history project who had gone from being a shop assistant at a co-operative store to sewing the covering on Spitfire elevators in the space of a couple of days!
Cheers
Steve

stona said:

Yes. There is much romanticisation of the Women's Land Army in the UK, and I am certainly not denying the valuable jobs that those women did, but there were never more than about 80,000 of them and considerably fewer for most of the war.
Substantially more went into industry, worked on the railways etc. More than 2 million extra women entered the work force between 1939 and 1945. They were cheap too, paid on average just 53% of the wage of a man doing the same job.
I once interviewed a lady for a living history project who had gone from being a shop assistant at a co-operative store to sewing the covering on Spitfire elevators in the space of a couple of days!
Cheers
Steve

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Theoretically I should have been possible for Britain to feed herself but it would require a great deal of manpower and it would have to be quite intelligent and well directed. They would need to know exactly what they were doing, which is the hard part. Some permaculturists have achieved incredible densities of food production. The best Ive heard is 180 sqm per person as supplying enough calories (vegetarian). Meat production can be surprisingly efficient if done properly, though one has to ignore the vegan/animal lib 'propaganda' out there when seeking information. I imagine it would be a sort of 18th century Irish diet of colcannon: Potato + Leavy Green such as cabbage/spinach mixed with milk.

The Problem with the Me 210(long) re-entering production in June 1942 is that this also marks the introduction of the 412mph Spitfire IX with the two stage intercooled Merlin 61 running on 100/130 which was producing 1565hp. The DB605B was capable of only 1300hp on B4 87 octane at the time and at a lower full throttle height and so the aircraft managed only 360mph. Had the aircraft entered service 1 year earlier it would have been a troublesome bomber to deal with for the Spitfire V and its slower speed of 370mph or so. In General the Messerschmitt fighters suffered a huge power disadvantage, over 20%, compared to the Spitfire and Mosquito.

The aircraft however eventually received the 1750hp DB603A, though it was a 900kg engine. I see nothing wrong with the aircraft had it been employed within its limits. It could have been used somewhat as a Beufighter was. Though it lacked the range/warload of the Ju 188/Do 217 it still outranged the Me 110 and did not slow down due to its internal bomb bay.
1 Dive Bomber to replace Ju 87 and Ju 88 for long range and maritime strike missions.
2 Torpedo bomber, with external torpedo and radar.
3 Night fighter with radar. The aircraft never received radar as due to its modest size it required repackaging of the electronics and as the required electrical engineers were urgently required it was decided not to divert them.

Again, even with the DB603A the aircraft could have used more power. Some 1900hp was possible simply by using C3 fuel. The late war DB603 and Jumo 213 had over 2200hp available with good altitude performance and jet thrust.

Me 410 came into service when the tide was turning against the Luftwaffe and it was facing overwhelming odds.

What the British did was bring far more land into the production of cereal crops.

The amount of arable land producing cereals in the UK rose from just over 5 million hectares in 1939 to about 8 million in 1945. That given over to wheat almost doubled to 1.5 million hectares.

More labour was required and the number of agricultural workers rose by about 100,000 during the war to a 1945 total of 800,000.

Livestock numbers fell sharply, including poultry. Numbers of pigs saw the biggest decline. This might be partially explained by a story my mother told me about her and her sister having to hide piglets from 'the Ministry man' on the farm on which they were working part time as teenaged school girls

Cheers

Steve

Back a bit about the engines, this time the Jumos. Cancel the 222 and 223 (24 cylinder diesel), work on the 211 and 213 exclusively. Inc case the bigger powered diesel is needed, maybe convert the 211 for diesel fuel?
The intercooled Jumo 211J is in the pipeline, step up the work on a 2700 rpm version (as per historical 211N version), a two-stage compressor (should go well with inter cooler) 'fighter engine' (permitting the prop shaft cannon).
The Jumo 213 should be also aimed for fighters 1st, at least the 3000 rpm mark is hopefully achieved by some time mid 1943 service machines, also intercooler and prop gun capability. The 3250 rpm and two stager versions should be tested before 1943 ends, by that time also including the MW injection system.

The 'proper' airframe for the 211 line should be the modestly-sized night fighter, among others. The Fw-190 might be a costumer for 2-stage 211s and all 213s, at least until the production ramps up.

Once the Polikovsky's device is known in Germany (from captured Mikulin engines), modify the mainstream engine models to include it, since it adds quite a bit of power under the engine's rated height, including the take-off regime.

It is very difficult to convert gas engines to diesel (not impossible) Because the peak pressures inside the diesel are much higher than for a gas engine (even a supercharged one). The average pressure is lower which is why they put out less power but with compression ratios of 14-18:1 the peak pressures are very high. The Block, heads, pistons, rods and all the bolts holding things together have to be able to stand up to the pounding which is why all those diesel truck engines weigh so much.
Two stage engine is going to need much larger intercooler than a singe stage engine. It can certainly be done but just because you have "an" intercooler doesn't mean it works in every application.

Indeed, the pressure ratios provided by the decent 2-stage compressor would be between 50 and 100% greater than even an excellent 1-stage S/C was able to provide, meaning much more raise of the manifold tempearture. We can also remember that the 2-stage V-1710 in the P-63 was without the intercooler, it's rated altitude for military power (1125 HP) being 6-9000 ft greater than the best 1-stage variant.

BTW, for the 2-stage Jumo 213 - no need to bother with a 3-speed gear, should save us some time.

One of the things not touched by this thread - a proper long-range fighter for the LW? If it did anything, the BoB underscored that LW lacks such an item. Despite the addition of a drop tank to the Bf-109.
The upcoming needs for the Mediterranean and Eastern front need to be addressed.