Luftwaffe after BoB: strategy, tactics, tecnology?

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But does that mean that they would have used some US paints or did some British paint sneak its way on board? I can imagine a few cans shoved in the cockpits along with the wing tips
Incidentally, that's another myth that's been dispelled by later research; the removal of the wingtips very much a last-minute operation, and wasn't planned. Wasp couldn't get far enough up-river to where the Spitfires were waiting, so they had to go to her. Each one was put onto a Queen Mary trailer, but the tips had to be removed to negotiate the narrow Glasgow streets.
If there hadn't been time to complete the painting, and there was paint available from Abbotsinch, who can say what might have happened? In early 1942, standard cellulose/oil-based paint was still in use; the synthetic variety didn't come in until August 1942.
 
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Reading signal traffic was a two way street, and a question of resources in the end. B-Dienst was delivering about 80% of Allied fleet movements at the beginning of the war, whereas at that point in the war the allies had virtually no idea. What made the difference were the resources put into the post intercept analysis. of that 80% that was read, perhaps 10% could be acted upon or rather, reacted to. The Germans simply could not put the resources into analysing then acting upon the intelligence they had gathered, and this was poorly co-rdinated anyway. there were many different agencies for the various services, and some others as well, virtually not talking to each other,and not co-ordinating their efforts at all. Inter-service rivalries also often prevented the sharing of intell between the services. B-Dienst was a navy outfit, but I doubt much of that information was shared on an inter-service basis. Sharing of information on the Axis side between services, or nations was virtually never done


In contrast to that, the allies started from a fairly poor base, but they pooled their resources, even between nations, and even from a very early point in the war. moreover the resources thrown at processing that intelligence was staggering in comparison to the german effort, and in the end, well co-ordinated. At the beginning of the war, about 10% of German signal traffic was being read, and little of it acted upon in a timely fashion. by midwar, that gap had been closed, percentage of signals read was up, but more important;ly, that intell was being analysed closely and used approipriately. That in itself took vast resources by the allies, but it was a cost well worth the effort in the end.










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Wasn't it the case that the Allies, the British in particular, were reluctant to act on intelligence unless it was thought that the Germans would believe thatthe information came through a method other than their signals being read?
 
But does that mean that they would have used some US paints or did some British paint sneak its way on board? I can imagine a few cans shoved in the cockpits along with the wing tips :)

Cheers

Steve

In 1942 the standard USN top surface colour for aircraft was Non-Specular Blue-Gray, M-485; there would have been stocks on USS Wasp. It certainly seems to have been used on BR124 2-U and I cannot see any reason why it wouldn't have been used on others.

SpitfireVCWaspHanger.gif


Keith Park in his Spitfire VB - Malta:

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A totally gratuitous diversion:

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Wasn't it the case that the Allies, the British in particular, were reluctant to act on intelligence unless it was thought that the Germans would believe thatthe information came through a method other than their signals being read?
Hmmm, we're getting into the world of the niceties of the English language. It was rather a case of reacting in such a way that the Germans felt it was chance, rather than advance knowledge, which caused things (from their perspective) to go wrong. Our ships just happened, by pure luck, to find the U-boat "Milk cows."
There is an accusation, regularly trotted out, that, to save Bletchley Park's security, Churchill allowed Coventry to be destroyed, and that he sat and did nothing while it occurred; he didn't, in fact he was on his way to Chequers, when word came through, and he immediately turned round and went back to London, to coordinate the response. The Germans used two-letter codes for British towns and cities, and, although we could work out that the intended target was a Midlands town, we didn't know which one. With the main Spitfire factory at West Bromwich, an educated guess was made that it was where the Germans would attack, but it was wrong.
 
Aozora beat me to it. You guys thinking USN SHIP paint and not USN Aircraft paint. The ship should have some on board. Thin that and spray it.

I've always thought that a USN aviation paint was a possibility in the absence of the correct British paint. I've never subscribed to the view that they took some kind of ship's paint and slapped that onto the valuable (very valuable in the context of the state of Malta's air defences at the time) Spitfires. I've seen USN deck paints suggested but these were formulated for an entirely different purpose and it makes little sense to apply them to a high performance fighter aeroplane.
The finish and the maintenance of the finish on British aircraft, particularly 'high speed' aircraft like the Spitfire was the subject of considerable regulation.
Cheers
Steve
 
I wasn't implying that only the allies could break codes, what i specificly meant was that the Germans, or at least most of them, seemed so sure that their codes simply couldn't be broken. And that kind of arroganse was all round an important reason the war was lost so 'quickly'.

Still, cred is to be given to the decision to channel ressourses into intelligence, and not acting in a way that beyond doubt showed the german codes to be compromised. Even if that is sure to have cost allied lives in the short run on many occasions.
 
The Luftwaffe ditched nightfighter intruder operations in 1941 because Hitler and Göring didn't believe they were making much of an impact. They were wrong; had the Luftwaffe restarted its intruder operations in 1943 it would have caused major problems for the RAF. A few Luftwaffe nightfighters infiltrating the returning bombers over bomber bases would have been very difficult to counter, because the RAF's nightfighters would have been confronted with large numbers of radar returns. Ditto the ground defences.

Apples Oranges, but the Finns used these tactics successfully against the Soviets.

From Wikipedia:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junkers_Ju_88#Finnish_Air_Force

One of the more remarkable missions was a bombing raid on 9 March 1944 against Soviet Long Range Aviation bases near Leningrad, when the Finnish aircraft, including Ju 88s, followed Soviet bombers returning from a night raid on Tallinn, catching the Soviets unprepared and destroying many Soviet bombers and their fuel reserves, and a raid against the Aerosan base at Petsnajoki on 22 March 1944.[43]
 
after 1943, several hundred radar sets supplied under LL. They did not have an integrated air defence system, but they did have the largest flak arm in the world, and a good part of their industry several thousand miles away from the front.
 
On the Stuka, 1st to complement it, than to replace it - how about the Fw-190 with dive brakes? Much like the P-51 became A-36.
Then - how much the Hs-129 is an asset? What would be an expedient way to have a capable tank buster, provided that is a really good use of German resources?
 
Thank you,
As this is in reference to intruder operations, the ability of intruders to penetrate a non-intergrated air defense system (did Russian bombers have IFF?) That lacked radar equipped night fighters patrolling near the bomber bases doesn't mean the same tactic would work against England.
An intruder campaign would only work IF it raised Bomber Command's losses to around 10% while keeping their own losses (from all causes) a bit lower than 10% in order to keep up the campaign.
 
On the Stuka, 1st to complement it, than to replace it - how about the Fw-190 with dive brakes? Much like the P-51 became A-36.
Then - how much the Hs-129 is an asset? What would be an expedient way to have a capable tank buster, provided that is a really good use of German resources?
Dive bombing lost a lot of it's attraction as AA defences got better. The dive bombing attack profile gives the AA gunners more aiming and firing time than low level attacks and a more predictable flight path.

Hs-129 used French engines so saved German resources in that way. You could make a better tank buster but if needed German engines......??
 
Looking at the specs of the Hs-129, it was been able to carry 6x50= 300 kg of bombs, vs. the Ju-87 carrying vastly more, up to 1800 kg in -D 'line', and up to 1000 kg in the -B line. Of course, Stukas were also able to carry multiple bombs; not all the targets require 1 ton bombs. The Hs-129 does not offer much of a save - we need anywhere from 3 to six of them to deliver the punch the Stuka was capable for, that is 3 to 6 times as number of pilots*, and 6 to 12 times the number of powerplants.
Ju-87Ds were also available as 'assault aircraft', that is without dive brakes, and with cannons, and the armor was bolstered when the -D was introduced.

*Stukas have/need rear gunners, though; Hs-129 also need a gunner, but can't have it
 
Similar to the RAF thread: what steps need to be undertaken by the LW in order to best it's opponents in the up coming years? The time frame is the same, starts in Autumn of '40, ends before '44 starts.

Is there any technology or manufacturing capability/capacity from other Axis, occupied or neutral countries that might be better utilized?
 
In Czechoslovakia, there is the 'Avia' company, design production of fighters (B.35, B.135 - almost as good as SPitfire I and Bf-109E), production of B.71 (license of the SB-2, a Soviet design); country also has license for the HS 12Y and Mercury engines. In Poland, there are substantial production lines, also Mercury produced under license.
In the Netherlands, Belgium and France, there is another lot of production lines. In Yugoslavia, there were Ikarus and Rogozarski factories, that produced either own designs or licensed stuff.

Germans have used some of the production lines for their needs during the ww2, but I'm not sure that was something that was run efficiently. The Germans themselves did not fully switched to the wartime production until some time in 1942?
 
Looking at the specs of the Hs-129, it was been able to carry 6x50= 300 kg of bombs, vs. the Ju-87 carrying vastly more, up to 1800 kg in -D 'line', and up to 1000 kg in the -B line. Of course, Stukas were also able to carry multiple bombs; not all the targets require 1 ton bombs. The Hs-129 does not offer much of a save - we need anywhere from 3 to six of them to deliver the punch the Stuka was capable for, that is 3 to 6 times as number of pilots*, and 6 to 12 times the number of powerplants.
Ju-87Ds were also available as 'assault aircraft', that is without dive brakes, and with cannons, and the armor was bolstered when the -D was introduced.

*Stukas have/need rear gunners, though; Hs-129 also need a gunner, but can't have it

A little 'selective' in the warload Tomo?

The Early Ju-87s had 'normal' bombload of one 250kg bomb and four 50kg bombs, The Early Hs 129s could carry one 250kg bomb and two 50kg bombs. Doesn't seem like a big advantage for the Ju-87, granted the Ju-87 can go to heavier bombs and ditch the under wing bombs. Of course the Hs 129 was carrying TWO 20mm MG 151s and TWO MG 17s at the same time as the bomb load compared to the JU-87s TWO MG 17s. DO you think the 20mm cannon (with 125rpg) just might be worth the two extra 50kg bombs? The Hs 129 had better cockpit armor too.
For most battlefield targets the heavy bombs weren't needed (both planes had options to carry extra machine guns for strafing) and they didn't do the same job a lot of the time. By late in the war the majority of the Ju-87 were operating at night while the Hs 129s were operating by day.

The 3-6 comparison is only valid if your are trying to sink battleships or take-out large concrete fortifications.

Later versions of both planes changed armament a bit and the Ju-87 got more power.

In Czechoslovakia, there is the 'Avia' company, design production of fighters (B.35, B.135 - almost as good as SPitfire I and Bf-109E), production of B.71 (license of the SB-2, a Soviet design); country also has license for the HS 12Y and Mercury engines. In Poland, there are substantial production lines, also Mercury produced under license.
In the Netherlands, Belgium and France, there is another lot of production lines. In Yugoslavia, there were Ikarus and Rogozarski factories, that produced either own designs or licensed stuff.

There is also a big difference between a production line than is set up to make a dozen or two dozen engines a month and one that can make two dozen engines a day. Many of the smaller countries had a licence to produce and a 'factory' or shop that turned out engines by the handful per month.

From wiki:

" Production of the P.11c started in 1934 and 175 were produced. The first series of approximately 50 P.11c aircraft were fitted with Mercury V S2 of 600 hp (447 kW), the rest with Mercury VI S2 of 630 hp (470 kW).[1]"

Please note that it does NOT say how long it took to produce the 175 aircraft. this is followed by,

"Even without the new WP2 plant at Mielec, the PZL works could produce at least 10 fighters every month"

Or look at the Romanian IAR 80 series, it took from Dec of 1939 until sometime in 1944 to build 346 planes. Granted their were starts and stops in production due to supply problems with guns (Germans weren't exactly forthcoming with even war booty guns) but with a production rate that low (average of under 10 planes a month although any one month might well have been double the average) the 'production line' for engines didn't have to be very big.

Some of these countries made some nice airplanes during the 30s but never in enough numbers to really compare to what the major countries were doing in peace time let alone when the shooting started. A years production form some of these factories might make up for a weeks worth of losses in a heavy combat week.
 
Thank you,
As this is in reference to intruder operations, the ability of intruders to penetrate a non-intergrated air defense system (did Russian bombers have IFF?) That lacked radar equipped night fighters patrolling near the bomber bases doesn't mean the same tactic would work against England.
An intruder campaign would only work IF it raised Bomber Command's losses to around 10% while keeping their own losses (from all causes) a bit lower than 10% in order to keep up the campaign.

I believe on the Eastern Front, the so-called "intruder" missions were very different from that on the Western Front. Most of the a/c use were bi-plane types that bombed and patrolled at night almost ground level. I think the obsolete Hs 123 was the plane of choice for the LW for these type of operations over the Eastern front. and no radar that I am aware of.
 

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